Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
J.PANDURANGARAO
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
ANDHRA PRADESH PUBLIC SERVICECOMMISSION
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
11/04/1962
BENCH:
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
BENCH:
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.
AIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA
SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ)
WANCHOO, K.N.
AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA
CITATION:
1963 AIR 268 1963 SCR (1) 707
ACT:
State Judicial Service-Appointment-Notification laying down
conditions-Constitutional validity-The High Court Meaning
of-Andhra State Judicial Service Rules, r. 12
(b)--Constitution of India, Arts.14, 16 (2).
HEADNOTE:
In January 1962, the Andhra Pradesh Public Service
Commission invited applications for selection for the posts
of District Munsifs in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The
petitioner applied but his application was rejected on the
ground that he aid not fulfil the first condition in para
4A(1) of the Commission, notification which reads thus :-4-
A(1)-"that at the time when the petitioner applies he is
practicing as an Advocate of the High Court. The question
is whether the expression "The High Court" in ’the-
notification refers to the Andhra High Court alone or to all
the High Courts in India. If the expression means the
Andhra High Court then the further question would be whether
the Rule prescribing the said requirement is ultra vires as
being discriminatory. The Clause in the notification is
based on r. 12(b) of the Andhra State Juducial Service Rules
and reads that "no person shall be eligible for appointment
to the post of District Munsiff by the method specified in
column (1) of the table below unless he possess the
qualifications specified in the corresponding entries in
column (2.) thereof" and among the qualifications specified
is the same as in 4(A) (1) of the notification.
Held, that the subject matter of the rules is the appoint-
ment of subordinate judicial officers who would work in
courts subordinate to the Andhra High Court, and so, the use
of the definite pronoun "The" in the expression "the High
Court" clearly indicates that it is not any High Court that
is intended but it is the particular High Court of Andhra
Pradesh that is in view. Therefore the expression "The High
Court" in the context means the Andhra High Court.
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Held, further, that though Art. 14 forbids class Legis-
lation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the
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purposes of legislation. When any impugned rules or statu-
tory provision is assailed on the ground that it contravenes
Art. 14, its validity can be sustained if ’two tests are
satisfied. The first test is that the classification on
which it is founded must be based on an intelligible
differential which distinguishes persons or things grouped
together from others left out of the group; and the second
is that the differential in question must have a reasonable
relation to the object sought to be achieved by the rule or
statutory provision in question. The classification on
which the statutory provision may be founded may be
referable to different considerations. It may be based on
geographical considerations or it may have reference to
objects or occupations or the like. In every case, there
must be some nexus between the basis of the classification
and the object intended to be achieved by the statute.
The plea that all the rules must be considered together is
entirely misconceived. It is quite clear that in testing
the validity of any one of these rules, the true scope and
effect of the impugned rule itself will have to be
considered and the decision of the question would have to be
confined to the relevant considerations in respect of the
said rule and no more. just as the presence of one invalid
rule cannot invalidate the other rules which may be valid,
so the presence of a number of valid rules would not help to
validate an impugned rule if it is otherwise invalid.
There is no rational basis for differentiating the advocates
enrolled into the Andhra High Court from the rest as the
impugned rule purports to do. If the basis of the impugned
rule is that a person who applies for appointment to the
post of a District Munsiff, should have been enrolled as an
Advocate of a High Court, that basis can be satisfied even
if the person is enrolled as an Advocate not of the Andhra
High Court but of any other High Court. All the High Courts
have the same status; all of them stand for the same high
traditions of the Bar and the administration of justice.
The impugned rule has introduced a classification between
one class of Advocates and the rest, and the said
classification must be said to be irrational inasmuch as
there is no nexus between the basis of the said
classification and the object intended to be achieved by the
relevant scheme of rules. The impugned rule and the
corresponding portion of the paragraph of the notification
based on it must be held to be ultra vires and
unconstitutional.
709
Nallanthighal Bhaktavatsalam Iyengar v. Secretary Andhra
Public Service Commission, A.I.R. 1936. Andh. 14,
overruled.
Shri R., K. Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. B. Tendolkar, [1959]
S.C.R. 279, relied on.
JUDGMENT:
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Petitions Nos. 355 of 1961 and 1 of
1962.
Petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India for
enforcement of Fundamental rights.
Sarjoo Prasad, A. Yedavalli, A. V. Rangam and T.
