Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Contempt Petition (civil) 202 of 2000
PETITIONER:
MRITYUNJOY DAS & ANR
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SAYED HASIBUR RAHAMAN & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/03/2001
BENCH:
Umesh C. Banerjee & S.N. Phukan
JUDGMENT:
In SLP No. 1416 of 1997
JUDGMENT
BANERJEE, J.
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The introduction of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 in
the statute book has been for purposes of securing a feeling
of confidence of the people in general for due and proper
administration of justice in the country. It is a powerful
weapon in the hands of the law courts by reason wherefor it
must thus be exercised with due care and caution and for
larger interest.
Incidentally, a special leave petition (1416/1997) was
filed before this Court by Paschim Banga Rajya Bhumijibi
Sangh against the judgment of the Calcutta High Court
pertaining to the question of constitutionality of certain
provisions of West Bengal Land Reforms Amendment Acts 1981
and 1986. The said Sangha filed an Interlocutory
Application being I.A.No.3 OF 1999 for issuance of certain
directions which inter alia reads as below:
(a) direct the State of West Bengal and its Revenue
Authorities not to initiate any proceedings for vesting of
the land against the members of the Petitioner Sangha and if
any vesting proceeding has been already initiated against
the members of the Petitioner Sangha in that event not to
pass any order and maintain status-quo in respect of the
land in question in all respect till the disposal of the
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.1416 of 1997 pending
before this Honble Court or in alternative clarify that the
order dated 20.3.1998 as quoted in paragraph 19-20 will
apply only to the parties thereto and not to the members of
the Petitioner No.1 Sangha.
The Interlocutory Application was heard on 29th October,
1999 and this Court was pleased to pass an order therein to
the following effect:
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At the request of Learned counsel for the Applicants
four weeks time is granted to enable him to put on record
appropriate information regarding members of the Sangha for
whom the application is moved and the nature of the stay
required.
In the meantime Learned Counsel for the Respondent will
also take appropriate instructions in connection with this
I.A.
Subsequently on 16th December, 1999, this Court in
I.A.No.3 passed an interim order to the effect as below:@@
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Having heard Learned counsel for the parties, by way of
an interim order, it is directed that status-quo regarding
possession on spot shall be maintained by both the sides in
connection with the members of the Petitioner-Sangha who
were before the High Court in the Writ Petition out of which
the present proceedings arise.
(Emphasis supplied)
In the meantime, learned senior counsel for the
respondent-State of West Bengal will verify the list of
these members, (Emphasis supplied ) which is furnished to
him by Learned Counsel for the Petitioner and subject to
that verification further orders will be passed after three
months.
To be placed after three months.
In the application (I.A.No.3) a further order was passed
on 17th April, 2000 which reads as below:@@
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We have heard learned senior counsel for the
Petitioners, Mr. Shanti Bhushan and Learned Senior Counsel
for respondent-State of West Bengal, Mr. Ray, Learned
Senior Counsel for respondent-State of West Bengal is right
when he says that some more time is required as 13,000
persons are listed and they have to ascertain about their
existence on the spot. We grant time up to the end of July,
2000. I.A. will be placed in the second week of August,
2000. In the meantime, at the request of Learned Counsel
for the Petitioners, Mr. Shanti Bhusan we grant additional
interim relief in continuation of our earlier order dated
16.12.1999 to the effect that if in the meantime, any
vesting orders have been passed in respect of the lands of
members of Petitioner Sangha who were before the High
Court in the matter out of which the present proceedings
arise, then those vesting orders shall not be implemented
until further orders."
