UNION OF INDIA vs. MAJOR R. METRI NO. MR 08585N

Case Type: Criminal Appeal

Date of Judgment: 04-04-2022

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Full Judgment Text

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2196 OF 2017 UNION OF INDIA & ORS.     ...APPELLANT(S) VERSUS MAJOR R. METRI NO. 08585N    ...RESPONDENT(S) WITH  CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 537­538 OF 2018 JUDGMENT B.R. GAVAI, J. 1. These   two   cross­appeals   challenge   the   judgments   and orders passed by the learned Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional bench,   Kochi   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   “the   learned   AFT”) nd dated 2   March, 2017, passed in O.A. (Appeal) No.2 of 2014 th and 30  May, 2017, passed in M.A. No.271 of 2017.   1 2. Criminal Appeal No.2196 of 2017 is filed by the Union of India and others, challenging that part of the judgment and nd order dated 2  March, 2017, of the learned AFT, vide which the learned AFT, while setting aside the order of conviction, under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the P.C. Act”) read with Section 69 of the Army Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as “the Army Act”) and the sentence of cashiering from service and suffering of rigorous th imprisonment for one year, dated 28  April, 2013 passed by the General Court Martial (hereinafter referred to as “GCM”), has convicted   the   respondent­Major   R.   Metri   (appellant   in connected appeals being Criminal Appeal Nos.537­538 of 2018) [hereinafter   referred   to   as   “the   respondent­officer”]   under Section 63 of the Army Act, and in turn, sentenced him to punishment of forfeiture of seniority of rank of Major and of severe reprimand.  The learned AFT has also directed that the respondent­officer be reinstated in service, with no pay and 2 allowance   for   the   period   he   remained   out   of   service,   but, without any service break.   3. Criminal Appeal Nos. 537­538 of 2018 have been filed by the   respondent­officer,   aggrieved   by   that   part   of   the   said judgment   and   order   of   the   learned   AFT,   convicting   him   for offence   punishable   under   Section   63   of   the   Army   Act   and sentencing him to punishment of forfeiture of seniority of rank and of severe reprimand.   The facts necessary for adjudication of the present appeals 4. are as under:   5. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to hereunder as are found in Criminal Appeal No. 2196 of 2017.   In the year 2008, the respondent­officer was posted as the 6. Recruiting Medical Officer, Army Recruiting Office, Jhunjhunu, Rajasthan.  At the relevant time, P.W.1­Col. Anil Singh Rathore 3 was the  Director of the Army Recruiting Office, Jhunjhunu, Rajasthan.  th th 7. Between 16   December, 2008 and 18   December, 2008, an Army Recruitment Rally took place in Udaipur. According to the prosecution, P.W.8­Major BSRK Prasad as well as P.W.12­ Major D. Srinivas, who were also working as Recruiting Medical Officers,   contacted   the   respondent­officer   and   told   him   that they  help  the  candidates  by making  them  medically fit and asked his help for clearing certain candidates by declaring them medically fit.  It is the case of the prosecution that, though, at first, the respondent­officer was reluctant, at the insistence of P.W.8­Major   BSRK   Prasad,   he   helped   clearing   certain candidates within acceptable range.   8. It   is   further   the   prosecution   case   that   when   the th respondent­officer went to his native place at Dharwad on 28 December,   2008,   he   was   informed   by   P.W.8­Major   BSRK Prasad that an amount of Rs.65,000/­ would be paid to him 4 towards his share.  It is further the prosecution case that the respondent­officer   asked   P.W.8­Major   BSRK   Prasad   that   the said amount be deposited in the account of his father­in­law. Accordingly, an amount of Rs.65,000/­ was deposited in the account of the father­in­law of the respondent­officer.   9. It is the further case of the prosecution that there was another Recruitment Rally in Dausa in January, 2009.  In the said rally, P.W.12­Major D. Srinivas requested the respondent­ officer   to   help   some   candidates   and   the   respondent­officer, though reluctant, helped in clearing some candidates within the acceptable   range.     It   is   the   prosecution   case   that   the th respondent­officer’s wife delivered a baby girl on 16  February, 2009,   and   as   such,   the   respondent­officer   wanted   to immediately rush to his native place.  Since he was not having sufficient funds to buy an air­ticket, he requested P.W.12­Major D.   Srinivas   to   lend   an   amount   of   Rs.   20,000/­.   The   said amount of Rs.20,000/­ was deposited in the account of the 5 respondent­officer   by   P.W.10­Varalakshmi   Srinivas,   i.e.,   the wife   of   P.W.12­Major   D.   Srinivas.     