REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.5212-5220 OF 2007
M/S. STATE BANK OF PATIALA …APPELLANT
THROUGH GENERAL MANAGER
VERSUS
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX,
PATIALA …RESPONDENT
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3185 OF 2015
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3383 OF 2015
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3764 OF 2015
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3766 OF 2015
CIVIL APPEAL NO.13465 OF 2015
[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.13359 OF 2015]
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3380 OF 2015
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3763 OF 2015
CIVIL APPEAL NO.13464 OF 2015
[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CIVIL) NO.13357 OF 2015]
JUDGMENT
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4008 OF 2015
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4322 OF 2015
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4987 OF 2015
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4988 OF 2015
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4990 OF 2015
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4991 OF 2015
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4992 OF 2015
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4993 OF 2015
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4994 OF 2015
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4995 OF 2015
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4996 OF 2015
CIVIL APPEAL NO.4997 OF 2015
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CIVIL APPEAL NO.4986 OF 2015
CIVIL APPEAL NO.5328 OF 2015
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3381 OF 2015
CIVIL APPEAL NO.3382 OF 2015
J U D G M E N T
R.F. Nariman, J.
1. Leave granted in special leave petition (civil) nos. 13359
of 2015 and 13357 of 2015.
2. There are 25 appeals that have been posted for hearing
before us. They are concerned primarily with interest that is
received by various banks after bills of exchange have been
discounted by them and a party defaults and hence has to pay
compensation by way of interest as payment is made after the
JUDGMENT
date stipulated in the bill of exchange. The precise question that
arises before us is whether such payment of compensation to
the said banks is “interest” liable to tax under the Interest Tax
Act, 1974.
3. The facts in all the cases are similar. The bank makes
purchases of bills of exchange from its customers and charges
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commission thereon for services rendered by it. The discounted
bills so purchased are then presented to the parties concerned
for realization. If on presentation the bill is realized within time,
realized in time but the other party pays the value of the bill
beyond the stipulated time, a certain amount in the form of
interest is charged by the bank on a fixed percentage basis for
every day of default. This amount is credited by the bank in its
interest account.
4. On these broad facts there is a sharp cleavage of opinion
between the High Courts. The Madhya Pradesh High Court,
Kerala High Court, Andhra Pradesh High Court, Madras High
Court and Rajasthan High Court have all decided that such
JUDGMENT
amounts are not chargeable to tax as “chargeable interest”
under the Interest Tax Act. On the other hand, the Karnataka
High Court and the Punjab and Haryana High Court have
differed from this view and have stated that such amount would
be so chargeable.
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5. The entire case hinges on the construction of Section 2(7)
of the Interest Tax Act, 1974 which defines “interest” as
follows:-
| | | | | |
|---|
| | | | | |
| “ | Section 2(7), I | nterest Ta | x Act, 19 | | 74 |
| | | | | |
| 2. | In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, |
|---|
| — | |
| (7) "interest" means interest on loans and advances<br>made in India and includes— | |
| (a) commitment charges on unutilised portion of<br>any credit sanctioned for being availed of in India;<br>and<br>(b) discount on promissory notes and bills of | |
| exchange drawn or made | in India, |
| but does not include— | |
| (i) interest referred to in sub-section (1B) of<br>section 42 of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (2<br>of 1934); | |
| (ii) discount on treasury bills;” | |
JUDGMENT
6. Under Section 4 of the said Act, there shall be charged on
every scheduled bank for every assessment year a tax in
respect of chargeable interest of the previous year at the rate of
7%.
