Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2534 OF 2011
Princl. Chief Conservator of Forest & Anr. …. Appellants
Versus
J.K. Johnson & Ors. ….Respondents
JUDGMENT
R.M. Lodha, J.
The significant and important question raised in this
appeal, by special leave, is : whether a specified officer empowered
under Section 54(1) of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 as
amended by the Wild Life (Protection) Amendment Act, 2002 (Act
16 of 2003) to compound offences has power, competence and
authority, on payment of a sum of money by way of composition of
1
the offence by a person who is suspected to have committed offence
against the Act, to order forfeiture of the seized items?
2. The above question arises in this way. In the intervening
night of July 24/25, 2004, at the Pothamsettipalli, Cross Roads, the
vehicles were being checked by the Sub-Inspector of Police,
Kulcharam Police Station, District Medak. In the course of the
checking, at 2.45 a.m. a jeep bearing Registration No. AP – 12 – D
703 was also stopped and checked. The said jeep was occupied by
the present respondent nos. 1, 2 and 3 and two other persons. On
checking, the Sub-Inspector of Police found one gunny bag tied to
the front side of the bumper of the jeep. The gunny bag had two
bags inside; one bag contained a hunted wild boar and the other
had three rabbits. The seizure panchnama was prepared
immediately at 3.30 a.m. The jeep, a battery, a torchlight, dead
animals and two rifles of foreign make fitted with telescope were
seized. The persons (including respondent nos. 1 to 3 who were
occupying the jeep) were taken into custody and a case (Crime No.
43 of 2004) was registered against them under Section 9 of the Wild
Life (Protection) Act, 1972 (for short, ‘the 1972 Act’). The Division
Forest Officer, Medak was also immediately informed.
2
3. On July 25, 2004 itself, the Divisional Forest Officer,
Medak recorded the statement of respondent nos. 1 to 3 and two
other persons. They gave some explanation with regard to the
gunny bag containing wild pig and three rabbits and the rifles in their
possession but stated that the offence was done by them in
ignorance and they were willing to pay money by way of composition
of the offence.
4. On August 10, 2004, the Conservator of Forests,
Nizamabad Circle, Nizamabad on the report submitted by the
Divisional Forest Officer, Medak that the accused persons
(Respondent Nos. 1 to 3) had offered for compounding the offence
and they were willing to pay the money by way of composition of the
offence, ordered that the offence be compounded for Rs. 30,000/-
under Section 54 of the 1972 Act and the vehicle and the weapons
used in committing the offence be forfeited.
5. The respondent no. 1 challenged the above order in
appeal before the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests, Andhra
Pradesh. The Principal Chief Conservator of Forests although by
his order dated October 9, 2004 held that appeal was not
maintainable but asked the Conservator of Forests, Nizamabad to
reduce the composition fee from Rs. 30,000/- to Rs. 25,000/- . The
3
respondent no. 1 was asked by the Principal Chief Conservator of
Forests to approach the Conservator of Forests, Nizamabad for
further action.
6. The Conservator of Forests, Nizamabad then passed a
fresh order on November 4, 2004 permitting the respondent nos. 1
to 3 to compound the offence for Rs. 25,000/-. The seized items
viz; vehicle No. AP – 12 – D 703 and two rifles were ordered to be
forfeited to the state government. It was also ordered that if the
offenders fail to pay compounding fee within seven days, necessary
action against them for their prosecution under Section 51 of the
1972 Act may be taken.
7. The respondent nos. 1, 2 and 3 challenged the above
three orders insofar as forfeiture of the vehicle and two rifles to the
state government was concerned in a writ petition filed under Article
226 of the Constitution of India before the Andhra Pradesh High
Court.
8. The Single Judge of the High Court, on hearing the
parties, by his judgment dated March 29, 2005 set aside the order
of forfeiture of the vehicle and the two rifles.
9. The present appellants—the Principal Chief Conservator
of Forests, Hyderabad and the Conservator of Forests, Nizamabad –
4
preferred intra-court appeal against the order of the Single Judge.
The Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the intra-court
appeal and maintained the order of the Single Judge. This is how
the present appeal has reached this Court.
10. We heard Mr. R. Sundervardhan, learned senior counsel
for the appellants and Mr. Jayant Kumar Mehta, learned counsel for
the contesting respondent nos. 1 to 3.
11. Mr. R. Sundervardhan, learned senior counsel for the
appellants invited our attention to Section 54 of the 1972 Act,
particularly sub-section (2) thereof prior to its amendment by Act 16
of 2003 and the amended Section 54 (2) whereby the portion, “the
property other than Government property, if any, seized, shall be
released” has been omitted and submitted that the legislative
intent was clear that release of seized items was not permissible and
it was competent for the specified officer empowered to compound
offences to order forfeiture of the seized items to the state
government. In this regard, learned senior counsel also referred to
Section 39 (1)(d) of the 1972 Act and submitted that the property
seized from a person accused of commission of an offence against
the 1972 Act, irrespective of the fact that offence has been
compounded, stands forfeited and the property becomes the
5
property of the state government or central government, as the case
may be.
12. Mr. R. Sundervardhan, learned senior counsel would
submit that the Statement of Objects and Reasons of Act 16 of 2003
leaves no manner of doubt that one of the objects sought to be
achieved by the amendment was to provide that the vehicles,
vessel, weapons, tools etc. used in committing compoundable
offences are not returned to the offenders. He argued that
legislative intent and policy must be given due regard.
13. Learned senior counsel for the appellants would also
contend that compounding of the offences under Section 54 is not
during the course of a trial or in the trial of a compoundable offence
and, therefore, an order of empowered officer in compounding the
offence is not an order of acquittal; it is plain and simple
departmental compounding. He urged that the effect of the
compounding offences, as provided in Section 320(8) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (for short, ‘the Code’) is not applicable
to the compounding of offences under Section 54 of the 1972 Act as
amended by Act 16 of 2003. He also referred to two decisions of
this Court (i) Sewpujanrai Indrasanrai Ltd. v. Collector of Customs
6
1
and Ors. to draw distinction between the expressions, “offender”,
“offence” and “confiscation” and (ii) Biswabahan Das v. Gopen
2
Chandra Hazarika and Ors. , particularly, paragraphs 8, 9 and 13
thereof. Learned senior counsel, thus, submitted that the view of the
High Court in quashing the order of forfeiture of the seized items is
contrary to the statutory provisions in the 1972 Act as amended by
Act 16 of 2003.
14. On the other hand, Mr. Jayant Kumar Mehta, learned
counsel for respondent nos. 1 to 3 stoutly supported the view of the
High Court. He submitted that Section 54 did not expressly
empower the specified officer to order forfeiture of property in the
event of composition of the offence. He submitted that the
Statement of Objects and Reasons of Act 16 of 2003 cannot be
acted upon in the absence of clear and explicit provision for
forfeiture of property in Section 54 of the 1972 Act. Learned counsel
submitted that the submission of the learned senior counsel for the
appellants that regardless of composition of offence, the property
seized from a person accused of commission of an offence against
the 1972 Act stands forfeited under Section 39, if accepted, would
not only result in anomaly but also lead to vesting of unguided,
1
AIR 1958 SC 845
2
(1967) 1 SCR 447
7
arbitrary or unconstitutional power in the hands of the empowered
officer.
15. Mr. Jayant Kumar Mehta, learned counsel for
respondent nos. 1 to 3 argued that the plain language of Section 39
(1)(d) does not give sanction to an officer empowered under Section
54 of the 1972 Act to forfeit seized items under the provisions of
the Act on composition of offence. He submitted that the expression
used in Section 39 (1)(d) is, “……… that has been used for
committing an offence …………. “ and not, “ ……… is suspected to
have been used for committing an offence……….”.