It   is   the   case   of   the prosecution that P.W.12­Major D. Srinivas told the respondent­ officer that the said amount of Rs.20,000/­ was towards his share for helping the candidates in Dausa Recruitment Rally.   10. It is further the case of the prosecution that there were also Recruitment Rallies in Jodhpur and Ganganagar in May, 2009 and June, 2009 respectively. It is the allegation that in the   said   rallies   also,   certain   malpractices   of   clearing   some candidates as medically fit, who were not otherwise fit, took place.   11. It is further the prosecution case that in the month of July, 2009, there was another Recruitment Rally at Ajmer. The respondent­officer, along with P.W.1­Col. Anil Singh Rathore, went to Ajmer to take part in the said Recruitment Rally.  When the   Recruitment   process   was   going   on   at   Ajmer,   a   First Information Report (hereinafter referred to as “FIR”) No.125 of 6 2009, came to be registered in Police Station Adarsh Nagar, th Ajmer   on   11   July,   2009,   at  the   instance   of   one   Narendra Singh, under Sections 406 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”), complaining about the malpractices in the  Army Recruitment Rally.   P.W.6­ Mohd. Anwar Khan, Circle Inspector, took up the investigation and arrested 10 persons, who were alleged to be touts.   th 12. It is the prosecution case that on 13  July, 2009, certain reports   were   published   in   Media   at   Ajmer.     In   the   media reports, the name of three officers, namely, (1) the respondent­ officer; (2) P.W.8­Major BSRK Prasad; and (3) P.W.12­Major D. Srinivas and three Junior Commissioned Officers, namely, (1) Subedar Major VP Singh; (2) Subedar Surjan Singh and (3) Subedar Major Jaswant Singh were mentioned. th 13. It is the case of the prosecution that, on 14  July, 2009, in the evening, the respondent­officer went to P.W.1­Col. Anil Singh Rathore. They had gone to a nearby temple and on the 7 stairs of the temple, the respondent­officer confessed about his involvement.     P.W.1­Col.   Anil   Singh   Rathore   asked   the respondent­officer to give his confession in writing.  It is further the case of the prosecution that the respondent­officer initially th came with a draft confession on 15   July, 2009, on which, P.W.1­Col. Anil Singh Rathore told him that there was no need for him to see the draft and he should submit a final statement. Accordingly,   on   the   same   day,   at   around   8.00   p.m.,   the respondent­officer gave a written statement to P.W.1­ Col. Anil Singh Rathore in the presence of P.W. 3­ Col. Bharat Kumar th and P.W.4­Col. Balraj Singh Sohi.     On 16   July, 2009, the Office of Superintendent of Police sought the presence of the respondent­officer to interrogate him and others in the FIR in question.  The statement of the respondent­officer was recorded th by the Police on 18  July, 2009.   th 14. On 14  December, 2009, the Court of Inquiry proceedings were   convened.     The   General   Officer   in   Commanding 8 (hereinafter referred to as “GOC”), South West Command, vide th Note dated 14  December, 2009, directed disciplinary action to be taken against the respondent­officer and two other officers, namely   P.W.12­Major   D.   Srinivas   and   P.W.8­Major   BSRK Prasad and three Junior Commissioned Officers. 15. The respondent­officer and others challenged the Court of Inquiry proceedings by way of Original Applications before the learned AFT, Jaipur. The same were rejected by the learned th AFT, Jaipur, vide order dated 9  April, 2010.   The   GCM   proceedings   were   ordered   to   be   instituted 16. th against the  respondent­officer  and  five  others  on 28   June, 2012, on the following Charges: "a)  Charge No.1:  Army   Act   Sec   69   Committing   a   civil offence, that is to say, being a public servant,   obtaining   for   himself   a gratification   other   than   legal remuneration as a reward for doing an 9 official   act,   contrary   to   section   7   of Prevention of Corruption Act 1988.  In that he  At   Dharwad   during   January   2009, which   came   to   the   knowledge   of authority   competent   to   initiate   action on 14 Dec 2009, while performing the duties   of   Recruiting   Medical   Officer Jhunjhunu,   being   a   public   servant, obtained Rs.65000/­ from MR­08309 L Major BSRK Prasad as a reward of his share   for   helping   the   candidates   for recruitment   in   the   Army,   in   Udaipur rally.  b)  Charge No.2:  Army   Act   Sec   69   Committing   a   civil offence, that is to say, being a public servant,   obtaining   for   himself   a gratification   other   than   legal remuneration as a reward for doing an official   act,   contrary   to   Section   7   of Prevention of Corruption Act 1988.  