Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
BANWARI LAL
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
TIRLOK CHAND & OTHERS (AND vice versa)
DATE OF JUDGMENT23/10/1979
BENCH:
KOSHAL, A.D.
BENCH:
KOSHAL, A.D.
UNTWALIA, N.L.
CITATION:
1980 AIR 419 1980 SCR (1) 998
1980 SCC (1) 349
ACT:
Hindu Law-Adoption-A statement in a will that certain
person was adopted son, if enough proof of adoption-Tests of
adoption-What are.
HEADNOTE:
G and J were the sons of S son of M. The plaintiff was
the grandson of another son of M.
In a document purporting to have been executed by G it
was stated that defendant No. 1 was his (G’s) adopted son
and heir and that C (his younger brother J’s widow) and
defendant No. 1 had rendered services to him, in recognition
of which he bequeathed properties detailed in the will to C
to be enjoyed by her during her life time and that on her
death defendant No. 1 shall be their owner.
The plaintiff in his suit for partition claimed that
the properties detailed in Schedule A to the plaint had been
acquired by his great grandfather M, those in Schedule B
were jointly acquired by G and J, both of whom constituted a
joint Hindu family, and those in Schedule C which once
belonged exclusively to J descended on his death to his
widow C. The plaintiff also challenged the adoption of
defendant No. 1.
Defendant No. 1 on the other hand claimed that since he
was the adopted son of G the properties bequeathed to him by
G’s will were his exclusive properties. He also claimed that
the properties in Schedule C were purchased by J’s widow C
with her stridhana, that by reason of her will he was
entitled exclusively to those properties and that they never
belonged to her late husband.
The trial court held that adoption had not been proved
and that the motive for the execution of the will was not
merely the recognition by the testator of his relationship
through adoption with the devisee but mainly the existence
of feelings of love and affection for him. The first
appellate court held that the recital in G’s will that
defendant No. 1 was his adopted son was sufficient to prove
the fact of adoption.
The High Court on the other hand was of the opinion
that the recital in G’s will that defendant No. 1 was his
adopted son was not sufficient to prove the adopted and that
the reference to adoption had been made merely as a
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description of the devisee and not as a motivation for the
execution of the will.
^
HELD: Defendant No. 1 had not been successful in
establishing the alleged adoption. [1005 F]
999
1. (a) It is well-established that evidence in support
of an adoption must be sufficient to satisfy the very grave
and serious onus that rests upon any person who seeks to
displace the natural succession by alleging an adoption.
[1005 D-E]
(b) The burden of proof of adoption in this case lay
heavily on defendant No. 1 which he has not discharged
satisfactorily. This is not a case in which the adoption had
taken place a very long time the suit was filed. It had in
fact taken place within about a decade immediately preceding
the suit when witnesses who were present at the ceremony and
who had seen the giving and taking would normally have been
available. He did not explain why no such witness was
forthcoming. [1005 A-B]
(c) The relationship mentioned in the will that
defendant No. 1 was his adopted son and heir was merely a
description of the devisee as understood by the testator.
The will was executed not because that relationship was
brought about by adoption but by reason of feelings of
affection which the devisee had earned by his association
with and the assistance rendered to the testator. [1003 H-
1004 A]
2. There is no force in the contention of the plaintiff
that the will executed by C must be held to be wholly
inoperative in so far as properties detailed in Schedules A
and B were concerned because one half of the properties
mentioned in these schedules had vested in C under the will
of G which itself declared that she would hold them merely
as a life-tenant and that thereafter they would devolve on
defendant No. 1. In devising the properties to defendant No.
1, C did no more than carry out the behest of her own
testator, which behest was good in law. [1004 A-C]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1742-
1743 of 1969.
Appeals by Special Leave from the Judgment and order
dated 12-12-1968 of the Allahabad High Court in R.S.A. No.
2777 of 1972.
S. N. Andley, Uma Datta and T. C. Sharma for the
Appellant in CA 1742/69.