16. Learned counsel for respondent nos. 1 to 3 also referred
to Section 50, Section 51(2) and Section 53 of the 1972 Act and
submitted that if the interpretation canvassed by the learned senior
counsel for the appellants is accepted, that would render Section
50(4), Section 51(2) and Section 53 superfluous. He argued that
even in cases of casus omissus , the court should not supply any
words which are found to be missing in the enactment. The
Statement of Objects and Reasons cannot be read to supplement or
supplant a statutory provision much less a source of power and in
any event, the penal provisions in the 1972 Act are required to be
construed strictly. He relied upon the Full Bench decision of the
8
Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Madhukar Rao S/o Malik
3
Rao v. State of M.P. and others and the judgment of this Court in
4
State of Madhya Pradesh and Others v. Madhukar Rao affirming
the Full Bench decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court. He also
relied upon decisions of this Court in A.C. Sharma v. Delhi
5
Administration ; State of Maharashtra v. Marwanjee F. Desai and
6 7
Others ; Prakash Kumar alias Prakash Bhutto v. State of Gujarat ;
8
Mohd. Shahabuddin v. State of Bihar and others and Mandvi
9
Cooperative Bank Limited v. Nimesh B. Thakore .
17. Mr. R. Sundervardhan, learned senior counsel, in
rejoinder, distinguished the decision of this Court in the case of
4 4
Madhukar Rao . He submitted that the issue in Madhukar Rao and
the issue raised in the present appeal are distinct and even on facts
4
the case of Madhukar Rao is distinguishable. He submitted that
Section 54 of the 1972 Act as amended by Act 16 of 2003 was not
4
under consideration in Madhukar Rao .
18. For a proper consideration of the question raised before
us as noted above, it is necessary to read few relevant sections of
3
2000 (1) MPLJ 289
4
(2008) 14 SCC 624
5
(1973) 1 SCC 726
6
(2002) 2 SCC 318
7
(2005) 2 SCC 409
8
(2010) 4 SCC 653
9
(2010) 3 SCC 83
9
the 1972 Act prior to amendment by Act 16 of 2003 and Section 54
after amendment with effect from April 1, 2003.
19. The 1972 Act was enacted by the Parliament to provide
for the protection of wild animals and birds and for matters
connected therewith or ancillary or incidental thereto. The Act, inter
alia, seeks to regulate hunting of wild animals and birds; regulate
possession, acquisition or transfer of, or trade in, wild animals,
animal articles and trophies and taxidermy thereof and provide
penalties for contravention of the Act. Pertinently, the 1972 Act has
been subjected to extensive amendments from time to time. It has
been amended by Act 23 of 1982, Act 28 of 1986, Act 44 of 1991,
Act 26 of 1993 and Act 16 of 2003.
20. The relevant portion of Section 39 in Chapter V, ‘Trade
or Commerce in Wild animals, Animal articles and Trophies’ is as
follows :
“ S. 39. Wild animals, etc., to be Government property.—(1)
Every—
(a), (b), (c) x x x x x x
(d) vehicle, vessel, weapon, trap or tool that has been
used for committing an offence and has been seized under
the provisions of this Act,
shall be the property of the State Government, and, where
such animal is hunted in a sanctuary or National Park
10
declared by the Central Government, such animal or any
animal article, trophy, uncured trophy or meat derived from
such animal or any vehicle, vessel, weapon, trap or tool
used in such hunting shall be the property of the Central
Government.
(2), (3) (a), (b), (c) x x x x x x”
21. Chapter VI deals with the prevention and detection of
offences. Section 50 after its amendment by Act 44 of 1991 and Act 16 of
2003 to the extent it is relevant, reads as follows :
“S.50. Power of entry, search, arrest and detention.—
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for
the time being in force, the Director or any other officer
authorised by him in this behalf or the Chief Wild Life
Warden or the authorised officer or any Forest Officer or
any Police Officer not below the rank of a sub-inspector,
may, if he has reasonable grounds for believing that any
person has committed an offence against this Act,—
(a) require any such person to produce for inspection
any captive animal, wild animal, animal article, meat,
trophy, uncured trophy, specified plant or part or derivative
thereof in his control, custody or possession, or any
licence, permit or other document granted to him or
required to be kept by him under the provisions of this Act;
(b) stop any vehicle or vessel in order to conduct
search or inquiry or enter upon and search any premises,
land, vehicle or vessel, in the occupation of such person,
and open and search any baggage or other things in his
possession;
(c) seize any captive animal, wild animal, animal
article, meat, trophy or uncured trophy, or any specified
plant or part or derivative thereof, in respect of which an
offence against this Act appears to have been committed,
in the possession of any person together with any trap,
11
tool, vehicle, vessel or weapon used for committing any
such offence and, unless he is satisfied that such person
will appear and answer any charge which may be preferred
against him, arrest him without warrant, and detain him:
(2) …………………………………………………………….