In that he  At   Dharwad   during   Feb   2009,   which came   to   the   knowledge   of   authority competent to initiate action on 14 Dec 10 2009,   while   performing   the   duties   of Recruiting   Medical   Officer   Army Recruiting   Office   Jhunjhunu,   being   a public   servant,   obtained   Rs.20,000/­ from Mrs. Vara Laxmi wife of MR­08205 K Major D Srinivas as a reward of his share   for   helping   the   candidates   for recruitment in the Army in Dausa rally. (c) Charge No.3:  Army   Act   Sec   69   Committing   a   civil offence, that is to say, being a public, servant,   obtaining   for   himself   a gratification   other   than   legal remuneration as a reward for doing an official   act,   contrary   to   Section   7   of Prevention of Corruption Act 1988.  In that he  At Jodhpur, between January 2009 and April   2009,   which   came   to   the knowledge   of   authority   competent   to initiate action, on 14 Dec 2009, while performing   the   duties   of   Recruiting Medical Officer, Army Recruiting Office Jhunjhunu,   being   a   public   servant obtained SIM No.9784341343 from Mr. Taru Lai, as a motive for helping his 11 candidates   for   recruitment   in   the Army." 17. At   the   conclusion   of   the   trial,   the   GCM   found   the respondent­officer guilty of charge Nos.1 and 2 and not guilty of th charge No.3.  The GCM, therefore, vide order dated 28  April, 2013, sentenced the respondent­officer to be cashiered from service and to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year.  The GOC   confirmed   the   findings   and   sentence   of   the  GCM,  but remitted   the   unexpired   portion   of   the   sentence   of   rigorous th imprisonment,   vide   order   dated   29   December,   2013.   Being aggrieved thereby, the respondent­officer preferred an appeal before the learned AFT by way of O.A. (Appeal) No.2 of 2014. The same has been partly allowed by the impugned judgment nd and order dated 2  March, 2017, as aforesaid.  Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeals.  18. We have heard Shri Vikramjit Banerjee, learned Additional Solicitor General (“ASG” for short), appearing on behalf of the 12 Union of India and others and Shri Gaurav Agrawal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent­officer. 19. Shri Vikramjit Banerjee, learned ASG, submits that the scope of interference by the learned AFT under Section 15 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as “the   AFT   Act”)   is   very   limited.     He   submitted   that   the reappreciation   of   evidence   by   the   learned   AFT   is   not permissible.  It is submitted that the interference by the learned AFT   would   be   warranted   only   on   three   grounds,   as   is mentioned under sub­section (4) of Section 15 of the AFT Act. In this respect, reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in the case of  Union of India and others vs. Sandeep Kumar 1 .   and others 20. Shri Banerjee further submitted that the learned AFT has grossly erred in holding that the confessional statement made by the respondent­officer was not voluntary.   It is submitted 1 (2019) 10 SCC 496 13 that   when   the   respondent­officer   made   the   confessional statement, he was not an accused, and as such, the learned AFT   has   grossly   erred   in   relying   on   Article   20(3)   of   the Constitution of India.  In this respect, he relies on the judgment of Eleven­judge Bench of this Court in the case of  The State of 2 Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu Oghad and others . Shri Banerjee further submits that the learned AFT itself 21. has   come   to   a   conclusion   that   the   respondent­officer   has indulged   in   financial   misconduct,   and   therefore,   the punishment   of   cashiering   from   service   for   such   misconduct ought not to have been sustained.  Reliance in this respect is placed on the judgment of this Court in the case of  Chandra 3 Kumar Chopra vs. Union of India and others . 22. Shri Gaurav Agrawal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of  the   respondent­officer,   on  the   contrary,   submits   that  the 2 (1962) 3 SCR 10 3 (2012) 6 SCC 369 14 learned AFT has rightly held that the confessional statement was   not   voluntary.       He   submitted   that   the   extra­judicial confession is a very weak piece of evidence and conviction on the basis of the same cannot be sustained, unless there is some corroboration. He submits that the news about the respondent­ th officer being already involved in the FIR, registered on 11  July, th 2009, was already published in the newspapers on 13   July, 2009.     He   submits   that   the   Police   had   already   started interrogation with regard to the FIR and there was discussion between   the   Police   officials   and   the   Army   officials.     He submitted that the learned AFT has come to a conclusion that it was a huge recruitment scam and in order to save the higher officials, the possibility of the respondent­officer being forced to give such a confession by promising him that he would also be saved,   is   a   possible   view.     He,   therefore,   submits   that   no interference   would   be   warranted   with   the   findings   of   the learned AFT in that regard.  