Neeraj Kumar @ Neeraj Yadav vs. State Of U.P.

2025 INSC 1386
REPORTABLE


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 7518 of 2025)

NEERAJ KUMAR @
NEERAJ YADAV …APPELLANT(S)

Versus
STATE OF U.P. & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)




J U D G M E N T



SANJAY KAROL J.


Leave Granted.
2. The present appeal arises out of the impugned judgment
nd
and order dated 22 April 2024 passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Revision No. 4729 of 2023,
rd
which affirmed the order dated 3 August 2023 passed by the
1
Court of Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bulandshahar
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
NAVEEN D
Date: 2025.12.04
19:52:22 IST
Reason:

1
Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Trial Court’.
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whereby the application filed by the prosecution under Section
2
319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 , praying for
3
summoning additional accused (Respondent Nos.2 to 4 herein)
in Sessions Trial No.1151 of 2021 arising out of Case Crime
No.187 of 2021, was dismissed.
3. The facts in brief, shorn of unnecessary details, are as
under:
th
3.1. On 25 March 2021, the appellant Neeraj Kumar
lodged FIR No. 187 of 2021 at PS Sikandrabad under
4
Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 alleging that
5
his sister Smt. Nishi had been shot by her husband, Rahul,
at her matrimonial home. The said FIR was registered
based on the information received by him from his niece
Shristi, aged about nine years, who informed the appellant
that ‘ Papa has shot Mummy at home’ .
3.2. The deceased was first taken to Government
Hospital, Bulandshahar, and thereafter to Kailash Hospital,
Noida, where she underwent treatment for the firearm
injury sustained by her. During the course of treatment, her
statements were recorded under Section 161 CrPC on two
th
occasions – firstly on 25 March 2021 and then again on
th
18 April 2021. In her first statement, she named her

2
Hereinafter referred to as ‘CrPC’
3
Collectively referred to as ‘the respondents’.
4
Hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’
5
Hereinafter referred to as ‘the deceased’.
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husband Rahul as the person who shot her; in the
subsequent one, she further alleged that he had done so at
the instigation of his mother Rajo @Rajwati (Respondent
No.2 herein), brother Satan @Vineet (Respondent No.3
herein) and brother-in-law Gabbar (Respondent No.4
herein). Both the statements were video recorded.
th

3.3. On 15 May 2021, the deceased succumbed to the
injuries sustained. Following her death, the appellant, on
th
20 May 2021, made another complaint before the SHO
PS Sikandrabad, requesting that appropriate legal action be
taken against the respondents (relatives of the husband),
since the deceased had categorically named them and
mentioned their role in the statement(s) recorded by the
police.
3.4. Upon completion of the investigation, a chargesheet
th
was filed on 16 July 2021 only against Rahul, the husband
of the deceased, under Sections 302 and 316 IPC, while
exonerating the private respondents herein.
3.5. The case thereafter proceeded to trial before the
th
concerned Court. The charges were framed on 18 October
th
2021 and the appellant was examined as PW-1 on 28
March 2022 and he deposed about the incident and the
events immediately following it. The minor daughter of the
th
deceased, Shristi, was examined as PW-2 on 12 July
2022. In her testimony, she narrated the circumstances
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surrounding the said incident, stating that her father had
shot her mother at the instigation of the private respondents
herein.
3.6. On the strength of these testimonies and the
statements of the deceased recorded under Section 161
CrPC, the prosecution moved an application under Section
319 CrPC, praying for summoning the private respondents
as additional accused to face trial along with the husband
of the deceased. It was contended that the evidence
recorded during the trial clearly disclosed their role in the
commission of the offence.
rd
3.7. The Trial Court, vide its order dated 3 August 2023
dismissed the said application, holding that the material on
record was insufficient or was not of such strength and
cogency to exercise the extraordinary power provided
under Section 319 CrPC.
3.8. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant preferred
Criminal Revision No.4729 of 2023 before the High Court,
which was dismissed vide the impugned judgment for the
following reasons:
th
(i) The statements of the deceased dated 25
th
March 2021 and 18 April 2021 recorded before her
death could not be treated as dying declarations
6
under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872