(3) It shall be lawful for any of the officers referred to in
sub-section (1) to stop and detain any person, whom he
sees doing any act for which a licence or permit is required
under the provisions of this Act, for the purposes of
requiring such person to produce the licence or permit and
if such person fails to produce the licence or permit, as the
case may be, he may be arrested without warrant, unless
he furnishes his name and address, and otherwise satisfies
the officer arresting him that he will duly answer any
summons or other proceedings which may be taken
against him.
(3A) Any officer of a rank not inferior to that of an
Assistant Director of Wild Life Preservation or an Assistant
Conservator of Forests, who, or whose subordinate, has
seized any captive animal or wild animal under clause (c)
of sub-section (1) may give the same for custody on the
execution by any person of a bond for the production of
such animal if and when so required, before the Magistrate
having jurisdiction to try the offence on account of which
the seizure has been made.
(4) Any person detained, or things seized under the
foregoing power, shall forthwith be taken before a
Magistrate to be dealt with according to law under
intimation to the Chief Wild Life Warden or the officer
authorized by him in this regard.
(5) to (9) x x x x x x.
22. The penalties are provided in Section 51 of the 1972
Act. This Section too has undergone changes in 1986, 1991 and
2003. Section 51 has also been amended subsequently by Act 39 of
12
2006 but that is not relevant for our purpose. Sub-section (2) of
Section 51 reads as under:
“S. 51. Penalties.—
(1), (1A), (1B) x x x x x x
(2) When any person is convicted of an offence
against this Act, the court trying the offence may order that
any captive animal, wild animal, animal article, trophy,
uncured trophy, meat, ivory imported into India or an article
made from such ivory, any specified plant, or part or
derivative thereof in respect of which the offence has been
committed, and any trap, tool, vehicle, vessel or weapon,
used in the commission of the said offence be forfeited to
the State Government and that any licence or permit, held
by such person under the provisions of this Act, be
cancelled.
(3), (4), (5) x x x x x x
23. Section 54, prior to amendment by Act 16 of 2003, read
as under :
“S. 54. Power to compound offences.—(1) The
Central Government may, by notification, empower the
Director of Wild Life Preservation or any other officer and
the State Government may, by notification, empower the
Chief Wild Life Warden or any officer of a rank not inferior
to that of a Deputy Conservator of Forests,—
(a) to accept, from any person against whom a
reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed an
offence against this Act, payment of a sum of money by
way of composition of the offence which such person is
suspected to have committed; and
13
(b) when any property has been seized as liable to
be forfeited, to release the same on payment of the value
thereof as estimated by such officer.
(2) On payment of such sum of money or such
value, or both, as the case may be, to such officer, the
suspected person, if in custody, shall be discharged, and
the property, other than Government property, if any,
seized, shall be released and no further proceedings in
respect of the offence shall be taken against such person.
(3) The officer compounding any offence may
order the cancellation of any licence or permit granted
under this Act to the offender, or if not empowered to do
so, may approach an officer so empowered, for the
cancellation of such licence or permit.
(4) The sum of money accepted or agreed to be
accepted as composition under clause (b) of sub-section
(1) shall in no case, exceed the sum of two thousand
rupees:
Provided that no offence, for which a minimum period
of imprisonment has been prescribed in sub-section (1) of
section 51, shall be compounded.”