15 23. He further submitted that even the evidence of P.W.1­Col. Anil   Singh   Rathore,   Director,   Army   Recruitment   Centre, Jhunjhunu;   P.W.2­Brigadier   Arun   Kumar   Tuli,   Dy.   Director General, Recruitment Zone Rajasthan at Jaipur; and P.W. 4­ Col. Balraj Singh Sohi, Director Recruiting Office, Jaipur would reveal that not a single person was found, who could be said to have   been   medically   declared   fit,   though   being   unfit.     He further submitted that, on the contrary, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses would itself reveal that actual tests were conducted by independent members and the medical team was only   assisting   the   independent   members   in   the   conduct   of tests, measurements and the medical examination.  He further submits that the evidence of prosecution witnesses would itself show   that   there   was   no   material   to   establish   that   the respondent­officer had received any amount from the touts as a consideration for clearing any candidate.  16 24. Shri Agrawal further submits that from the evidence of P.W.10­Varalakshmi Srinivas, it is clear  that the  amount of Rs.20,000/­  was   deposited   by   her,   on   the   directions   of   her husband,  P.W.12­Major   D.   Srinivas,  since   the   respondent­ officer was in dire need of the said money as he had to rush to his home­ town at Dharwad by flight.  He submitted that from the evidence of P.W.12­Major D. Srinivas, it would be clear that the   said   amount   of   Rs.20,000/­   was   returned   by   the respondent­officer to  P.W.12­Major D. Srinivas,  on his return from Dharwad.  25. Insofar as the amount of Rs.65,000/­ alleged to have been received   from   P.W.8­Major   BSRK   Prasad   is   concerned,   Shri Agrawal   would   submit   that  P.W.8­Major   BSRK   Prasad  had taken   a   loan   of   Rs.65,000/­   from   the   father­in­law   of   the respondent­officer, since he wanted to purchase a plot of land. He submits that the amount of Rs.65,000/­ deposited in the account   of   the   father­in­law   of   the   respondent­officer   was 17 towards the repayment of the said loan. He submits that the said fact would be evident from the evidence of P.W.8­Major BSRK Prasad.  26. With the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties, we have scrutinized the material on record.  Insofar as the first submission with regard to scope of Section 15 of the AFT Act is concerned,   it   will   be   relevant   to   refer   to   sub­section   (4)   of Section 15 of the AFT Act, which reads as under:  
“15.Jurisdiction, powers and authority
in matters of appeal against court­
martial.­(1) ………………………………
(2) ………………………………………. (3) ………………………………………. (4)  The   Tribunal   shall   allow   an   appeal against   conviction   by   a   court­martial where­  (a)  the   finding   of   the   court­martial   is legally   not   sustainable   due   to   any reason whatsoever; or 18 (b) the   finding   involves   wrong   decision on a question of law; or (c) there   was   a   material   irregularity   in the   course   of   the   trial   resulting   in miscarriage of justice, but,  in any other case, may dismiss the appeal where   the   Tribunal   considers   that   no miscarriage of justice is likely to be caused or has actually resulted to the appellant: Provided   that   no   order   dismissing   the appeal   by   the   Tribunal   shall   be   passed unless such order is made after recording reasons therefor in writing.” 27. It could thus be seen that, in view of clause (a) of sub­ section (4) of Section 15 of the AFT Act, the learned AFT would be justified in interfering with the finding of the court­martial where its finding is legally not sustainable due to any reason whatsoever.  Under clause (b) thereof, it would be permissible for the learned AFT to interfere with such a finding when it involves a wrong decision on a question of law.  Under clause (c) thereof, the learned AFT would be justified in allowing an 19 appeal against conviction by a court­martial when there was a material   irregularity   in   the   course   of   the   trial   resulting   in miscarriage of justice.   28. Insofar   as   reliance   placed   by   Shri   Vikramjit   Banerjee, learned   ASG   on   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of Sandeep Kumar and others  (supra) is concerned, this Court in the said case itself has observed thus: “46. Section   15   of   the   Act   confers   wide power   on   the   Tribunal   so   as   to   allow   an appeal against conviction by a court martial where   the   finding   of   the   court   martial   is legally not sustainable due to any reason; the   finding   involves   wrong   decision   on   a question   of   law   or   there   was   a   material irregularity   in   the   course   of   the   trial resulting   in   miscarriage   of   justice.   Even though the power of the Tribunal is wide but it is not merely a different opinion on the appreciation of the evidence to interfere with   the   findings   recorded   by   the   court martial. The first ground of interference is whether the finding of the court martial is “legally   not   sustainable”.   