6
Hereinafter referred to as ‘Evidence Act’
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th
since her death had occurred on 15 May 2021, after
the expiry of a substantial period from the date of
recording such statements.
(ii) The statement of PW-1, the informant/brother
of the deceased, was held to be of limited
evidentiary value with respect to the actual
occurrence, as he was not an eyewitness to the
incident.
(iii) The testimony of PW-2, the minor daughter
of the deceased, was also not sufficient to summon
the respondents, since she had admitted in her cross-
examination that she reached the place of occurrence
only after hearing the sound of two gunshots,
thereby indicating that she was also not an
eyewitness to the said incident.
Relying on the above, the High Court concluded that no strong
and cogent evidence emerged justifying exercise of power under
Section 319 CrPC and accordingly affirmed the order passed by
the Trial Court.
3.9. It is against this judgment of the High Court that the
appellant is before us.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and
perused the material on record. The sole issue that arises for our
consideration is whether the Courts below, in the attending facts
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and circumstances, were justified in dismissing the application
for summoning the respondents as additional accused?
5. Section 319 CrPC contemplates that:
“(1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or
trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence
that any person not being the accused has
committed any offence for which such person
could be tried together with the accused, the Court
may proceed against such person for the offence
which he appears to have committed. …”


6. The law governing the summoning of an additional
accused under Section 319 CrPC is now well settled. The
provision is an enabling one, empowering the Court, during the
course of an inquiry or trial, to proceed against any person not
already arraigned as an accused, if, from the evidence adduced
before it, such person appears to have committed an offence. Its
object is to ensure that no guilty person escapes the process of
law, thereby giving effect to the maxim judex damnatur cum
nocens absolvitur (Judge is condemned when guilty is acquitted).
It casts a duty upon the Court to ensure that the real offender does
not go unpunished, for only then can the concept of fair and
complete trial be realised.
7. It is no longer res integra that the power conferred under
this Section is extraordinary and discretionary in nature, intended
to be exercised sparingly and with due circumspection. While
invoking it, the Court must be satisfied that the evidence
appearing against the person sought to be summoned is such that
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it prima facie necessitates bringing such person to face trial. The
degree of satisfaction required is higher than that warranted at the
stage of framing of charge, yet short of the satisfaction necessary
to record a conviction. Such satisfaction must rest on cogent and
credible material brought on record during the trial, and not based
on conjectures or speculations. In this regard, reference to a few
judicial pronouncements of this Court would be apposite.
7.1. The Constitution Bench of this Court in Hardeep
7
Singh v. State of Punjab extensively discussed the power
conferred under Section 319 CrPC. Relevant part is
extracted hereunder:

7
(2014) 3 SCC 92
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xxx
117.6. A person not named in the FIR or a person
though named in the FIR but has not been
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(emphasis supplied)

8
7.2. In S. Mohammed Ispahani v. Yogendra Chandak ,
it reiterated that under this Section the Court possesses the
power to summon the persons not named in the chargesheet
to face trial, if the evidence on record so warrants. It further
clarified that a statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC,
though not an independent piece of evidence, sufficient in
itself to invoke the power under this Section may,
nevertheless, be relied upon for corroborative purposes
when supported by evidence emerging during trial. It was
observed as under:

8
(2017) 16 SCC 226
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(emphasis supplied)

9
7.3. In Omi v. State of M.P. , a coordinate bench of this
Court laid the following principles of law with regard to
Section 319 CrPC:

9
(2025) 2 SCC 621
Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No. 7518 of 2025 Page 10 of 24

