Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
RAMESH SINGH (DIED) BY LRS. & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF HARYANA & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/01/1996
BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
G.B. PATTANAIK (J)
CITATION:
1996 SCC (4) 469 JT 1996 (5) 467
1996 SCALE (2)839
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
O R D E R
Notification under Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act [1
of 1894] [for short, ’the Act’] was published on August 2,
1973 acquiring the lands situated in Etmadpur Village for
public purpose. The Collector awarded compensation under
Section 11 by his award dated February 19, 1974.
Dissatisfied therewith, Ramesh Singh and Hari Singh filed
application under Section 18 which was duly referred by the
Collector to the Civil Court. The Addl. District Judge,
Gurgaon dismissed the reference petition on May 3, 1978.
Rumal Singh, one of the claimants equally sought a separate
reference in respect of his claim. Thereon, the Addl.
District Judge, Gurgaon enhanced the compensation. The
Legal Representatives of Ramesh Singh, the petitioners and
Hari Singh filed an application to implead themselves in the
reference of Rumal Singh which was also dismissed by the
District Judge on May 1, 1986. The petitioners allege that
they challenged the order in a revision said to have been
filed on November 3, 1986 and is stated to be pending
decision in the High Court. However, we are not concerned
with the same.
When Rumal Singh filed execution application to enforce
his award made under Section 26, the petitioners filed an
application in the execution Court to award the same
compensation on par with Rumal Singh and the Addl. District
Judge, Gurgaon, by his order dated April 8, 1992 allowed the
application and enhanced the compensation as awarded to
Rumal Singh. The State filed the Revision No.2248 of 1992
and by the impugned order dated September 2, 1993, the
learned single Judge allowed the revision and set aside the
order of the District Judge. Thus this special leave
petition.
Shri Rohtagi, learned counsel for the petitioners
contended that the petitioners have a joint interest in the
lands acquired admeasuring 20 kanals 4 marlas and,
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therefore, being co-owners, they are entitled to the same
compensation as was awarded to Rumal Singh. The execution
Court, therefore, has rightly granted the enhanced
compensation to the petitioners. The High Court was not
right in its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115,
C.P.C. to interfere with and set aside the order. There is
manifest error of jurisdiction committed by the High Court.
We find no force in the contention. In view of the narration
of the facts, it is clear that Ramesh Singh and Hari Singh
dissatisfied with the award made by the Collector under
Section 11 had sought reference under Section 18 which was
duly made to the Civil Court. The District Judge dismissed
the reference Rumal Singh equally sought reference and he
had the compensation enhanced in the award and decree dated
May 1, 1986 under Section 26. The only remedy to the
petitioners and Hari Singh is to have corrected the
illegality in the order of reference under Section 18. It
does not appear to have been availed of. The remedy under
Section 28A is not available to the petitioners since they
have availed of the remedy under Section 18.
The question then is: whether the execution
Court which passed the award in the case of Rumal Singh had
jurisdiction to implead the non-parties to the award and
make the award in their favour. It is settled law that the
execution Court cannot go behind the award and decree. It
has jurisdiction only to execute the decree made under
Section 26 and in case of an appeal, under Section 54 and
further appeal under Art.136 of the Constitution to this
Court as may be modified in the appellate decree which
ultimately would be the executable decree. Besides the
decree, the execution Court is devoid of jurisdiction and
power to go behind the decree either to implead third
parties to it who are not persons claiming right, title and
interest in the decree through the decree-holder nor does it
have power to pass an independent award and decree under
Section 26 in favour of the third parties. The civil Court
gets jurisdiction to award compensation higher than the
compensation made under Section 11 in respect of the
acquired land only on reference under Section 18. It is not
an ordinary Civil court under Section 9 of the Civil
Procedure Code but a Court constituted for the purpose of
deciding the compensation for the acquired land under the
Act on reference to an established Court. Under the Act even
a Special Judge could award compensation on reference under
Section 18. The execution Court cannot even amend the decree
of inter-parties. The only remedy for the inter-parties
would be to have the decree, as engrafted under Section 265
or modified or affirmed in appeal either under Section 54 or
under Article 136 of the Constitution, as the case may be.
The execution Court, therefore is devoid of jurisdiction and
power to amend the decree or to award compensation and
statutory benefits to the petitioners. The order is a
nullity. The High Court, therefore, has rightly corrected
obvious and palpable error of jurisdiction committed by the
Addl. District Judge Gurgaon, i.e., execution Court in
awarding compensation and statutory benefit Section.
It is argued by Shri Rohtagi that the petitioners being
co-owners, they are entitled to compensation on parity with
other co-owners and the denial thereof is violative of
Art.14. We find no force in the contention. Having laid
independent claims and sought reference under Section 18,
the right and remedy are only as provided under Section 18
or on an appeal under Section 54 but not by way of getting
impleaded on the premise of a co-owner. Merely because
one of the claimants had got higher compensation, others do
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not automatically get the same compensation unless the
remedies, as provided under the Act, are availed of. One of
the remedies under the Act is Section 28A; if it is
available according to law. Determination of higher
compensation in favour of some claimants or so-called co-
owners and denial thereof to other claimants is not
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The subject
matter having been regulated under the provisions of the
Act, the right and remedy for higher compensation should be
sought and had only under the Act. The principle of equality
of Art.14 cannot be extended in that behalf.
The S.L.P. is accordingly dismissed.