Therefore,   to exercise such power, there has to be error of law by the court martial which would confer 20 jurisdiction   on   the   Tribunal   to   interfere against the conviction recorded by the court martial.   The   second   ground   is   “wrong application on a question of law”. However, the   Tribunal,   in   the   present   case,   has committed grave error in interfering with the finding of the court martial by misreading an   Army   Order.   There   is   no   material irregularity   pointed   out   by   the   Tribunal inasmuch as the irregularity pointed out is with regard  to  confessional  statements  by military   officer   which   is   not   a   bar   either under the Evidence Act or under the Army Order issued under the Act. The Tribunal could   reappreciate   evidence   to   find   out   if any findings of the court martial are legally not sustainable due to any reason; or that the   finding   involves wrong   decision   on   a question   of   law   or   there   was   a   material irregularity   in   the   course   of   the   trial resulting in miscarriage of justice. But such wide powers do not confer jurisdiction to the Tribunal   to   reverse   the   findings   merely because   it   finds   that   different   view   is possible.” It could thus be seen that this Court itself has held that 29. the learned AFT was entitled to reappreciate evidence   to find out   if   any   findings   of   the   court   martial   are   legally   not 21 sustainable due   to   any   reason;   or   that   the   finding   involves wrong decision on a question of law; or there was a material irregularity in the course of the trial resulting in miscarriage of justice.  We find that the reliance placed by the learned ASG on the   sentence,   i.e.,   “ But   such   wide   powers   do   not   confer jurisdiction   to   the   Tribunal   to   reverse   the   findings   merely because it finds that different view is possible”, is being pressed into service without context.    In the said case, on facts, this Court   came   to   the   conclusion   that   there   was   no   material irregularity   pointed   out   by   the   Tribunal   inasmuch   as   the irregularity   pointed   out   was   with   regard   to   confessional statements by military officer which was not a bar either under the Evidence Act or under the Army Order issued under the Act.    This Court, therefore, came to a specific conclusion that the finding recorded by the Tribunal was on misreading of an Army order.   The sentence which is pressed into service will have to be read in the context of those findings.  We are unable 22 to accept the contention urged on behalf of the Union of India that   the   learned   AFT   is   not   entitled   to   reappreciate   the evidence.  Such reappreciation of evidence is permissible to find out   if   any   findings   of   the   court   martial   are   legally   not sustainable due to any reason. 30. It is not in dispute that the GCM has passed its conviction basically   on   the   confessional   statement   made   by   the respondent­officer.   Reliance in this respect is placed on the judgment of the Eleven­judge Bench of this Court in the case of The State of  Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu Oghad and others (supra).  It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court in the said case: “( 1 ) An accused person cannot be said to have   been   compelled   to   be   a   witness against himself simply because he made a   statement   while   in   police   custody, without anything more. In other words, the mere fact of being in police custody at   the   time   when   the   statement   in question was made would not, by itself, 23 as a proposition of law, lend itself to the inference   that   the   accused   was compelled   to   make   the   statement, though   that   fact,   in   conjunction   with other   circumstances   disclosed   in evidence in a particular case, would be a relevant   consideration   in   an   enquiry whether or not the accused person had been compelled to make the impugned statement.” 31. It is to be noted that this Court, in the aforesaid case itself, has held that the question, as to whether a person was compelled to make a statement or not, is a question of fact in each case to be determined by the Court on weighing the facts and circumstances disclosed in the evidence before it.   32. In the present case, the learned AFT, upon perusal of the evidence of P.W.1­ Col. Anil Singh Rathore, P.W.3­ Col. Bharat Kumar   and   P.W.4­Col.   Balraj   Singh   Sohi,   has   come   to   a conclusion that from the circumstances as emerged, it cannot be said that the confessional statement was voluntary.   