It is this order which is said to have been violated and
thus bringing the orders of this Court into ridicule. The
factum of violation is said to have been deliberate since in
spite of the order as above and even after the service of
the order dated 17th April, 2000 to the authorities of Land
Reforms Department, Government of West Bengal for its
compliance, the Petitioner No.1 being a resident of village
Amriti, District, Malda, West Bengal and a life member of
the Paschim Banga Rajya Bhumijibi Sangha was served with a
notice dated 5.4.2000 under Section 57 of the West Bengal
Land Reforms Act together with Section 14-T (3) of the said
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Act read with Rule 4 of the Rules framed thereunder by the
Revenue Officer Cell, Malda asking to submit details of land
held by him and his family members since 7.8.1969 and
particulars of land transferred by him after that date. The
records depict that a reply to the said notice was furnished
as early as 30th April, 2000 alongwith the certification of
membership of the Sangha and copy of the order dated 16th
December, 1999 passed by this Court. It further appears
that a hearing did take place and the Revenue Officer passed
an order of vesting on 17th April, 2000. Subsequently, on
the factual matrix, it appears that by the notice dated 26th
April, 2000 issued by the Revenue Officer, possession of
37.47½ acres of land was directed to be made over to the
Land Revenue Authority on 27.4.2000. It has been the
definite case of the petitioners that in spite of receipt of
both the orders dated 16th December, 1999 and 17th April,
2000, the Block Land & Land Reforms Officer, English Bazar,
Malda came on the site and took possession of the said land.
Similar is the situation as regards the land belonging to
petitioner No.2 and possession 20.76 acres of land was also
obtained by the Block Land & Land Reforms Officer, English
Bazar, Malda. This act of obtaining possession from the
applicants herein is stated to be a deliberate violation of
this Courts order and thus cannot but be ascribed to be
contemptuous in nature.
Mr. Sanyal, the learned Senior Advocate appearing in
support of the petition for Contempt contended that the high
handedness of the executive authorities is apparent in the
deliberate action of taking over possession of land from two
of the members of the Samiti even after coming to know of
the orders of this Court and resultantly committing an act
of gross contempt.
Admittedly, this Court passed an order on 17th April,
2000 as a continuation of the earlier order dated 16th
December, 1999 to the effect that if in the meantime, any
vesting order has been passed in respect of the land of
members of petitioners Sangha who were before the High
Court in the matter out of which the present proceeding
arise, then those vesting orders shall not be implemented
until further orders. The order dated 16th December, 2000
also categorically records the maintenance of status quo
regarding possession on spot by both the State and Private
Respondents. As regards however the Private Respondents,
the order was directed to be made applicable to the cases of
the members of the petitioners Sangha who were before the
High Court in the Writ Petition out of which the present
proceeding arose.
Needless to state that Land Reforms Legislation in
States have been introduced with a view to proceed with the
socialistic approach as enshrined in the Constitution. The
amendments have been effected in the main provisions of the
act, validity of which stands further scrutiny before this
Court. We are however, not called upon to delve into these
issues neither we intend to do the same. The noting
aforesaid is just to introduce the subject for our
consideration though in a separate jurisdiction being of
extra- ordinary nature but as conferred by and under the
statute.
Let us however, at this juncture consider the counter
affidavit as filed by the alleged Contemnors and assess the
situation as to whether there is any deliberate act on the
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part of the revenue officers of the State or an omission to
note the true effect of the order which has resulted in such
an action which is said to be contemptuous in nature. The
alleged Contemnors No.2 and 3 being Sayed Kadar Hossain and
Chitaranjan Chakraborti stated that as officers of the
Government, they have tried to discharge their duties to the
best of their ability, capacity and understanding. There
was never any motive or intention to violate or disobey the
orders of this Court. In paragraphs 4 and 5 alleged
contemnors stated as below.
4. We respectfully submit that as understood by us
that the number of the Petitioner Sangha who were before the
High Court in the Writ Petition were understood by us as
parties on the date on which the Writ Petition was filed.
The petitioners themselves have admitted that they became
members only in 1992-93, and the order of this Honble Court
would not be applicable then as they were not members of the
Sangha on the date of filing the Writ Petition. If the
interpretation given by the Petitioners was sought to be
accepted, then there could be no occasion for this Honble
Court making the order for verification of members of the
Sangha. We never proceeded with the matter to violate the
orders of this Honble Court.