(emphasis supplied)
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7.4. Recently, this Court, through one of us (Sanjay
10
Karol, J.), in Shiv Baran v. State of U.P. summarised the
principles that the Court ought to keep in mind while
considering an application under this Section. It was
observed:
“15. The principles that the Trial Court ought to
follow while exercising power under this Section
are:
(a) This provision is a facet of that area of law
which gives protection to victims and society at
large, ensuring that the perpetrators of crime
should not escape the force of law;
(b) It is the duty cast upon the Court not to let the
guilty get away unpunished;
(c) The Trial Court has broad but not unbridled
power as this power can be exercised only on the
basis of evidence adduced before it and not any
other material collected during investigation;
(d) The Trial Court is not powerless to summon a
person who is not named in the FIR or
Chargesheet; they can be impleaded if the
evidence adduced inculpates him;
(e) This power is not to be exercised in a regular
or cavalier manner, but only when strong or cogent
evidence is available than the mere probability of
complicity;
(f) The degree of satisfaction required is much
stricter than the prima facie case, which is needed
at the time of framing of charge(s);
(g) The Court should not conduct a mini-trial at
this stage as the expression used is ‘such
person could be tried’ and not ‘should be tried’.

(emphasis supplied)


10
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1457
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8. Keeping in view the principles delineated above, let us now
examine whether the Courts below have applied the correct
standard while declining the prosecution’s prayer to summon the
respondents as additional accused. As is evident from record, the
prosecution has relied primarily on three facets of evidence: (i)
the testimony of PW-1, the informant and brother of the deceased;
(ii) the testimony of PW-2, the minor daughter of the deceased,
along with her statement recorded during investigation; and (iii)
the statements of the deceased herself recorded under Section 161
CrPC. We may consider each in turn.
9. The statement of PW-1, the appellant and informant, when
read in its entirety, clearly attributes specific roles to each of the
respondents. The relevant extract of the statement reads as under:
“… Due to three daughters of my sister, her
Dewar- Satan, Husband- Rahul, Sas-
Rajwati,Nandoi- Gabbar used to harass my sister-
Nishi. When my sister- Nishi, became pregnant
fourth time, sex determination test of child in her
ovary was got done by Dewar- Satan, Husband-
Rahul, Sas- Rajvanti, Nandoi- Gabber. In said test,
it had appeared that, this time also in her ovary is
female child. Then her Dewar- Sattan, Husband-
Rahul, Sas- Rajwati, Nandoi- Gabbar mounted
pressure over her for getting abortion. In this
context, my sister had told me telephonically. She
had also told that, she is willing to give birth to her
female child. On the date of 25.3.21 at about 9.30
a.m. my niece[sister's daughter] namely- Shristi
telephonically informed me that, on instigation of
uncle- Satan, grandmother- Rajwati and Fufa -
Gabbar, Papa opened fire upon mummy. At this
information, with members of my family, I
proceeded for matrimonial home of my sister-
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Nishi. In route, we got information that; Nishi is
brought to Rana Hospital at Buland Shahar. …”

A perusal of his statement indicates that, allegedly, the deceased,
his sister, was continuously harassed by the respondents for
having given birth to three daughters, and that upon her
subsequent pregnancy, they compelled her to undergo a sex
determination test. When it was found that she was carrying a
female foetus, they pressured her to terminate her pregnancy. It is
further deposed that his niece (PW-2), an eyewitness to the
occurrence, telephonically informed him that her father had shot
the deceased and that the respondents had provoked him to
commit the said act. His statement, therefore, prima facie
indicates active participation and instigation on the part of the
respondents in the commission of the offence.
10. While it is true that the appellant did not specifically
mention in the FIR that the husband of the deceased had fired at
the instigation of the respondents, as conveyed by his niece,
however, it is trite law that an FIR is not an encyclopaedia that
must contain every minute detail of the incident, since its primary
purpose is to set criminal law in motion. [See: CBI v. Tapan
11 12
Kumar Singh and Amish Devgan v. Union of India ]
Therefore, at this stage, his deposition cannot be construed as an
embellished or improved one simply because of the absence of
certain particulars in the FIR, particularly when his testimony is