Satyanarayan for the petitioner (in Petn. No. 355/61).
A.Vedavalli and A. V. Rangam, for the petitioner (in Ptn.
No. 1, 1962).
C. K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India T. V. R.
Tatachari and P. D. Menon, for the respondents.
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1962. April II. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-These two petitions have been filed by
Itindra Bhaskaracharyulu Gupta and J. Pandurangarao
respectively under Article 32 of the Constitution and, in
substance, they challenge the validity of one of the rules
framed by the Governor of Andhra in exercise of the powers
conferred on him by Art. 234 and the proviso to Art. 309 in
respect of the Andhra Judicial Service. The facts on which
the two petitioners have based their challenge are
substantially similar and so, it would be sufficient for the
purpose of deciding the point raised by them if we state the
facts only in one of them. We will accordingly state the
facts in petition No. 355 of 1961. Our conclusion on the
merits of the point raised by this petition will govern the
decision of the other petition No. 1 of 1962.
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The petitioner J. Pandurangarao belongs to a family which
has been settled in the district of Guntur in Andhra Pradesh
for several generations past. The petitioner himself was
born, brought up and educated in the said district. He
passed his B. A. examination from the Andhra Christian
College at Guntur 1950. Thereafter, he took his L.L.B.
Degree from the Nagpur University in 1952 and in 1954 he got
himself enrolled as an Advocate of the Mysore High Court.
Having thus been enrolled as an Advocate of the Mysore High
Court, he set up his practice in the Court in Tenali in
Guntur district and has been practising there ever since.
In January, 1961, the respondent No. 1, the Andhra Pradesh
Public Service Commission, invited applications for
selection for the posts of District Munsifs in the State of
Andhra Pradesh. As the petitioner was qualified for this
post.. he sent in his application on the 27th January, 1961.
Respondent No. 1, however, rejected his applications on the
25th September, 1961 on the ground that he did not fulfil
the condition set out in paragraph 4-A (1) of the
Commission’s notification published on the 17th December,
1960, by which applications had been invited. The said
paragraph reads as follows :-
"That at the time when the petitioner applies
:
(1) he is practising as an Advocate of the
High Court:
(2) he has been actually practising in
Courts of Civil or Criminal jurisdiction in
India for a period not less than three years."
According to respondent No. 1, the petitioner satisfied the
second condition but did not satisfy the first since he had
not been practising as an
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Advocate of the Andhra High Court. In his present petition,
the petitioner alleges that respondent No’ 1 has
misconstrued the requirement prescribed by para. 4A (1) when
it assumed that the expression ",the High Court" in that
condition refers to the Andhra High Court and not to all the
High Courts in India. In the alternative’ the petitioner’s
contention is that if the expression "the High Court" means
the Andhra High Court, then the rule 1 prescribing the said
requirement is ultra vires in as much as it contravenes the
petitioner’s fundamental rights guaranteed by articles 14
and 16 (1) of the Constitution. It is on these to two
alternative grounds that the petitioner challenges the
decision of respondent No. 1 and it is only if the first
ground fails that the petitioner questions the validity of
the impugned rule.
To this petition, the petitioner has joined respondent No. 1
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and respondent No. 2, the Government of Andhra Pradesh,
represented by its Chief Secretary. On behalf of the
respondents, it is urged that the construction sought to be
placed by the petitioner on the relevant clause in the
notification is erroneous. The expression the High Court"
in the Context means the Andhra High Court and no other. It
is also urged that even on that construction the requirement
of the notification itself which is based on a corresponding
rule is valid.
It would thus be seen that though the petitioner technically
did not challenge the validity of the rule on which the
relevant clause in the notification itself is based, in
substance, the dispute between the par. ties in the present
proceedings ultimately resolves into a dispute as to the
validity of the basic rule framed by the Governor of the
Andhra Pradesh under Art. 234 and the proviso to Art. 309 of
the Constitution. The corresponding rule is Rule 12(b). The
said rule provides special qualifications and says that "no
person shall be eligible for appointment
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to the post of District Munsif by the method specified in
column (1) of the table below unless he possesses the
qualifications specified in the corresponding entries in
column (2) thereof" For direct recruitment as District
Munsif, several qualifications are mentioned. One of them
is that the applicant must be practicing as an Advocate of
the High Court, and the other is that he must be actually
practising in Courts of Civil or criminal jurisdiction in
India for a period not less than three years. It would thus
be seen that the relevant clauses in the notification, the
validity of one of which is challenged before us, are based
on these provisions in the statutory rules.