5. We also submit that in the proceedings, the
Petitioners were given full opportunity of being heard and
in fact the Petitioner appeared through Advocate and made
submission and after considering the facts and circumstances
of the case and also the material on record, the Revenue
Officer being the competent Authority under the Act
(Contemnor No.2) recorded the following finding:
It appears from certificate which was issued by that
Sangha that Sl. No. of Life Membership of raiyat
Mrityunjoy Das is 2698/93. It is clear that the raiyat
obtained membership in the year 1993 and he was not the
member of the said Sangha during the time of filing the Writ
Applicant or before the Honble High Court. So the raiyat
is not entitled to get benefit of the order of the Honble
Supreme Court dated 16.12.1999.
A true copy of the order dated 17.4.2000 in this regard
is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure- R 1/1.
We further submit that we have not tried to justify the
conduct any way, by making the aforesaid statements and have
stated these only to explain the circumstances and if any
lack of understanding as aforesaid has resulted in violation
of this order and consequently the Contempt of Court, I
repent for the same and tender my unqualified apology before
this Honble Court. I further submit that whatever I have
done was in the course of my official work as a Government
servant and I have no personal interest whether the process
of Land Reforms continues or halts. On the face of this
order of this Honble Court, or in that way any Order of any
Court, which I am duty bound to obey. I again submit that
if my interpretation of the order of this Honble Court was
wrong that was because of my limitations to understand but
there is nothing malafide in it and I cannot think of
over-reaching or flouting the order of this Honble Court in
any way or under any circumstances.
On the state of pleadings as above, Mr. Tapas Chandra
Ray, the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the@@
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Respondents with his usual eloquence submitted that the@@
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order of this Court dated 16th December, 1999 pertaining to
the maintenance of status quo regarding possession, has been
rather categorical in its application: This Court has
restricted its applicability to the members of the
petitioners Sangha who were before the High Court in the
Writ Petition and not all and sundry. Mr. Ray drew the
attention of the Court to a portion of the order (as
emphasized in page 3 hereof) and submitted that a contra
interpretation to the order would not only be grossly
irregular but be totally unsubstantiated. The user of the
words who were before the High Court in the writ petition
shall have to be attributed some meaning and the intention
has been rather clear and categorical as to its
applicability. Mr. Ray contended that this Court obviously
could not indulge in surplusage or record a specific order
without attributing any meaning thereto and it is in this
context Mr. Ray further contended that in any event, if two
explanations are available and out of which one stands
adopted by the alleged contemnors which cannot by any
stretch, be termed to be wholly unwarranted, question of
returning a verdict of guilty in an Application for Contempt
does not and cannot arise.
Contra however, is the submission of Mr. Sanyal and Mr.
Ganguli for the petitioners with reference to the user of
the words present proceeding by this Court which cannot as
contended but mean that the order has been intended to apply
to the applicants before this Court, in addition to the
members who were members on the date of filing of the Writ
Petition and this by no stretch be restrictive at all.
Since, otherwise the order would only be partial and a
majority of the persons proceeding with this litigation as
parties herein would be deprived of the same a situation
which cannot possibly be conceived in the matters of an
order of this Court since this Court confers benefit on to
those who seek relief in a proceeding before this Court
indeed an attractive submission.
Before however, proceeding with the matter any further,
be it noted that exercise of powers under the Contempt of
Courts Act shall have to be rather cautious and use of it
rather sparingly after addressing itself to the true effect
of the contemptuous conduct. The Court must otherwise come
to a conclusion that the conduct complained of tentamounts
to obstruction of justice which if allowed, would even
permeat in our society (vide Murray & Co. v. Ashok Kr.
Newatia & Anr.: 2000 (2) SCC 367) this is a special
jurisdiction conferred on to the law courts to punish an
offender for his contemptuous conduct or obstruction to the
majesty of law. It is in this context that the observations
of the this Court in Murrays case (supra) in which one of
us (Banerjee, J.) was party needs to be noticed.