A. P. S. Chauhan and N. N. Sharma for Respondent No. 1
in CA 1742/69 and for the Appellant in CA 1743/69.
1000
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KOSHAL, J.-The facts giving rise to these two cross
appeals by special leave may, with advantage, be stated with
reference to the following pedigree-table:
CHHITAR MAL
|
___________________________________________________________
| | | |
Salag Ram Banshi Dhar Narain Dass Bhagwan Dass
| (died | |
| issueless) | |
| ----------- |
| | | |
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| Balu Ram Ram Chander |
| | | |
| | Tirlok Chand |
| | (plaintiff) |
| ------------------------ |
| | | | |
| Rag Vir Ram Nath Bhagirath |
| Saran (defendant) (Defendant |
| No. 3) No. 4) No. 5) |
| |
| -------------------------------------
| | | |
| Devi Sahai Piarye Lal Gopi Nath
| (died in (Defendent |
| 1943) No. 2) |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| Damodar Dass Smt Barfi
| (defendant (daughter)
| No. 6
|
____________________________________________________
| | | |
Murli Kewal Ram Govind Jagananth =Smt. Chhoti
Dhar (dies Ram (died (died
(died issueless (died issueless issueless
in 1925) in 1952) issue- in 1940 in 1955)
in 1952)
____________________________________________________________
The litigation between the parties started with suit
No. 1912 of 1958 instituted by Tirlok Chand for partition of
properties detailed in schedules A,B and C forming part of
the plaint. His case was that
1001
the property described in schedule A had been acquired by
his great-grand-father Chhitar Mal, that the property
detailed in schedule B was jointly acquired by Salag Ram’s
sons Jagannath and Govind Ram, the two of whom constituted a
joint Hindu family, and that the property specified in
schedule C had once belonged exclusively to Jagannath, son
of Salag Ram and that it was from him that it had descended
to his widow Smt. Chhoti.
Apart from defendants Nos. 2 to 6 whose names appear in
the pedigree-table, Banwari Lal [who is the appellant before
us in Civil Appeal No. 1742(N) of 1969] was arrayed as
defendant No. 1 and he has been the real contesting
defendant whose claim was based on his adoption by Govind
Ram, grandson of Chhitar Mal and on two registered wills,
both dated the 25th of September, 1950, purporting to have
been executed by Govind Ram and Smt. Chhoti respectively. He
claimed that the two testators had bequeathed their entire
property to him, that the property covered by schedule A was
acquired not by Chhitar Mal but by Salag Ram and that the
one embraced by schedule C had been purchased by Smt. Chhoti
with her stridhana and was never the property of her husband
Jagannath. He therefore claimed to be entitled to all the
properties in suit exclusively for himself, it being common
ground between the parties that those properties were the
subject-matter of the two wills.
The plaintiff denied the adoption set up by defendant
No. 1 and challenged the two wills as forgeries.
The trial court and the first appellate court found
that the property covered by schedule A had been acquired
not by Chhitar Mal but by his son Salag Ram. There was no
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contest in relation to the property embraced by schedule B
which was therefore treated to have been acquired jointly by
Govind Ram and Jagannath as part of their joint Hindu family
assets. In relation to the property detailed in schedule C,
the trial Court held that it had been acquired by Jagannath
but the finding was reversed by the first appellate court
which found that the acquisition was made by Smt. Chhoti
with funds of her own, her husband Jagannath having no
interest therein.
On behalf of defendant No. 1 no evidence was led to
prove that he had been given or taken in adoption. The trial
court therefore held that the adoption had not been proved.
In the will of Govind Ram however, there was a recital that
defendant No. 1 was his adopted son and this recital was
considered by the first appellate court to be sufficient to
prove the adoption. Both the wills were held to be genuine
1002
and legally valid and the suit was therefore dismissed by
the trial court and the first appellate court in toto.