11
(2003) 6 SCC 175
12
(2021) 1 SCC 1
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consistent with the overall narrative. Moreover, the
th
representation dated 20 May 2021, made before the SHO,
wherein he categorically named the respondents, further
corroborates his testimony.
11. The deposition of PW-2, Shristi, the minor daughter of the
deceased, prima facie has considerable evidentiary value, given
the fact that she is allegedly an eyewitness to the occurrence. She
narrated the events of the fateful day in the following terms:
“Mummy had asked to Papa for bringing tea leaves
and sugar. But Papa did not bring tea leaves and
sugar. Meantime my grandmother came and she
asked my mother to consume some pill
(contraceptives), but my mummy refused to take
the same. So, my grandmother complained to my
Papa in this regard. Then my Fufa-Gabbar and
Uncle- Satan said that, she gives birth of only
female child. So, kill her. Hearing this, Papa
opened fire upon my mummy twice. Receiving fire
arms/gun shot injuries, my mummy fell down in
her room. Then my uncle and Fufa tried to find out
that, whether my mummy is dead or not? After
examining they said, she still alive. So, kill her. At
this, Papa this time opened fire and shot three more
times, from his country made pistol. At this, I
suggested mummy to go house of Baba. At this,
Mummy reached to house of my Baba. He was at
his home. He carried away my mummy to
Hospital. My uncle had given to my Papa the said
gun. My Papa had opened fire and shot every time
before me. Said occurrence is of morning. Name
of my grandmother is Rajo.”

(emphasis supplied)

From reading the above, it is evident that a quarrel took place
between her parents. During this altercation, her father, Rahul
Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No. 7518 of 2025 Page 15 of 24


Yadav, obtained a country made pistol from her uncle Sattan
@Vineet (Respondent No.3 herein) and, on the provocation of her
grandmother Rajo @Rajwati (Respondent No.2 herein) and her
aunt's husband Gabbar (Respondent No.4 herein), fired at her
mother/deceased. The High Court, however, in the impugned
judgment, concluded that PW-2 was not an eyewitness to the
actual firing and relied on her cross-examination wherein she
stated – “ I had heard the sound of firing. From sound of firing I
came to know that, that two times firing was made. I had seen
empty cartridge on ground.”. to hold that she had reached the
scene of occurrence only after hearing the gunshots. In our
considered view, the High Court's approach is erroneous.
Drawing such an inference amounts to conducting a mini-trial at
the stage of summoning, which is impermissible. At the stage of
deciding the application under Section 319 CrPC, the Court is not
required to test the credibility or weigh the probative value of the
evidence as would be done at the end of the trial for determining
the conviction or otherwise of the accused. What the Court has to
consider at this stage is whether the material on record reasonably
indicates involvement of the proposed accused so as to exercise
the extraordinary power. Therefore, the reliance placed by the
Courts below on PW-2’s cross-examination to discredit her
testimony was misplaced.
12. The respondents have further contended that PW-2 did not
initially name the respondents in her statement recorded during
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the investigation and that, being a minor, she may have been
influenced or tutored to implicate the respondents, as she was
residing with the appellant's family following the incident.
However, we are not persuaded to accept this contention, as even
in her statement recorded under Section 161, had categorically
named the respondents as those who instigated the commission
of the said crime. She stated:
“Q.No.12: What happened to your mother and
whether father did something to her?
Ans: First Papa went out outside then return back,
mother asked him to bring Tea Leaves and Sugar
and later on asked him to bring chilli but he did not
brought any of the item mother started preparing
kitchen after little quarrel. In the meantime, Grand
Mother came in and asked my mother to take pills
to which she refused. Then Grand Mother went
and called father, Rahul, Uncle-Gabbar, Satan
Uncle.

Q.13.: What happened next?
Ans: Grand mother told if she wont take pills then
she should take bullets now kill her. Uncle gave
the pistol.

