Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
SHAIK HANIF, GUDMA MAJHI & KAMAL SAHA
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF WEST BENGAL
DATE OF JUDGMENT01/02/1974
BENCH:
SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH
BENCH:
SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH
KRISHNAIYER, V.R.
CITATION:
1974 AIR 679 1974 SCR (3) 258
1974 SCC (1) 637
CITATOR INFO :
R 1974 SC 806 (21)
R 1974 SC 816 (3)
D 1974 SC 832 (3,6,8)
F 1974 SC 889 (3)
F 1974 SC 895 (3)
R 1974 SC 917 (14)
F 1974 SC1739 (4)
D 1974 SC1814 (6)
R 1974 SC2120 (6)
RF 1974 SC2240 (1)
D 1974 SC2337 (15)
F 1975 SC 255 (1)
R 1975 SC1508 (7)
RF 1976 SC1207 (560)
RF 1980 SC1983 (4)
R 1984 SC 444 (26)
R 1990 SC1361 (12)
R 1990 SC1455 (12)
F 1992 SC 687 (11)
ACT:
Maintenance of Internal Security Act--If counter-affidavit
to be sworn by the District Magistrate himself and under
what circumstances--"Veteran copper wire stealer"--meaning
of.
HEADNOTE:
Since the matters are similar, the facts of W.P. No. 1679 of
1973 are as follows:
The petitioner was arrested u/s. 3, sub section (1) and (2)
of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971. The
grounds of detention were that the petitioner, on 3-7-72,
alongwith his associates kept concealed 20 bundles of
Telegraph copper wire in his court-yard under ground with a
view to dispose the same at an opportune moment. The said
telegraph wire were recovered on 3-7-72 on the basis of the
confession made by his associates. The petitioner was,
therefore, arrested because he was acting in a manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services
essential to the community.
The detention order was challenged on various grounds :-(i)
That the counter-affidavit on behalf of the State of West
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Bengal was sworn by the Deputy Secretary and not by the
District Magistrate, on the basis of whose subjective
satisfaction the detention order was made and therefore, it
was illegal.
(ii)From the counter-affidavit, it was clear that there
were "reliable informations" and material other than the
solitary ground of detention communicated to the detenu and
so, the detenu was unable to make an. effective
representation. Therefore, the detention order was
violative of clause (5) of Art. "I of the Constitution of
India etc.
Allowing the petitions,
HELD : (1) When a Rule Nisi is issued in a habeas corpus
petition, it is incumbent upon the State to satisfy the
court that the detention of the petitioner was legal and in
conformity not only with the mandatory provisions of .he
Act, but is also in accord with the requirements of Cl. (5)
of Art. 22 of the Constitution. [262 EJ
Niranjan Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh A.I.R. 1972 S.C.
2215, referred to.
(2)Since the Court is precluded from testing the
subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority by
objective standards, it is all the more desirable that in
response to the Rule Nisi, the counter-affidavit on behalf
of the State should be sworn to by the District Magistrate
or the authority on whose subjective satisfaction the
detention order was made. If for sufficient reason shown to
the satisfaction of the Court that the affidavit of the
person who passed the detention order could not be
furnished, the counter-affidavit should be sworn by some
responsible officer who personally dealt with the case in
the Govt. Secretariat etc. [262 E-F]
In the present case, the deponent did not swear that he had
at any relevant time personally dealt with the case of the
detenu and secondly, the explanation given for not
furnishing the affidavit of the District Magistrate due to
his transfer from that District, was far from satisfactory.
Ranjit Dam v. State of West Bengal A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 1753 and
J. N. Roy v. State of West Bengal A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2143
referred to.
259
(3)The failure to furnish the counter-affidavit of the
Magistrate who passedthe order of detention is an
impropriety. However, in most cases, it mayDot be of much
consequence; but in a few cases, for instance. where mala
fides or extraneous considerations are attributed to the
detaining authority, it may, taken in conjunction with other
circumstances, assume the shape of a serious infirmity. [263
C]
(4)In the counter-affidavit, it was mentioned that the
detenu was a "veteran copper wire stealer" and there were
"reliable information" before the District Magistrate.