7. The first important thing to notice is that the definition of
interest contained in the Interest Tax Act, 1974 is a narrow one,
and is exhaustive as it is a ‘means and includes’ definition. In
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P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology , 1995 Supp
(2) SCC 348, this Court, when dealing with The Tamil Nadu
Private Colleges (Regulation) Act, 1976, stated as follows:-
| “ | A particular expression is ofte | | | | | | | | | | | n defined by the |
|---|
| Legislature by using the word ‘means’ or the word | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ‘includes’. Sometimes the words ‘means and | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| includes’ are used. The use of the word ‘means’ | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| indicates that “definition is a hard-and-fast definition, | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| and no other meaning can be assigned to the | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| expression than is put down in definition”. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| (See : | | | | Gough | | v. | | Gough [( | | | 1891) 2 QB 665 : 60 LJ | |
| QB 726] ; | | | | | | Punjab Land Development and | | | | | | |
| Reclamation Corpn. L<br>Labour Court [(1990) 3 S | | | | | | | | | | | td. v. Presiding Officer,<br>CC 682, 717 : 1991 SCC | |
| (L&S) 71] .) The word | | | | | | | | | | | ‘includes’ when used, | |
| enlarges the meaning of t | | | | | | | | | | | he expression defined so | |
| as to comprehend not o | | | | | | | | | | | nly such things as they | |
| signify according to their | | | | | | | | | | | natural import but also | |
| those things which the c | | | | | | | | | | | lause declares that they | |
| shall include. The words “means and includes”, on | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| the other hand, indicate “an exhaustive explanation | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| of the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| must invariably be attached to these words or | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| JUDG<br>expressions”. (See : Dil | | | | | | | | | | | ME<br>worth v. | NT<br>Commissioner of |
| Stamps | | | | | [1899 AC 99, 105-106 : (1895-9) All ER | | | | | | | |
| Rep Ext 1576] (Lord Watson) | | | | | | | | | | | | ; Mahalakshmi Oil |
| Mills | | | v. | State of A.P. | | | | | | [(1989) 1 SCC 164, 169 : 1989 | | |
| SCC (Tax) 56]” [at para 19 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
8. The precise question that arises before us is whether
compensation that can be traced to Section 32 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can be regarded as interest
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on loans and advances. Section 32 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act states as follows:-
In default of such payment as aforesaid, such
maker or acceptor is bound to compensate any
party to the note or bill for any loss or damage
sustained by him and caused by such default.”
9. It will be seen that when default of payment takes place,
the acceptor of the bill of exchange is bound to compensate
JUDGMENT
any party to the bill for any loss or damage sustained by him
and caused by such default. In most cases such loss or
damage is a liquidated amount which can be calculated from
the rate mentioned on the face of the bill of exchange.
10. The first thing that will be noticed is that the interest on
which tax is payable under the Interest Tax Act is primarily on
loans and advances made in India. By a deeming fiction,
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discount on bills of exchange made in India is also included. It
is clear, therefore, that discount on bills of exchange would
obviously not come within the expression “loans and advances
payable by way of compensation after a bill is discounted by the
Bank would not be an amount which would be “on loans and
advances made in India”.
11. Shri A.K. Sanghi, learned senior advocate appearing on
behalf of the revenue basically placed for our consideration the
reasoning of the Karnataka High Court judgment and adopted
that reasoning as his argument. On the other hand, Shri
Sanjay Jhanwar, learned counsel for the assessees, placed
before us the reasoning of the High Courts in his favour and
JUDGMENT
adopted the same as his argument. He also argued that a loan
of money may result in a debt but every debt does not involve a
loan. He further argued that the transaction of drawing,
accepting, discounting or re-discounting of bills of exchange
can be bifurcated into three separate categories, and that the
drawer of a bill may discount the bill of exchange with the bank,
which would not result into a relationship of debtor and creditor
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with the bank. It thus becomes imperative to first find out what
in fact the High Courts have held on this vexed question.
ITR 607, has reasoned thus:
“Sri Sarangan, learned counsel for assessee relying
on a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court
in C.I.T. v. State Bank of Indore (69 CTR (MP) 147)
contended that though this sum of money may be
interest in its wider sense including both interest
proper and interest by way of damages, still the
provisions of Income Tax Act are not attracted since
what can be brought within the purview of the Act is
only interest on loans and advances. The amount
charged by the assessee on delayed payment of
bills cannot be held to interest on loans and
advances and it was not exigible to tax under the
Interest Tax Act. He also relied upon Sec. 32 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act and contended that the
said provision contemplates only compensation and
not the interest at all. When the Bank discounts a
bill what happens is the drawee gets a credit from
the Bank to the extent of the amount covered by the
Bill. This position has been explained in LAW OF
BANKING By Paget, 9th Edition at page 415 thus:
JUDGMENT
“The discount of a bill is the purchase of it with,
normally, a right of recourse and for a sum less than
its face value. The discounter is free to deal with the
Instrument as he pleases. Discount is a negotiation.