24. After amendment by Act 16 of 2003, Section 54 reads as
follows :
“S. 54. Power to compound offences.—(1) The Central
Government may, by notification, empower the Director of
Wild Life Preservation or any other officer not below the
rank of Assistant Director of Wild Life Preservation and in
the case of a State Government in the similar manner,
empower the Chief Wild Life Warden or any officer of a
rank not below the rank of a Deputy Conservator of
Forests, to accept from any person against whom a
reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed an
offence against this Act, payment of a sum of money by
way of composition of the offence which such person is
suspected to have committed.
14
(2) On payment of such sum of money to such
officer, the suspected person, if in custody, shall be
discharged, and no further proceedings in respect of the
offence shall be taken against such person.
(3) The officer compounding any offence may order
the cancellation of any licence or permit granted under this
Act to the offender, or if not empowered to do so, may
approach an officer so empowered, for the cancellation of
such licence or permit.
(4) The sum of money accepted or agreed to be
accepted as composition under sub-section (1) shall, in no
case, exceed the sum of twenty-five thousand rupees:
Provided that no offence, for which a minimum period
of imprisonment has been prescribed in section 51, shall
be compounded.”
25. Chapter VI-A has been inserted in the 1972 Act by Act 16
of 2003. This chapter makes provision for forfeiture of property
derived from illegal hunting and trade. The applicability of Chapter
VI-A is provided in Section 58 A. This Chapter is, accordingly,
applicable to (a) every person who has been convicted of an offence
punishable under the Act with imprisonment for a term of three years
or more; (b) every associate of a person referred to in clause (a) and
(c) any holder of any property which was at any time held by a person
referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) unless the present holder or, as
the case may be, anyone who held such property after such person
and before the present holder, is or was transferee in good faith for
adequate consideration.
15
26. The Statement of Objects and Reasons (Act 16 of 2003)
annexed with Wild Life (Protection) Amendment Bill, 2002, in clause
(xvi), proposed, “to provide that the vehicles, weapons and tools, etc.
used in committing compoundable offences are not to be returned to
the offenders”.
27. In the backdrop of the above scheme of law, we have to
consider the correctness of the view of the High Court and the
question of law raised in the appeal.
28. One thing is clear that the statutory provisions noticed
above do not in explicit terms provide for the forfeiture of the seized
items by the departmental authorities from a person who is suspected
to have committed offence/s against the 1972 Act. Chapter VI-A
which has been inserted in the 1972 Act by Act 16 of 2003 that
provides for forfeiture of property derived from illegal hunting and
trade is entirely different provision and has nothing to do with
forfeiture of the property seized from a person accused of
commission of offence against the 1972 Act. Insofar as Section 39(1)
(d) of the 1972 Act is concerned, it provides that every vehicle,
vessel, weapon, trap or tool that has been used for committing an
offence and has been seized under the provisions of the Act shall be
the property of the state government and in a certain situation, the
16
property of the central government. The key words in Clause (d) of
Section 39(1) are, “..... has been used for committing an offence . .. .”.
What is the meaning of these words? The kind of absolute vesting of
the seized property in the state government, on mere suspicion of an
offence committed against the 1972 Act, could not have been
intended by the Parliament. It is not even scarcely disputed that
every enactment in the country must be in conformity with our
Constitution. In this view, it is not sufficient – nor the law-makers
intended to make it – to deprive a person of the property seized
under the 1972 Act on accusation that such property has been used
for committing an offence against the Act. Section 39(1)(d) does not
get attracted where the items, suspected to have been used for
committing an offence, are seized under the provisions of the Act. It
seems to us that it is implicit in Section 39(1)(d) that for this provision
to come into play there has to be a categorical finding by the
competent court of law about the use of seized items such as
vehicle, weapon, etc. for commission of the offence. There is merit
in the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 to
3 that if the construction put upon Section 39(1)(d) by Mr. R.
Sundervardhan is accepted, the expression ‘has been used for
committing an offence’ occurring therein has to be read as, ‘is
17
suspected to have been used for committing an offence’. In our view,
this cannot be done.