Those reliable information were withheld. The
words ..veteran copper wire stealer" also implied a long
course of repetitive, thievery of copper-wire, it is
manifest that but for those "reliable information" showing
that the detenu was repeatedly and habitually stealing
copper wire, the District Magistrate might not have passed
the detention order in question. Further, from the
’Criminal Biography, supplied by the State, it was clear
that all material particulars of the ground of detention
necessary to enable the detenu to make an effective
representation were not communicated to the detenu. Hence,
the impugned order of detention is violative of Art. 22(5)
of the Constitution and therefore, liable to be quashed.
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Similarly, the other two petitions were also allowed on the
ground that material particulars were not communicated to
the detenues and therefore, the detentions were illegal.
[263 G- 264 C]
JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition- Nos. 1679, 1662 and
1681 of 1973.
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution for issue of a writ in
the nature of Habeas Corpus.)
R. K. Jain, amicus curiae for the Petitioner.
M. M. Kshatriya and G. S. Chatterjee for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SARKARIA J.-This judgment will dispose of all the three
petitions above-mentioned under Article 32 of the
Constitution of India. It will be convenient to first take
up Writ Petition No. 1679 of 1973.
The petitioner Shaik Hanif, aged 40 years, was arrested on
February 23, 1973 in pursuance of a detention order, dated
February 19, 1973, passed by the District Magistrate, West
Dinajpur in West Bengal under sub-s. (1) read with sub-s.
(2) of s.3 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971
(for short, ’the Act’). On February 19, 1973, the District
Magistrate reported about his detention to the State Govern-
ment which approved it on March 1, 1973. The detenu made a
representation which was rejected by the State Government on
April 5, 1973 and forwarded to the Advisory Board for
consideration. The Board reported to the State Government
on April 24. 1973 that there was sufficient cause for the
detention. Thereupon the Government confirmed the order of
detention under s.12(1) of the Act and directed that the
detention of the petitioner would continue "till the
expiration of 12 months from the date of his detention or
until the expiry of Defence of India Act of 1971 whichever
is later."
The grounds of detention as conveyed to the detenu under P.
8(1), read as under :
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"You are being detained in pursuance of a
detention order on the ground that you have
been acting in a manner prejudicial to the
maintenance of supplies and services essential
to the community, as evidenced by the
particulars given below :
On 3-7-72 at dead of night you along with your
associates kept concealed 20 bundles, of
Telegraph copper wire weighing 2 qutls. 60
kgs. in your court-yard under earth with a
view to dispose of the same in opportune
moment. The said Telegraph copper wire were
recovered on 3-7-72 on the basis of the
confession of your associates. The police
seized those copper wire and arrested your
associate but you evaded arrest. This
activity of yours seriously affected one of
the essential services to the community by
disrupting Telegraph facilities to the public
and thus you acted in a manner prejudicial to
the maintenance of supplies and services
essential to the community.
You are hereby informed that you may make a
representation to the State Government against
the detention order your case shall be placed
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before the Advisory Board within thirty days
from the’ date of your detention under the
order.
You are also informed that under Section 11
(Act 26 of 1971) the Advisory Board, shall if
you desire to be heard, hear you in person.
Sd/- K. L. Gupta 19-2-73.
District Magistrate, West Dinajpur,
Balurghat".
In answer to the Rule Nisi issued by this
Court, Shri Sukuniar Sen, Deputy Secretary,
Home (Special) Department, Government of West
Bengal filed the counter-affidavit, explaining
that the district Magistrate who passed the
order of detention "is at present not
available for affirming the affidavit as he
has been transferred from the said District".
In para 4 of the affidavit, it is stated :
"It appears from the records that after
receiving reliable information relating to the
illegal anti-social and prejudicial activities
of the above-named detenu-petitioner relating
to the maintenance of supplies and services
essential to the community, the said
District
Magistrate of West Dinajpur passed order of
detention against him under the provisions of
the said Act."
In para 7, it is averred
"I further state that it appears from the
record that the petitioner is a veteran copper
wire stealer. It was found on 3-7-72 that the
petitioner and his associates kept concealed
about 20 bundles of telegraph cable wire
underground in the court-yard of his house
with a view to dispose the same at opportune
moment. The said removal of copper wire from
261
the telegraph lines resulted in disruption of
telegraph service and he was detained under
the said Act".