Q.14: What happened next?
Ans: Then papa fire two bullets and went away,
Mummy got up and went inside the room, then
Satan Uncle and Gabbar Uncle went inside to
check and told she still alive go and finish her ....
then Papa again shot 3 more bullets

Q.15: Where your father go?
Ans: He went outside and I do not know where.
…
Q.20: At the time of incident, who else where there
at the time when your fathe r shot your mother?
Ans: Fufa , Uncle and Grand Mother

Q. 21: Who amongst you were t here?
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Ans : We all were there (Three S is ters) ”

(emphasis supplied)

While a statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC is not
substantive evidence in itself, it may be used to corroborate the
evidence recorded by the Court to invoke the power under Section
319 CrPC, as held in S. Mohammed Ispahani (supra). Therefore,
conjointly reading PW-2’s deposition along with her Section 161
statement, we find that a specific and overt act has been assigned
to the respondents. Whether she actually witnessed the firing or
arrived immediately thereafter, and the extent to which her
statement inspires confidence, are matters that are to be
determined at the stage of trial, upon full appreciation of the
evidence. The testimony of a child witness shall be weighed by
the Court concerned in view of the principles in laid in State of
13 14
Rajasthan v. Chatra and State of M.P. v. Balveer Singh .
13. Lastly, the prosecution has also placed reliance upon the
statements of the deceased recorded during the investigation
under Section 161 CrPC to seek the summoning of the
respondents. However, the respondents have contended that such
statements cannot be relied upon as, firstly, they were neither
recorded in the presence of a Magistrate nor accompanied by any
contemporaneous medical certification regarding the mental
fitness of the deceased to give such statements; and secondly,

13
(2025) 8 SCC 613
14
(2025) 8 SCC 545
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both statements are inconsistent inter se , since the first one does
not name the respondents whereas the second does.
14. We find these contentions bereft of any merit. We say so
because it is a well-established position of law that a statement
made by a deceased person, as to the cause of his death or to the
circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, to a
Police Officer and recorded under Section 161 CrPC, shall be
relevant and admissible under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act,
notwithstanding the express bar provided in Section 162 CrPC.
Such a statement, upon the death of the declarant, assumes the
character of a dying declaration. It is also equally settled that a
dying declaration need not necessarily be recorded in the presence
of a Magistrate, and that the lack of a doctor's certification as to
the fitness of the declarant’s state of mind would not ipso facto
render the dying declaration unacceptable. This position has been
recently reiterated by this Court in Dharmendra Kumar v. State
15
of M.P. , wherein it was held:
“ 65. Section 161CrPC empowers the police to
examine orally any person who is acquainted with
the facts and circumstances of the case under
investigation. The police may reduce such
statement into writing also. Section 162(1)CrPC,
nonetheless, mandates that no statement made by
any person to a police officer, if reduced to writing,
be signed by the person making it, nor shall such
statement be used in evidence except to contradict
a witness in the manner provided by Section 145
of the Evidence Act. However, sub-section (2) of
Section 162CrPC carves out an exception to sub-

15
(2024) 8 SCC 60
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16
(2002) 6 SCC 710
17
(2013) 12 SCC 137
18
(2019) 8 SCC 779
Crl.A.@SLP(Crl.)No. 7518 of 2025 Page 20 of 24


19
Odisha ; and Manjunath v. State of
20
Karnataka ]

15. Coming to the instant case, the two statements of the
th th
deceased, dated 25 March 2021 and 18 April 2021, clearly fall
within the ambit of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act. For
convenience, the relevant portions of both these statements are
extracted below:
th
First statement dated 25 March 2021:
“Statement of Victim ............. On asking, Mrs
Nishi W/o- Rahul … told that, Sir, I have three
daughters. On this issue often my husband used to
quarrel with me. But when today my husband
quarrelled with me, firstly he asked to our children
to go out, but my elder daughter Shrishti remained
there and in her presence, my husband opened fire
upon me with country made pistol. Thereafter I got
dizziness. …”

