Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
SOHAN LAL AND OTHERS
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
AMIN CHAND AND SONS AND OTHERS(With connected appeals & peti
DATE OF JUDGMENT22/08/1973
BENCH:
MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN
BENCH:
MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN
BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH
CITATION:
1973 AIR 2572 1974 SCR (1) 453
1973 SCC (2) 608
ACT:
Arbitration Act (10 of 1940) Ss. 13(b), 14(3) and 39(1)
(ii)--Opinion on a question of law referred by arbitration
to Court-If appealable.
Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908), s. 107; 0.30, r. 4-
Appeal by firm-Death of partner-If appeal abates.
Code of Civil Procedure (Act 5 of 1908). 0.47, r. 7-Review
on merits Scope of appeal.
HEADNOTE:
Certain trade marks were registered in the name of two firms
and one of the partners gave notice of dissolution of the
two firms. Thereafter, he filed two suits for accounts.
While the suits were pending he died and his legal
representatives (appellants) were impleaded. The parties
agreed to refer the matter to arbitration and before the
arbitrators a question was raised whether the legal
representatives were entitled to continue the suits. The
arbitrators stated a special case to the Court for its
opinion under the first part of a. 13(b), Arbitration Act,
1940. Meanwhile, one of the firms filed a suit against the
appellants in the names of the firms under which they
(appellants) Were tracking for an injunction restraining
them from using the trade-marks. An ex-parte injunction was
granted restraining the appellants from manufacturing and
selling certain implements under the trade marks. On
objection by the appellants, the order was vacated. A
review application by the respondents was Allowed,. The
order of the Court granting review was a combined order
granting review and disposing of the application for interim
injunction on merits. Oil appeal, the High Court confirmed
the order. Against the order of the High Court an appeal
was filed to this Court and this Court passed an interim
order that the appellants will be entitled to use the trade
marks but that the parties should keep accounts of all goods
manufactured and sold and submit them to the trial court
during the pendency of the appeal. While the appeal was
pending in this Court, one of the appellants died.
The Court, to which reference was made under the first part
of s. 13(b), Arbitration Act, gave its opinion that the
appellants were not entitled to continue the suits, and an
appeal was filed against the order under Art. 136.
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The respondents filed a criminal complaint before the
Magistrate stating that the appellants were using the trade
marks without authority, and that they were passing off
their goods as goods manufactured by the original firm. The
appellants applied to this Court for taking proceedings for
contempt of court against the respondents ’for having
disobeyed the interim order of this Court’.
On the questions :
(1) Whether the appeal against the order of
injunction had abated because of the death of
one of the appellants ?
(2) Whether the appeal against the order of
injunction on merits, was maintainable "
(3) Whether the trial court ’was justified
in passing the order of injunction ?
(4) Whether an appeal against the opinion of
the Court given under the first part of s.
13(b) of the Arbitration Act was maintainable,
and
(5) Whether the respondents, in filing the.
criminal complaint were guilty of contempt of
this Court ?
454
HELD : (1) Under 0.30, r. 4, C.P.C., two or more persons may
sue or be sued in the name of a firm, and if any of the
partners dies, whether before the institution or during the
pendency of any suit, it shall not be necessary to join the
legal representatives of the deceased as a party to the
suit. Under s. 107. C.P.C., the provisions of 0.30, r. 4,
apply to appeals also. Since. the appellants were sued in
the names of their firms, the injunction was issued against
them in the names of their firms, and they filed the appeal
in the names of their firms, the death of one of the
partners would not cause the appeal to abate. [456F-H]
(2) The order of the trial court was not only an order
granting the review but also an order passed on merits.
Therefore, the appellants were entitled, not only to
challenge the order on the grounds mentioned in 0.47, r. 7,
but also on any other ground open to them, namely that on
merits, the order of injunction should not have been passed.
[457 B-D]
(3) Prima facie the respondents are not entitled to the
exclusive use of the trade marks which formed part of the
assets of the partnership of the two firms. If that be so,
the court was not justified in granting the injunction res-
training the appellants from using the trade marks. [457 G-
H]
(4) The consultative ’jurisdiction of the court does not
result in a decision which is equivalent to a judgment,
decree, determination or order which is appealable to this
Court under Art. 136, and hence, the appeal is incompetent.
