Full Judgment Text
2024 INSC 887
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 297 OF 2024
RANDEEP SINGH @ RANA & ANR. … APPELLANTS
versus
STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
ABHAY S. OKA, J.
FACTUAL ASPECTS
1. The present appellants accused were charged for
committing the offences punishable under Sections 364, 302,
201, 212 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short,
‘the IPC’). There were eight accused persons. The respondent
nos.2 to 6 and one Bhim Sain @ Kaka Ganth were the other
accused. All of them were convicted by the Sessions Court for
the offences punishable under Sections 364, 302 and 120-B of
the IPC and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment. They were
also convicted for the offence punishable under Section 201 of
the IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3
years. All of them preferred appeals to the High Court. By the
impugned judgment, the High Court confirmed the appellants'
conviction. But other accused were acquitted.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
ASHISH KONDLE
Date: 2024.11.22
15:07:14 IST
Reason:
2. The deceased-Gurpal Singh was the father of the
complainant-Jagpreet Singh (PW-8). The case of the
Criminal Appeal No.297 of 2024 Page 1 of 18
prosecution is that on 8th July 2013, the deceased left his
house in his Ford Fiesta car. The deceased had gone to meet
his sister-Paramjeet Kaur (PW-26). He had visited PW-26 at
about 06:30 pm. After meeting PW-26, when the deceased was
returning to his house and had reached the main gate of
Prabhu Prem Puram Ashram, a few unknown persons
travelling in a white car stopped the car of the deceased and
abducted him. He was put in the car brought by the accused.
The accused persons also took away the car of the deceased.
After conducting a search, PW-8 could not locate his father,
and therefore, a First Information Report was lodged at his
instance. On 9th July 2013, the torso with other body parts of
the deceased was recovered from a canal. The prosecution
examined twenty-nine witnesses.
SUBMISSIONS
3. Mr Vinay Navare, the learned senior counsel appearing
for the appellants, pointed out that the prosecution relied upon
the CCTV footage of the cameras installed in the branch of
Bank of Baroda near the place where the offence was allegedly
committed. He submitted that apart from the fact that the
certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
(for short, ‘the Evidence Act’) was not produced, the evidence
of Mr Rajesh Gaba, Senior Manager, Bank of Baroda (PW-1)
and Mr Jeewan Sonkhla, CCTV Engineer (PW-24) does not
prove that the CD produced on record contained what is
recorded in the CCTV cameras installed by the Bank. He
submitted that though the prosecution claims that PW-26 is an
eyewitness, the material part of her evidence is an omission.
Criminal Appeal No.297 of 2024 Page 2 of 18
Moreover, the husband of PW-26, who was stated to be an
eyewitness, has not been examined. He also invited our
attention to the manner in which the evidence of PW-27
[Investigating Officer] was recorded by incorporating the
incriminating portion of the statements of the present
appellants in the alleged memorandum under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act. He submitted that except for the evidence of the
discovery of the car and the weapon used by the accused at the
instance of the accused, there is no other legal evidence on
record. He submitted that only based on discovery/disclosure
statements, the accused cannot be convicted.
4. The learned counsel appearing for the first respondent,
the State of Haryana, submitted that there is no reason to
discredit the testimony of PW-26, who is a natural eyewitness.
He pointed out that she had identified the accused in court. It
was submitted that the circumstantial evidence proves the
appellants' guilt even otherwise. He submitted that the CCTV
footage also proves the complicity of the accused. He submitted
that this case is of a very brutal and gruesome offence, and,
therefore, no interference should be made with concurrent
judgments of conviction.
CONSIDERATION
EVIDENCE OF EYEWITNESS (PW-26)
5. PW-26 is the only alleged eyewitness examined by the
th
prosecution. She deposed that on 8 July 2013 at about 06:45
pm, the deceased, who was her brother, had come to her house.
At around 07:15 pm, he left her home. Her brother had parked
Criminal Appeal No.297 of 2024 Page 3 of 18
his car in the open plot in front of her house. While the
deceased was leaving the house, she, along with her husband,
went to see off the deceased. She stated that the deceased sat
in his car and left towards Prabhu Prem Puram Ashram. She
claimed that she and her husband went towards that side. She
noticed that a white Maruti car chased the car of the deceased,
and after crossing the car of the deceased, it stopped in front
of his car. She stated that seven to eight boys came out of that
Maruti car and cordoned off the car of the deceased. When she
swiftly walked towards that direction, she heard cries from her
brother to save him. She stated that these boys forcibly threw
her brother in the car. Some boys sat in her brother's car
and ran away. She stated that two boys on a motorcycle came,
lifted her brother's turban, and left the spot.