In second appeal the High Court upheld all the findings
of fact arrived it by the first appellate court except the
one relating to adoption. The High Court was of the opinion
that the recital in the will of Govind Ram about defendant
No. 1 being his adopted son was not sufficient to prove the
adoption which therefore was held not to have been
established. It was further held by the High Court that a
half share in the property specified in schedules A and B
having descended from Jagannath to Smt. Chhoti as a life
tenant only, she was not competent to will it away and that
the plaintiff, along with other members of the family, was
entitled to succeed to that half share.
It was vehemently contended before the High Court that
even if the wills be taken to be genuine, they would operate
only if defendant No. 1 was shown to have been validly
adopted by Govind Ram because both Govind Ram and Smt.
Chhoti had described him as Govind Ram’s adopted son and
must therefore be presumed to have executed the wills in
favour of defendant No. 1 by reason of his being the adopted
son of Govind Ram. The contention was repelled by the High
Court (as it had also been by the trial court) on the ground
that the mention of defendant No. 1 as the adopted son of
Govind Ram in each of the two wills had been made merely as
a description of the devisee and not as a motivation for the
execution of either will. Support was found for this view
from Ranganathan Chattiar and Another v. Periskaruppan and
Another.
In the result the High Court accepted the appeal of the
plaintiff in part, set aside the dismissal of the suit and
remitted the case to the trial court for declaring the
shares of the parties in the property which descended to
Smt. Chhoti from her husband, in the light of its (the High
Court’s) judgment and for partition of the property
accordingly thereafter.
2. Both the contesting parties feel aggrieved by the
judgment of the High Court. While defendant No. 1 claims in
Civil Appeal No. 1742 of 1969 the entire property covered by
schedules A, B and C, the plaintiff has filed a cross appeal
(Civil Appeal No. 1743 of 1969) seeking to defeat in toto
the claim of defendant No. 1.
3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at
length. In so before as the findings of fact are concerned
they are not open to challenge before us. The first question
which learned counsel for the plaintiffs
1003
has re-opened before us is whether the two wills were
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rightly held to be operative in favour of defendant No. 1
inspite of the fact that he was found not to have
established his character as an adopted son which was the
description given to him in both the wills. To this question
also we think the High Court gave the correct answer. In
this connection reference may be made to the relevant part
of Govind Ram’s will and the same is extracted below :
"Shri Banwarilal is the adopted son and heir of
the executant. Shrimati Chhoti is the widow of
Jagannath Prasad, resident of Pilkhuwa, Pargana Dasna,
Tahsil Ghaziabad. Both the persons live along with the
executant and render all due service to the executant.
Therefore, I make the following will: That after the
death of the executant all my estate movable and
immovable, with all other goods and household property
along with Dharamshala No. 1/60 and one-storeyed shop
No. 1/57 bounded as given below shall be owned by
Shrimati Chhoti widow of Jagannath Prasad, occupation
shopkeeper, resident of Pilkhuwa, who shall have no
right to sell the estate. She shall have the right to
spend for the Dharamshala the income of shop No. 1/57
connected with the Dharamshala. After the death of Smt.
Chhoti, Banwarilal, adopted son and heir of the
executant, shall be the owner ..
Interpreting this document and considering the surrounding
circumstances of the case, the trial court found that the
motive for the execution of the will was not merely the
recognition by the testator of his relationship through
adoption with the devisee but mainly the existence of
feelings of love and affection for him. It was found as a
fact that Banwari Lal was living with Govind Ram and Smt.
Chhoti, that he had served them during their illness and
that he was affectionately attached to them so that at the
time when the wills were executed there was no one nearer or
dearer to Govind Ram and Smt. Chhoti than Banwari Lal. In
this view of the matter, the failure to establish the stated
relationship is not decisive of the point under
consideration, and as remarked by the High Court, it appears
that the testator made the will not for the reason that he
had in fact and lawfully adopted Banwari Lal but for the
reason that he treated Banwari Lal as an adopted son and was
moved really by the service which the latter had rendered to
him. The relationship mentioned in the will was merely a
description of the devisee as understood by the testator who
executed the will in favour of the devisee not because of
the relationship
1004
brought about by the adoption but by reason of feelings of
affection which the devisee had earned by his association
and assistance.
