Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
J. S. BAJAJ & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
ARJANDAS DAYARAM VACHHANI & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
21/01/1970
BENCH:
DUA, I.D.
BENCH:
DUA, I.D.
SIKRI, S.M.
BHARGAVA, VISHISHTHA
CITATION:
1970 AIR 1226 1970 SCR (3) 440
1970 SCC (1) 382
ACT:
The Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation)
Rules. r. 19(2) and (3)-Scope of.
HEADNOTE:
Rule 19(2) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and
Rehabilitation) Rules provides for the method of
compensation to joint families which have migrated to India
as a result of the partition of the country in 1947. Rule
19(3)(b) provides that for the purpose of calculating the
number of members of a joint family. Under r. 19(2), a
person who was a lineal descendant in the main line of
another living member of the family entitled to claim
partition shall be excluded.
A joint family consisting of a father and his sons had
migrated to India from Sind. The father made an application
for the verification of claim in respect of the properties
left by the family in Sind and the claim was verified. One
of the sons claimed that the father and sons -should be
treated as tenants-in-common. The authorities under the Act
held that the parties constituted a joint Hindu family ’and
that in view of the r. 19 (3) (b), r. 19(2) was not
applicable. The High Court quashed the order holding that
the living member of the family whose lineal descendants are
to be excluded under r, 19(3) (b), must be a person other
than their father, on the assumption that a person against
whom partition can be claimed by the father must be some
member of the family other than his lineal descendants.
In appeal to this Court,
HELD : The special provision embodied in the rule is
intended to treat a joint Hindu family consisting only of a
father and his sons as one unit for the purpose of payment
of compensation for the joint family property left in
Pakistan. The rule is rational and logical and its_language
is not susceptible of the meaning given to it by the High
Court, because under Hindu law a father and each of his sons
are entitled to claim partition against each other. [444 A-
B, C-F]
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JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1178 of
1966.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated
June 15, 16, 1965 of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil
Application No. 2061 of 1963.
V. A. Seyid Muhammad and S. P. Nayar, for the appellant.
N. N. Keswani for the respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DUA. J. This appeal by special leave is directed against
the decision of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court
allowing
441
a petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution by
Arjandas Dayaram Vachhani challenging the order of the
Deputy Chief Settlement Commissioner (with delegated powers
of Chief Settlement Commissioner) under the Displaced
Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (44 of
1954), hereafter referred to as the Act disallowing the writ
petitioner’s revision from the order of the Settlement
Officer (with delegated powers of Settlement Commissioner)
which had affirmed on appeal the order of the Assistant
Settlement Officer. The writ petitioner’s case was held to
fall within r. 19(3) of the Displaced Persons (C & R) Rules,
hereafter called the Rules, made by the Central Government
under s. 40 of the Act. The question which falls for
decision is a very short one and it relates to the meaning
and effect of r. 19(3).
The facts are not in dispute. Kishanchand Dayaram Vachhani
and his four sons Arjandas Dayaram Vachhani, Dayaram A.
Vachhani, Ramchand Dayaram Vachhani and Kanayalal Dayaram
Vachhani constituted a joint Hindu family when, as a result
of partition of the country in 1947, they migrated from Sind
(now in Pakistan) to India. After their migration
Kishanchand Dayaram Vachhani, the father, made an
application for vertification of claim in respect of the
properties left by the joint Hindu family in Sind. This
claim was duly verified. It is unnecessary to make a
detailed reference to the history of the case. Suffice it
to say that on October 28, 1961 ’Shri Purshottam Sarup,
Deputy Chief Settlement Commissioner (with delegated powers
of Chief Settlement Commissioner) (Rehabilitation
Department) allowed the appeal preferred by Arjandas Dayaram
Vachhani from the order of Shri H. K. Chaudhary, Regional
Settlement Commissioner, Bombay, dated May 14, 1961 and
after setting aside the impugned order, directed that the
property. in question be treated as joint family property in
which the parties would be entitled to apportionment as
members of joint Hindu family in accordance with the Rules.
Pursuant to this direction Shri K. S. Bedi, Assistant
Settlement Officer, Bombay, on June 12, 1963 directed that
the case be re-processed. Shri Arjandas Dayaram Vachhani
appealed from this order to the Settlement Officer (with
delegated powers of the Regional Settlement Commissioner)
but without success. That officer recorded a fairly
exhaustive order dated October 21, 1963 in which the entire
history of the case was noticed. A revision was taken to
the Deputy Chief Settlement Commissioner, Shri Purshottam
Sarup (with delegated powers of -Chief Settlement
Commissioner). That officer also went into the controversy
at some length and by his order’ dated February 13, 1964
disallowed Shri Arjandas Dayaram Vachhani’s claim both under
r. 20 and r. 19(2). of the Rules. It was pointed out that
in his (Shri Purshottam Sarup’s) earlier order it had
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442
been clearly stated that the parties constituted a joint
Hindu family and were entitled to apportionment. The father
and the sons could not be treated as separate and that their
claim as tenants in common or as co-sharers was contrary to
his earlier decision which had remained unchallenged. In
view of sub-r. (3) of r. 19, r. 19(2) was held
inapplicable.
