Full Judgment Text
REPORTABLE
2023 INSC 683
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2340 OF 2023
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 10656 of 2022)
MOHAMMAD WAJID & ANR. …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF U.P. & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
J.B. PARDIWALA, J. :
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is at the instance of the original accused
Nos. 1 and 2 resply of the First Information Report (FIR) being
the Crime Registration No. 224 of 2022 dated 19.09.2022
registered with the Mirzapur Police Station, District
Saharanpur, State of U.P. for the offences punishable under
Sections 395, 504, 506 and 323 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC)
and is directed against the order passed by the High Court of
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Charanjeet Kaur
Date: 2023.08.08
15:45:16 IST
Reason:
Judicature at Allahabad dated 17.10.2022 in the Criminal
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Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 15174 of 2022 by which the
High Court rejected the Writ Petition filed by appellants herein
thereby declining to quash the aforesaid FIR.
FACTUAL MATRIX
3. The respondent No. 4 herein namely Ram Kumar lodged
FIR No. 224 of 2022 for the offences enumerated above at the
police station also referred to above. The FIR reads thus:-
“… The undersigned Ramkumar son of Sadhuram is
a resident of Kasimpur, P.S. Mirjapur. I want to
submit that Haji Iqbal, his son Javed, Wazid,
Alishan, Afjal and brother of Iqbal namely Mehmood
Ali forcefully started to tell us since long that our land
bearing Khasra No. 256/1 situated at Village
Mayapur belongs to them. It is in the year 2021
when time for cultivation arrived, that myself and my
brother Rajkumar went to the house of Iqbal, son of
Abdul Wahid at Mirjapur. We requested him that you
people are disturbing the peace and tranquility of us.
We said, we were destitudes. It is on that Iqbal, his
brother Mehmood and his sons namely Zabed, Wajid,
Alishan and Afjal became very furious on us. They
started using abusive language against us. We
requested them to stop uttering abusive language. It
is at that time all these persons assaulted us with
their hands and fists for a long time. It is thereafter
they on a point of pistol put on my forehead, they
took away Rs. 2 lakh kept in my pocket forcefully.
Thereafter, all these people stated that if we would
talk of this to any one, they would kill all the
members of our family. It is then Iqbal told me to sign
the stamp paper. After terrorizing and threatening us,
they compelled we both brothers to put our
signatures on the stamp papers. We being robbed,
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we returned silently to our home. We thereafter
communicated the present fact before our family
members. It is however due to fear of these persons,
none of the members of our family supported us
against these persons. After thinking a lot and
mustering courage, I have come down before your
police station for lodging the present report.
Applicant Sd/-Rajkumar 19.09.2022-Ram Kumar
s/o Sadhuram r/o Kasimpusr, P.S. Mirjapur, District
Saharanpur, M.No. 9758031420.”
(Emphasis supplied)
4. Thus the FIR as aforestated reveals that the first
informant is a resident of village Kasimpur, Mirzapur, District
Saharanpur. His name has been recorded as a tenure holder of
agricultural land bearing Khasra No. 256/1 situated at village
Mayapur, District Saharanpur. He has alleged that the
appellants herein alongwith few other co-accused have been
putting forward wrong claim of being the owners of the land
bearing Khasra No. 256/1. It is his case that sometime in the
year 2021, he along with his brother namely Rajkumar had
visited the house of the appellant No. 2 herein situated at
Mirzapur to request him not to interfere with their lawful
possession and ownership of the land in question. It is his
case that at that point of time the appellants herein and other
co-accused hurled abuses to the first informant and his
brother Rajkumar and all the accused thereafter assaulted the
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first informant and his brother with hands and fists. It is
further alleged that at that point of time the accused persons
on the point of a gun forcibly took away Rs. 2 Lakh from the
pocket of the first informant. The accused persons are also
alleged to have threatened the first informant that if he would
talk to anyone about the incident, then all his family members
would be killed. In the last, the first informant has alleged that
the accused persons forcibly obtained signatures of the first
informant and his brother on a plain stamp paper. After the
alleged incident, the first informant and his brother Rajkumar
left the house of the appellant No. 2 herein.
5. It is pertinent to note that for the incident alleged to
have occurred in the year 2021, the FIR was lodged in the year
2022. It is also pertinent to note that in the FIR, no date and
time of the alleged incident has been stated. No plausible
explanation was offered by the first informant as to why there
was inordinate delay in lodging the FIR.
6. The appellants herein went before the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad and filed Criminal Miscellaneous Writ
Petition No. 15174 of 2022 and prayed for the quashing of the
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FIR in question. The High Court declined to entertain the writ
application and rejected the same observing as under:-
“Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and
learned A.G.A for the State respondents.
The relief sought in this petition is for quashing
of the F.I.R. dated 19.09.2022, registered as Case
Crime No. 0224 of 2022, under sections 395, 504,
506, 323 I.P.C., Police Station Mirzapur, District
Saharanpur.
Learned AGA opposed the prayer for quashing
of the FIR, which discloses cognizable offence.
Perusal of the impugned first information report
prima facie reveals commission of cognizable offence.
Therefore, in view of the law laid down by Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana and
others vs. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 Supp. (1) SCC
335 and M/s Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs.
State of Maharashtra, AIR 2021 SC 1918 and in
Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.3262/2021
(Leelavati Devi @ Leelawati & another vs. the State of
Uttar Pradesh) decided on 07.10.2021, no case has
been made out for interference with the impugned
first information report.
Therefore, the writ petition is dismissed leaving
it open for the petitioners to apply before the
competent court for anticipatory bail/bail as
permissible under law and in accordance with law.”
Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid, the
appellants are before this Court with the present appeal.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS
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7. Mr. Siddhartha Dave, the learned senior counsel
appearing for the appellants in the written submissions filed
by him has stated as under:-
“1. The Petitioners who are Accused Nos. 6 and 1
respectively in FIR No. 224 of 2022 have filed the
present Special Leave Petition against the impugned
judgment and final order dated 17.10.2022 passed
by the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 15174 of 2022,
whereby the Hon’ble High Court has dismissed the
said Writ Petition filed by the Petitioners under Article
226 of the Constitution of India seeking quashing of
FIR No. 224 of 2022 dated 19.09.2022 registered
under Sections 395, 504, 506 & 323 of the Indian
Penal Code against six accused persons namely,
Mohd. Iqbal alias Bala (Petitioner No. 2 herein),
Mehmood Ali (Brother of Petitioner No. 2), Afjal (Son
of Petitioner No. 2), Alishan (Son of Petitioner No. 2),
Javed (Son of Petitioner No. 2), and Mohammad
Wajid (Petitioner No. 1 herein and son of Petitioner
No. 2) at Police Station Mirzapur, District Saharanpur.