6. In her examination-in-chief, PW-26 did not state that she
knew the accused earlier. She described the accused as ‘seven
to eight boys’. She did not depose that a test identification
parade was conducted. Moreover, she did not identify the
accused in the examination-in-chief by ascribing specific roles
to them. She stated in the examination-in-chief that “accused
are present in the Court through video conferencing”. She did
not identify the accused who picked up her brother and the
accused who sat in her brother's car. She did not identify the
boys who came on the motorcycle.
7. When she was confronted with her statement (Exhibit D6)
recorded under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 (for short, ‘the CrPC’), she admitted that the following
Criminal Appeal No.297 of 2024 Page 4 of 18
facts which she stated before the Court were not mentioned in
her statement recorded by the Police:
i. The deceased had parked his car in the open plot in
front of her house;
ii. She, along with her husband, had gone out to see
off the deceased;
iii. She, along with her husband, went towards Prabhu
Prem Puram Ashram, in which direction the
deceased left;
iv. She saw a Maruti car of white colour that chased
her brother’s car and, after crossing her brother’s
car, stopped the car;
v. She saw seven to eight boys coming out of the
Maruti car who cordoned off her brother’s car, and
she heard cries of “bachao bachao” from her
brother; and
vi. The boys threw the deceased in the car, and some
of them sat in the car of the deceased and ran away.
Therefore, the material part of the testimony of PW-26 (the so-
called eyewitness) is full of omissions. These omissions are very
significant and relevant as they relate to the most crucial part
of the prosecution’s case. Hence, these omissions amount to
contradictions in view of the explanation to Section 162 of the
CrPC. Moreover, the identification of the accused by PW-26 is
very doubtful in the absence of the test identification parade.
Criminal Appeal No.297 of 2024 Page 5 of 18
For all the reasons recorded above, the evidence of PW-26 will
have to be kept out of consideration.
8. PW-26’s husband, who, according to her, was an
eyewitness, was not examined by the Police. She admitted that
her husband had accompanied her to the Police Station. She
stated that she was not aware whether the Police recorded her
husband’s statement. In her cross-examination recorded on
th
13 May 2016, she admitted that her husband was present in
the Court. Therefore, an adverse inference will have to be
drawn against the prosecution for withholding evidence of an
eyewitness. Then, what remains is the circumstantial
evidence.
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
9. We come to the evidence of PW-1. He was the Manager of
the Bank of Baroda, Kala Amb branch. The prosecution relied
upon the CCTV footage recorded on the camera installed by the
Bank outside its premises. The prosecution contends that the
white car and the accused were seen in the footage. PW-1
stated that based on the application made by the Police, he got
th
a CD prepared from the CCTV footage of 8 July 2013 and
produced the same before the Investigating Officer. In the
cross-examination, he admitted that he had no personal
knowledge about the contents of the CD and he had not
personally seen the CCTV footage. He stated that he had not
appended his signature on the parcel of the CD handed over to
the Police. He accepted that even the stamp of the Bank was
not put on the CD.
Criminal Appeal No.297 of 2024 Page 6 of 18
10. PW-24 claims to be a CCTV engineer. He stated that
Balaji Digital Security Advisor, where he worked as an
engineer, had a contract with the Bank. He claimed that he
prepared a CD from the security system of the Bank of Baroda
as per the request made by the Police. He accepted that he did
not put his identification on the CD or make any markings on
the CD. He admitted that editing could be made of the CCTV
footage on the CD and that the CD could be tampered with. He
also did not depose that he had seen the CCTV footage before
downloading on the CD. Thus, neither PW-1 nor PW-24 had
seen the CCTV footage downloaded on the CD. Moreover, the
CD did not bear any marking or sign from either of the
witnesses. Most importantly, the prosecution failed to produce
the certificate under Section 65B of the Evidence Act
concerning the CD. Therefore, the evidence in the form of the
CD will have to be kept out of consideration as it is not
admissible in evidence.
11. There is one more crucial aspect. Assuming that the
CCTV footage was admissible, the learned trial Judge and the
Judges of the High Court did not see the CCTV footage. Still,
the Courts relied upon it.