29. Section 51(2) of the 1972 Act provides for forfeiture of
the property on conviction; it says, inter-alia, that when any person
is convicted of an offence against the Act, the court trying the offence
may order that any captive animal, wild animal, etc. in respect of
which the offence has been committed and any vehicle, vessel or
weapon etc. used in the commission of the said offence be forfeited
to the state government.
30. ‘Forfeiture’ and ‘seizure’ have different meaning and
connotation in law. In ‘The Law Lexicon’ by P. Ramanatha Aiyer
nd
[2 edition (Reprint 2000)], ‘forfeiture’ is defined as the divestiture of
specific property without compensation in consequence of some
default or act forbidden by law. The word ‘forfeit’ is defined in
Concise Oxford English Dictionary (Tenth Edition): ‘lose or be
deprived of (property or a right or privilege) as a penalty for
10
wrongdoing’. In R.S. Joshi etc. v. Ajit Mills Ltd & Anr. ., this Court
speaking through Krishna Iyer, J., with reference to expression
‘forfeiture’ occurring in Section 37 (1) of the Bombay Sales Tax Act,
said, “this word 'forfeiture’ must bears the same meaning of a penalty
10
AIR 1977 SC 2279
18
for breach of a prohibitory direction”. While construing the word
‘forfeiture’ with reference to Sections 431 and 432 of the Bengal
Municipal Act (15 of 1932), this Court stated in the case of The
11
Chairman of the Bankura Municipality v. Lalji Raja & sons that
unless the loss or deprivation of the goods is by way of a penalty or
punishment for a crime, offence or breach of engagement, it would
not come within the definition of forfeiture. However, in light of the
provisions under consideration, the Court held that forfeiture of
property was not one of the penalties or punishments for any of the
offences under that Act. ‘Seizure’ on the other hand is generally
understood to mean a forcible taking possession. In law, seizure is
the taking possession of property by an officer under legal process.
Seizure of property under legal process is a temporary measure. It
is temporary interference with the right to hold the property. Seizure
under legal process is usually followed by confiscation or forfeiture or
disposal in accordance with the provisions under which seizure has
been made or the property is returned to the person from whom it has
been seized or to the lawful claimant to such property. While
Section 39(1)(d) provides that seized property under the 1972 Act
used for commission of the offence/s against the Act shall be the
11
AIR 1953 SC 248
19
property of the state government or the central government as the
case may be, the other provisions like Section 51(2) and Chapter VI-
A provide for forfeiture of the property in certain situations. However,
for the seized property used for commission of offence to be the
property of the state government or the central government under
Section 39(1)(d), in our view, offence against the Act has to be legally
ascertained and adjudicated by a competent court of jurisdiction.
4
31. In Madhukar Rao , a lbeit, the question was little different
but this Court considered the ambit and scope of Section 39(1)(d).
That matter reached this Court from a Full Bench decision of the
Madhya Pradesh High Court. The question before the Full Bench was
whether as a result of deletion of sub-section (2) of Section 50
withdrawing power of interim release, there existed any power with
the authorities under the 1972 Act or the Code to release the vehicle
used in the course of alleged commission of offence under the Act.
The Full Bench of the High Court held that any property including
vehicle seized on accusation or suspicion of commission of offence
under the 1972 Act can be released by the Magistrate pending trial in
accordance with Section 50(4) read with Section 451 of the Code.
The Full Bench also held that mere seizure of any property including
vehicle on the charge of commission of offence would not make the
20
property to be of the State Government under Section 39(1)(d) of the
1972 Act. Against the decision of the Full Bench, the State of Madhya
Pradesh preferred special leave petition in which leave was granted.
This Court extensively considered the statutory provisions and
approved the view of the Full Bench of the High Court that deletion of
sub-section (2) and its replacment by sub-section (3)(A) in Section 50
of the 1972 Act had no effect on the powers of the Court to release
the seized vehicle during the pendency of trial under the provisions of
the Code. While dealing with Section 39(1)(d), this Court also
approved the view of the Full Bench of the High Court that Section
39(1)(d) would come into play only after a court of competent
jurisdiction found that accusation and allegations made against the
accused were true and recorded the finding that the seized article
was, as a matter of fact, used in the commission of offence. This
Court said :
“ ……… . Any attempt to operationalise Section 39(1)( d )
of the Act merely on the basis of seizure and
accusations/allegations levelled by the departmental
authorities would bring it into conflict with the constitutional
provisions and would render it unconstitutional and
invalid……….”