2. The allegation in the said FIR No. 224 of 2022
dated 19.09.2022 is that the Complainant Ram
Kumar (Respondent No. 4 herein), who is a resident
of Village Kasimpur, Mirzapur, District Saharanpur, is
recorded as a tenure holder of land situated at
Khasra No. 256/1, Village Mayapur, Mirzapur,
District Saharanpur. It is further alleged that the
accused Haji Iqbal (Petitioner No. 2 herein) and his
sons Javed, Mohammad Wajid (Petitioner No. 1
herein), Alishan, Afjal and his brother Mehmood Ali
had earlier claimed that the said land bearing
Khasra No. 256/1 belonged to them. In the year
2021, when the Complainant and his bother Raj
Kumar went to Petitioner No. 2’s house situated at
Mirzapur, Saharanpur and requested him not to
disturb the peace and tranquility of their land upon
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which Petitioner No. 2 Iqbal, Mehmood Ali, Javed,
Petitioner No.1 Mahmood Wajid, Alishan and Afzal
abused the Complainant and thereafter they
assaulted him and his brother Raj Kumar with their
hands and fists. It is further alleged that the accused
persons then pointed a pistol on the Complainant’s
forehead and forcibly took an amount of Rs. 2 lakh
from the Complainant’s pocket. The accused persons
threatened the Complainant that in case he told
anyone about the incident then all his family
members will be eliminated. It is further alleged that
the accused persons forcibly got the signatures of the
Complainant and his brother on a blank stamp paper
and after being robbed of their money the
Complainant and his brother quietly returned home.
3. It is respectfully submitted that the alleged
First Information Report is absolutely false and
frivolous, and on a reading of the said FIR, the
offence of dacoity is clearly not made out against the
Petitioners. It is highly doubtful that the
Complainant, who was aware of the criminal history
of Petitioner No. 2 Iqbal, would go to the house of the
accused Petitioner No. 2 with a huge sum of money,
that is, Rs. 2 lakh in his pocket and after the alleged
incident would remain silent for one year. Although it
is alleged that the Complainant and his brother Raj
Kumar were assaulted by the accused persons
however there is no injury or medical report
whatsoever to substantiate the said allegation.
4. The allegations in the First Information Report
are not only vague but also highly improbable given
that except for the bald allegation that the incident
occurred in the year 2021, there is no mention of the
date and time of incident in the FIR. The said
incident allegedly occurred in the year 2021, while
the FIR has been lodged after an inordinate delay of
1 year, that is, on 19.09.2022. On a reading of the
FIR it is evident that the entire dispute is with respect
to the land situated at Khasra No. 256/1, Village
Mayapur, Mirzapur, District Saharanpur. It is
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pertinent to submit that the Petitioners are neither the
owner of the land nor have they got anything to do
with the said land and there was therefore no
question of the Petitioners having threatened and
assaulted the Complainant.
5. It is submitted that after the change of
Government in the State of Uttar Pradesh in the year
2017, the ruling party came to power and
immediately after the change of the Government the
Petitioners along with their family members were
falsely implicated in more than 30 criminal cases at
the behest of the ruling party. The Petitioners are
being unnecessarily harassed by the State
machinery including the Police. Although the
Respondent State is heavily relying upon the criminal
cases registered against the Petitioners and their
family members to show that they are habitual
offenders but till date the petitioners have not been
convicted by any Court of law and moreover every
time the Petitioners or their family members gets
protection (anticipatory bail or stay of arrest) from
either this Hon’ble Court or the Hon’ble High Court,
the local police immediately registers false cases
against them.
6. It is submitted that the alleged Look Out Notice
dated 10.05.2022 was issued much prior to the
registration of the present FIR No. 224 of 2022 which
was registered on 19.09.2022 and as such is
inconsequential.
7. It is respectfully submitted that the alleged
First Information Report has been maliciously
instituted at the behest of the present ruling party in
the State of Uttar Pradesh to wreak vengeance and to
settle political scores with Petitioner No. 2 Mohd.
Iqbal alias Bala as he belongs to a rival political
party and he was also a Member of Legislative
Council from the period 2011 to 2016. Petitioner No.
2 Mohd. Iqbal alias Bala belongs to a respectable
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family of Saharanpur and he is running several
Charitable Institutions.
8. The allegations made in the First Information
Report do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case under Sections 395, 504, 506 and
323 IPC against the Petitioner and thus, the FIR is
liable to be quashed. It is pertinent to mention that
even after the charge sheet has been filed, the
petition for quashing of a FIR is well within the
powers of a Court of law [ Please see: Anand
Kumar Mohatta and another VS. State (NCT of
Delhi), Department of Home & Another (2019)
11 SCC 706 at paragraph 14 & 16]
9. For the reasons mentioned above, the Special
Leave Petition may be allowed and the order of the
Hon’ble High Court refusing to quash the FIR No. 224
of 2022 dated 19.09.2022 be set aside. ”
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE
8. Ms. Garima Prasad, the learned Additional Advocate
General appearing for the State of U.P. in her written
submissions has stated as under:-
“
A. NO AFFIDAVIT OR VAKALATNAMA FILED BY
ACCUSED IQBAL @ HAJI IQBAL @ BALA,
ACCUSED MEHMOOD AND DILSHAD - NO RELIEF
CAN BE GIVEN TO PETITION FILED BY THIRD
PARTIES
● That the instant SLPs have been filed by a third
party. The Accused Iqbal @ Haji Iqbal @ Bala nor the
other petitioners have signed the vakalatnama and
affidavit and Iqbal is absconding from the law. Even,
the Writ Petition under section 482 Cr.P.C. filed before
the Hon’ble High Court, has not been signed by Iqbal
9
himself. No relief can be granted to those who have
not approached this Hon’ble Court.
