Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
R. SAHARI, GENL. MANAGER, DAURALA SUGAR MILLS, DAURALA & ORS
DATE OF JUDGMENT23/03/1979
BENCH:
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
BENCH:
FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA
KOSHAL, A.D.
CITATION:
1979 AIR 1544 1979 SCR (3) 625
1979 SCC (2) 387
ACT:
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act-Sections 20 & 20-A-
Scope of
HEADNOTE:
Toffees sold by a vender to a Food Inspector having
been found to be adulterated, prosecution was launched
against him. The vendor produced a warranty in the Trial
Court as a result of which he was acquitted by the
Magistrate. The Magistrate however directed notice to the
respondents under section 20-A for being impleaded and
prosecuted on the grounds that the articles manufactured and
distributed the them were adulterated. On revision, the
Session Judge dismissed the same but on further revision to
the High Court, it allowed the revision and set aside the
order of the Magistrate,
In the other two Criminal Appeals Nos. 166 & 167 of
1972, the appellants were impleaded under section 20A before
the acquittal of the last seller and that order was upheld
by the High Court. On the question whether the magistrate
was entitled to implead the distributors or manufacturers
under s. 20A even after acquitting the seller on the ground
that he was protected by a warranty.
Dismissing the appeals
^
HELD :The opening lines of section 20A clearly
contemplate a contingency where the discretionary
jurisdiction under this Act can be exercised only during the
trial of any offence, i.e. the stage at which the magistrate
can exercise his jurisdiction under this section must be
before the trial has concluded and ended in acquittal or
conviction. A combined reading of section 20A and 20 is that
where a distributor or manufacturer or any other person is
impleaded in the course of a trial, the obligation to get a
fresh sanction for such a person is dispensed with and the
sanction obtained for the last seller in the trial, will
ensure for the benefit of the prosecution of the other
person impleaded. Therefore protection of section 20 is not
available if the parties concerned are impleaded after the
trial was over. The special statutory concession is given to
the prosecution only if the conditions mentioned in s. 20A
are fulfilled and not otherwise. [627B-C, F-H]
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V. N. Kamdar v. Municipal Corpration of Delhi [1974] 1
S.C.R. 157 followed.
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos.
152-153 of 1972.
From the Judgment and Order dated 28-10-1970 of Delhi
High Court in Criminal Revision Nos. 426/68 and 5/70.
AND
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 166-167 OF 1972
From the Judgment and Order dated 28-10-1970 of Delhi
High Court in Criminal Revision Nos. 72-73/68.
626
Soli J. Sorabji, Addl. Sol. Genl. of India, B. P.
Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for the Appellant in Crl. A.
Nos. 152-153/72.
V. M. Tarkunde, S. C. Malik and B. R. Agarwala for RR 4
in Crl. A. 152/72.
H. K. Puri for RR. 3 in Crl. A.153/72
Mrs. Urmila Sirur for RR. 3 in Crl. A. No. 152/72.
B. K. Jaggi for the Appellant in Crl. A. No. 166-
167/72.
H. S. Marwah and M. N. Shroff for RR. in Crl. A. Nos.
166-167/72.
B. P. Maheshwari and Suresh Sethi for the Intervener.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
FAZAL ALI, J. These appeals by certificate arise out of
a common Judgment delivered by the High Court of Delhi and
will be disposed of by us by one judgment. In Appeals Nos.
152-153/72, one Gian Singh sold toffees to the Food
Inspector and as the toffees were found to be adulterated, a
prosecution was launched against him under S. 7/16 of the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Gian Singh, however,
produced in course of the trial a warranty given by the
distributors and manufacturers as a result of which the
Magistrate acquitted accused Gian Singh. After having
acquitted Gian Singh, the Magistrate issued notice under S.
20A against the Respondents for being impleaded and
prosecution on the ground that the articles manufactured by
the distributors were adulterated. The respondents went up
in revision to the Sessions Judge which was dismissed. But
on further revision to the High Court the High Court allowed
the petition and set aside the order of the Magistrate
impleading the respondents. In the other two appeals i.e.
Crl. Appeals Nos. 166 and 167/1972, the manufacturers were
impleaded under S. 20A before the acquittal of the last
seller and that order was upheld by the High Court and,
hence these appeals before us by the appellants.