[458E; 459F-G]
(a) There is no material difference in the language of the
corresponding section of English Act and s. 13(b) of the
Indian Arbitration Act. In spite of the opinion given by
the Court the arbitrators are clothed with the final duty of
determining the case and the opinion of the Court does not
finally determine the case and is not binding on the
arbitrators. [459E-F; 460B]
British Westing House Electric and Manufacturing Company
Ltd. v. Under,,round Electric Railways Company of London,
Ltd., [1912] A.C. 673, in re an Arbitration between Knight
and the Tabernacle Permanent Building Society, [1892] 2
Q.B.D. 613, Union of India v. M/s. South India Corporation
A.I.R. 1960 Andhra Pradesh 346, Union of India v. M/s Ram
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Sukh Das and Others, A.I.R. 1959 Punjab 61, Adamji Lukmanji
and Louis Dreyfus & Co. In the matter of an Arbitration,
A.I.R. 1925 Sind 83, and Clive Mills Ltd. v. Swalal Jain
A.I.R. 1957 Calcutta 692, referred to.
(b) It might be that the arbitrators may choose to act upon
the opinion, but that is not because the opinion is a
determination or decision binding on the arbitrator. It
need even be incorporated in the award under s. 14(3).
Section 14(3) is concerned only with the latter part of
s.13(b) because, that part provides for stating the award
wholly or in part in the form of a special case of such
question for the opinion of the court, and under s. 14(3)
such opinion should,be added to and form part of the award.
But an opinion given under the first part of section 1 3 (b)
need not be added to and does not form part of the award.
There could be no appeal from the decision of the
arbitrators on the ground they did not act upon the opinion
although it might be a ground for impeaching their award on
the ground of misconduct. [459F; 469F-H; 461AC]
(c) Moreover, under s. 39(1)(ii) an appeal is provided only
against an order on an award stated in the form of a special
case, but there is no provision for an appeal against the
opinion given by the court on a special case Started to the
court under the first part of s. 13(b). The scheme of the.
Act shows that the legislature wanted to provide for an
appeal only when there is to be a decision by the court
binding on the parties and not when it tenders an opinion
which is not binding on the arbitrators and which is not to
be incorporated in the award, [460G-H-. 461B]
(5) There could be no dispute that the respondent was
entitled to file the complaint and therefore, it cannot be
held that the respondent had disobeyed the order of this
Court and committed any contempt. [462D-E]
455
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 227 (N)
of 1970.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
April 7, 1969 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court at
Chandigarh in F.A.O. No. 41 of 1969 and civil-appeals Nos.
1296-1297 of 1971.
From the judgment and order dated 1st June 1971 of the Court
of Senior Sub Judge, at Jullundur in Case No. 130 and 140 of
1968.
C. L. Lakhanpal, S. K. Mehta, K. R. Nagaraja, M.
Qamaruddin and Vinod Dhavan, for the appellant in all the
appeals.
R. P. Khosla, R. S. Sodhi and Hardev Singh, for respondent
No. 1 in Civil Appeal No. 227 of 1970.
G. N. Dikshit, S. K. Bisaria and Parmod Swaroop, for
respondent No. 1 in Civil Appeal Nos. 1296-97 of 1971.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MATHEW, J.
Civil Appeal No. 227 of 1970.
There were two firms called ’Amin Chand and Sons" and
"Landra Engineering & foundry Works". The partners of the
firms were three brothers Bakshi Ram, Shiv Dayal and Kishan
Chand, after the retirement of the 4th partner. Certain
trade marks were registered in the names of the firms. On
January 30, 1967, Bakshi Ram gave notices to the other
partners dissolving the firms. The notices were served upon
the other partners sometime before March, 1967. On October
3, 1967, Bakshi Ram filed two suits for rendition of
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accounts against the other two partners in the subordinate
Judge’s court at Jullundur. The defendants in the suits
filed applications under s. 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act
for stay of the trial of the suits on the ground that the
court had no jurisdiction to proceed with the trial in view
of- the clause for arbitration in the partnership
agreements. On February 4, 1968, Bakshi Ram died and his
legal representatives, 10 in number, were brought on record.