24 33. The finding as recorded by the learned AFT, was recorded while allowing the appeal preferred by the respondent­officer th against the judgment and order of the GCM dated 28   April, th 2013, as confirmed by the GOC vide order dated 29  December, 2013,   holding   him   guilty   for   the   offence   punishable   under Section 7 of the P.C. Act read with Section 69 of the Army Act. As such, in the present matter, while considering the appeal of the   Union   of   India   and   others,   we   will   be   guided   by   the parameters   that   weigh   while   considering   an   appeal   against acquittal.  If the view taken by the learned AFT is found to be a plausible   one,   it   will   not   be   permissible   for   this   Court   to interfere with the same only because this court finds the other view to be more probable/plausible.  Equally, unless the finding of the learned AFT is found to be perverse or impossible, an interference would not be justified.   From   the   perusal   of   evidence   of   P.W.1­Col.   Anil   Singh 34. Rathore, it would reveal that he himself has stated that after he 25 was posted as Director, Army Recruiting Office, Jhunjhunu, Rajasthan in  May, 2008,  he had received various calls from unauthorized elements seeking favours for recruitment. He had told them to lay off.  However, in spite of this, the said callers increased the frequency of making calls seeking favours and also started using threatening language.   He stated that the issue was discussed in detail with all Directors of the Army Recruiting   Office   under   the   zone.     He   stated   that,   in   the Conference, he had informed the Additional Director General Recruiting,   Integrated   Headquarters   of   Ministry   of   Defence (Army) that, though the recruiting system was free and fair, yet about 90% of the persons recruited, pay varying amounts to the touts.  He further stated that in the month of May, 2009, when the Recruitment Rally was held at Jodhpur, the respondent­ officer was detailed as a member of the medical team for the said Recruitment Rally.   When the Recruitment Rally was in process,   he   received   a   call   from   the   respondent­officer 26 informing him  that the  respondent­officer  had received calls from undesirable elements asking favours from the respondent­ officer.  P.W.1­Col. Anil Singh Rathore has further stated that he told the respondent­officer not to do any favour to anyone and report the matter to the Director of Host Army Recruiting Office, i.e., P.W.3­Col. Bharat Kumar.   35. P.W.1­Col.   Anil   Singh   Rathore  further   stated   in   his evidence that another Recruitment Rally was held in June 2009 at Ganganagar, where he was the Host Army Recruiting Office. He   had   a   meeting   with   Detachment   Commander   of   South Western Command Intelligence Unit, who provided him some inputs about the touts’ activities in the area. He has stated in his   evidence   that   the   respondent­officer   was   one   of   the members of the medical team at the Recruitment Rally held at Ganganagar.  It will be apposite to reproduce the following part of the 36. cross­examination of P.W.1­Col. Anil Singh Rathore: 27 “As   far   as   I   remember,   first   time   the accused   informed   me   about   having received   calls   from   undesirable   elements was sometime in the month of December, 2008   when   I   came   back   from   leave. Subsequently, he informed me about the same   from   Jodhpur   recruitment   rally. Further   in   Ganganagar,   I   heard   the medical   officers   including   the   accused discussing about such calls being received by   them   on   the   dining   table   during breakfast   time.     Finally   the   same information was given by the accused in his   verbal   and   written   confessional statement made on 14 and 15 July 2009 respectively.” 37. P.W.1­Col. Anil Singh Rathore  has further stated in his evidence that he along with the respondent­officer, who was also one of the members of team ‘B’ as Medical Officer, went to th Ajmer on 9  July, 2009 for the Recruitment Rally to be held on th 11  July, 2009.   He states about the news being published in th newspapers on 13   July, 2009 about the Police taking action against the touts.  He states that the respondent­officer came to 28 th him on 14  July, 2009 and wanted to confess his involvement in the recruitment racket with the touts.  They went to a nearby temple   where   he   narrated   about   his   involvement   over   a duration of two hours or so.   He told the respondent­officer to give everything in writing about what he has narrated.  He has th further stated that on 15   July, 2009, the respondent­officer came   to   him   and   handed   over   a   written   statement   in   the presence  of  P.W.3­Col.  Bharat  Kumar and   P.W.4­Col.  Balraj   Singh Sohi.   38. P.W.1­Col. Anil Singh Rathore, in  his cross­examination, has admitted that he and the other Recruiting Officers had been interacting with the Media at the site of the Recruitment th Rally.  He has further admitted that during interaction on 13 July,   2009,   a  number   of   media  persons   had   arrived   in the stadium, where the Recruitment Rally was being conducted. Though he has denied that the details of information published th in the newspaper dated 13  July, 2009 were given by him, it is 29 th not denied that he has interacted with the Police on 13  July, 2009.   