● Accused Iqbal has absconded from the jurisdiction
of this Hon’ble Court and has in all likelihood
absconded from the country. It is humbly submitted
that a person who is not within the jurisdiction of this
Hon’ble Court and has not signed any affidavit or
vakalatnama, cannot be entitled for any relief.
● The accused have selectively brought only a few
cases before this Hon’ble Court leaving the more
heinous and gross cases.
B. Iqbal @ Haji Iqbal @ Bala is the Most Wanted
Criminal in the area of Mirjapur District
Saharanpur creating terror in the minds of the
citizens. He is a known sand mafia, land
grabber having grabbed Government Land,
Forest Land, Poor Farmers’ Land and built a
university namely Glocal University,
Saharanpur in the area of more than 700
Acres. The Office of Senior Superintendent of
Police, Meerut Zone, Meerut, vide its office
memo dated 11.02.2023, has declared Iqbal @
Bala a most wanted criminal with a prize
money of Rs. 1,00,000/-
● PROTECTION OF EARLIER DISPENSATION : It is
evident that the Crime world of Accused Iqbal and
his family has grown over the past decades with
support of earlier dispensation/Government(s), and
that is why the criminal cases registered against him
in the years 1990 – 1993, were withdrawn by the
earlier Government(s). The Accused Iqbal terrorized
the people, he is a known name of terror in the area
of District Saharanpur or Western State of Uttar
Pradesh, due to which, no FIR(s)/Criminal cases
were registered against the Accused Iqbal and his
family members.
● : The accused Iqbal is
LOOK OUT NOTICES
absconding from the process and the number of Look
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Out Circulars were issued against him. But the
Accused Iqbal has not appeared even once in any
case and has already absconded. A person who
does not cooperate with the investigation, no relief
can be granted to him.
● : A large number of
NOTICES U/S SECTION 41
notices under section 41A Cr.P.C. have been issued
in a large number of cases. were issued to the
accused Iqbal @ Bala, despite the service of notices,
the Accused Iqbal neither appeared nor joined the
investigation in any criminal case.
●
HISTORY SHEETER GANGSTER GANG LEADER
: The Accused Haji Iqbal @ Mohd. Iqbal @ Bala is a
history-sheeter, gang leader, known name of terror, if
any relief to be given to such type of criminals, who
are publicly involved in rape cases, dacoity cases,
fraud cases, land grabbing cases, extortion cases etc
will send a wrong message/signal to the society and
those persons/victims who come against these
wrongdoers will never get justice and no one will ever
raise their voices against these criminals in future.
● So far as concerned, admitted with the change of
Government, complainant/terrified people, aggrieved
peoples, have been able to come forward to lodge or
register complaints against the Accused Iqbal. Due to
illegal support of earlier Government(s), no complaint
or criminal cases were registered against them. Now,
they have come forward to register their grievances.
In the present Government, the number of aggrieved
People, Terrified People/Complainant(s) have been
able to come forward to register or raise a voice
against the Accused Iqbal. On the basis of criminal
complaint(s) actions were taken against the Accused
Iqbal and his family members.
● Even, if these are false cases, the honest or law
abiding persons should join the investigation but the
accused Iqbal is evading all notices and has not
joined any investigation in any criminal case, and
hence Look Out Notices have been issued.
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● It is pertinent to mention here that in all criminal
cases, the complainants are different and the crime
is different and some accused are also different.
● Further, it is pertinent to mention that the Accused
Iqbal and his family regularly threatened the
witnesses.
● The Accused Iqbal should be called upon to submit
and appear before this Hon’ble Court or any court of
law.
● The Accused Iqbal is a land mafia, sand mafia,
rapists, gangster.
● The Accused Iqbal started committing fraud, theft
and robbery cases in the initial days. Eventually, he
became involved in the illegal mining cases and
became a gang leader. Thereafter, the Accused Iqbal
started to grab the forest land as well as government
land in the District of Saharanpur. His family
members and close associates also started to grab
the land of the poor people.
● The Accused Mohd. Iqbal @ Bala is the mining
mafia in western part of state of Uttar Pradesh and
several number of criminal cases are registered
against him and his family members.
● The Accused Mohd. Iqbal, Resident of District
Saharanpur and Ex-Member, Uttar Pradesh
Legislative Council (BSP MLC) is involved in the
various criminal activities. The main allegations
against Mohd. Iqbal are as follows:
● Amassed disproportionate assets;
● Incorporated a number of sham companies under
the Companies Act, 1956, many of which have
dummy directors or fictitious shareholders;
● Used Golbal University in Saharanpur (located in
exceeding area more than 700 acres, where he is the
founder Chancellor and managed by the Abdul
Waheed Educational and Charitable Trust, a trust
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set up in in his father’s name with his family
members as its trustees, for creating assets out of
money illegally earned through the mining contracts.
● The Accused Haji Iqbal @ Bala and his family
members are involved in illegal mining cases, land
grabbing cases, fraud cases and other criminal cases
including rape, dacoity and others.
● The Accused Iqbal @ Bala, being Gang leader, and
his gang members are criminal minded persons and
indulges in anti-social activities and the Petitioners,
to gain the illegal money, are involved in illegal
mining business, grabbing the government and non-
government land by taking illegal possession.
● It is submitted that the fact that the complaints
may have been initiated by reason of political
vendetta is not in itself ground for quashing the
criminal proceedings.
● That the section 482 of the Cr.P.C. provides:- “482.
Saving of inherent powers of High Court — Nothing in
this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the
inherent powers of the High Court to make such
orders as may be necessary to give effect to any
order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the
process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends
of justice.”
● That this Hon’ble Court has held in Monica
Kumar (Dr.) v. State of U.P. reported as (2008) 8
SCC 781, that inherent jurisdiction under Section
482 of the Cr. P. C has to be exercised sparingly,
carefully and with caution and only when such
exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down
in the section itself.
● That further, it is pertinent to mention that this
Hon’ble Court has held in case Mrs. Dhanalakshmi
Vs R. Prasanna Kumar , reported as AIR 1990 SC
494 that in exceptional cases, to prevent of the
13
powers of Court, the High Court might in exercise of
its inherent powers under section 482 Cr. P.C. quash
criminal proceedings. However, interference would
only be justified when complaint did not disclose any
offence, or was patently frivolous, vexatious or
oppressive.