On June 24, 1968, the parties agreed to have the matter
referred to arbitration. The court stayed the trial of the
suits and referred the matter to arbitrators. Before the
arbitrators, a question was raised whether the legal
representatives of Bakshi Ram were entitled to continue the
suits. The arbitrators stated a special case for the
opinion of the court under the first part of s. 13 (b) of
the Act the question of law, whether the legal
representatives are competent to, continue the suits. On
December 20, 1968, a suit was filed by a firm called "Amin
Chand and Sons" through Shiv Dayal, in the District Court at
Rohtak against three of the legal representatives of Bakshi
Ram trading under the names "Bakshi Ram and Sons", "Sohan
Lal and Brothers" and "Kaybus Industries and others", for a
permanent injunction restraining them from using certain
trade, marks. The plaintiff-
456
respondents in the suit applied for restraining the
defendant-appellants and their dealers from manufacturing or
selling agricultural implements under the trade mark Nos.
125062 and 138979 which were originally registered in the
name of Amin Chand and Sons of which Bakshi Ram, Shiv Dayal
and Kishan Chand were partners. The court granted an ex
parte injunction. That was vacated on the objection of the
defendants in the suit. Thereafter applications were filed
by the plaintiff-respondents for reviewing the order
dismissing the application for temporary injunction, and for
issue of a temporary injunction, to restrain the defendant-
appellants from using the trade marks registered in the name
of Amin Chand and Sons of which Bakshi Ram was a partner.
These applications were allowed and temporary injunction as
prayed for was granted. The defendant-appellants ,preferred
an appeal against that order to the High Court. The High
Court confirmed the order. This appeal, by special leave,
is directed ,against that order.
During the pendency of the appeal here, one of the
appellants. namely, Dharam Vir, died on May 14, 1970. The
application to implead his legal representatives was filed
only on July 14, 1970. The respondents, by way of
preliminary objection, contended that the appeal has abated.
So, the first question for consideration is whether the
appeal has abated. The plaint shows that three persons were
sued in the names of the firms under which they were
carrying on business. The injunction order was issued
against these persons in the names of the firms. The
injunction order operated against these persons as carrying
on business in the names of the firms.
Order 30 rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code provides that
notwithstanding anything contained in s. 45 of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872, two or more persons may sue or be sued
in the name of a firm under the foregoing provisions and if
any of such persons dies, whether before the institution or
during the pendency of any suit, it shall not be necessary
to join the legal representative of the deceased as a party
to the suit. We have already said that the injunction order
was directed against the partners in the names of the firms
and that it operated as against them. The partners filed
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the appeal in the names of the firms against the order and
when one of the partners died, the failure to implead his
legal representatives would not cause the appeal to abate
under sec. 107 of the C.P.C. the provisions of rule 4 of
Order XXX will apply to appeals also.
Counsel for the respondents also raised another objection
namely that since the appeal to the High Court was against
the order granting a review, the only grounds which could
have been taken in the appeal were those mentioned in Order
47, rule 7 of the Civil Pro-
457
cedure Code and that the appellants are not, therefore,
entitled to canvass the merits of the injunction, order
here. There, is no substance in this objection either.
It is not very clear from the order of the trial court
whether that. court reviewed its previous order vacating the
injunction and then passed the order of injunction after
granting the review or whether it modified its previous
order vacating the injunction in the. exercise of its
inherent Power- If the order under appeal before the High
Court is considered to be one granting the review, then
certainly the only grounds on which that order could have
been impeached in the appeal are those stated in rule 7 of
Order 47. But the order appealed against was not only an
order granting the review but also an order passed on merits
on the application for injunction. It cannot be disputed
that an appeal lay from the order granting the injunction,
and in such an appeal it was open to the appellant to urge
any grounds to show that the injunction was wrongly granted.
The order of the, trial court was a combined order granting
the review and disposing of the application for injunction
on merits and, therefore, the appellants were not only
entitled to challenge the order on the grounds mentioned in
Order 47, rule 7, but also on any other ground open to them,
namely, that, on merits, the order of injunction should not
have been passed.
Then the question is whether there was any justification for
passing the order of injunction and whether the appellate
court was right in confirming it.