12. In the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of
1
Maharashtra , which is a locus classicus on circumstantial
evidence, this Court laid down five principles. Paragraph 153
reads thus:
“153. A close analysis of this decision
would show that the following conditions
1
(1984) 4 SCC 116
Criminal Appeal No.297 of 2024 Page 7 of 18
must be fulfilled before a case against an
accused can be said to be fully
established:
(1) The circumstances from which the
conclusion of guilt is to be drawn
should be fully established. It may be
noted here that this Court indicated
that the circumstances concerned
“must or should” and not “may be”
established. There is not only a
grammatical but a legal distinction
between “may be proved” and “must be
or should be proved” as was held by this
Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v.
State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793
: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ
1783] where the observations were
made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p.
1047] “Certainly, it is a primary principle
that the accused must be and not merely
may be guilty before a court can convict
and the mental distance between ‘may
be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides
vague conjectures from sure
conclusions.”
(2) the facts so established should be
consistent only with the hypothesis of
the guilt of the accused, that is to say,
they should not be explainable on any
other hypothesis except that the accused
is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a
conclusive nature and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible
hypothesis except the one to be proved,
and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence
so complete as not to leave any
reasonable ground for the conclusion
Criminal Appeal No.297 of 2024 Page 8 of 18
consistent with the innocence of the
accused and must show that in all
human probability the act must have
been done by the accused.”
(emphasis added)
CCTV footage is one of the circumstances in the chain of
circumstances relied upon by the prosecution. Even if one of
the circumstances forming part of the chain is not proved, the
prosecution case cannot be held as established.
13. Now, what remains is the evidence of recovery of the parts
of the dead body of the deceased. It must be noted here that
th
the recovery of the torso and other body parts was made on 9
July 2013. The recovery cannot be said to be at the instance of
the accused. The reason is PW-27 stated that he received an
information that one dead body was found without head, hands
and legs near village Dhalla. This information was given to him
on telephone by MHC, Police Station at Mahesh Nagar. The
evidence of recovery at the instance of the accused is of
the Maruti car used in the offence, the weapon used in the
offence and recovery of articles of the deceased such as
a driving licence. After disbelieving the testimony of PW-26,
who claims to be an eyewitness, after discarding the evidence
of the CD of the alleged CCTV footage and after finding that
another eyewitness, though available, has not been examined,
it is not possible to sustain the conviction of the accused only
based on the evidence of recovery. Moreover, all the
circumstances forming part of the chain have not been proved.
Criminal Appeal No.297 of 2024 Page 9 of 18
RELIANCE ON INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
14. The evidence of PW-27 is relevant for different reasons. It
is material to state how his evidence has been recorded. In the
examination-in-chief, he has stated thus:
“ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. . .. .. .
I interrogated accused Randeep Rana
and Rajesh @ Don. Both the accused
persons admitted about the crime
(objected to). Thereafter, they both
brought to the police station and were
lodged in the lock-up.
On 10.7.2013, I interrogated accused
Randeep @ Rana and Rajesh @ Don
while in police custody one by one,
who suffered disclosure statements
Ex.P55 and Ex.P56 respectively. Said
statements were signed by the
respective accused and were
witnessed by ASI Dharamvir and HC
Sultan Singh. Accused Randeep @
Rana while admitting his
involvement in the present case,
had disclosed that about 13-14
years back his uncle was murdered
by the family member of
complainant. Due to that revenge
they have hatched a conspiracy and
after making planning with co-
accused had abducted Gurpal and
committed his murder that he could
identify the place from where
Gurpal was abducted, where he was
murdered and where his body was
thrown. He had also disclosed that
Kaka @ Kanch in whose office the
murder of Gurpal was committed
was having the knowledge about all
the conspiracy as he was the party
of the conspiracy. He also disclosed
that accused Chaman was also
Criminal Appeal No.297 of 2024 Page 10 of 18
present in the said office. He also
disclosed about the role played by
accused Naini, Prabhjot, Rajesh @
Don, Vicky @ Kali, Parveen @ Kala,
Mohit @ Kaga in the commission of
crime of murder of Gurpal (object to
being inadmissible)
Similarly, accused Rajesh @ Don
admitting his involvement in the
commission of crime of the present
case, has disclosed about the
conspiracy of committing murder of
Gurpal and he also disclosed about
the vehicle used in the crime. He
had also disclosed that Kaka @
Kanch in whose office the murder of
Gurpal was committed was having
the knowledge about all the
conspiracy as he was the party of
the conspiracy and that accused
Chaman Lal was also present in the
said office. He also disclosed about
the role played by accused Naini,
Prabhjot, Randeep Rana, Vicky @
Kali, Parveen @ Kala, Mohit @ Kaga
in the commission of crime of
murder of Gurpal. The accused also
disclosed about the place where
they had left the car of Gurpal. He
also offered to get the aforesaid place
of occurrence identified. The aforesaid
disclosure statements of the accused
were reduced into writing as per their
version, which were attested by ASI
Dharamvir and HC Sultan Singh as
witnesses (objected to being
inadmissible).