In the present case, the FIR/Crime No. 122/2022
U/s 376, 323, 354(A) IPC & Section 7, 8 of POCSO
Act, 2012 was registered at P.S. Mahila Thana,
District Saharanpur disclosed the glaring facts and
there are serious allegations against the Accused
Iqbal and other accused. The facts of the FIR No. 122
of 2022 prima facie reveals commissions of
cognizable offence.
The Accused Haji Iqbal @ Bala has been involved in
more than 45 criminal cases including rape cases,
illegal mining, land grabbing, fraud cases, assault
cases and other criminal cases since 1990. The first
FIR was registered against the Accused Iqbal in 1990
i.e. FIR No. 57 of 1990 U/s 379, 411 IPC and Section
26 of Forest Act at Mirzapur Police Station. However,
due to earlier Government(s) supports, no legal
actions were taken against the Accused Iqbal and his
family members. The following criminal cases are
registered against the Accused Iqbal are as follows:-
| Sr. No. | FIR/Crime<br>No. | Under Section | Police Station | District |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | 57 of 1990 | 379, 411 IPC<br>and section 26<br>Forest Act | Mirzapur | Saharanpur |
| 2. | 53 of 1991 | 379, 411 IPC<br>and section<br>4/10 Forest Act | Chilkana | Saharanpur |
| 3. | 217 of<br>1993 | 147, 323, 504,<br>506 IPC | Behat | Saharanpur |
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| 4. | 302 of<br>2016 | 420, 467, 468,<br>471 IPC | Ecotech third | Gautambudh<br>Nagar |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5. | 196 of<br>2017 | 420, 406, 506<br>IPC | Mirzapur | Saharanpur |
| 6. | 246 of<br>2017 | 452, 323, 504,<br>506, 354, 147,<br>148, 386, 420,<br>467, 468, 471,<br>120B IPC | SadarBajar | Saharanpur |
| 7. | 39 of 2018 | 420, 467, 468,<br>471 IPC | Janakpuri, | Saharanpur |
| 8. | 52 of 2018 | 147, 148, 149,<br>352, 504, 147,<br>148, 386, 420,<br>467, 468, 471,<br>120B IPC<br>Section 3(2)(5)A<br>SC/ST Act and<br>Section 7<br>Criminal Law<br>Amendment<br>Act | SadarBajar | Saharanpur |
| 9. | 65 of 2018 | 403, 447, 506,<br>120B IPC | Mirzapur | Saharanpur |
| 10. | 165 of<br>2018 | 2/3 Gangster Act | Mirzapur | Saharanpur |
| 11. | 177 of<br>2019 | 420, 504, 506,<br>467, 468, 471<br>IPC | Mirzapur | Saharanpur |
| 12. | 178 of<br>2019 | 406, 342, 392,<br>504, 506, 354<br>IPC | Mirzapur | Saharanpur |
| 13. | 587 of<br>2019 | 120B, 167,<br>467,<br>468, 471 IPC | SadarBajar | Saharanpur |
| 14. | 519 of<br>2021 | 420, 466, 467,<br>468, 471,<br>120B IPC | Behat | Saharanpur |
15
| 15. | 83 of 2022 | 2/3 Gangster Act | Mirzapur | Saharanpur |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 16. | 97 of 2022 | 504, 506, 386<br>IPC | Mirzapur | Saharanpur |
| 17. | 101 of<br>2022 | 504, 506 IPC | Mirzapur | Saharanpur |
| 18. | 102 of<br>2022 | 420, 467, 468,<br>471 IPC | Mirzapur | Saharanpur |
| 19. | 89 of 87-88 | Badkala Forest<br>Range | ||
| 20. | 29 of 89-90 | Badkala Forest<br>Range | ||
| 21. | 173 of<br>89-<br>90 | Badkala Forest<br>Range | ||
| 22. | 53 of 91 | 4/10 Forest Act | Behat | Saharanpur |
| 23. | 70 of 91-92 | Behat | Saharanpur | |
| 24. | 71 of 91-92 | Behat | Saharanpur | |
| 25. | 72 of 91-92 | Behat | Saharanpur | |
| 26. | 103 of<br>1992 | 379, 411 IPC<br>and<br>26 of Forest Act | Behat | Saharanpur |
| 27. | 104 of<br>1994 | 379, 411 IPC<br>and<br>section 26<br>of Forest Act | Behat | Saharanpur |
| 28. | 105 of<br>1992 | 379, 411 IPC<br>and<br>section 26<br>of Forest Act | Behat | Saharanpur |
| 29. | 32 of 2001 | 147, 148, 306<br>IPC | Yamuna Nagar, | Yamuna<br>Nagar,<br>Haryana |
16
FIR No. 224 of 2022 U/s 395, 504, 506, 323
IPC:-
c) The Petitioners and other accused robbed the
Complainant and his brother and got the signature on
stamp papers of the aforementioned land forcefully.
d) Further, it was alleged in that due to terror of the
Petitioners and their family, no other family members
have supported to lodge the complaint, but after seeing
that the other aggrieved persons are taking action
against the Petitioners and their family members, the
complainant decided to lodge the complaint against the
Petitioners and other accused persons for the said
criminal incident.
e) The Investigation Officer also recorded the statement
of the independent witnesses and collected the other
material evidence against the Petitioners and other
accused persons, which prima facie shows that the
Petitioners ad other accused persons have committed
the serious offences.
f) The Investigation has been completed and
chargesheet is ready to file against the Petitioners but
due to stay order dated 28.11.2022 of this Hon’ble
Court, the chargesheet could not be submitted.
SUBMISSIONS IN RESPECT OF DELAY
a) The impugned first information report prima
facie reveals commission of cognizable offences and
which inspire confidence that it is clear from the
contents of the FIR that serious crime was committed
by the Petitioners and other accused persons.
b) The Dacoity is defined under section 391 IPC,
which stipulates that when five or more persons
conjointly or attempt to commit a robbery or, or where
the whole number of persons conjointly committing or
attempting to commit a robbery, and persons present
and aiding such commission or attempt, amount to five
17
or more, every person so committing, attempting or
aiding, is said to commit “dacoity.
c) Further, the robbery has defined under section
390 IPC, which stipulates that Theft is “robbery” if, in
order to the committing of the theft, or in committing the
theft, or in carrying away or attempting to carry away
property obtained by the theft, the offender, for that
end, voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any
person death or hurt or wrongful restraint, or fear of
instant death or of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful
restraint.