It may be recalled that Bakshi Ram gave notices for the
dissolution of the two firms in January, 1967 to the other
partners. The appellants contend that with the dissolution
of the firm assets of the firm- including the trade marks
registered in the name of the firms belonged to the partners
as co-owners and that two of the partners, namely, the
respondents, have no right to appropriate or use the assets
of the firm to the exclusion of the legal representatives of
the other partner, Bakshi Ram. The suit in which the
injunction order was passed was filed for a declaration that
"Amin Chand and Sons" constituted by the two surviving
partners alone was entitled to use the assets of the firm of
"Amin Chand and Sons" of which Bakshi Ram was a partner, and
it was for restraining the appellants from using that firm’s
assets, namely, the two trade marks in question, that the
order of injunction was sought. Prima facie, it would
appear that the respondents are not entitled to the
exclusive use of the two trade marks which formed part of
the assets of the partnership of Aminchand and Sons of which
the three brothers were partners. The appellants being the
legal representatives of Bakshi Ram were also entitled to a
share of the assets of that partnership. If that be so we
do not think that the courts were justified in granting the
injunction restraining the appellants from using the trade
marks. In these, circumstances, we think that the proper
course to adopt is to continue in force the order passed by
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this Court when it granted the special leave, on the basis
of the application filed by the appellants for stay of the
order of injunction, after setting aside the order under
appeal.
458
We, therefore, order that the injunction granted by the
District Judge, Rohtak, on March 20,1969, is varied to the
extent that the ,appellants will be entitled to use the
trade mark "Amin Chand and Soins’ and "Landra", but they
will keep accounts of all goods manufactured and sold and
submit six-monthly accounts to the trial court during the
pendency of the suit and that the respondents will also keep
similar accounts and furnish accounts to the trial court.
The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated but is
dismissed in other respects. We make no order as to costs.
Civil Appeals No. 1296 and 1297 of 1971
It might be recalled that Bakshi Ram had filed two suits for
rendition of accounts on the basis that the firms stood
dissolved by the notices issued by him in 1967 and that
after his death, the parties to the suits had agreed to have
the subject matter of the suits. referred to arbitration.
After the arbitrators had entered upon the reference, a
question was raised whether the legal representatives of
Bakshi Ram were competent to proceed with the two suits.
The arbitrators stated a special case for the opinion of the
court under the first part of s. 13(b) of the Arbitration
Act.
The Court gave the opinion and it is against the opinion
that these appeals by way of special leave have been
preferred.
A preliminary objection was raised by the respondents to the
maintainability of these appeals on the ground that an
opinion given pursuant to the first part of s. 13(b) of the
Arbitration Act is not a judgment, decree, determination or
order as visualized in article 136 of the Constitution and,
therefore, the appeals would not lie.
In order to dispose of the objection it is necessary to
decide the nature of an opinion given by a court under the
first part of s. 13(b) of the Arbitration Act.
In British Westing House Electric and Manufacturing Company
Ltd. v. Underground Electric Railways Company of London
Ltd.(1) the House of Lords held that the opinion of the High
Court upon a special case stated by an arbitrator under the
Arbitration Act, 1889, with regard to a question of law
arising in the course of the reference cannot be the subject
of an appeal, but, if that opinion is erroneous an award
expressed to be founded on that opinion can be set aside as
containing an error of law apparent on the face of the
award. In the course of his speech Viscount Haldane L.C.
said:
"No doubt an opinion given by the Court under
the provisions of the Arbitration Act is not a
judgment or order, and is, therefore, not
susceptible of being the subject of an appeal.
But in my opinion, that is the only reason why
it cannot be appealed, and if the law embodied
in it is afterwards set out on the, face of a
final award, I see no reason for thinking with
Vaughan Williams, L.J.that the Act inten-
(1) [1912] A. C. 673.
459
ded to make the statement of the law appearing
on the face of the award binding on a higher
tribunal before which the award might come for
review."
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In re an Arbitration between Knight and- the Tabernacee
Permanent Building Society(1), Lord Esher said that when the
statute stated (Arbitration Act, 1889) that "any referee,
arbitrator or umpire may at any stage of the proceedings
under a reference, and shall if so directed by the Court or
a Judge, state in the form of a special case for the opinion
of the Court any question of law arising in the course of
the reference", the words being not "for determination" or
"decision" by the court, there is no determination or
decision when the court gives the opinion. He also said
that it would be most inexpedient that, where an opinion is
given by the court- under this statute in the course of a
reference for the guidance of, the arbitrators, there should
be an appeal which might be carried up to the House of
Lords. Bowen, L.J. said that it could not have been
intended that, whenever a case is stated under this section
for the opinion of the Court, such opinion when taken is to
be treated as an absolute determination of the rights of the
parties with the result that there may be an appeal from it
which may be carried to the House of Lords. He further said
that the section in question contemplated a proceeding by
the arbitrator for the purpose of guiding himself as to the
course he should pursue in the reference and that he does
not divest himself of his complete authority over the
subject matter of the arbitration but still remains the
final judge of law and fact although, a fair and honest
arbitrator would, in the absence of special circumstances,
be bound in honesty and morality, after taking the opinion
of the Court, to act upon. such opinion.
