Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1436 OF 2013
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2 of
2013)
Sumit Mehta …..Appellant(s)
Versus
State of N.C.T. of Delhi .... Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
P.Sathasivam,CJI.
1) Leave granted.
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2) This appeal is directed against the order dated
18.12.2012 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in
Bail Application No. 1479 of 2012 whereby learned single
Judge of the High Court while granting anticipatory bail to the
appellant herein in a case registered against him vide FIR No.
104 dated 22.08.2012 for the offences punishable under
Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code,
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1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”) directed him to
deposit an amount of Rs.1,00,00,000/- (one crore) in fixed
deposit in the name of the complainant in any nationalized
| FDR with | the Inve |
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3) According to learned senior counsel for the appellant,
the condition for depositing the amount in fixed deposit in
the impugned order is untenable in law and is outside the
purview of Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (in short “the Code”). He further pointed out that
learned single Judge, while imposing the condition for
depositing the amount in fixed deposit, has failed to
appreciate that the liberty for grant of anticipatory bail under
Section 438 of the Code cannot be used for recovery of the
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alleged cheated amount to the complainant. He further
pointed out that while passing the impugned order, learned
single Judge failed to consider that imposing a condition of
depositing an amount of Rs. 1 crore in fixed deposit would
make the grant of anticipatory bail impossible for the
appellant. He also pointed out that the said direction is
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contrary to Article 21 of the Constitution of India and results
in denial of liberty to the appellant.
4) During the course of hearing, one Harnam Jaspal-the
| minal Mi | sc. Petiti |
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intervention. Intervention application is allowed. Learned
counsel appearing for the intervener, after highlighting the
transaction between the intervener and the appellant-
accused and various factual aspects, contended that the
High Court is fully justified in imposing such condition and
there is no need to interfere with the same.
5) On behalf of the respondent-State, learned Additional
Solicitor General submitted that taking note of the dispute
between the complainant and the appellant-accused, the
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condition imposed for grant of anticipatory bail cannot be
construed as onerous.
6) We have carefully considered the rival contentions and
perused all the relevant materials.
7) The only point for consideration in this appeal is
whether the condition of depositing an amount of Rs.
1,00,00,000/- in fixed deposit for anticipatory bail is
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sustainable in law and whether such condition is outside the
purview of Section 438 of the Code?
8) In order to answer the above question, it is useful to
| refer Section 438 of the Code which reads as under:<br>“438. Direction for grant of bail to person<br>apprehending arrest:-<br>(1) Where any person has reason to believe that he may<br>be arrested on accusation of having committed a non-<br>bailable offence, he may apply to the High Court or the<br>Court of Session for a direction under this section that in<br>the event of such arrest he shall be released on bail; and<br>that Court may, after taking into consideration, inter alia,<br>the following factors, namely:-<br>(i) the nature and gravity of the accusation;<br>(ii) the antecedents of the applicant including the<br>fact as to whether he has previously<br>undergone imprisonment on conviction by a<br>Court in respect of any cognizable offence;<br>(iii) the possibility of the applicant to flee from<br>justice; and<br>(iv) where the accusation has been made with the<br>JUDGMENT<br>object of injuring or humiliating the applicant<br>by having him so arrested,<br>either reject the application forthwith or issue an<br>interim order for the grant of anticipatory bail:<br>Provided that, where the High Court or, as the<br>case may be, the Court of Session, has not passed<br>any interim order under this sub-section or has<br>rejected the application for grant of anticipatory bail,<br>it shall be open to an officer in-charge of a police<br>station to arrest, without warrant the applicant on<br>the basis of the accusation apprehended in such<br>application. | ||
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| f the applicant including the<br>ether he has previously<br>onment on conviction by a<br>f any cognizable offence; | ||
| (iii) the possibility of the applicant to flee from<br>justice; and | ||
| (iv) where the accusation has been made with the<br>JUDGMENT<br>object of injuring or humiliating the applicant<br>by having him so arrested, | ||
| either reject the application forthwith or issue an<br>interim order for the grant of anticipatory bail: | ||