The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the
majesty and dignity of the Courts of law since the image of
such a majesty in the minds of the people cannot be led to
be distorted. The respect and authority commanded by Courts
of Law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen and
the entire democratic fabric of the society will crumble
down if the respect for the judiciary is undermined. It is
true that the judiciary will be judged by the people for
what the judiciary does, but in the event of any indulgence
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which even can remotely be termed to affect the majesty of
law, the society is bound to lose confidence and faith in
the judiciary and the law courts thus, would forfeit the
trust and confidence of the people in general.
The other aspect of the matter ought also to be noticed
at this juncture viz., the burden and standard of proof.
The common English phrase he who asserts must prove has
its due application in the matter of proof of the
allegations said to be constituting the act of contempt. As
regards the standard of proof, be it noted that a
proceeding under the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of the
Court in terms of the provisions of the Contempt of Court
Act is quasi criminal, and as such, the standard of proof
required is that of a criminal proceeding and the breach
shall have to be established beyond reasonable doubt. The
observations of Lord Denning in Re Bramblevale (1969 3 All
ER 1062) lend support to the aforesaid. Lord Denning in Re
Bramblevale stated:
A contempt of court is an offence of a criminal
character. A man may be sent to prison for it,. It must be
satisfactorily proved. To use the time- honoured phrase, it
must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. It is not
proved by showing that, when the man was asked about it, he
told lies. There must be some further evidence to
incriminate him. Once some evidence is given, then his lies
can be thrown into the scale against him. But there must be
some other evidence. Where there are two equally
consistent possibilities open to the Court, it is not right
to hold that the offence is proved beyond reasonable doubt.
In this context, the observations of the Calcutta High
Court in Archana Guha v. Ranjit Guha Neogi (1989 (II) CHN
252) in which one of us was a party (Banerjee, J.) seem to
be rather apposite and we do lend credence to the same and
thus record our concurrence therewith.
In The Aligarh Municipal Board and Others v. Ekka Tonga
Mazdoor Union and Others (1970 (III) SCC 98), this Court in
no uncertain term stated that in order to bring home a
charge of contempt of court for disobeying orders of Courts,
those who assert that the alleged contemners had knowledge
of the order must prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt.
This Court went on to observe that in case of doubt, the
benefit ought to go to the person charged.
In a similar vein in V.G. Nigam and others v. Kedar
Nath Gupta and another (1992 (4) SCC 697), this Court stated
that it would be rather hazardous to impose sentence for
contempt on the authorities in exercise of contempt
jurisdiction on mere probabilities.
Having discussed the law on the subject, let us thus at
this juncture analyse as to whether in fact, the contempt
alleged to have been committed by the alleged cotemners, can
said to have been established firmly without there being any
element of doubt involved in the matter and that the Court
would not be acting on mere probabilities having however,
due regard to the nature of jurisdiction being quasi
criminal conferred on to the law courts. Admittedly, this
Court directed maintenance of status quo with the following
words the members of the petitioner Sangha who were
before the High Court in the writ petition out of which the
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present proceedings arise. And it is on this score the
applicant contended categorically that the intent of the
Court to include all the members presenting the Petition
before this Court whereas for the Respondent Mr. Ray
contended that the same is restricted to the members who
filed the writ petition before the High Court which
culminated in the initiation of proceeding before this
Court. The Counter affidavit filed by the Respondents also
record the same. The issue thus arises as to whether the
order stands categorical to lend credence to the answers of
the respondent or the same supports the contention as raised
by the applicants herein Incidentally, since the appeal is
pending in this Court for adjudication, and since the matter
under consideration have no bearing on such adjudication so
far as the merits of the dispute are concerned, we are not
expressing any opinion in the matter neither we are required
to express opinion thereon, excepting however, recording
that probabilities of the situation may also warrant a
finding, in favour of the interpretation of the applicant.
The doubt persists and as such in any event the respondents
being the alleged contemners are entitled to have the
benefit or advantage of such a doubt having regard to the
nature of the proceeding as noticed herein before more
fully.
In view of the observations as above, we are not also
inclined to go into the question of apology. On the wake of@@
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the aforesaid, this Contempt Petition fails and is dismissed@@
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without however, any order as to costs.@@
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