In the present case, the other accused persons (total 6
accused persons) have looted & extorted the
complainant. The contents of the FIR prima facie
reveals that the Complainant, when they visited the
house of the Petitioners, he was looted and wrongful
restrained by the Petitioners. The petitioners and the
other accused persons, as such, prima facie involved in
the offences as mentioned in the FIR.
d) Recently, this Hon’ble Court has held in case
Mahendra Prasad Tiwari Vs Amit Kumar Tiwari
& Anr reported as 2022 SCC Online SC 1057 held that
delay is registration of the FIR is not a ground to
discharge.
e) This Hon’ble Court has held in case
Thakur
, reported as (1966) 2 SCR 740,
Ram v. State of Bihar
that barring a few exceptions, in criminal matters the
party who is treated as the aggrieved party is the State
which is the custodian of the social interests of the
community at large and so it is for the State to take all
the steps necessary for bringing the person who has
acted against the social interests of the community to
book.
f) This Hon’ble Court has held in case Sheonandan
Paswan v. State of Bihar , (1987) 1 SCC 288
17. It is undoubtedly true that the prosecution
against Dr. Jagannath Mishra was initiated by
18
the successor government of Karpoori Thakur
after Dr. Jagannath Mishra went out of power.
But that by itself cannot support the inference
that the initiation of the prosecution was
actuated by political vendetta or mala fides
because it is quite possible that there might be
material justifying the initiation of prosecution
against Dr. Jagannath Mishra and the
successor government might have legitimately
felt that there was a case for initiation of
prosecution and that is why the prosecution
might have been initiated. There would be
nothing wrong on the part of the successor
government in doing so and the prosecution
cannot be said to be vitiated on that account.
This is precisely what Hidayatullah, J.
speaking for the Constitution Bench pointed out
in Krishna Ballabh Sahay v. Commission of
Enquiry [AIR 1969 SC 258 : (1969) 1 SCR 387,
393 : 1969 Cri LJ 520] :
“The contention that the power cannot be
exercised by the succeeding Ministry
has been answered already by this Court
in two cases. The earlier of the two has
been referred to by the High Court
already. The more recent case is P.V.
Jagannath Rao v. State of Orissa [AIR
1969 SC 215 : (1968) 3 SCR 789] . It
hardly needs any authority to state that
the inquiry will be ordered not by the
Minister against himself but by someone
else. Where a Ministry goes out of office,
its successor may consider any glaring
charges and may, if justified, order an
inquiry. Otherwise, each Ministry will
become a law unto itself and the corrupt
conduct of its Ministers will remain
beyond scrutiny.”
These observations afford a complete answer to the
contention urged on behalf of Dr. Jagannath Mishra
19
that this Court should not interfere with the
withdrawal of the prosecution because the successor
government of Karpoori Thakur or Sheonandan
Paswan was actuated by political motivation or
vendetta.”
9. Ms. Garima Prasad brought to the notice of this Court
that the investigation has been completed and charge sheet is
ready to be filed against the appellants and other co-accused,
however, due to the interim order passed by this Court on
28.11.2022, the Investigation Officer has not been able to file
the charge sheet before the concerned trial court.
ANALYSIS
10. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the
parties and having gone through the materials on record, the
following questions fall for the consideration by this Court:-
1. Whether the plain reading of the FIR discloses
commission of the offence of dacoity punishable under
Section 395 of the IPC? To put it in other words, even
if the entire case of the prosecution is believed to be
true, whether the ingredients to constitute the offence
of dacoity punishable under Section 395 of the IPC
are disclosed?
20
2. Whether any case of criminal intimidation
punishable under Sections 504 and 506(2) of the IPC
is made out?
3. Whether the allegations levelled in the FIR
inspire any confidence considering the fact that the
FIR was lodged in the year 2022 for the alleged offence
of the year 2021 and more particularly, without
furnishing any details as regards the date and time of
the alleged incident?
4. Whether the case on hand falls within any
one of the parameters laid down by this Court in the
case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal , AIR 1992
SC 604, for the purposes of quashing the criminal
case?
DISCUSSION
OFFENCE OF DACOITY:-
11. The offence of dacoity falls within Chapter XVII of the
IPC which relates to Offences Against Property. Section 390
explains what is “robbery”. It explains, when theft is robbery
21
and when extortion is robbery. Section 390 along with
illustrations reads thus:-
“ Section 390. Robbery .─In all robbery there is either
theft or extortion.
.—Theft is "robbery" if, in order
When theft is robbery
to the committing of the theft, or in committing the theft,
or in carrying away or attempting to carry away
property obtained by the theft, the offender, for that end
voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to any person
death or hurt or wrongful restraint, or fear of instant
death or of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint.
When extortion is robbery .—Extortion is "robbery" if
the offender, at the time of committing the extortion, is in
the presence of the person put in fear, and commits the
extortion by putting that person in fear of instant death,
of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint to that
person or to some other person, and, by so putting in
fear, induces the person so put in fear then and there to
deliver up the thing extorted.
Explanation.—The offender is said to be present if he is
sufficiently near to put the other person in fear of instant
death, of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint.
Illustrations
(a) A holds Z down, and fraudulently takes Z's money
and jewels from Z's clothes, without Z's consent. Here A
has committed theft, and, in order to the committing of
that theft, has voluntarily caused wrongful restraint to Z.
A has therefore committed robbery.
(b) A meets Z on the high road, shows a pistol, and
demands Z's purse. Z, in consequence, surrenders his
purse. Here A has extorted the purse from Z by putting
him in fear of instant hurt, and being at the time of
committing the extortion in his presence. A has therefore
committed robbery.
22
(c) A meets Z and Z's child on the high road. A takes the
child, and threatens to filing it down a precipice, unless Z
delivers his purse. Z, in consequence, delivers his purse.
Here A has extorted the purse from Z, by causing Z to be
in fear of instant hurt to the child who is there present. A
has therefore committed robbery on Z.