39. It could thus be seen that when the respondent­officer th allegedly made an oral confession on 14  July, 2009 and gave a th written statement on 15  July, 2009, the news with regard to the recruitment racket was already known to one and all.   40. P.W.3­Col. Bharat Kumar, who was the Director of Army Recruiting   Office   at   the   relevant   time,   has   stated   in   his examination­in­chief that during Jodhpur Recruitment Rally, th st held   between   11   May,   2009   and   21   May,   2009,   the respondent­officer had come to him, totally shattered with tears in his eyes, and informed that he had received threatening calls and SMS messages from the touts’ seeking favours for some candidates.  It is thus clear from the evidence of P.W.1­Col. Anil Singh 41. Rathore  and   P.W.3­Col.   Bharat   Kumar  that   from   December 30 2008 itself, they were aware about the racket of touts in the recruitment scam.   Not only this, but P.W.1­Col. Anil Singh Rathore  has gone on record to say that, in the recruitment process, 90% of the persons recruited pay varying amount to touts, though the selection process was free and fair.   P.W.1­ Col.   Anil   Singh   Rathore   has   admitted   that   the   respondent­ officer had informed him about the phone calls as early as in December,   2008.     Insofar   as   P.W.3­Col.   Bharat   Kumar  is concerned,   he   has   also   admitted   that   the   respondent­officer had informed him about the phone calls in the month of May, 2009.     The   finding   of   the   learned   AFT   that,   in   view  of   the circumstances, it appears unnatural that the respondent­officer th would make a voluntary confession on 14  July, 2009 and the th written   statement   on   15   July,   2009   and   that   many   more persons might be involved in the recruitment scam and in order to  find   a  scapegoat,   the  possibility   of   the   respondent­officer being   asked   to   make   a   confessional   statement   with   an 31 assurance that no action will be taken against him, cannot be said to be an impossible view.   42. P.W.2­ Brigadier Arun Kumar Tuli, at the relevant time, was the Deputy Director General, Recruitment Zone Rajasthan at Jaipur.  He  has   also  admitted  in  his   examination­in­chief that, when he assumed the office of Deputy Director General Recruiting Zone, the first Recruitment Rally was conducted at th th th Jodhpur, sometime between 11  May, 2009 and 18 /19  May, 2009.  He has admitted that during this Recruitment Rally, he came to know about the receipt of complaints from Medical Officers,   including   the   respondent­officer,   that   they   had received unwanted calls and SMS messages with threatening th contents.   He has also admitted in his evidence that, on 14 July, 2009, he received local newspapers, which were full of th news on recruitment racket. He has also admitted that, on 14 July, 2009, a meeting was arranged with the Superintendent of Police, Ajmer, who informed him about the FIR.   32 43. It could thus be seen that, on cumulative appreciation of evidence   of   P.W.1­Col.   Anil   Singh   Rathore,   P.W.2­   Brigadier Arun Kumar Tuli and P.W.3­Col. Bharat Kumar, the view that the confessional statement made by the respondent­officer did not appear to be voluntary cannot be said to be a perverse view. This is particularly so, when P.W.1­Col. Anil Singh Rathore has admitted that the respondent­officer had intimated him about such calls as early as in December, 2008, and also, P.W.2­ Brigadier Arun Kumar Tuli and P.W.3­Col. Bharat Kumar have admitted about they having knowledge about such calls much th th earlier to 14  July, 2009 and 15  July, 2009, i.e., the dates of oral/written confession.  44. This Court in the case of   Sahadevan and another vs. 4 , after surveying various judgments on State of Tamil Nadu   the issue,  has laid down the following principles: “ The principles 4 (2012) 6 SCC 403 33
16. Upon a proper analysis of the<br>abovereferred judgments of this Court, it<br>will be appropriate to state the principles<br>which would make an extra­judicial<br>confession an admissible piece of evidence<br>capable of forming the basis of conviction<br>of an accused. These precepts would guide<br>the judicial mind while dealing with the<br>veracity of cases where the prosecution<br>heavily relies upon an extra­judicial<br>confession alleged to have been made by<br>the accused:
(i) The extra­judicial confession is a<br>weak evidence by itself. It has to be<br>examined by the court with greater care<br>and caution.
(ii) It should be made voluntarily and<br>should be truthful.
(iii) It should inspire confidence.
(iv) An extra­judicial confession<br>attains greater credibility and<br>evidentiary value if it is supported by a<br>chain of cogent circumstances and is<br>further corroborated by other<br>prosecution evidence.