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . ”
(emphasis added)
Criminal Appeal No.297 of 2024 Page 11 of 18
15. Sections 25 to 27 of the Evidence Act read thus:
“25. Confession to police-officer not
to be proved.–– No confession made to
a police-officer , shall be proved as
against a person accused of any
offence.
26. Confession by accused while in
custody of police not to be proved
against him.–– No confession made by
any person whilst he is in the custody
of a police-officer, unless it be made in
the immediate presence of a
Magistrate, shall be proved as against
such person.
Explanation.––In this section
“Magistrate” does not include the head
of a village discharging magisterial
functions in the Presidency of Fort St.
George or elsewhere, unless such
headman is a Magistrate exercising
the powers of a Magistrate under the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882 (10
of 1882).
27. How much of information
received from accused may be
proved.–– Provided that, when any
fact is deposed to as discovered
inconsequence of information received
from a person accused of any offence,
in the custody of a police-officer, so
much of such information, whether it
amounts to a confession or not, as
relates distinctly to the fact thereby
discovered, may be proved. ”
16. A perusal of the deposition of PW-27, which we have
quoted above, shows that he attempted to prove the
confessions allegedly made by the accused to a police officer
Criminal Appeal No.297 of 2024 Page 12 of 18
when they were in Police custody. There is a complete
prohibition on even proving such confessions. The learned
Trial Judge has completely lost sight of Sections 25 and 26 of
the Evidence Act and has allowed PW-27 to prove the
confessions allegedly made by the accused while they were in
police custody. PW-27 stated that the appellant “suffered
disclosure statement at Exhibits ‘P55’ and ‘P56’ respectively”.
Obviously, he is referring to disclosure of the information under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The law on disclosure under
Section 27 is well settled right from the classic decision of the
Privy Council in the case of Pulukuri Kotayya & Ors. v. King-
2
Emperor . In the case of K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State
3
of A.P. , this Court relied upon the decision of the Privy
Council and in paragraph 9 held thus:
“9. Let us then turn to the question
whether the statement of the appellant
to the effect that “he had hidden them
(the ornaments)” and “would point out
the place” where they were, is wholly
admissible in evidence under Section
27 or only that part of it is admissible
where he stated that he would point
out the place but not that part where
he stated that he had hidden the
ornaments. The Sessions Judge in this
connection relied on Pulukuri Kotayya
v. King-Emperor [ (1946) 74 IA 65]
where a part of the statement leading
to the recovery of a knife in a murder
case was held inadmissible by the
Judicial Committee. In that case the
Judicial Committee considered
2
1946 SCC OnLine PC 47 : AIR 1947 PC 67
3
1962 SCC OnLine SC 32
Criminal Appeal No.297 of 2024 Page 13 of 18
Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act,
which is in these terms:
“Provided that, when any fact is
deposed to as discovered in
consequence of information
received from a person accused of
any offence, in the custody of a
police officer, so much of such
information, whether it amounts to
a confession or not, as relates
distinctly to the fact thereby
discovered, may be proved.”
This section is an exception to
Sections 25 and 26, which prohibit the
proof of a confession made to a police
officer or a confession made while a
person is in police custody, unless it is
made in immediate presence of a
Magistrate. Section 27 allows that part
of the statement made by the accused
to the police “whether it amounts to a
confession or not” which relates
distinctly to the fact thereby
discovered to be proved. Thus even a
confessional statement before the
police which distinctly relates to
the discovery of a fact may be
proved under Section 27. The
Judicial Committee had in that case
to consider how much of the
information given by the accused to
the police would be admissible
under Section 27 and laid stress on
the words “so much of such
information…as relates distinctly to
the fact thereby discovered” in that
connection. It held that the extent
of the information admissible must
depend on the exact nature of the
fact discovered to which such
information is required to relate. It
Criminal Appeal No.297 of 2024 Page 14 of 18
was further pointed out that “the
fact discovered embraces the place
from which the object is produced
and the knowledge of the accused as
to this, and the information given
must relate distinctly to this fact”.