(d) A obtains property from Z by saying "Your child is in
the hands of my gang, and will be put to death unless
you send us ten thousand rupees". This is extortion, and
punishable as such: but it is not robbery, unless Z is put
in fear of the instant death of his child.”
12. Section 391 of the IPC defines “dacoity”. Section 391
reads thus:-
“ Section 391. Dacoity . — When five or more persons
conjointly commit or attempt to commit a robbery, or
where the whole number of persons conjointly
committing or attempting to commit a robbery, and
persons present and aiding such commission or attempt,
amount to five or more, every person so committing,
attempting or aiding, is said to commit "dacoity".”
13. Section 395 provides for punishment for the offence of
dacoity. Section 395 reads thus:-
“ Section 395. Punishment for dacoity . —Whoever
commits dacoity shall be punished with imprisonment
for life, or with rigorous imprisonment for a term which
may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”
14. Theft amounts to ‘robbery’ if, in order to the committing
of the theft, or in committing the theft, or in carrying away or
attempting to carry away property obtained by the theft, the
23
offender for that end, voluntarily causes or attempts to cause to
any person death or hurt or wrongful restraint, or fear of instant
death or of instant hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint. Before
theft can amount to ‘robbery’, the offender must have
voluntarily caused or attempted to cause to any person death or
hurt or wrongful restraint, or fear of instant death or of instant
hurt, or of instant wrongful restraint. The second necessary
ingredient is that this must be in order to the committing of the
theft, or in committing the theft, or in carrying away or
attempting to carry away property obtained by the theft. The
third necessary ingredient is that the offender must voluntarily
cause or attempt to cause to any person hurt etc., for that end,
that is, in order to the committing of the theft or for the purpose
of committing theft or for carrying away or attempting to carry
away property obtained by the theft. It is not sufficient that in
the transaction of committing theft, hurt, etc., had been caused.
If hurt, etc., is caused at the time of the commission of the theft
but for an object other than the one referred to in Section 390,
IPC, theft would not amount to robbery. It is also not sufficient
that hurt had been caused in the course of the same
transaction as commission of the theft.
24
15. The three ingredients mentioned in Section 390, IPC,
must always be satisfied before theft can amount to robbery,
and this has been explained in Bishambhar Nath v. Emperor ,
A.I.R. 1941 Oudh 476, in the following words:-
“The words “for that end” in sec.390 clearly mean that
the hurt caused by the offender must be with the
express object of facilitating the committing of the theft,
or must be caused while the offender is committing the
theft or is carrying away or is attempting to carry away
the property obtained by theft. It does not mean that the
assault or the hurt must be caused in the same
transaction or in the same circumstances.”
| 16. In Karuppa Gounden v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1918 Madras<br>821, which followed two Calcutta cases of Otaruddi<br>Manjhi v. Kafiluddi Manjhi, (1900-01) 5 C.W.N. 372, and King<br>Emperor v. Mathura Thakur, (1901-02) 6 C.W.N. 72, it has<br>been observed at page 824 as follows:- | ||
|---|---|---|
| “Now it is our duty to give efef ct to the words “for that<br>end”. It would have been open to the legislature to have<br>used other words which would not raise the difficulty<br>that arises here. The Public Prosecutor has been forced<br>to argue that “for that end” must be read as meaning ‘in | ||
| those circumstances’. In my opinion we cannot do that in | ||
| construing a section in the Penal Code. Undoubtedly, | ||
| words ‘in those circumstances’ would widen the | ||
| application of the section and we are not permitted to do | ||
| that. The matter has been considered in two judgments<br>of the Calcutta High Court one of which is reported as |
25
| Otaruddi Manjhi v. Kafli uddi Manjhi (1900-01) 5 C.W.N.<br>372. Their Lordships put the question in this way: | ||
|---|---|---|
| “It seems to us that the whole question turns upon<br>the words “for that end”. Was any hurt or fear of | ||
| instant hurt, that was caused in the present case, | ||
| caused for the end of the commission of the theft? We<br>think not. It seems to us that whatever violence was<br>used for the purpose of dispossessing the persons<br>who were already in possession of the premises in<br>question and had no relation to the commission of<br>theft, although theft was committed at the same<br>time.” | ||
| (Emphasis supplied) |
17. Ordinarily, if violence or hurt is caused at the time of
theft, it would be reasonable to infer that violence or hurt was
caused for facilitating the commission of the theft or for
facilitating the carrying away of the property stolen or for
facilitating the attempt to do so. But there may be something
in the evidence to indicate that hurt or violence was caused not
for this purpose but for a different purpose. We are of the view
that prosecution has blindfoldedly and without understanding
the true purport of the offence of “dacoity” registered the FIR
for the offence punishable under Section 395 of the IPC and
proceeded to even prepare charge sheet for the offence of
dacoity.
26
18. Even if we believe or accept the entire case put up by
the first informant, none of the ingredients to constitute the
offence of dacoity are disclosed. Let us once again recapitulate
the case of the first informant. The incident is alleged to have
occurred at the house of the appellant No. 2. It is the first
informant and his brother who are said to have visited one fine
day the house of the appellant No. 2. At that point of time, the
other co-accused are also shown to be present. There is no
good or plausible explanation coming from the first informant
as to why he was carrying Rs. 2 Lakh in his pocket. The entire
case put up by the first informant appears to be fabricated. Let
us assume for the time being that the first informant was in
fact carrying Rs. 2 Lakh in his pocket and at the time of alleged
incident, the amount was forcibly taken away by the accused
persons, whether this taking away of Rs. 2 Lakh from the
pocket of the first informant would fall within the ambit of the
words “for that end” occurring in Section 390 of the IPC. The
answer is an emphatic “No”. Even according to the first
informant, the dispute was one relating to the agricultural
land. The first informant says that he is the lawful owner of
the land in question, whereas, according to him, the accused
27
persons are wrongly claiming to be the lawful owners of the
land. With a view to settle this dispute, the first informant and
his brother are said to have visited the house of the appellant
No. 2 on their own free will and volition. It is only after
reaching the house of the appellant No. 2 that the entire
incident is alleged to have occurred. We should be mindful of
the fact that we are dealing with provisions of a criminal
statute, like the IPC. The provisions of any criminal statute are
to be construed and interpreted strictly.