We think that in spite of the opinion given by the Court,
the arbitrators are clothed with the final duty of
determining the case and that the opinion of the Court does
not finally determine the case, although it might bind the
arbitrators in honesty and morals to act upon the law as the
court stated it. We also think that there could be no
appeal from their decision because they- did not act upon
the opinion although it might be a ground for impeaching
their award on the ground of misconduct. It appears to us
that this consultative jurisdiction of the Court does not
result in a decision which is equivalent to a judgment.
decree, determination or order.
In Union of India v. M/s. South India Corporation(2) it was
held that an opinion on a special case stated under the
first part of s. 13 (b) of the Arbitration Act is
consultative in character and is not a determination of the
rights of the parties.
In Union of India v. M/s. Ram Sukh Das and Others(3), the
Court said that no appeal will lie from an opinion given by
the Court ,on a special case stated under the first part of
S. 13 (b) of the Arbitra-
(1) [1892] 2 Q. B. D. 613. (2) A. T. R. 1960 Andhra
Pradesh 346.
(3) A. T. R. 1959 Punjab 61.
460
tion Act. The same view was taken in Adamji Lukmanji and
Louis Dreyfus & Co. In the matter of an Arbitration(1).
Counsel for the appellants relied on the ruling in Clive
Mills Ltd. Swalal Jain(2) and submitted that-there are
material differences between the English Arbitration Act and
the Indian Arbitration Act and therefore the decision of the
House of Lords might not be a safe guide. We do not think
that there is any material difference in the language of the
corresponding section of the English Act with which the
House of Lords was dealing.
Counsel for the appellants submitted that the opinion given
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by court has to be incorporated in the award under S. 14 (3)
and therefore, the opinion was binding on the arbitrators.
Section 14 (3) provides:
"14 (3) Where the arbitrators or umpire state
a special case under clause (b) of s. 13, the
Court after giving notice to the parties and
hearing them, shall pronounce its opinion
thereon and such opinion shall be added to,
and shall form part of the award."
The marginal note to s. 14 says: "Award to be signed and
filed". Section 14 (1) says that when the award is made by
the arbitrators, they shall sign it and give notice to the
parties of the making and signing of the award; s. 14 (2)
provides that the arbitrators shall, at the request of any
party to the arbitration agreement, cause the award to be
filed in court and that the court shall thereupon give
notice to the parties of the filing of the award. Then
comes sub-section (3) of s. 14 The entire scheme of the
section would show that the section is concerned with the
making of an award. Therefore, the reasonable way to read
s. 14 (3) is that it is concerned only with the latter part
of s. 13 (b), because the latter part of s. 13(b) provides
for stating, the award wholly or in part in the form of a
special case of such question for the opinion of the court.
The opinion given under the latter part of s. 13 (b) should
be added to and form part of the award under s. 14(3). We
do not think that an opinion given tinder the first part of
s. 13(b) should be added to and from part of the award. The
reason why the opinion given under the latter part of s. 13
(b) should be added to,. and becomes part of the award is
because the arbitrators have stated the award wholly or in
part in the form of a special case of such question for-the
opinion of the court. This view is further strengthened by
the circumstance that under s. 39(1) (ii), an appeal is
provided only against an order on an award stated in the
form of a special case. The reason why an appeal is
provided for in such a case is that the opinion of the court
has to be added to and form part of the award and it
therefore becomes a decision of the court, notwithstanding
the fact that it is incorporated in the award. There is no
provision for an appeal against an opinion given by the
court on a special case stated to the court under the first
part of s. 13 (b) or against the decision to state a special
case for the opinion of the,
(1) A. T. R. 1925 Sind 83.
(2) A. 1. R. 1957 Calcutta 692.
461
court for tile reason that the opinion is not a decision.