32. We are in complete agreement with the view of this Court
4
in Madhukar Rao that on the basis of seizure and mere
21
accusations/allegations, Section 39(1)(d) of the 1972 Act cannot be
allowed to operate and if it is so done, it would be hit by the
constitutional provisions.
33. Now, we have to see whether Section 54(2) of the 1972
Act, after its amendment by Act 16 of 2003, empowers the specified
officer to order forfeiture of the property, in respect of the offences
against the Act suspected to have been committed by such person,
on composition of such offence. In other words, whether in the
absence of any specific provision in Section 54(2) that the property
seized shall be released, the specified officer empowered to
compound offences is authorized to order forfeiture of the seized
property and not return the property to the person from whom it has
been seized.
34. Mr. R. Sundervardhan, learned senior counsel for the
appellants was right in contending that the composition of the offence
under Section 54 of the 1972 Act is not during the course of trial or in
the trial of a compoundable offence. He is also right in his submission
that compounding under Section 54 is a departmental compounding
and does not amount to an acquittal. But then, what is the sequitar?
What is the effect of such departmental composition of offence under
Section 54(1) of the 1972 Act?
22
2
35. The observations made by this Court in Biswabahan Das
may be useful in order to understand the effect of compounding
offence/s. That was a case in which this Court was concerned with
the provision for composition of forest offence under Assam Forest
Regulation, 1891 – a provision quite similar to Section 54 of the
1972 Act prior to amendment by Act 16 of 2003. This Court said:
“………It must be borne in mind that although the marginal
note to s. 62 of the Assam Regulation is “power to
compound offences” the word “compounding” is not used in
sub-s. (1) clause (a) of that section. That provision only
empowers a forest officer to accept compensation for a
forest offence from a person suspected of having
committed it. The person so suspected can avoid being
proceeded with for the offence by rendering compensation.
He may think that he was being unjustly suspected of an
offence and he ought to defend himself or he may consider
it prudent on his part to pay such compensation in order to
avoid the harassment of a prosecution even when he is of
the view that he had not committed the offence. By
adopting the latter course he does not remove the
suspicion of having committed the offence unless he is to
have such benefit conferred on him by some provision of
law. In effect the payment of compensation amounts to his
acceptance of the truth of the charge against him. Sub-s.
(2) of s. 62 only protects him with regard to further
proceedings, but has not the effect of clearing his character
or vindicating his conduct.”
36. There may be myriad reasons, for a person, suspected of
commission of offence, to apply for composition of the offence. What
is important is not the reason for composition of offence but the
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effect of composition. The effect of composition of offence has to be
found in the statute itself. Section 54(2) provides that on payment of
money to the empowered officer, the suspected person, if in custody,
shall be discharged and no further proceedings in respect of the
offence shall be taken against such person. In terms of sub-section
(2) of Section 54, therefore, on composition of the offence, the
suspected person is saved from criminal prosecution, and from being
subjected to further proceedings in respect of the offence.
37. Section 54(2) of the 1972 Act, prior to the amendment by
Act 16 of 2003, authorized the empowered officer, on payment of
value of the property liable to be forfeited, to release the seized
property, other than the government property. The provision
underwent changes w.e.f. April 1, 2003 and the provision for release
of the seized property has been deleted. Does the provision in new
Section 54(2) authorize the empowered officer to order forfeiture of
the seized property to the state government? We think not. In the
first place, by deletion of such expression, it cannot be said that the
Parliament intended to confer power on the specified officer to order
forfeiture of the seized property which is nothing but one form of
penalty in the context of the 1972 Act. Had the Parliament intended
to do so, it would have made an express provision in that regard.