The first question which calls for our decision is: what
does the expression ’,the High Court" mean when the rule
requires that the applicant must be practising as an
Advocate of the High Court? It is urged by Mr. Sarjoo
Prasad that the expression ’,’the High Court?’ need not
receive the narrow construction as contended for by the
respondents. He suggests that the expression ’,,the High
Court" really means any High Court. In other words’ his
argument is that as soon as it is shown that the applicant
has been practising as an Advocate is any High Court in
India, that should be deemed to meet the requirement in
question. We do not think that this argument is well-
founded. In the context, the expression "the High Court"
must, we think, mean the Andhra High Court. In construing
the expression "the High Court", we must bear in mind the
fact that the subject-matter of the rules is the appointment
of subordinate judicial officers who would work in courts
subordinate to the Andhra High Court; and so, the use of the
definite pronoun "the" clearly indicates that it is not any
or a High Court that is intended but it is the particular
High Court of Andhra Pradesh that is in view.
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Besides, the scheme of the notification issued by respondent
No. 1 clearly indicates that a person practising as an
Advocate of the High Court to whom the impugned rule refers,
must be a person practising in the Andhra High Court. In
that connection, it is significant that the notification
requires that the applications should be submitted to the
Commission through the High Court of Andhra Pradesh if the
candidates are practicing in the High court and through the
District Judge concerned and the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh if they are practising in the subordinate Courts.
There can be no doubt that the High Court mentioned in the
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impugned rule is the Andhra High Court through which
applications are required to be sent by the Advocates
practising in that Court. It would be unreasonable to
assume that an Advocate practising in any other High Court
should cave been required to send his application through
the Andhra High Court; but that would be the result if the
expression "the High Court" in this rule is read as meaning
any High Court. Therefore, it is clear that the expression
"the High Court" in the context means the Andhra High Court.
That immediately raises the question about the validity of
the impugned rule. The petitioner argues that by
prescribing the limitation that the applicant must be an
Advocate of the Andhra High Court, the rule has violated his
fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16(i) of
the Constitution. As a result of the rule, persons who are
not practising as Advocates of the Andhra High, Court are
disqualified and that amounts to unconstitutional
discrimination. Art. 14 which provides that the State shall
not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal
protection of the laws within the territory of India, as
well as Article 16 (1) which provides that there shall be
equality of opportunity for all citizens in
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matters relating to employment or appointment to any office
under the State, have been frequently considered by this
Court. The scope and effect of the provisions of Article 14
can no longer be the subject-matter of any doubt or dispute.
It is well settled that though Art. 14 forbids class
legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification
for the purposes of legislation. When any impugned rule or
statutory provision is assailed on the ground that it
contravenes Art. 14, its validity can be sustained if two
tests are satisfied. The first test is that the
classification on which It is founded must be based on an
intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or
things grouped together from others left out of the group;
and the second is that the differentia in question must have
a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by
the rule or statutory provision in question. As the
decisions of this Court show, the classification on which
the statutory provision may be founded may be referable to
different considerations. It may be based on geographical
considerations or it may have reference to objects or
occupations or the like. In every case,, there must be some
nexus between the basis of the classification and the object
intended to be achieved by the statute, vide Shri Ram
Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendolkar (1) It is in
the light of these principles that we must now proceed to
examine the problem raised by the petitioners for our
decision in the present proceedings.
The object of the rule is to recruit suitable and proper
persons to the Judicial Service in the State of Andhra with
a view to secure fair and efficient administration of
justice, and so, there can be no doubt that it would be
perfectly competent to the authority concerned to prescribe
qualifications for eligibility for appointment to the said
Service. Knowledge of local laws as well as knowledge of
the regional language and adequate
(1) [1959] S. C. R. 279.
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experience at the bar may be prescribed as qualifications
which the applicants must satisfy before they apply for the
post. In that connection, practice in subordinate Courts or
in the High Court may also be a relevant test to prescribe.