19. The general rule governing the interpretation of penal
statute is that it must be strictly construed. Strict
interpretation in the words of Crawford connotes:-
“If a statute is to be strictly construed, nothing should
be included within its scope that does not come clearly
within the meaning of the language used. Its language
must be given exact and technical meaning with no
extension on account of implications or equitable
considerations; or has been aptly asserted, its
operation must be confined to cases coming clearly
within the letter of the statute as well as within its
spirit and reason. Or stated perhaps more concisely, it
is close and conservative adherence to the literal or
textual interpretation
.”
20. According to Sutherland, by the rule of strict construction
it is not meant that the statute shall be stringently or narrowly
28
construed but it means that everything shall be excluded from its
operation which does not clearly come within the scope of the
language used.
21. When it is said that all penal statutes are to be
construed strictly, it only means that the Court must see that
the thing charged is an offence within the plain meaning of the
words used and must not strain the words.
22. In the circumstances referred to above, we have reached
the conclusion that Section 395 of the IPC is not applicable to
the case on hand.
SECTIONS 503, 504 AND 506 OF THE IPC
23. Chapter XXII of the IPC relates to Criminal Intimidation,
Insult and Annoyance. Section 503 reads thus:-
“ . —Whoever
Section 503. Criminal intimidation
threatens another with any injury to his person,
reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of
any one in whom that person is interested, with intent
to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person
to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to
omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled
to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such
threat, commits criminal intimidation.
Explanation.—A threat to injure the reputation of any
deceased person in whom the person threatened is
interested, is within this section.
29
Illustration
A, for the purpose of inducing B to resist from
prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B's house. A
is guilty of criminal intimidation .”
Section 504 reads thus:-
“ Section 504. Intentional insult with intent to
.—Whoever
provoke breach of the peace
intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to
any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that
such provocation will cause him to break the public
peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or
with both.”
Section 506 reads thus:-
“ Section 506. Punishment for criminal
—Whoever commits, the offence of
intimidation.
criminal intimidation shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;
If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt,
—And if the threat be to cause death or grievous
etc.
hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by
fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death
or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a
term which may extend to seven years, or to impute
unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both.”
24. An offence under Section 503 has following essentials:-
1) Threatening a person with any injury;
(i) to his person, reputation or property; or
30
(ii) to the person, or reputation of any one in whom
that person is interested.
2) The threat must be with intent;
(i) to cause alarm to that person; or
(ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not
legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the
execution of such threat; or
(iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which
that person is legally entitled to do as the means of
avoiding the execution of such threat.
25. Section 504 of the IPC contemplates intentionally
insulting a person and thereby provoking such person insulted
to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing
it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked so as to
cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other
offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the
section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might
amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted
to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other
offence. If abusive language is used intentionally and is of such
a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the
31
person insulted to break the peace or to commit an offence
under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of
the Section merely because the insulted person did not
actually break the peace or commit any offence having
exercised selfcontrol or having been subjected to abject terror
by the offender. In judging whether particular abusive language
is attracted by Section 504, IPC, the court has to find out what,
in the ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the
abusive language used and not what the complainant actually
did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool
temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general
nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering
whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to
provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace
and not the particular conduct or temperament of the
complainant.
26. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not
amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section
504, IPC if it does not have the necessary element of being
likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the
32
peace of an offence and the other element of the accused
intending to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of
the peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to
commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive language
shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and
circumstances of that case and there cannot be a general
proposition that no one commits an offence under Section 504,
IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the
complainant. In ,
King Emperor v. Chunnibhai Dayabhai
(1902) 4 Bom LR 78, a Division Bench of the Bombay High
Court pointed out that:-
“To constitute an offence under Section 504, I.P.C. it
is sufficient if the insult is of a kind calculated to
cause the other party to lose his temper and say or
do something violent. Public peace can be broken by
angry words as well as deeds.”
(Emphasis supplied)
27. A bare perusal of Section 506 of the IPC makes it clear
that a part of it relates to criminal intimidation. Before an
offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be
established that the accused had an intention to cause alarm
to the complainant.
33
28. In the facts and circumstances of the case and more
particularly, considering the nature of the allegations levelled
prima facie
in the FIR, a case to constitute the offence
punishable under Section 506 of the IPC may probably could
be said to have been disclosed but not under Section 504 of the
IPC. The allegations with respect to the offence punishable
under Section 504 of the IPC can also be looked at from a
different perspective. In the FIR, all that the first informant has
stated is that abusive language was used by the accused
persons. What exactly was uttered in the form of abuses is not
stated in the FIR. One of the essential elements, as discussed
above, constituting an offence under Section 504 of the IPC is
that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to
intentional insult. Where that act is the use of the abusive
words, it is necessary to know what those words were in order
to decide whether the use of those words amounted to
intentional insult. In the absence of these words, it is not
possible to decide whether the ingredient of intentional insult
is present.
34
29. However, as observed earlier, the entire case put up by
the first informant on the face of it appears to be concocted
and fabricated. At this stage, we may refer to the parameters
laid down by this Court for quashing of an FIR in the case of
Bhajan Lal (supra). The parameters are:-
“(1) Where the allegations made in the first information
report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do
not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of
the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within
the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support
of the same do not disclose the commission of any
offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis
of which no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
35
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or
where there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the
grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to
spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
In our opinion, the present case falls within the parameters Nos.
1, 5 and 7 resply referred to above.
30. At this stage, we would like to observe something
important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court
invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the
criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that
such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or
instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then
in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the
FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once
the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an
ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he
would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with
36
all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that
the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they
disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged
offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to
look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the
purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to
constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or
vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many
other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the
case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due
care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The
Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself
only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account
the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of
the case as well as the materials collected in the course of
investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs
have been registered over a period of time. It is in the
background of such circumstances the registration of multiple
FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of
wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.