Other things being equal there is no practical or
legal distinction between the ordinary negotiation of
a bill and its being discounted except in the sum
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paid on it. Discounting is a means of lending as is
pledge.”
| It is stated in Byles on BILL OF EXCHANGE (24th<br>Edition) at page 282 as follows: | |
| “A banker clearly gives value for a bill when he<br>discounts it, the transaction consisting of the<br>purchase of the bill at a discount, i.e. allowing the<br>interest for the time the bill has to run, subject in the<br>event of dishonour to a right of recovery from the<br>person for whom it is discounted.” | |
| The practice of the Bank itself, at the time of<br>discounting is as disclosed in the letter used to be<br>sent along with the intimation of discount which<br>showed that in case of delayed payment an overdue<br>interest at a particular rate had to be collected if not<br>paid on presentation. These facts are sufficient to<br>hold that the amount in question is interest under<br>Sec. 2(7) of the Interest Tax Act. | |
| It is settled law that interest is damages or<br>compensation for delayed payment of money due.<br>Therefore the expression ‘compensation’ in Section<br>32 of the Negotiable Instruments Act will include<br>interest paid by way of damages or compensation<br>JUDGMENT<br>for delayed payments. We have already held that<br>Discounting of Bills is a form of advance or loan, | |
| and hence compensation paid on delayed payment | |
| of money due thereon is interest on loans and | |
| advances. Discount on bill is a form of advance or<br>loan granted to its customer by a Bank and if that be<br>the true position as indicated by Paget any amount<br>collected by the Bank for delayed payment of that<br>amount cannot be anything but interest, whatever<br>may be the nomenclature, and is chargeable<br>interest for the purpose of Interest Tax Act.” [at<br>pages 610 – 611] | |
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13. The Punjab and Haryana High Court in CIT v. State Bank
of Patiala , (2008) 300 ITR 395 (P&H) has merely reiterated the
aforesaid view.
14. On the other hand, the Madhya Pradesh High Court in
Commissioner of Income-Tax v. State Bank of Indore ,
(1988) 172 ITR 24 has reasoned thus:-
| “ | Now the right to charge the amount for delay in | | |
|---|
| payment of bills accrued to the assessee by virtue | | | |
| of the provisions of section 32 of the Negotiable<br>Instruments Act, 1881, and in accordance with the | | | |
| terms of the agreemen<br>assessee with its constitue | | t entered into by the<br>nts in pursuance of which | |
| bills were purchased by t | | he assessee. On account | |
| of delayed payment of | | bills purchased by the | |
| assessee, the assesse | | e became entitled to | |
| liquidated damages by way of compensation, as | | | |
| stipulated in the agreemen | | t. The right to charge that | |
| amount by the assessee did not, therefore, arise on | | | |
| account of any delay in repayment of any loan or | | | |
| JUDGMENT<br>advance made by the assessee. That right accrued | | | |
| on account of default in the payment of the bills | | | . It |
| may be that the amount payable by way of | | | |
| compensation for detention of a sum of money due, | | | |
| can be said to be covered by the expression | | | |
| “interest” in its widest sense, including both interest | | | |
| proper and interest by way of damages. But the | | | |
| provisions of the Interest-tax Act are attracted only | | | |
| in the case of interest on loans and advances. The | | | |
| amount charged by the assessee for delayed | | | |
| payment of bills cannot be held to be “interest on | | | |
| loans and advances”. In our opinion, therefore, the | | | |
| Tribunal was not right in holding that the amounts in | | | |
| question charged by the assessee for delayed | | | |
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| payment of bills were in the nature of interest on | | |
|---|
| advances and exigible to tax under the Interest-tax | | |
| Act.” [ | at page 28] | |
| The Kerala High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. | missioner of Income Tax vs. |
|---|
| State Bank of Travancore, [19 | 97] 228 ITR 40 (Ker), in arriving |
| |
| at the same conclusion as the Madhya Pradesh High Court, | |