th
Second statement dated 18 April 2021:
“What happened in occurrence? What all thing
was done? ....... Answer- I was shot by firearm .. ..
.. .. ... By whom? .... By my husband, I was shot on
instigation by one of my Nandoi (Brother-in-law
of husband), my [Saas] mother-in-law and Dewar
[Brother-in-law] under their conspiracy. .......
What is name of your Nandoi? His name is
Gabbar. … What was said by your Dewar? My
Dewar had me threatened me. Earlier, we used to
reside with him. My Dewar said to me that, he will
get send me home, then he will get me killed. What
did your Mother-in-Law say? ..... My mother-in-
law said to me that, I shall not permit to live in my
house and you cannot live in my house and I will
get you killed ... .. ... My Nandoi said one plot is in

19
(2019) 11 SCC 500
20
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1421
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your name also. He instigated my husband to open
fire upon me. i.e. when your husband opened fire
upon you, your Nandoi was present on spot. Yes
sir. They had tried to hang me also. i.e. they done
everything for committing my murder. … My
mother-in-law had given me threat of getting my
murder done and My Dewar also had given me
threat of getting my murder. … My mother-in-law
had given me threat of getting my murder done and
My Dewar also had given me threat of getting my
murder. Who had brought you to hospital? Sir, I
was unconscious. So, I do not about it.”

A perusal of both these statements reveals that while the former
primarily narrates the incident, the latter elaborates on the
circumstances that culminated in the fatal act and brings forth the
complicity of the respondents. The mere omission of their names
in the first statement, or the lack of the Magistrate's presence or
medical certification, does not undermine the relevance of these
statements. Any inconsistencies between them, as well as their
evidentiary value, reliability, and the weight to be attached to
them are, again, matters which are to be examined at trial and not
at the preliminary stage of summoning.

16. Additionally, in our considered view, the High Court erred
in holding that these statements cannot be treated as dying
declaration(s) merely because the death of the deceased occurred
after a substantial lapse of time from their recordings. Such an
approach is clearly untenable since the law does not require that
a declarant, at the time of making the statement, to be under the
shadow of death or the expectation that death is imminent. Here
the time gap between the incident and the death is less than 2
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months. In any event, Section 32 of the Evidence Act, contains
no such limitation. What is pertinent is that the statement relates
either to the cause of death or the circumstances leading to it.
21
[See: Rattan Singh v. State of H.P. ; Kulwant Singh v. State of
22 23
Punjab ; and Amar Singh v. State of Rajasthan ]
17. Consequent to the above discussion, we find that the
material on record, i.e. the depositions of PW-1 and PW-2, along
with the statements of the deceased recorded during the
investigation, prima facie suggests the complicity of the
respondents in the commission of the said offence. There, thus,
exists sufficient ground to exercise the power under Section 319
CrPC and summon them to face trial in Sessions Trial No.1151
of 2021. The objections raised by the respondents, including the
alleged tutoring of the minor witness, omission of their names in
the FIR, inconsistencies in the statements of the deceased and lack
of contemporaneous medical certification, are all premature and
cannot be conclusively decided at the stage of exercising power
under Section 319 CrPC.
18. We clarify that all the observations made herein are only
for the purpose of deciding the application under Section 319
CrPC to summon the respondents as additional accused and
should not be construed as remarks on the merits of the matter.

21
(1997) 4 SCC 161
22
(2004) 9 SCC 257
23
(2010) 9 SCC 64
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19. Therefore, the appeal is accordingly allowed. The
impugned judgment and order of the High Court, as referred to in
Paragraph 2, is set aside. Parties are directed to appear before the
th
Trial Court on 08 January 2026. We direct them to fully
cooperate and not take any unnecessary adjournments. The trial
is expedited.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.




………………………………………………J.
(SANJAY KAROL)




………………………………………………..J.
(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)


New Delhi;
December 04, 2025
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