Nor is it to be incorporated in the award. If, as a matter
of fact, the opinion given by the court on a special case
stated under first part of s. 13 (b) is binding on the
arbitrators and has to be incorporated in the award, there
was no reason why, the legislature should not have provided
for ,an appeal against the opinion or against the reference
which led to le opinion. The scheme of the Act shows that
the legislature wanted to provide for an appeal only when
there is to be a decision by the court binding on the
parties, not when it tenders an opinion which is not binding
on the arbitrators and which is not to be ilicorporated in
the award. It might be that the arbitrator may choose to
act upon the opinion. But that is not for the reason that
it is a binding determination or a decision. We have,
therefore no hesitation in holding that the appeals are
incompetent.
The appellants’ counsel argued that the opinion expressed by
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,the court is prima facie wrong for the reason that it did
not take into account the real issue. The real issue,
according to counsel, was whether the partnerships "Amin
Chand and Sons" and "Landra Engineering & Foundry Works"
stood dissolved by the notices issued by Bakshi Ram in 1967,
whether the two suits instituted by Bakshi Ram for rendition
of accounts were competent, and whether there was any bar in
his legal representatives continuing the suits. Counsel
argued that under s. 43 of the Indian Partnerships Act, it
was open to Bakshi Ram to dissolve the partnerships by
giving notice to, the other partners as the partnerships
were partnerships at will and that clauses 14 and 15 of the
partnership agreement have nothing to do with the competency
of one of the partners to dissolve the firms or the legal
representatives of Bakshi Ram to continue the suits.
Apparently, it would seem that there was no bar to Bakshi
Ram filing the suits for rendition of accounts if the
partnerships stood dissolved by the notices issued by him
and perhaps there, would then be no reason also why his
legal representatives could not continue the suits.
However, we, do not express any final opinion on the merits
of the controversy. We need only say that that opinion of
the court is not binding on the arbitrators and counsel for
the respondents did not contend otherwise.
The appeals have to be dismissed and we do so but in the
circumwithout any, order as to costs.
Civil Miscellaneous Petitions No. 2183 and 2184 of 1972
This application is for taking proceedings for contempt of
court against "Amin Chand and Sons" represented by Shiv
Dayal, the respendent in these petitions, for having
disobeyed the interim order passed by this Court on the
application for stay while admitting Special Leave Petition
(Civil) No. 1851 of 1969 on January 29, 1970. That order
provided as follows:-
"Special leave granted. The injunction
granted by the District Judge, Rohtak on 20-3-
69 is varied to the extent that the petitioner
will be entitled to use the trade mark "Amin
Chand and Sons and Landra", but they will keep
462
accounts of all goods manufactured and sold
and submit SIX-monthly accounts to the Trial
Court. during the pendency of the appeal. The
respondents will also keep similar
accounts and furnish accounts to the Trial
Court."
The main allegation in this application is that the
respondent Shiv Dayal filed a criminal complaint before the
Judicial Magistrate, I Class, Phillaur stating that the,
applicants were using the trade marks "Special Landra" and
"Amin Chand" without authority and that they were using the
name of "Amin Chand and Sons" under which the respondent
Shiv Dayal and his partner were carrying on their trade.
On the objection of the applicants as to the maintainability
of the complaint, the learned Magistrate passed an order
holding. that the complaint was maintainable because one of
the allegations in the complaint was that the applicants
were using the name of "Amin Chand and Sons", the firm under
which Shiv Dayal and his partner are carrying on the trade
on the goods manufactured by the applicants and thus passed
off their goods as goods manufactured by "Amin Chand and
Sons". On a perusal of the complaint, it is clear that
there are allegations to show that the applicants were using
the name of the firm "Amin Chand and Sons" under which the
respondent Shiv Dayal and his partner are carrying on the
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business, on the goods manufactured by the applicants. In
these circumstances, we do not see how the respondent has
committed any contempt by disobeying the order of this Court
There can be no dispute that the respondent was entitled to
file a complaint on the ground that the applicants were
manufacturing goods under the trade marks as being
manufactured by, the firm of "Amin Chand and Sons" and were
passing off the goods as manufactured by the respondent
firm. It would appear that the applicants have filed a
petition under s. 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure
before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana for quashing the
order of the Magistrate holding that the complaint was
maintainable. The High Court will pass the appropriate
order on that petition.
We see no substance in this petition. We therefore dismiss
it.
V. P. S. C.A. 227 of
1970 allowed.
Other matters dismissed.
463