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Such conferment of power of penalty upon the specified officer
cannot be read by implication in Section 54(2). Secondly, any power
of forfeiture conferred upon Executive authority merely on suspicion
or accusation may amount to depriving a person of his property
without authority of law. Such power cannot be readily read by
relying on the Statement of Objects and Reasons (Act 16 of 2003)
without any express provision in the statute.
38. Way back in 1960, this Court in The Central Bank of India
12
& Ors. v. Their W orkmen, etc. said that the Statement of Objects
and Reasons is not admissible for construing the section, far less
can it control the actual words used. It has been reiterated by this
Court time and again that the reference to the Statement of Objects
and Reasons is for understanding the enactment and the purpose is
to ascertain the conditions prevailing at the time the Bill was
introduced and the objects sought to be achieved by the proposed
amendment; the Statement of Objects and Reasons is not ordinarily
used to determine the true meaning of the substantive provisions of
the statute. As an aid to the construction of a statute, the Statement
of Objects and Reasons appended to the Bill, ordinarily must be
avoided.
12
AIR 1960 SC 12
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39. It is true that by Act 16 of 2003, the Parliament has
consciously deleted from Section 54 the provision concerning
release of seized property liable to be forfeited on payment of value
of such property but the plain language that is retained in Section 54
(2) after amendment which reads, ‘on payment of such sum of money
to such officer, the suspected person, if in custody, shall be
discharged and no further proceedings in respect of the offence shall
be taken against such person’ does not show that the Legislature
intended to empower the specified officer under Section 54 to forfeit
the seized property used by the suspected person in commission of
offence against the Act. There is no replacement of the deleted
words by any express provision. Section 54 substituted by Act 16
of 2003 does not speak of seized property at all – neither its return
nor its forfeiture – while providing for composition of offence. The
property seized under Section 50(1)(c ) and Section 50(3A) has to
be dealt with by the Magistrate according to law. This is made clear
by Section 50(4) which provides that things seized shall be taken
before a Magistrate to be dealt with according to law. Section 54
substituted by Act 16 of 2003 does not empower the specified officer
to deal with the seized property. In this view of the matter, we are
unable to accept the submission of the learned senior counsel for the
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appellants that a comparative reading of pre-amended Section 54(2)
and Section 54 (2) as substituted by Act 16 of 2003 makes the
legislative intent clear that seized articles shall be forfeited on
composition of the offence under the 1972 Act. When the language
of the statutory provision is plain and clear no external aid is required
and the legislative intention has to be gathered from the language
employed. In our view, neither Section 54(2) of the 1972 Act by itself
nor Section 54(2) read with Section 39(1)(d) or any other provision of
the 1972 Act empowers and authorizes the specified officer under
Section 54, on composition of the offence, to deal with the seized
property much less order forfeiture of the seized property used by the
person suspected of commission of offence against the Act.
40. In view of the above, the order passed by the Conservator
of Forests, Nizamabad for forfeiture of the vehicle and two rifles to the
state government is de hors the provisions of the 1972 Act and
unsustainable. The High Court has rightly set aside such illegal
order. However, the Single Judge was not right in his order dated
March 29, 2005 in directing the respondents therein (present
appellants) to release the vehicle and rifles. The Division Bench also
erred in maintaining the above direction. Since the items were seized
in exercise of the power under Section 50(1)( c), the seized property
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has to be dealt with by the Magistrate under Section 50(4) of the
1972 Act. The respondent nos. 1 to 3 must accordingly apply to the
concerned Magistrate for the return of seized items who obviously will
consider such application according to law.
41. We hold, as we must, that a specified officer empowered
under Section 54(1) of the 1972 Act as substituted by Act 16 of 2003
to compound offences, has no power, competence or authority to
order forfeiture of the seized items on composition of the offence by
a person who is suspected to have committed offence against the
Act. Our answer to the question framed at the outset is in the
negative.
42. The appeal is disposed of as indicated above with no
order as to costs.
………………………J
(R.M. LODHA)
….…………………………….J.
(JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR )
NEW DELHI
OCTOBER 17, 2011.
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