4. The only other noticeable point raised on behalf of
the plaintiff was that the will executed by Smt. Chhoti must
be held to be wholly inoperative in so far as properties
detained in schedules A and B are concerned. There is no
force in that contention either. One half of the properties
mentioned in those two schedules had vested in Smt. Chhoti
under the will of Govind Ram which itself declared that Smt.
Chhoti would hold them merely as a life-tenant and that
thereafter they would devolve on defendant No. 1. In
devising those properties to defendant No. 1 Smt. Chhoti did
nothing more than carry out the behest of her own testator,
which behest was good in law and would have been effective
even if Smt. Chhoti had made no will in favour of defendant
No. 1 in respect of the properties acquired by her under
Govind Ram’s will.
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5. On behalf of defendant No. 1 the only submission
made was that the two wills must be given effect to not only
with regard to the properties received by Smt. Chhoti from
Govind Ram but also in respect of those which devolved on
her as a successor to her husband Jagannath. This submission
is also without substance. Jagannath died in 1940 when Smt.
Chhoti came into his property on the usual life-tenure
without any right of a alienation (except for necessity) or
of devise. To the extent that she overstepped her rights in
devising Jagannath’s property the will transgressed the law
and has been rightly held to be inoperative, the result
being that her reversioners and not her devisee would
succeed to Jagannath’s share in the properties covered by
schedules A and B. The situation would certainly have been
different if the adoption had been proved; for, in that
case, defendant No. 1 would have succeeded as the sole
reversioner to the estate left by Smt. Chhoti, being her
husband’s brother’s son and therefore his nearest and sole
heir. And that is why a contention was raised on behalf of
defendant No. 1 that a valid adoption had been proved and
that the finding to the contrary arrived at by two of the
courts below was unsupportable. Reference in this connection
was made to the recital in the will executed by Govind Ram
about defendant No. 1 being the adopted son of the devisor
and to the oral evidence of Raj Pal, DW-2 who attested that
will and deposed that defendant No. 1 had been adopted by
the testator. These two pieces of evidence were considered
by the trial court as well as the High Court, both of whom
regarded the material as insufficient to hold that a valid
adoption was proved. The finding in relation to the adoption
is a finding of fact which we see no reason to interfere
with in the circumstances of the case. The
1005
adoption is alleged to have taken place within about a
decade immediately preceding the suit between the parties so
that evidence of witnesses who were present at the actual
adoption and had seen the ’giving and taking’ would normally
have been available. However, no attempt was made to produce
any such witness nor to explain why no such witness was
forthcoming. Different considerations may have prevailed if
proof of adoption was required to be submitted to court
after a very long period of its having taken place, which is
not the case here. The statement made by the testator in the
will about the adoption is certainly a piece of admissible
evidence as observed in Chandreshwar Prasad Narain Singh v.
Bisheshwar Pratap Narain Singh cited by learned counsel for
defendant No. 1 but there is no rule of law or prudence
laying down the principle that such a statement must be
regarded as conclusive, and this was also the view taken in
that case. And the burden of proof of adoption was heavy on
the defendant. In this connection we may refer to the
following passage in Article 512 of Mulla’s Hindu Law (14th
edition):
".. But the evidence in support of an adoption
must be sufficient to satisfy the very grave and
serious onus that rests upon any person who seeks to
displace the natural succession by alleging an
adoption. That onus is particularly heavy where the
adoption is made a long time after the date of the
alleged authority to adopt.. "
It is true, as pointed out by Mulla in a later passage
occurring in the same article that when there is a lapse of
a very long period between the adoption and its being
questioned, every allowance for the absence of evidence to
prove the factum of adoption must be favourably entertained;
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but then that is not the situation here as we have already
pointed out. We are therefore one with the High Court in
holding that on the evidence adduced, defendant No. 1 has
not been successful in establishing the alleged adoption.
6. In the result both the appeals fail and are
dismissed with no order as to costs.
P.B.R. Appeals dismissed.
1006