The respondents contend that the impugned rule seeks to do
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nothing more than to require the applicant to possess
knowledge of local laws and that being so, the validity of
the rule cannot be impeached on the ground of
discrimination. In support of this argument., reliance is
placed on the decision of the Andhra High Court in
Nallanthighal Bhaktavatsalam Iyenger v. Secretary, Andhra
Public Service Commission, Kurnool (1) in which the validity
of the impugned rule has been upheld.
It is also contended that in considering the validity of the
impugned rule, we must have regard to all the rules
considered together. The argument is that it would not be
fair or reasonable to pick out one rule for challenge and in
that sense, to ignore the context in which the said rule
along with others has been framed. In this connection, our
attention has been drawn to the fact that several
qualifications have been prescribed by the rules. These
relate to the educational qualifications, to the requirement
as to age, to the knowledge of the local language and some
other factors which undoubtedly are relevant to the
appointment to the judicial post in question. Thus
considered, it is urged, the validity of the impugned rule
cannot be successfully challenged.
Dealing with this latter argument first, it seems to us that
the plea that all the rules must be considered together is
entirely misconceived. It is quite clear that in testing
the validity of any one of these rules, we will have to
consider the true scope and effect of the impugned rule
itself and the decision of the question would have to be
(1) A. 1. R. 1956 Andhra 14,
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confined to the relevant considerations in respect of the
said rule and no more. Just as the presence of one invalid
rule cannot invalidate the other rules which may be valid,
so the presence of a number of valid rules would not help to
validate an impugned rule if it is otherwise invalid. If,
while prescribing relevant tests which must be satisfied by
an applicant, the rule had stated that the applicant should
satisfy the test of a particular height or colour for
instance,-which factors are irrelevant for judicial service-
the respondents could not be heard to say that because the
other rules are valid, the irrelevant rule about the
requirement of the applicant’s height or colour must also be
treated as valid. If the height or colour of the applicant
is wholly irrelevant in making an appointment to a judicial
post, it must be treated as irrelevant and invalid though it
may have been placed in a code of rules and the rest of the
rules may be perfectly valid. Therefore, we cannot accept
the argument urged by the learned Solicitor-General that the
impugned rule cannot and need not be considered by itself
but must be treated as a part of a bigger scheme of rules
and since the other rules are valid, the impugned rule must
also be treated as valid.
Does the impugned rule serve the object of requiring the
applicant to possess knowledge of local laws ? That is the
next question to consider. It if; urged by the respondents
that since actual practice for three years which is the
other condition prescribed, is practice in Courts of Civil
or Criminal jurisdiction in India, it follows that even
lawyers practising in courts outside the State of Andhra
Prades would satisfy that test and that means that the
satisfaction of the said test would not meet the requirement
that the applicant should have knowledge of local laws.
That is why, it is urged, the impugned condition requires
that the applicant must be practising as an Advocate of the
Andhra High Court. An Advocate of the
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Andhra High Court would generally have had the benefit of
apprenticeship for one year in the Chambers of a senior
Advocate and may have passed the apprenticeship examination
in different subjects prescribed by the ’ Bar Council. It
is in that way that he would have acquired the knowledge of
local laws which he would have to administer if he is
appointed to the post of a District Munsif.
It is not clear that the impugned rule can effectively meet
the alleged requirement of the knowledge of local laws. If
the object intended to be achieved is that the applicant
should have adequate knowledge of local laws, the usual and
proper course to adopt in that behalf is to prescribe a
suitable examination which candidates should pass, or adopt
some other effective method. No material has been placed
before us to show that the alleged requirement about the
knowledge of local laws can be met on the two grounds
suggested in support of the validity of the rule. Besides,
study of general laws prevailing in the country as a whole,
and the study of important local laws are generally included
in the curriculum prescribed for the law Degree, and
obtaining a Law Degree which would entitle a person to be
enrolled as an Advocate, in substance, meets the requirement
of the knowledge of important local laws.