| Provided that, where the High Court or, as the<br>case may be, the Court of Session, has not passed<br>any interim order under this sub-section or has<br>rejected the application for grant of anticipatory bail,<br>it shall be open to an officer in-charge of a police<br>station to arrest, without warrant the applicant on<br>the basis of the accusation apprehended in such<br>application. | ||
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| (1A) Where the Court grants an interim order under<br>sub-section (1), it shall forthwith cause a notice being not<br>less than seven days notice, together with a copy of such<br>order to be served on the Public Prosecutor and the<br>Superintendent of Police, with a view to give the Public<br>Prosecutor a reasonable opportunity of being heard when<br>the application shall be finally heard by the Court. | |||
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| (1B) The presence of the applicant seeking<br>anticipatory bail shall be obligatory at the time of final<br>hearing of the application and passing of final order by the<br>Court, if on an application made to it by the Public<br>Prosecutor, the Court considers such presence necessary<br>in the interest of justice. | |||
| (2) When the High Court or the Court of Session makes<br>a direction under sub-section (1), it may include such<br>conditions in such directions in the light of the facts of the<br>particular case, as it may thinks fit, including- | |||
| (i) a condition that the<br>available for interrogation by<br>required; | person shall make himself<br>a police officer as and when | ||
| (ii) a condition that the person shall not, directly or<br>indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any<br>person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to<br>dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to<br>any police officer; | |||
| (iii) a condition that the person shall not leave India<br>without the previous permission of the Court; | |||
| (iv) such otherJ coUnditDionG asM maEy bNe imTposed under sub-<br>section (3) of section 437, as if the bail were granted<br>under that section. | |||
| (3) If such person is thereafter arrested without warrant<br>by an officer in charge of a police station on such<br>accusation, and is prepared either at the time of arrest or<br>at any time while in the custody of such officer to give bail,<br>he shall be released on bail; and if a Magistrate taking<br>cognizance of such offence decides that a warrant should<br>issue in the first instance against that person, he shall<br>issue a bailable warrant in conformity with the direction of<br>the Court under sub- section (1).” | |||
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A reading of the above provision makes it clear that a person
should not be harassed or humiliated in order to satisfy the
grudge or personal vendetta of the complainant. The grant
of bail under Section 438(1) of the Code is dependent on the
merits and circumstances of a case.
9) A Bench of five-Judges of this Court in Shri Gurbaksh
Singh Sibbia & Ors. vs. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC
565, while dealing mainly with the question of considerations
that can validly weigh with the courts while granting bail
under Section 438 , examined various facets of the issue and
held as under:
“26. We find a great deal of substance in Mr.
Tarkunde's submission that since denial of bail amounts to
deprivation of personal liberty, the Court should lean
against the imposition of unnecessary restrictions on the
scope of Section 438 , especially when no such restrictions
have been imposed by the legislature in the terms of that
section. Section 438 is a procedural provision which is
concerned with the personal liberty of the individual, who
is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of innocence
since he is not, on the date of his application for
anticipatory bail, convicted of the offence in respect of
which he seeks bail. An over-generous infusion of
constraints and conditions which are not to be found in
Section 438 can make its provisions constitutionally
vulnerable since the right to personal freedom cannot be
made to depend on, compliance with unreasonable
restrictions. The beneficent provision contained in Section
438 must be saved, not jettisoned. No doubt can linger
after the decision in Maneka Gandhi [1978]2SCR621 that
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| , at all co<br>challenge<br>erein.” | sts, to avo<br>by readin |
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The aforesaid decision gives an abundant clarity as to the
intention and the scope of Section 438 of the Code.
Certainly, the power conferred must be exercised very
sparingly and judiciously. However, this Court has always
frowned on onerous condition being imposed as a condition
precedent for granting anticipatory bail.
10) In Amarjit Singh vs. State of NCT of Delhi (2009) 13
SCC 769, this Court ruled as under:
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“ 7. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of
the present case, we have no hesitation in coming to the
conclusion that the imposition of condition to deposit the
sum of Rs. 15 lacks in the form of FDR in the Trial Court is
an unreasonable condition and, therefore, we set aside the
said condition as a condition precedent for granting
anticipatory bail to the accused/appellant.”