In paragraph 9 of the affidavit it is inter alia stated that
the "statements made in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 are
based on information derived from the records kept in the
office of the State Government in its Home Department
(Special Section), which I verily believe to be true."
Mr. R. K. Jain, who assisted the Court as amicus curiae
advanced these contentions in support of the petition : (1)
After the issue of Rule Nisi by this Court, it was incumbent
upon the Respondent-State to satisfy the Court about the
legality of the detention by producing the affidavit of the
District Magistrate who had. passed the detention order.
The counter-affidavit of the Deputy Secretary who did not
personally deal with the case at any stage, is no substitute
for the affidavit of the District Magistrate on the basis of
whose subjective, satisfaction, the detention has been
effected. The omission to file the counter-affidavit of the
District Magistrate coupled with the other circumstances of
the case, shows that the detention order was passed in an
utterly casual way, without application of mind and it was
therefore, illegal; (2) From the counter-affidavit of the
Deputy Secretary, it appears that there were "reliable
information" and material (other than the solitary ground of
detention communicated to the detenu) before the detaining
authority on the basis of which it was satisfied that the
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petitioner was a "veteran copper wire stealer" and had been
indulging in "illegal anti-social activities prejudicial to
the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the
community". Since the, nondisclosure of that information or
material lo the detenu is not sought to be justified under
clause (6) of Article 22, on the ground of its being facts
which the detaining authority considers to be against the
public interest to disclose, it was incumbent upon the
authority to communicate the detenu that information and
material in full. Since this was not done, the detenu was
unable to make an :effective representation. The detention
order was thus violative of the mandate of clause (5) of
Article 22, and liable to be struck down on that score; (3)
The Act is violative of Articles 19 and 21 of the
Constitution because its :-
(a) Section 3 makes no provision for an
objective determination of the truth of the
allegations that form the basis of action
under that section;
(b) Section 8 does not provide for
consideration of the representation of the
detenu by an impartial body in accordance with
the principles of natural justice;
(c) Section It enables the Advisory Board to
base its report on the material received by
the Board from the Officer passing the order
of detention without the said report
being disclosed to the detenu and without
affording him an opportunity to controvert the
contents of the said report;
262
(d) Sections 11 and 12 empower the Advisory
Board and the State Government, as the. case
may be,. to take, into consideration materials
and information without giving the detenu an
opportunity to make his submissions with
regard to those materials or to adduce
evidence to disprove the allegations levelled
against him.
(4) (a) The continuance of Emergency in as much as it
suspends Fundamental Rights, indefinitely under an executive
fiat is unconstitutional. What the Parliament cannot
destroy in exercise of its amendatory powers under Article
368, a fortiori, the President cannot bury by embalming and
encasing the same in a Proclamation of Emergency.
Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Article 19 are essential
features of the, Constitution and their indefinite
suspension under the cloak of Emergency, amounts to their
destruction; (b) In forming in opinion as to the necessity
of proclaiming Emergency under Article 352 of the
Constitution, the President has to act on certain objective
facts open to judicial scrutiny. The war having ended more
than two years ago, there is no justification for continuing
the Proclamation of Emergency.
We will take up contentions (1) and (2) together..
As was pointed out by this Court in Natarajan Singh v. State
of Madhya Pradesh,(1) where in a habeas corpus petition a
Rule Nisi is issued, it is incumbent upon the State to
satisfy the Court that the detention of the petitioner was
legal and in conformity not only with the mandatory
provisions of the Act, but is also in accord with the
requirements implicit in clause (5) of Article 22 of the
Constitution. Since the Court is precluded from testing the
subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority by
objective standards, it is all the more desirable that in
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response to the Rule Nisi the counter-affidavit on behalf of
the State should be sworn to by the District Magistrate or
the authority on whose subjective satisfaction the detention
order under s.3 was passed. If for sufficient reason shown
to the satisfaction of the Court, the affidavit of the
person who passed the order of detention under s.3 cannot be
furnished, the counter-affidavit should be sworn by some
responsible officer who personally dealt with or processed
the case in the Government Secretariat or submitted it to
the Minister or other Officer duly authorised under the
rules of business framed by the Governor under Article 166
of the Constitution to pass orders on behalf of the
Government in such matters.
In the instant case, the counter-affidavit of Shri Sukumar
Sen Deputy Secretary, Home, suffers from two infirmities.