It was further observed that—
“Information as to past user, or
the past history of the object
produced is not related to its
discovery in the setting in which
it is discovered.”
This was exemplified further by the
Judicial Committee by observing—
“Information supplied by a
person in custody that ‘I will
produce a knife concealed in the
roof of my house’ leads to the
discovery of the fact that a knife
is concealed in the house of the
informant to his knowledge, and
if the knife is proved to have
been used in the commission of
the offence, the fact discovered
is very relevant. If however to
the statement the words be
added ‘with which I stabbed A',
these words are inadmissible
since they do not relate to the
discovery of the knife in the
house of the informant.”
(emphasis added)
Section 27 is an exception to Sections 25 and 26. It permits
certain parts of the statement made by the accused to a police
officer while in custody to be proved. Under Section 27, only
that part of the statement made by the accused is admissible,
which distinctly relates to the discovery. It becomes admissible
Criminal Appeal No.297 of 2024 Page 15 of 18
when a fact is discovered as a consequence of the information
received from the accused. What is admissible is only such
information furnished by the accused as relates distinctly to
the facts thereby discovered. No other part is admissible. By
Exhibits ‘P55’ and ‘P56’, it is alleged that the accused showed
the places where the deceased was abducted, where he was
murdered and where his body was thrown. In this case, even
the inadmissible part of the statement under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act has been incorporated in the examination-in-
chief of PW-27. The learned trial judge should not have
recorded an inadmissible confession in the deposition. A
confessional statement made by the accused to a police officer
while in custody is not admissible in the evidence except to the
extent to which Section 27 is applicable. If such inadmissible
confessions are made part of the depositions of the prosecution
witnesses, then there is every possibility that the Trial Courts
may get influenced by it.
THE GRAVITY OF THE OFFENCE
17. It is true that this is a case of a brutal murder. The
brutality of the offence does not dispense with the legal
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case,
there is no legal evidence to prove the involvement of the
accused. The Courts can convict an accused only if his guilt is
proved beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of legally
admissible evidence. There cannot be a moral conviction. We
are tempted to quote what this Court observed in paragraph 24
Criminal Appeal No.297 of 2024 Page 16 of 18
of its decision in the case of Subhash Chand v. State of
4
Rajasthan . It reads as follows:
“24. Thus, none of the pieces of
evidence relied on as incriminating, by
the trial court and the High Court, can
be treated as incriminating pieces of
circumstantial evidence against the
accused. Though the offence is
gruesome and revolts the human
conscience but an accused can be
convicted only on legal evidence
and if only a chain of circumstantial
evidence has been so forged as to
rule out the possibility of any other
reasonable hypothesis excepting
the guilt of the accused. In
Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit case
[(1981) 2 SCC 35: 1981 SCC (Cri)
315: AIR 1981 SC 765] this Court
cautioned — “human nature is too
willing, when faced with brutal
crimes, to spin stories out of strong
suspicions” (SCC p. 44, para 33). This
Court has held time and again that
between may be true and must be true
there is a long distance to travel which
must be covered by clear, cogent and
unimpeachable evidence by the
prosecution before an accused is
condemned a convict. ”
(emphasis added)
CONCLUSION AND OPERATIVE PART
18. The appellants' guilt has not been established beyond a
reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we allow the appeal. We quash
th th
and set aside the judgments dated 14 February 2017 and 17
February 2017 passed by the learned Additional Sessions
4
(2002) 1 SCC 702
Criminal Appeal No.297 of 2024 Page 17 of 18
Judge, Ambala in Sessions Case no.16 of 2013, as well as the
th
impugned judgment dated 10 February 2020 passed in
Criminal Appeal Nos.D-335-DB and D-398-DB of 2017 (O&M)
by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh and
acquit the appellants. The impugned judgments have already
been set aside as far as the other accused are concerned. That
part is not disturbed. If appellants are in prison, they shall be
immediately set at liberty unless required in connection with
any other offence.
...…………………………….J.
(Abhay S Oka)
...…………………………….J.
(Ahsanuddin Amanullah)
...…………………………….J.
(Augustine George Masih)
New Delhi;
November 22, 2024.
Criminal Appeal No.297 of 2024 Page 18 of 18