34 ( v ) For an extra­judicial confession to be the basis of conviction, it should not suffer from any material discrepancies and inherent improbabilities. ( vi ) Such statement essentially has to be   proved   like   any   other   fact   and   in accordance with law.” 45. It could thus be seen that the extra­judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence.  Unless such a confession is found to be voluntary, trustworthy and reliable, the conviction solely on the basis of the same, without corroboration, would not be justified. 46. In the present case, there is no corroboration at all. On the contrary, P.W.1­Col. Anil Singh Rathore in his evidence has himself admitted that the respondent­officer was part of team ‘B’.    It  will  be   relevant  to  refer   to  the  following   part  of his examination­in­chief:   “In any recruitment rally there are three teams,   Host   Army   Recruiting   Office, 35 team 'A' and 'B'. Host Army Recruiting Office is responsible for documentation and   administration.   Team   'A'   is responsible   for   physical   tests   and   run while   team   'B'   is   responsible   for measurements of the candidate and their medical   examination.   Actual   tests   are conducted   by   independent   members. These team only assist the independent members   in   conduct   of   tests, measurements   and   the   medical examination. 47. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   a   single   officer   like   the respondent­officer cannot declare a candidate medically fit, if he is otherwise not.   His evidence would show that the team like the one of which the respondent­officer was a member, only assists   the   independent   members   in   the   conduct   of   tests, measurements and the medical examination.   48. All the three witnesses have admitted that they had no knowledge   if   any   candidate,   declared   fit  by   the   respondent­ officer, was subsequently found to have been medically unfit. 36 All the three witnesses have also admitted that there was no material to establish that the amount, which was deposited in the account of the respondent­officer and his father­in­law was an amount received as illegal gratification.   We are, therefore, of the view that no error could be found 49. with the findings of the learned AFT that the respondent­officer deserves   to   be   acquitted   of   the   offence   punishable   under section 7 of the P.C. Act.   That leaves us with the appeals of the respondent­officer.  50. 51. Perusal of the evidence of P.W.10­Varalakshmi Srinivas and   P.W.12­Major   D.   Srinivas   would   reveal   that   they   have stated in their evidence, that since the wife of the respondent­ th officer had given birth to a girl child on 16  February, 2009, he wanted to rush to his native place at Dharwad and did not have sufficient funds. As such, he had requested  P.W.12­Major D. Srinivas  to   give   a   loan   of   Rs.20,000/­,   which   amount   was 37 deposited by P.W.10­Varalakshmi Srinivas in the account of the respondent­officer, on the instructions of her husband P.W.12­ Major D. Srinivas.     From the evidence of P.W.12­ Major D. Srinivas, it would reveal that on his return from his native place, the respondent­officer had returned the said amount.   52. Insofar as the amount of Rs.65,000/­ is concerned, P.W.8­ Major BSRK Prasad, in his evidence, has stated that he had taken   a   loan   of   Rs.65,000/­   from   the   father­in­law   of   the respondent­officer for purchase of a plot of land.  The amount of Rs.65,000/­ deposited by him in the account of the father­in­ law of the respondent­officer was towards repayment of the said loan amount.   53. It   could   thus   be   seen   that   the   respondent­officer   had discharged the burden to prove, as to how the said amount of Rs.20,000/­ was deposited in his account and as to how the amount of Rs.65,000/­ was deposited in the account of his father­in­law.   As such, that part of the order, which convicts 38 the respondent­officer for the offence punishable under Section 63 of the Army Act, in our view, is not sustainable.   54. In the result, we pass the following order: A. CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2196 OF 2017 (i) Criminal Appeal No. 2196 of 2017 filed on behalf of the Union of India and others is dismissed.  B. CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 537­538 OF 2018 (i) Criminal Appeal Nos.537­538 of 2018 filed on behalf of the appellant­Major R. Metri No.08585N are allowed.  nd (ii) The impugned judgment and order dated 2   March, 2017,   passed   by   the   learned   AFT,   convicting   the appellant­Major   R.   Metri   No.08585N   for   the   offence punishable   under   Section   63   of   the   Army   Act   and sentencing him to forfeiture of seniority of rank and of severe reprimand is quashed and set aside.  39 (iii) The appellant­Major R. Metri No.08585N is acquitted of all the charges, charged with.  (iv) The appellant­Major R. Metri No.08585N is directed to be   reinstated   forthwith   with   continuity   of   service. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the   appellant­Major   R.   Metri   No.08585N   will   not   be entitled for back­wages for the period during which he was out of employment.   55. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.  …..….......................J. [L. NAGESWARA RAO] …….........................J.        [B.R. GAVAI] NEW DELHI; APRIL 04, 2022 40