On an application under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitu-
tion the High Court disagreed with the view of the Chief
Settlement Commissioner and held r. 19(3) to be inapplicable
when the joint Hindu family consists only of father and his
sons. On this view the order of the departmental
authorities was set aside. The short question which now
falls for our determination in this appeal is whether the
sons of Kishanchand Dayaram Vachhani are entitled to claim
the benefit of r. 19(2) which has been granted by the High
Court on their writ petition in disagreement with the view
of the departmental authorities which excluded the claim of
the sons under r. 19(3). Rule 19 may here be re-ad
"Special provision for payment of compensation to joint
families :
(1) Where a claim relates to properties left by the members
of an undivided Hindu family in West Pakistan (hereafter
referred to as the joint family) compensation shall be
computed in the manner hereinafter provided in this rule.
(2) Where on the 26th September, 1955 hereinafter referred
to ’as the relevant date the joint family consisted of
(a) two or three members entitled to claim partition, the
compensation payable to such family shall be computed by
dividing the verified claim into two equal shares and
calculating the compensation separately on each such share,
(b) four or more members entitled to claim partition, the
compensation payable to such family shall be computed by
dividing the verified claim into three equal shares and
calculating ’the compensation separately on each such share.
(3) For the purpose of calculating the number of the
members of a joint family under sub-rule (2), a person who
on the relevant date:--
(a) was less than 18 years of age,
443
(b) was a lineal descendant in the main line of another’
living member of joint Hindu family entitled to claim
partition shall be excluded :
Provided that where a member of a joint family has died
during the period commencing on the 14th August, 1947 and
ending on the relevant date leaving behind on the relevant
date all or -any of the following heirs namely:
(a) a widow or widows,
(b) a son or sons (whatever the age of such son or sons)
but no lineal ascendant in the main line, then all such
heirs shall, notwithstanding anything contained in this
rule, be reckoned as one member of the joint Hindu family.
Explanation :-For the purpose of this rule, the question
whether a family is joint or separate shall be determined
with reference to the status of the family on the 14th day
of August, 1947 and every member of a joint family shall be
deemed to be joint notwithstanding the fact that he had
separated from the family after that date."
According to the High Court the other living member of the
joint Hindu family whose lineal descendants are to be
excluded under sub-r. (3) (b) must be a person other than
their own father. This view, in our opinion, is’ contrary
to the plain words used in this sub-rule. The High Court
expressed its opinion in these words
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"It is clear that this condition is intended to apply to a
case where a joint family consists of more than two persons
where each -one of them is entitled to claim partition and
the members sought to be excluded are lineal descendants of
one of such members. It is only in such cases that it could
be said that they were lineal descendants of -a member who
was’ entitled to claim partition against another. In the
present case the father and each of the sons is entitled to
claim partition against each other. If the lineal
descendants are to be excluded even in a case like the
present it only means that all the descendants of the father
must be excluded even though there is no other member
against whom the father can seek to enforce partition.
Having regard to the words used the only interpretation
which can be placed on clause (b) of sub-rule (3) of r. 19,
is the one adopted by us."
444
The error into which the -High Court seems to have fallen is
that it has assumed that a person against whom partition can
be claimed by the father’ of the lienal descendants
constituting the joint Hindu family must be some member of
that family other than his lienal descendants and that it
excludes his right to claim partition when -the only other
members of the joint family are his own lineal descendants.
Far this assumption there does not seem to us to be any.
justification either in the language or in the scheme of the
Act and the rules or in any other provision of law
applicable to the parties before us and governing the
present controversy.
According to the general provisions of Hindu law the father
in a joint Hindu family has the power to partition the joint
family property and indeed in the present case the High
Court has accepted the legal position that the father and
-each of his sons are entitled to claim partition against
each other. It is only on the language of r. 19(3) and as
the judgment under appeal suggests, on that Court’s
disinclination to accept as proper, the exclusion of the
sons when the, joint family consists only of the father and
his sons that the High Court-construed r. 19(3) in the,
manner stated above. We are unable to find any warrant for
this view. The plain reading of r. 19(3) is against it.
The language is not susceptible of the meaning that there
should be in existence some member of the joint family other
than the sons, against whom the father should be entitled to
claim partition. The words of the sub-rule being plain and
unambiguous they have, in our view, to be construed in their
natural and ordinary sense. No cogent reason has been
suggested for departing from the rule of literal
construction in this case. The consequence flowing from.
this construction is quite intelligible and seems to us to
be rational and logical. The special provision embodied in
r. 19 for paying compensation to joint Hindu families is, in
our view, intended to treat a joint Hindu family consisting
only of a father and his sons as one, unit for the purpose
of payment of compensation for the joint family property
left in Pakistan. Such a joint -family is not intended to
be broken up by the statutory scheme of the Act and the
Rules. Sub-rule (3) (b) of r. 19 was, in our opinion
correctly construed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner and
the High Court was wrong in disagreeing with it and in
allowing the writ petition. The appeal accordingly succeeds
and is allowed with costs.
V.P.S. Appeal
allowed.
445
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