Firstly, the deponent does not swear that he had at any
relevant time personally dealt with the case of the detenu.
He has verified the correctness of the averments in his
affidavit on the basis of facts gathered from tile official
records. Secondly, the explanation given for not furnishing
the affidavit of the District Magistrate who had passed the
detention order, is that the Magistrate has been transferred
from that District. The explanation is far from being
satisfactory.
(1) A. I. R. 1972 S. C. 2215.
263
In Ranjit Dam v. State of West Bengal,(1) the reason given
for not’ making the counter-affidavit by the Magistrate
himself, who had passed the detention order, was that he had
since then been appointed as Secretary of the State
Electricity Board. It was held that the reason, given was
not satisfactory. "Shri Sukumar Sen is incharge of a
specially created cell in the Government Secretariat of West
Bengal, which maintains the records of all persons detained
under the Act. It is true that a similar reason given for
not furnishing the affidavit of the Magistrate who passed
the impugned order, was accepted by this Court in J. N. Roy
v. State of West Bengal,(2) and instead, the counter-
affidavit of the Secretariat official specially entrusted
with detention cases was deemed sufficient. But that was so
because nothing turnedon it. Nevertheless, the failure to
furnish the counter-affidavit of theMagistrate who passed
the order of detention, is an impropriety. In most cases,
it may not be of much consequence but in a few cases, for
instance, where mala fides or extraneous considerations are
attributed: to the Magistrate or the detaining authority, it
may, taken in conjunction with other circumstances, assume
the shape of a serious infirmity, leading the Court to
declare the detention illegal. In the present case, too,
the mere omission to file the affidavit of the District-
Magistrate does not vitiate the detention orders. But it is
a circumstance, among others, in the light of which
contention (2) is to be appreciated.
The Act restricts citizens’ personal liberty which is a
fundamental’ right under the Constitution. It has therefore
to be construed strictly, as far as possible, in favour of
the citizen and in a manner that does not restrict that
right to an extent greater than is necessary to effectuate
that object. The provisions of the Act have, therefore, to
be applied with watchful care and circumspection. It is the
duty of the. court tosee that the efficacy of the limited
yet crucial, safeguards provided in the law of preventive
detention is not lost in mechanical routine, dull casualness
and chill indifference on the part of the authorities
entrusted with their application. Let us therefore see,
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whether there has been sucha careful and strict compliance
with the legal procedure in the instant case.
In the counter-affidavit, the Deputy Secretary has inter
alia, stated that the petitioner is a "veteran copper wire
stealer" and there were "reliable informations" before the
District Magistrate about his antisocial activities
prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services
essential to the community. "Veteran copper wire stealer"
implies a long course of repetitive thievery of copper-wire.
No-one is born a knave: it takes time for one to become so.
It is manifest that but forthose "reliable informations"
showing that the detenu was repeatedly and habitually
stealing copper wire, the District Magistrate, night not
have passed the detention order in question. Those
"reliable information" were withheld. No privilege under
clause (6) of Article 22 has been claimed in respect of
them. Even the main ground viz. that the petitioner is a
"veteran copper wire stealer" was not, as such,,
(1) A. 1. R. 1972 S. C, 1753.
(2) A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2143..
264
communicated to the detenu. The ground intimated was that
"you have been acting in a manner prejudicial to the
Maintenance of Supplies and Services essential to the
community". Only one solitary instance of the recovery of
stolen copper-wire from the petitioner’s house on 3-7-1972
was conveyed to the detenu.
Learned Counsel for the State has been fair enough to
collect and place before us what the Deputy Secretary in his
counter-affidavit called "reliable information" on the basis
of which the District Magistrate ordered the detention. In
this, under the caption "Criminal Biography", is mentioned
inter alia, how the petitioner with his associates organised
a gang to steal telegraph copper wire systematically.
From what has been said above, it is clear as day light that
all material particulars of the ground of detention which
were necessary ,to enable--the detenu to make an effective
representation, were not communicated to him. The impugned
order of detention is thus ,violative of Article 22(5) of
the Constitution, and is liable to be quashed on that score
alone.
In view of the above finding, it is not necessary to decide
the. .remaining contentions canvassed by Mr. Jain.