| has, however, adopted a different line of reasoning in the<br>following terms:-<br>“These overdue bills are presented to the bank by<br>the makers for the purpose of their recovery. As far<br>as the makers are concerned, there may be justified<br>or required circumstances for them to approach the<br>bank. The bank has ready facilities for recovery,<br>more statutory powers of stringent character and,<br>therefore, the practice gets established that the<br>makers hand over the overdue bills to the bank for<br>recovery. It is thereafter that the bank sets in<br>motion. In other words, what is undertaken by the<br>bank is the reJcoUverDy oGf thMe aEmoNuntT covered by the<br>bill and in regard to which, by virtue of Section 32 of<br>the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, a statutory<br>liability is created with regard to the prompt<br>payment. The details that are available in the<br>context would show that the origin of the amount<br>which is the subject-matter of an overdue bill gets<br>snapped. In other words, the moment the maker<br>presents the overdue bill to the bank for recovery, it<br>becomes a document negotiable in itself on its own<br>strength empowering the bank to effect recovery<br>and creating the liabilities of the parties as regards<br>prompt payment thereof. In such a situation,<br>ignoring the intermittent acrobatics as to whether | |
| “These overdue bills are presented to the bank by<br>the makers for the purpose of their recovery. As far | | | | | |
|---|
| as the makers are concern | | ed, there may be justified | | | |
| or required circumstances | | for them to approach the | | | |
| bank. The bank has rea | | dy facilities for recovery, | | | |
| more statutory powers of | | stringent character and, | | | |
| therefore, the practice g | | ets established that the | | | |
| makers hand over the overdue bills to the bank for | | | | | |
| recovery. It is thereafter that the bank sets in | | | | | |
| motion. In other words, what is undertaken by the | | | | | |
| bank is the recovery of the amount covered by the | | | | | |
| JUDGMENT<br>bill and in regard to which, by virtue of Section | | | | 32 | of |
| the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, a statutory | | | | | |
| liability is created with regard to the prompt | | | | | |
| payment. | The details that are available in the | | | | |
| context would show that the origin of the amount | | | | | |
| which is the subject-matter of an overdue bill gets | | | | | |
| snapped. In other words, the moment the maker | | | | | |
| presents the overdue bill to the bank for recovery, it | | | | | |
| becomes a document negotiable in itself on its own | | | | | |
| strength empowering the bank to effect recovery | | | | | |
| and creating the liabilities of the parties as regards | | | | | |
| prompt payment thereo | | f. In such a situation, | | | |
| ignoring the intermittent acrobatics as to whether | | | | | |
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| the amount can be understood as interest or could<br>continue to have the character of its description as<br>compensation in accordance with the provisions of<br>Section 32 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881,<br>would be wholly unnecessary, at least for the<br>purpose of consideration as to whether the amount<br>can assume the character of "chargeable interest".<br>It is elementary in the context that taxation liability<br>has to be understood and established and unless<br>this is apparent from the material on record, the<br>imposition of tax does not get justified. In other<br>words, unless the amount which is sought to be<br>chargeable as the chargeable interest has any<br>necessary relationship with loans and advances,<br>such an attempt to understand the amount alone<br>would not satisfy the requirement of justification.”<br>15. Likewise, the Andhra Pradesh High Court in | |
|---|
| Commissioner of Income Tax | v. State Bank of Hyderabad, |
| [2014] 367 ITR 128 (AP) has also dissented from the Karnataka | |
| the amount can be understood as interest or could | | | | |
|---|
| continue to have the character of its description as | | | | |
| compensation in accordance with the provisions of | | | | |
| Section | | 32 | | of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, |
| would be wholly unnecessary, at least for the | | | | |
| purpose of consideration as to whether the amount | | | | |
| can assume the character of "chargeable interest". | | | | |
| It is elementary in the context that taxation liability | | | | |
| has to be understood and established and unless | | | | |
| this is apparent from the material on record, the | | | | |
| imposition of tax does not get justified. In other | | | | |