There is another aspect of the problem which is very
important. It is common ground that under rule 1(ii) of the
Andhra Bar Council Rules, an advocate entered on the roll of
Advocates of a High Court established by law in India, other
than the High Court of Andhra, is entitled to practice as an
Advocate of the Andhra High Court, provided there is
reciprocity between the Andhra High Court on whose roll he
has been entered as an Advocate. This rule is subject to
the further proviso that where any person had been admitted
718
as an advocate of such High Court without undergoing a
course of study in the chambers of a practising advocate for
a period of one year, he shall be of not less than one
year’s standing as an advocate of such High Court. It is
thus clear that an Advocate enrolled in any other High
Court who is entitled to the benefit of rule 1(ii) would be
eligible to practies in the Andhra High Court and as such,
would satisfy the test of the impugned rule ; and in such a
case, the theory that the impugned rule serves the purpose
of requiring the applicant to possess knowledge of local
laws completely break down. By operation of rule 1(ii)
which is, doubt, based on the health convention of
reciprocity between the different High Court in this
country, Advocste who can have no know. ledge of the local
laws prevailing in Andhra would satisfy the test of the
impugned rule, therefore, the main argument that the object
intended to be achieved by the impugned rule is that the
applicant should possess knowledge of local laws, cannot be
sustained.
Then it is urged that a person who has been enrolled as an
Advocate of the Andhra High Court would have feelings of
attachment for the institution of the Andhra High Court and
would be subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the
said High Court and that would afford a rational basis for
differentiating the class of advocates of the Andhra High
Court from the rest of the Advocates in this country. In
our opinion, neither of the two grounds can be said to have
any nexus with the object intended to be achieved by the
rule. What is relevant and more important in the matter of
recruiting persons to judicial service is not only the
applicant?’ Loyalty and attachment to the institution of a
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particular High Court but their loyalty and a
sense of dedication to the cases of judicial administration
and this; feeling and sense of dedication would be present
in the minds of persons
719
enrolled as Advocates in the Andhra High Court as much in
the minds of other persons enrolled as
Advocates in other High Courts. The test of disciplinary
jurisdiction is hardly relevant because advocates of other
High Courts would likewise be subject to the disciplinary
jurisdiction of their High Courts; and if a person who
continues to be on the roll of the Andhra High Court can be
presumed to be a person worthy to belong to the profession
of law and so, eligible for the judicial post, so can a
person who continues on the roll of any other High Court be
entitled to claim the same status. Therefore, in our
opinion, there does not appear to be any rational basis for
differentiating the advocates belonged to the Andhra High
Court from the rest as the impugned rule purports to do.
In this connection, it may be permissible to point out that
the second condition in regard to three years’ actual
practice might more appropriately have required that the
said three years’ practice should be in the Civil or
Criminal Courts subordinate to the jurisdiction of the
Andhra High Court. That would have more effectively secured
the object of requiring the applicants to have knowledge of
local laws and to have experience in the matter of the
administration of the said laws. As it happens, the said
condition under the relevant rule enables advocates
practising in Civil or Criminal Courts all over India to
apply, and so, the requirement about the knowledge of local
laws cannot invariably be satisfied by the said condition.
But as we have just pointed out, he said test cannot be said
to be satisfied by the impugned rule as well.
If the basis of the impugned rule is that a person who
applies for appointment to the post of a District Munsif,
should have been enrolled as an Advocate of a High Court,
that basis can be satisfied even if the person is enrolled
as an Advocate
720
not of the Andhra High Court but of any other High Court.
All the High Courts have the same status; all of them stand
for the same high traditions of the Bar and the
administration of justice, and advocates enrolled in all of
them are presumed to follow the same standards and to
subscribe to the same spirit of serving the cause of the
administration of justice. Therefore, in our opinion, the
impugned rule has introduced classification between one
class of Advocates and the rest, and the said classification
must be said to be irrational inasmuch as there is no nexus
between the basis of the said classification and the object
intended to be achieved by the relevant scheme of rules.
That being so, it must be held that the decision of the
Andhra High Court in the case of Nallanthighal
Bhaktavatsalam Iyengar is not correct.
In the result, the impugned rule and the corresponding
portion of the paragraph of the notification based on it
must be held to be ultra vires and unconstitutional. In
that view of the matter, we issue a direction calling upon
the first respondent to entertain theapplications of the
petitioners and to deal with them in accordance with law.
We were toldby the learned Solicitor-General that the
Public Service Commission has already conducted the test in
respect of a large number of candidates and amongst them,
the petitioners’ cases have also been considered. If that
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be so, our present decision will not affect the procedure
followed by the Commission. The effect of our decision is
that applications of the persons like the petitioners cannot
be rejected on the preliminary ground that they are not
persons practising as Advocates in the Andhra High Court and
that they should be considered on the merit its along with
the rest of the applications. The petitions are accordingly
allowed With costs.
Petitions allowed.
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