37
| 31. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Golconda Linga Swamy,<br>(2004) 6 SCC 522, a two-Judge Bench of this Court elaborated on<br>the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR.<br>The Court drew a fine distinction between<br>consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence and<br>appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly<br>fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for<br>quashing an FIR. The Court held:- | ||
|---|---|---|
| “5. …Authority of the court exists for<br>advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to<br>abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the<br>court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an<br>abuse of the process of the court to allow any action<br>which would result in injustice and prevent<br>promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court<br>would be justifei d to quash any proceeding if it fni ds<br>that initiation or continuance of it amounts to<br>abuse of the process of court or quashing of these<br>proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.<br>When no ofef nce is disclosed by the complaint, the<br>court may examine the question of fact. When a<br>complaint is sought to be quashed, it is<br>permissible to look into the materials to assess<br>what the complainant has alleged and whether<br>any ofef nce is made out even if the allegations<br>are accepted in toto. | ||
| 6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC<br>866 : 1960 Cri LJ 1239, this Court summarised some<br>categories of cases where inherent power can and<br>should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (AIR p.<br>869, para 6) |
38
| (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a<br>legal bar against the institution or continuance<br>e.g. want of sanction; | |
|---|---|
| (ii) where the allegations in the fri st information<br>report or complaint taken at its face value and<br>accepted in their entirety do not constitute the<br>ofef nce alleged; | |
| (iii) where the allegations constitute an<br>ofef nce, but there is no legal evidence<br>adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or<br>manifestly fails to prove the charge. | |
| 7. In dealing with the last category, it is<br>important to bear in mind the distinction<br>between a case where there is no legal evidence<br>or where there is evidence which is clearly<br>inconsistent with the accusations made, and a<br>case where there is legal evidence which, on<br>appreciation, may or may not support the<br>accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under<br>Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would<br>not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether<br>the evidence in question is reliable or not or<br>whether on a reasonable appreciation of it<br>accusation would not be sustained. That is the<br>function of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no<br>doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or,<br>needless harassment. Court should be circumspect<br>and judicious in exercising discretion and should take<br>all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration<br>before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument<br>in the hands of a private complainant to unleash<br>vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the<br>same time the section is not an instrument handed<br>over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and<br>bring about its sudden death…..”<br>(Emphasis supplied) | |
DELAY IN LODGING THE FIR
39
32. The alleged incident is said to have occurred sometime in
the year 2021. There is no reference to any date or time of the
incident in the FIR. The allegations are too vague and general.
Had it been the case of prompt registration of the FIR, probably
the police might have been able to recover Rs. 2 Lakh from the
possession of the accused persons alleged to have been forcibly
taken away from the pocket of the first informant. The FIR also
talks about a document on which the first informant and his
brother were forced to put their signatures. We wonder, whether
the investigating agency was in a position to collect or recover
any such document from the accused persons containing their
signatures in the course of the investigation, more particularly
when the State says that the investigation is over and the charge
sheet is also ready. In the absence of all this material, how is the
State going to prove its case against the accused persons. The
FIR in a criminal case is an extremely vital and valuable piece of
evidence for the purpose of corroborating the oral evidence
adduced at the trial. The object of insisting upon lodging of the
FIR to the police in respect of commission of an offence is to
obtain early information regarding the circumstances in which
the crime was committed, the names of the actual culprits and
40
the part played by them as well as names of the eye witnesses
present at the scene of occurrence.
33. In the aforesaid context, we may clarify that delay in the
registration of the FIR, by itself, cannot be a ground for
quashing of the FIR. However, delay with other attending
circumstances emerging from the record of the case rendering
the entire case put up by the prosecution inherently
improbable, may at times become a good ground to quash the
FIR and consequential proceedings. If the FIR, like the one in
the case on hand, is lodged after a period of more than one year
without disclosing the date and time of the alleged incident and
further without any plausible and convincing explanation for
such delay, then how is the accused expected to defend himself
in the trial. It is altogether different to say that in a given case,
in the course of investigation the investigating agency may be
able to ascertain the date and time of the incident, etc. The
recovery of few incriminating articles may also at times lend
credence to the allegations levelled in the FIR. However, in the
absence of all such materials merely on the basis of vague and
41
general allegations levelled in the FIR, the accused cannot be
put to trial.
34. The learned Additional Advocate General appearing for
the State vehemently submitted that considering the gross
criminal antecedents of the appellants before us, the criminal
proceedings may not be quashed. The learned Additional
Advocate General appearing for the State in her written
submissions has furnished details in regard to the antecedents
of the appellants. A bare look at the chart may give an
impression that the appellants are history sheeters and
hardened criminals. However, when it comes to quashing of the
FIR or criminal proceedings, the criminal antecedents of the
accused cannot be the sole consideration to decline to quash the
criminal proceedings. An accused has a legitimate right to say
before the Court that howsoever bad his antecedents may be,
still if the FIR fails to disclose commission of any offence or his
case falls within one of the parameters as laid down by this
Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra), then the Court should
not decline to quash the criminal case only on the ground that
the accused is a history sheeter. Initiation of prosecution has
42
adverse and harsh consequences for the persons named as
accused. In Directorate of Revenue and another v.
Mohammed Nisar Holia , (2008) 2 SCC 370, this Court
explicitly recognises the right to not to be disturbed without
sufficient grounds as one of the underlying mandates of Article
21 of the Constitution. Thus, the requirement and need to
balance the law enforcement power and protection of citizens
from injustice and harassment must be maintained. It goes
without saying that the State owes a duty to ensure that no
crime goes unpunished but at the same time it also owes a duty
to ensure that none of its subjects are unnecessarily harassed.
35. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that
the continuation of the criminal case arising from the FIR No.
224 of 2022 registered at Mirzapur Police Station, Saharanpur
will be nothing but abuse of the process of the law. In the
peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we are inclined to
accept the case put up on behalf of the appellants herein.
36. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed.
The impugned order passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad is hereby set aside. The criminal proceedings arising
43
from FIR No. 224 of 2022 dated 19.09.2022 registered at Police
Station Mirzapur, Saharanpur, State of U.P. are hereby quashed.
37. It is needless to clarify that the observations made in this
judgment are relevant only for the purpose of the FIR in
question and the consequential criminal proceedings. None of
the observations shall have any bearing on any of the pending
criminal prosecutions or any other proceedings.
………………………………..J.
( B.R. GAVAI )
………………………………..J.
( J.B. PARDIWALA )
NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 08, 2023
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