| words, unless the amount which is sought to be | | | | |
| chargeable as the chargeable interest has any | | | | |
| necessary relationship with loans and advances, | | | | |
| such an attempt to understand the amount alone | | | | |
| would not satisfy the requirement of justification.” | | | | |
High Court’s view. In addition, the Andhra Pradesh High Court
JUDGMENT
has reasoned thus:
| “ | It is not uncommon that banks purchase Bills of | | | |
|---|
| Exchange from their customers and make | | | | |
| payments, on being satisfied that they are in order. | | | | |
| Whenever the purchase of Bills of Exchange takes | | | | |
| place, the purported transaction comes to be | | | | |
| governed by Section | | | | 32 of the Negotiable |
| Instrument Act. The basic transaction of borrowing | | | | |
| and lending is required to be between the persons | | | | |
| described as "maker" and "acceptor" under Section | | | | |
| 32 | | | of the Negotiable Instrument Act. The person | |
| who purchased the Bills of Exchange becomes the | | | | |
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| "bearer" thereof. Section 32 of the Negotiable<br>Instrument Act, defines the liability of the concerned<br>persons to discharge their respective obligations.<br>However, it is difficult to imagine that the purchaser<br>of the Bills of Exchange can be treated as a person<br>who has advanced the loans, to the original<br>borrower. For all practical purposes a different<br>transaction altogether, comes into existence.”<br>The Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. | | |
|---|
| Cholamandalam Investment and Finance Co. Ltd. | , [ | 2008] |
| 296 ITR 601 (Mad ) has simply followed the Kerala High Court’s<br>view, and the Rajasthan High Court in a judgment dated<br>12.11.2014, which is the impugned judgment in Civil Appeal<br>No.4988 of 2015, has reasoned thus:-<br>“The assessee-bank got right to charge the amount | | |
| "bearer" thereof. Section 32 | | | of the Negotiable | |
|---|
| Instrument Act, defines the liability of the concerned | | | | |
| persons to discharge their respective obligations. | | | | |
| However, it is difficult to imagine that the purchaser | | | | |
| of the Bills of Exchange can be treated as a person | | | | |
| who has advanced the loans, to the original | | | | |
| borrower. For all practic | al pu | | rposes a different | |
| transaction altogether, comes into existence | | | | .” |
| mmissioner of Income Tax | v. |
|---|
JUDGMENT
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the provision of the Interest Tax Act can be said to
be attracted only in case of interest received on
loans and advances. However, the transaction ends
on the due date occurs and the relationship of
borrower lender ends.
| scope a | nd defini |
| t be inter | preted to |
We are further of the view that on the due
date/cutoff date whatever amount has been
recovered by the assessee bank, will certainly fall in
the nature of interest, but once the due date/cutoff
date is over, any amount received after that date by
the bank, would be in the nature of
compensation/penalty/liquidated damages and will
not be “interest”. It is well settled proposition of law
that the way in which entries are made by an
assessee in its books of account or the
nomenclature given to a transaction by the parties is
not determinative of the due character/nature of that
transaction. The definition as we have pointed out of
''interest'', shall not cover the amount received by
the assessee after the due date.
JUDGMENT
We have gone through the judgments rendered by
various High Courts as quoted above and are not in
conformity with the view of Karnataka and Punjab
and Haryana High Court and we concur with the
view of Madhya Pradesh & Kerala High Court.
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Accordingly, in our view, the amount received as
“overdue interest” in inland/foreign demand bills is
not liable to be taxed as interest under the Interest
Tax Act and we answer this question in favour of
the assessee and against the revenue.”
We are of the view that the Karnataka High Court’s reasoning is
fallacious for the simple reason that Section 2(7) itself makes a
distinction between loans and advances made in India and
discount on bills of exchange drawn or made in India. It is
obvious that if discounted bills of exchange were also to be
JUDGMENT
treated as loans and advances made in India there would be no
need to extend the definition of “interest” to include discount on
bills of exchange. Indeed, this matter is no longer res integra .