11) In Sheikh Ayub vs. State of M.P. (2004) 13 SCC 457, it
was held that a direction to pay a portion of the amount
misappropriated by the accused to the complainant as a
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condition for bail is unwarranted. Similar view was adopted
by this Court in I. Glaskasden Grace and Ors. vs.
Inspector of Police and Anr. (2009) 12 SCC 769,
| vs. Ins | pector |
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(2009) 12 SCC 721 and Sandeep Jain vs. National Capital
Territory of Delhi Rep. by Secretary, Home Deptt.
(2000) 2 SCC 66.
12) While exercising power under Section 438 of the Code,
the Court is duty bound to strike a balance between the
individual’s right to personal freedom and the right of
investigation of the police. For the same, while granting relief
under Section 438(1), appropriate conditions can be imposed
under Section 438(2) so as to ensure an uninterrupted
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investigation. The object of putting such conditions should be
to avoid the possibility of the person hampering the
investigation. Thus, any condition, which has no reference to
the fairness or propriety of the investigation or trial, cannot
be countenanced as permissible under the law. So, the
discretion of the Court while imposing conditions must be
exercised with utmost restraint.
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13) The law presumes an accused to be innocent till his
guilt is proved. As a presumably innocent person, he is
entitled to all the fundamental rights including the right to
| der Articl | e 21 of t |
14) We also clarify that while granting anticipatory bail, the
Courts are expected to consider and keep in mind the nature
and gravity of accusation, antecedents of the applicant,
namely, about his previous involvement in such offence and
the possibility of the applicant to flee from justice. It is also
the duty of the Court to ascertain whether accusation has
been made with the object of injuring or humiliating him by
having him so arrested. It is needless to mention that the
Courts are duty bound to impose appropriate conditions as
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provided under sub-section (2) of Section 438 of the Code.
15) Thus, in the case on hand, fixed deposit of Rs.
1,00,00,000/- for a period of six months in the name of the
complainant and to keep the FDR with the investigating
officer as a condition precedent for grant of anticipatory bail
is evidently onerous and unreasonable. It must be
remembered that the Court has not even come to the
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conclusion whether the allegations made are true or not
which can only be ascertained after completion of trial.
Certainly, in no words are we suggesting that the power to
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cases of cheating, electricity pilferage, white-collar crimes or
chit fund scams etc.
16) The words “any condition” used in the provision should
not be regarded as conferring absolute power on a Court of
law to impose any condition that it chooses to impose. Any
condition has to be interpreted as a reasonable condition
acceptable in the facts permissible in the circumstance and
effective in the pragmatic sense and should not defeat the
order of grant of bail. We are of the view that the present
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facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant such
extreme condition to be imposed.
17) In the light of the above discussion, while retaining the
order granting anticipatory bail in favour of the appellant-
accused, namely, Sumit Mehta, we set aside the direction
relating to deposit of FDR in the name of the complainant.
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| However, the appellant-accused has to fulfill the following<br>conditions: | |
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| (i) The appellant shall make himself available for<br>interrogation by a police officer as and when<br>required; | |
| (ii) The appellant shall not directly or indirectly make any<br>inducement, threat or promise to any person<br>acquainted with the facts of the case so as to<br>dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court<br>or to any police officer; | |
| (iii) The appellant shall furnish his address to the<br>Investigating Officer who shall verify it and submit it<br>to the trial Court under his signature. In case of<br>JUDGMENT<br>change of address, it must be communicated to the<br>Investigating Officer who shall verify it and intimate<br>the same to the court concerned under his signature;<br>and | |
| (iv) The appellant shall not leave India without the<br>previous permission of the trial Court. |
18) The appeal is disposed of with the above directions.
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……...…………………………CJI.
(P. SATHASIVAM)
| ………….<br>(RANJA |
|---|
JUDGMENT
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