Now we take up Writ Petition No. 1662 of 1973. In this case
also, Shri Sukumar Sen, Deputy Secretary in his counter-
affidavit .averred that the detenu was a "veteran copper
wire stealer" and that the District Magistrate, Burdwan, had
passed the order of the petitioner’s detention on receipt of
reliable information about the illegal, anti-.social and
prejudicial activities of the petitioner. Here also, all
the ’material information’ showing or even alleging how the
petitioner was a "veteran copper wire stealer" was not
communicated to him. Only two instances of theft of
electric copper wire which took place on November 6, 1971
and November 25, 1971 were intimated to him.
Learned Counsel for the State has placed for our perusal a
copy of History Sheet of the detenu on receiving which, the
District Magistrate had passed the impugned order of
detention. Among other facts, it is mentioned therein that
on November 3, 1973, also, the petitioner alongwith his two
associates had committed theft of, electric copper wire
measuring 125 ft. from the electric poles near Hatgarui and
a case under section 379, Penal Code was registered in
Police Station Asansol on the same date, relating to this
theft. It is further stated that "from his boyhood the
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petitioner started mixing up with anti-social elements,
wagon-breakers and in course of time, he along with his
associates, indulged in thefts of iron materials, copper-
wire and other forms of crime".
All this matter including that concerning the theft dated
November 3, 1973, was admittedly not communicated to the
detenu. Its non to the detenu is not being justified as
privileged under Article 22(6). Thus in this case also, all
the material or adequate particulars relatable to the ground
intimated, were not conveyed to the detenu. It is not
possible to predicate how far the mind of the ,detaining
authority was influenced in passing the order of detention
by the uncommunicative material. By this omission, the
petitioner’s
265.
constitutional right of making an effective representation
was seriously. jeopardised.
In the result the detention of the petitioner (Gudma Majhi)
must be held to be illegal.
In Writ Petition No. 1681 of 1973, the ground of detention
as communicated to the petitioner, Kamal Saha, ran as under
:
"That on 10-12-1972 at about 19-30 hrs. you
and your associates being armed with daggers
put all the passengers to fear of death of a
IInd Class Compartment of 162 Dn. train at New
Barrackpore R.S. and committed robbery in
respect of one bundle of woollen Shawl
containing 90 pieces valued at Rs. 9500/- from
Golam Kadar Kashmiri of 96 Ripon Street
Calcutta-16, you were subsequently arrested.
44 pieces of shawl valued a Rs. 4500/- were
recovered later on. Your action caused panic,
confusion and disturbed public order then and
there, you have thus acted in a. manner
prejudicial to the maintenance of public
order".
In Para 7 of counter-affidavit, Shri Sukumar
Sen, Deputy Secretary, stated
"that it appears from the records that the
petitioner is a veteran Railway Criminal and
was indulging in committing robbery in running
sub-urban trains. It appears that on 10-12-
1972 at about 19-30 hours the petitioner and
his associates armed with daggers, committed
robbery in a III class Railway
Compartment......"
The history-sheet communicated by the Superintendent of
Police to,, the detaining authority states that "he formed
and organised a gang and started committing robbery in
Sealdah Bongaon Railway Section., This gang is so desperate
that nor body of the locality resists them,. even if they
commit robbery and other offences even in their very
presence. They always move with deadly weapons such as
pype-guns, daggers, bombs etc. by which they intimidate the
local people."
Thereafter, instances of two robberies committed by him
along with his associates, on January 30, 197Z and August 1,
1972, are, mentioned. The particulars of any past crime
committed by him, which were necessary for showing how he
was a veteran railway criminal, were not communicated to the
detenu. In respect of the uncommunicative material, nor
privilege under Art. 22(6) was claimed’.
266
In the absence of those material particulars, the detenu
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could not ,exercise his constitutional right of making an
effective representation. In other words, the grounds
communicated to the petitioner suffered .from vagueness.
For the reasons aforesaid, all the three petitions are
allowed and the petitioner in each of them is directed to be
set at liberty forthwith.
Nothing in this judgment, however shall preclude, the State
Government /District Magistrate, if so advised, from passing
fresh orders of the detention of the petitioners or any of
them, after full and meticulous ’compliance with the
procedure prescribed by law.
S.C.
Petitions allowed.
267