Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 8818-8830 of 2003
PETITIONER:
Parsottambhai Maganbhai Patel and Ors.
RESPONDENT:
State of Gujarat through Deputy Collector Modasa and Anr.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/09/2005
BENCH:
B. P. SINGH & S. B. SINHA
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
B.P. SINGH, J.
These appeals by special leave are directed against the
common judgment and order of the High Court of Gujarat at
Ahemdabad dated November 7, 2000 in First Appeals Nos.7957 to
7969 of 1999 whereby the High Court held that the application for
making a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act
was barred by limitation.
The facts of the case are few and undisputed. Pursuant to
acquisition proceeding taken under the Land Acquisition Act, an
award was declared under Section 11 of the Act on January 17,
1982. The respondents filed an application for making a reference
under Section 18 of the Act on September 22, 1988. The High
Court held that since the application for making a reference under
Section 18 of the Act was filed beyond the period of six months
from the date of declaration of the award, the same was barred by
limitation. Hence, the High Court allowed the appeals preferred by
the State of Gujarat and quashed the judgment and awards passed
by the Reference Court in Land References Cases referred to it for
adjudication.
The High Court considered the case in the light of the
provisions of Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. It, firstly,
held that the claimants were not present when the award was made
and, therefore, Section 18 (2) (a) was not attracted. It, then, held
that the State had not been able to establish that a notice under
Section 12 (2) of the Act was issued and served upon the claimant.
Thus, the first part of Section 18(2)(b) was also not attracted. It,
therefore, held that the limitation prescribed under the latter part of
Section 18 (2) (b) applied in the case and held that the application
under Section 18 ought to have been filed within six months from
the date of the declaration of the award. Since the application for
reference was made beyond the period of six months from the date
of declaration of the award, the same was barred by time.
Counsel for the claimants-appellants urged that the High
Court clearly erred in law in holding the reference application to be
barred by time inasmuch as the appellants were not present when
the award was made nor were they served with notices under
Section 12(2) of the Act. In fact the appellants had no knowledge
of the date of declaration of the award till July, 1988 when
compensation was paid to them. It was only then that they came to
know that the award had been declared on January 17, 1982.
The learned Assistant Judge, Sabarkantha District at
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Himmatnagar by his judgment and order of April 21, 1999
recorded a finding that the application under Section 18 of the Act
made on September 22, 1988 was not barred by limitation. This
finding is based on the fact that the claimants had been paid
compensation in July, 1988 and the application under Section 18
was made on September 22, 1988. There was no evidence to prove
that notice under Section 12(2) was even served on the appellants.
In these circumstances, he held that the application under Section
18 of the Act was within time. In sum and substance, the Assistant
Judge computed the period of limitation from the date of
knowledge of the award in July, 1988.
Learned counsel for the appellant rightly placed reliance
upon the judgment of this Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh
Vs. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and another : AIR 1961
SC 1500 and submitted that since the appellants were not present
when the award was made, and no notice was given to them under
Section 12(2) of the Act, the application for making a reference
under Section 18 of the Act must be held to be within time if it is
filed within six months of the date of knowledge of the declaration
of the award. In our view, the submission is sound and must be
accepted. This Court in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra)
was dealing with a case in which an award was declared under the
Act on March 25, 1951. No notice under Section 12(2) of the Act
was given to the claimants. It was only on January 12, 1953 that
the claimants came to know about the declaration of the award
whereafter they filed an application claiming a reference under
Section 18 of the Act on February 24, 1953. The High Court of
Allahabad held that the case fell under the latter part of Clause (b)
of the proviso to Section 18 and since the application made by the
appellant before the Land Acquisition Officer for claiming a
reference under Section 18 was made beyond six months from the
date of the award in question, it was beyond time. This view of the
High Court was overruled by this Court and in doing so the Court
made the following pertinent observations:-
"Therefore, if the award made by the Collector is
in law no more than an offer made on behalf of the
Government to the owner of the property then the
making of the award as properly understood must
involve the communication of the offer to the party
concerned. That is the normal requirement under
the contract law and its applicability to cases of
award made under the Act cannot be reasonably
excluded. Thus considered the date of the award
cannot be determined solely by reference to the
time when the award is signed by the Collector or
delivered by him in his office: it must involve the
consideration of the question as to when it was
known to the party concerned either actually or
constructively. If that be the true position then the
literal and mechanical construction of the words
"the date of the award" occurring in the relevant
section would not be appropriate.
(6) There is yet another point which leads to
the same conclusion. If the award is treated as an
administrative decision taken by the Collector in
the matter of the valuation of the property sought
to be acquired it is clear that the said decision
ultimately affects the rights of the owner of the
property and in that sense, like all decisions which
affects persons, it is essentially fair and just that
the said decision should be communicated to the
said party. The knowledge of the party affected by
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such a decision, either actual or constructive, is an
essential element which must be satisfied before
the decision can be brought into force. Thus
considered the making of the award cannot consist
merely in the physical act of writing the award or
signing it or even filing it in the office of the
Collector; it must involve the communication of
the said award to the party concerned either
actually or constructively. If the award is
pronounced in the presence of the party whose
rights are affected by it it can be said to be made
when pronounced. If the date for the
pronouncement of the award is commnunicated to
the party and it is accordingly pronounced on the
date previously announced the award is said to be
communicated to the said party even if the said
party is not actually present on the date of its
pronouncement. Similarly if without notice of the
date of its pronouncement an award is pronounced
and a party is not present the award can be said to
be made when it is communicated to the party
later. The knowledge of the party affected by the
award, either actual or constructive, being an
essential requirement of fair-ply and natural justice
the expression "the date of the award" used in the
proviso must mean the date when the award is
either communicated to the party or is known by
him either actually or constructively. In our
opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to
construe the words "from the date of the
Collector’s award" used in the proviso to S.18 in
literal or mechanical way".
This Court, therefore, held that the limitation under the latter
part of section 18(2)(b) of the Act has to be computed having
regard to the date on which the claimants got knowledge of the
declaration of the award either actual or constructive. This
principle, however, will apply only to cases where the applicant
was not present or represented when the award was made, or where
no notice under Section 12(2) was served upon him. It will also
apply to a case where the date for the pronouncement of the award
is communicated to the parties and it is accordingly pronounced on
the date previously announced by the Court, even if, the parties are
not actually present on the date of its pronouncement. Coming to
the facts of the instant case the High Court has not rejected the plea
of the appellants that they came to know of the award only when
compensation was being paid to them in July, 1988. They had
admittedly no notice under Section 12(2) of the Act. They had
therefore filed the application under Section 18 of the Act on
September 22, 1988 well within the period of limitation. The
Reference Court recorded a finding in favour of the appellants but
the High Court has reversed that finding without applying the
principle laid down in Raja Harish Chandra (supra). Moreover,
we find from the grounds of appeal filed before the High Court that
the assertion of the claimants that they came to know of the
declaration of the award only when compensation was being paid
to them in July, 1988, has not even been challenged.
We are, therefore, of the view that these appeals must be
allowed. We, accordingly, allow these appeals and set aside the
finding of the High Court that the application for reference under
Section 18 of the Act was barred by limitation. However, since the
appeals have not been disposed of on merit, we remit the matter to
the High Court for disposal of the appeals on merit in accordance
with law.
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