Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (crl.) 452 of 2003
PETITIONER:
Megh Singh
RESPONDENT:
State of Punjab
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/09/2003
BENCH:
DORAISWAMY RAJU & ARIJIT PASAYAT.
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
Appeal preferred by appellant-Megh Singh questioning his
conviction under Section 15 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985 (for short the ’Act’) was dismissed by learned
Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Court by the impugned
judgment. He has questioned the legality thereof in the present appeal.
The compass of controversy as unfolded during trial by the
prosecution is as follows:
On 22.2.1993, police party headed by SI Chanan Singh, In-charge of
Police Station Dharamgarh (PW 1/B) was going on kacha road towards drain
from village Dharamgarh in connection with patrol duty and when they
reached near brick kiln, Santa Singh son of Bachan Singh met them and
joined in the police party. When the police party was little short of
the drain, they saw three persons sitting on gunny bags. Two of them
fled from the spot and the third one, accused-appellant Megh Singh was
apprehended. He disclosed the names of the persons who had run away to
be Baldev Singh and Pillu. Twenty-five bags containing poppy husk were
found at the spot. Two samples of 250 gms. were taken from each bag and
after taking the samples, weight of bags was found to be 36 kgs. 500
gms. each. All the fifty samples and 25 bags of poppy husk were sealed
with seal ’CS’ which after use was handed over to HS Mithu Singh (PW-2).
The case property was taken into possession vide recovery memo Exhibit
PC attested by witnesses including Santa Singh. On the basis of ruqa
Exhibit PE. F.I.R. Exhibit PE/1 was registered. Baldev Singh who had run
away from the spot was arrested on 27.2.1993 and Pillu Singh was
arrested on 10.3.1993. Case property was produced before Baldev Singh,
SHO of Police Station, Sunam (PW-3) who verified the investigation and
sealed the same with seal ’BS’. On chemical examination, the samples
were found to be of poppy husk vide report Exhibit PK.
Trial Court after considering the evidence on record held that the
accusations against appellant-Megh Singh have been found established;
accordingly convicted him under Section 15 of the Act and sentenced him
to undergo RI for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.1 lakh with default
condition of further RI for 1 year. Appellant challenged the conviction
and sentence before the High Court. Primary stand was that accused had
been arrested on 19.2.1993 and telegram had been sent in that regard to
the police officials. It was contended that when benefit of doubt has
been given to the other co-accused persons, there was no basis for
convicting the accused-appellant. There was no material to show any
conscious possession which is sine qua non for conviction under Section
15 of the Act. In any event, requirements of Section 50 were not
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complied with. High Court discarded the plea regarding arrest of Megh
Singh on 19.2.1993 on the ground that the evidence on record establishes
that the application/telegram was received on 24.2.1993 and merely
because an earlier date was indicated, it cannot be said that the
accused was really arrested on 19.2.1993. Coming to the plea of
conscious possession it was held that the prosecution had produced ample
evidence that accused was in physical possession and in terms of Section
54 of the Act conscious possession was presumed unless proved to the
contrary. Accused has failed to do so. Therefore, conscious possession
was established. Accordingly the appeal filed by the accused was
dismissed. It was further held that Section 50 has no application
because there was no personal search of the applicant. Consequentially
conviction and sentence were upheld.
Learned counsel appearing for the accused-appellant submitted that
the facts of the case greatly resemblance with that of Avtar Singh and
Ors. v. State of Punjab (2002 (7) SCC 419). Since conscious possession
has not been proved, the conviction of the accused-appellant cannot be
stand on a different footing from those co-accused who have been
acquitted. Non-compliance with requirements of Section 50 of the Act
vitiates the conviction.
In response, learned counsel for the respondent-State submitted
that conscious possession has been established and by application of
logic of Section 54 of the Act when physical possession is established,
there is presumption of conscious possession. Merely because co-accused
persons have been acquitted that cannot be a factor to hold the accused-
appellant innocent. It is submitted that since there was no personal
search, Section 50 of the Act has no application.
Whether there was conscious possession has to be determined with
reference to the factual backdrop. The facts which can be culled out
from the evidence on record is that the accused was sitting atop gunny
bags containing the contraband articles.
Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband articles an offence.
Section 20 appears in chapter IV of the Act which relates to offence for
possession of such articles. It is submitted that in order to make the
possession illicit, there must be a conscious possession.
It is highlighted that unless the possession was coupled with
requisite mental element, i.e. conscious possession and not mere custody
without awareness of the nature of such possession, Section 20 is not
attracted.
The expression ’possession’ is a polymorphous term which assumes
different colours in different contexts. It may carry different meanings
in contextually different backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed
in Superintendent & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil
Kumar Bhunja and Ors. (AIR 1980 SC 52), to work out a completely logical
and precise definition of "possession" uniformally applicable to all
situations in the context of all statutes.
The word ’conscious’ means awareness about a particular fact. It
is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended.
As noted in Gunwantlal v. The State of M.P. (AIR 1972 SC 1756)
possession in a given case need not be physical possession but can be
constructive, having power and control over the article in case in
question, while the person whom physical possession is given holds it
subject to that power or control.
The word ’possession’ means the legal right to possession (See
Health v. Drown (1972) (2) All ER 561 (HL). In an interesting case it
was observed that where a person keeps his fire arm in his mother’s flat
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which is safer than his own home, he must be considered to be in
possession of the same. (See Sullivan v. Earl of Caithness (1976 (1) All
ER 844 (QBD).
Once possession is established the person who claims that it was
not a conscious possession has to establish it, because how he came to
be in possession is within his special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act
gives a statutory recognition of this position because of presumption
available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section 54 where
also presumption is available to be drawn from possession of illicit
articles. This position was highlighted in Madan Lal and Anr. v. State
of Himachal Pradesh (2003 (6) SCALE 483).
In the factual scenario of the present case not only possession
but conscious possession has been established. It has not been shown by
the accused-appellant that the possession was not conscious in the
logical background of Sections 35 and 54 of the Act.
Now comes the question whether there was non-compliance of Section
50 of the Act.
A bare reading of Section 50 shows that it only applies in case of
personal search of a person. It does not extend to search of a vehicle
or a container or a bag, or premises. (See Kalema Tumba v. State of
Maharashtra and Anr. (JT 1999 (8) SC 293), The State of Punjab v. Baldev
Singh (JT 1999 (4) SC 595), Gurbax Singh v. State of Haryana (2001(3)
SCC 28). The language of Section 50 is implicitly clear that the search
has to be in relation to a person as contrasted to search of premises,
vehicles or articles. This position was settled beyond doubt by the
Constitution Bench in Baldev Singh’s case (supra). Above being the
position, the contention regarding non-compliance of Section 50 of the
Act is also without any substance.
The decision in Avtar Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab (2002 (7)
SCC 419) was rendered in a different factual background. In that case
the articles were being carried in a truck. There were several persons
in the truck. It had not been established by evidence that any one of
them had any conscious possession. That also was not the only factor
taken note of. While the accused was examined under Section 313 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short ’the Code’), the essence of
accusations was not brought to his notice, more particularly with
possession aspect. It was also noticed that the possibility of the
accused persons being labourers of the truck was not ruled by the
evidence. Since the decision was rendered on consideration of several
peculiar factual aspects specially noticed in that case, it is of no
assistance to the accused also.
Circumstantial flexibility, one additional or different fact may
make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases or between
two accused in the same case. Each case depends on its own facts and a
close similarity between one case and another is not enough because a
single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. It is more
pronounced in criminal cases where the backbone of adjudication is fact
based.
We find no substance in this appeal, which deserves dismissal, and
we so direct.