| Sahara India Savings & Investment Corpn. Ltd. | , |
|---|
(2009) 17 SCC 43, this Court while dealing with the definition
contained in Section 2(7) of the Interest Tax Act, held:-
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| “ | Section 2(5) defines “chargeable interest” to mean |
|---|
| total amount of interest referred to in Section 5, | |
| computed in the manner laid down in Section 6. In | |
| other words, the “scope of chargeable interest” is | |
| defined under Section 5 whereas “computation of | |
| chargeable interest” is under Section 6. Section 2(7) | |
| is the heart of the matter as far as the present case | |
| is concerned. | |
| In accounting sense, there is a conceptual | |
| difference between loans and advances on the one | |
| hand and investments on the other hand. Section | |
| 2(7) defines the word “interest” to mean interest on | |
| “loans and advances including commitment | |
| charges, discount on promissory notes and bills of | |
| exchange but not to include interest referred to | |
| under Section 42(1-B) of the Reserve Bank of India<br>Act, 1934 as well as discount on treasury bills”. | |
| Section 2(7), therefore, d | efines what is interest in |
| the first part and that first | part confines interest only |
| to loans and advances | , including commitment |
| charges, discount on pro | missory notes and bills of |
| exchange. | |
| Pausing here, it is clear that the interest tax is | | |
| meant to be levied only on interest accruing on | | |
| loans and advances but the legislature, in its | | |
| JUDGMENT<br>wisdom, has extended the meaning of the word | | |
| “interest” to two other items, namely, commitment | | |
| charges and discount on promissory notes and bills | | |
| of exchange. | In normal accounting sense, “loans | |
| and advances”, as a concept, is different from | | |
| commitment charges and discounts and keeping in | | |
| mind the difference between the three, the | | |
| legislature, in its wisdom, has specifically included | | |
| in the definition under Section 2(7) commitment | | |
| charges as well as discou | | nts. The fact remains that |
| interest on loans and advances will not cover under | | |
| Section 2(7) interest on bonds and debentures | | |
| bought by an assessee as and by way of | | |
| “investment”. Even the exclusionary part of Section | | |
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| 2(7) excludes only discount on treasury bills as well | |
|---|
| as interest under Section 42(1-B) of the Reserve | |
| Bank of India Act, 1934.” [at paras 5 – 7] | |
| High Cou<br>and, ther | rt’s view<br>efore, can |
|---|
“Loans and advances” has been held to be different from
“discounts” and the legislature has kept in mind the difference
between the two. It is clear therefore that the right to charge for
overdue interest by the assessee banks did not arise on
account of any delay in repayment of any loan or advance
made by the said banks. That right arose on account of default
in the payment of amounts due under a discounted bill of
exchange. It is well settled that a subject can be brought to tax
only by a clear statutory provision in that behalf. Interest is
JUDGMENT
chargeable to tax under the Interest Tax Act only if it arises
directly from a loan or advance. This is clear from the use of
the word “on” in Section 2(7) of the Act. Interest payable “on” a
discounted bill of exchange cannot therefore be equated with
interest payable “on” a loan or advance. This being the case, it
is clear that the reasoning contained in the High Courts which
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differ from the Karnataka view is obviously correct but for the
reasons given by us.
Section 2(28A) defines interest as follows:-
“2. Definitions .--- In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires.
[(28A) “interest” means interest payable in any
manner in respect of any moneys borrowed or debt
incurred (including a deposit, claim or other similar
right or obligation) and includes any service fee or
other charge in respect of the moneys borrowed or
debt incurred or in respect of any credit facility
which has not been utilized.]”
18. It will be noticed that this definition is much wider than
that contained in Section 2(7) of the Interest Tax Act, 1974. The
JUDGMENT
expression “payable in any manner in respect of any moneys
borrowed” is an expression of considerable width. It will be
noticed that the aforesaid language of the definition section
contained in the Income Tax Act is broader than that contained
in the Interest Tax Act in three respects. Firstly, interest can be
payable in any manner whatsoever. Secondly, the expression
“in respect of” includes interest arising even indirectly out of a
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money transaction, unlike the word “on” contained in Section
2(7) which, we have already seen, connotes a direct arising of
payment of interest out of a loan or advance. And thirdly, “any
The former expression would certainly bring within its ken
moneys borrowed by means other than by way of loans or
advances. We therefore conclude that the Interest Tax Act,
unlike the Income Tax Act, has focused only on a very narrow
taxable event which does not include within its ken interest
payable on default in payment of amounts due under a
discounted bill of exchange.
19. In fact, when we come to the second point agitated in
some of the appeals by revenue namely as to whether
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guarantee fees paid to the Deposit Insurance and Credit
Guarantee Corporation could be included in the definition of
interest in Section 2(7) of the Interest Tax Act, 1974, it will be
clear that such definition does not include any service fee or
other charges in respect of monies borrowed or debt incurred,
again unlike the definition of ‘interest’ under the Income Tax
Act. We find that the Rajasthan High Court in the impugned
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judgment in Civil Appeal No.4988 of 2015 is correct when it
observed:-
| quoted he<br>in para 4 | rein abov<br>(supra), |
|---|
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20. In the circumstances, we dismiss the appeals of revenue
and allow the appeals of the assessees and set aside the
judgments in favour of revenue.
……………………J.
(A.K. Sikri)
……………………J.
New Delhi; (R.F. Nariman)
November 18, 2015
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