The common question of law that arises for
consideration in all these appeals is: whether or not the
Magistrate is entitled to implead the distributors or
manufacturers under S. 20A even after acquitting the last
seller on the ground that he is protected by a warranty. In
other words, the question for decision in these appeals
turns upon the interpretation of S. 20A and S. 20 of the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. S. 20A runs thus:-
"Where at any time during the trial of any offence
under this Act, alleged to have been committed by any
person, not
627
being the manufacturer, distributor or dealer of any of
food, the Court is satisfied, on the evidence adduced
before it, that such manufacturer, distributor or
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dealer is also concerned with the offence, then the
Court may, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-
section(1) of S. 351 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1898, or in Section 20 proceed against him as though a
prosecution had been instituted against him under S.
20".
The opening lines of S. 20A clearly contemplate a
contingency where the discretionary jurisdiction under this
Act can be exercised only during the trial of any offence,
that is to say, the stage at which the Magistrate can
exercise his discretion under this Section must be before
the trial has concluded and ended in acquittal or
conviction. S. 20 which precedes S. 20-A runs thus:-
"S. 20 (1) No prosecution for an offence under
this Act, not being an offence under S. 14 or section
14A, shall be instituted except by or with written
consent of the Central Government or the State
Government or a person authorised in this behalf, by
general or special order, by the Central Government or
the State Government;
Provided that a prosecution for an offence under
this Act may be instituted by a purchaser referred to
in section 12, if he produces in court a copy of the
report of the public analyst alongwith the complaint.
(2) No court inferior to that of a Metropolitan
Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class
shall try any offence under this Act.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973, an offence punishable
under subsection (IAA) of Section 16 shall be
cognizable and non-bailable".
A combined reading of S. 20A and S. 20 is that where a
distributor or manufacturer or any other person is impleaded
in the course of a trial, the obligation to get a fresh
sanction for such person is dispensed with and the sanction
obtained for the last seller in the trial will ensure for
the benefit of the prosecution of the other person impleaded
also and no further sanction is necessary. It is manifest
that this special statutory concession is given to the
prosecution only if the conditions mentioned in S. 20A are
fulfilled and not otherwise. In other words, the protection
of S. 20 is not available to the prosecution if the parties
concerned are impleaded after the trial is over. In such a
case, a fresh trial will have to be started by obtaining
sanction under
628
S. 20. This matter is no longer res integra as it has been
fully considered by this Court in V. N. Kamdar v. Municipal
Corporation, Delhi(1) where this Court observed as follows:-
"....In order that the manufacturer, distributor
or dealer may be impleaded under S. 20A, it is
necessary that there should be a trial for an offence
committed under the Act by a person and that the
manufacturer, distributor or dealer must be concerned
in the offence. When once the manufacturer, distributor
or dealer is impleaded, the trial proceeds as if he is
also an accused in the case. That is made clear by the
closing words of the section. As already indicated, no
prosecution for an offence under the Act can be
instituted by a Food Inspector without the sanction
specified in S. 20.... The real purpose of enacting S.
20A is to avoid. as far as possible, conflicting
findings. If, in the prosecution instituted against the
vendor, it is found that the vendor has sold the
article of food in the same state as he purchased it
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and that while it was in his possession it was properly
stored, and the vendor is acquitted, it would look
rather ridiculous if in the prosecution against the
manufacturer, distributor or dealer, it is found on the
evidence that he did not give a false warranty, but
that the article was not stored properly while it was
in the possession of the vendor or that he did not sell
the article in the same stage as he purchased it. This
being so, the object of the legislature in enacting the
section will be frustrated if a Magistrate were to
exercise his discretion improperly by failing to
implead the manufacturer, distributor or dealer under
S. 20A in a case where he should be impleaded. But that
is no reason to hold that a separate prosecution
against the manufacturer, distributor or dealer would
be barred, if he is not impleaded under s. 20A, and
tried along with the person who is alleged to have
committed an offence under the Act. In order to avoid
multiplicity of proceedings and conflict of findings,
it is imperative that the Magistrate should implead
these persons under S. 20A whenever the conditions laid
down in the section are satisfied. As I said, it is a
far cry from this to say that if this is not done, the
manufacturer, distributor or dealer would get an
immunity from a separate prosecution."
For these reasons, therefore, and in the facts and
circumstances of the case so far as Cr. Appeals No. 152-
153/1972 are concerned, the
629
Magistrate had no jurisdiction to implead the respondents
after having concluded the trial by the acquittal of the
last seller. Similarly, the Magistrate was fully justified
in Crl. Appeals No. 166 and 167/72 in impleading the
appellants during the course of the trial as the trial was
still continuing and the case would, therefore, squarely
fall under S. 20A of the Act and no further sanction would
be necessary. For these reasons, therefore, all the appeals
are dismissed.
N.K.A. Appeals dismissed.
630