Full Judgment Text
2025 INSC 962
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.10817 of 2024)
MANGE RAM ...APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
& ANOTHER ...RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
NAGARATHNA, J.
Leave granted.
2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the appellant is
the father-in-law of respondent No.2. In April 2017, respondent
No.2 came into contact with the appellant’s son through a
matrimonial website. What began as a digital acquaintance soon
developed into a personal relationship.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
RADHA SHARMA
Date: 2025.08.12
16:33:30 IST
Reason:
Page 1 of 23
3. The marriage between respondent No.2 and the appellant’s
son was solemnised on 23.12.2017 in accordance with the
provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. However, by April
2019, differences appear to have arisen between the couple. On
15.05.2019, respondent No.2 left the matrimonial home and
returned to her parental residence at Jabalpur. It is stated that
she informed her family of the mental and physical cruelty
allegedly meted out to her by her husband and his family
members.
4. Respondent No.2 approached the Mahila Police Station,
Jabalpur and pursuant to her complaint, both parties were called
for counselling. While the appellant’s son was to appear for the
first session of counselling which took place on 26.05.2019, he
was in fact present during the second session conducted on
02.06.2019. That session, which was also attended by members
of both families, culminated in an understanding that the
marriage would be solemnised again, this time through
customary Hindu rites, within two months.
Page 2 of 23
5. However, the accord reached did not last long. Disputes
appear to have resurfaced shortly thereafter. Respondent No.2
once again left the matrimonial home. On 21.07.2019, she lodged
First Information Report (“FIR”) No.58 of 2019 at Mahila Police
Station, Jabalpur, naming her husband i.e., the appellant’s son,
the appellant herein (her father-in-law), mother-in-law and sister-
in-law as accused under Sections 498A and 34 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 (“Dowry Act”). As per the contents of the
FIR, respondent No.2 alleged that soon after the counselling
sessions, fresh demands were made by the appellant and his wife,
including a sum of Rupees five lakhs in cash, gold ornaments, a
motor car, clothing, and other customary articles. It was further
alleged that they insisted upon the ceremonial Hindu marriage
being held at a respectable hotel.
6. While there was, at first, some indication of conciliation, the
situation deteriorated soon thereafter. The appellant is alleged to
have called respondent No.2 to Jabalpur Railway Station, where
he publicly admonished her, slapped her, and threatened to ruin
her life, expressing his displeasure at having been summoned to
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the police station. It is further alleged that he reiterated the dowry
demand, which, according to the complainant, was subsequently
enhanced to Rupees ten lakhs. Thereafter, the charge sheet was
filed on 18.08.2019 against the appellant, the appellant’s son and
other family members.
7. Being aggrieved by the continuation of the criminal
proceedings, the appellant herein, who is the father-in-law of
respondent No.2, along with his son, who is the husband of
respondent No.2 and other family members, approached the High
Court by filing Misc. Criminal Case No.30559 of 2022 and Misc.
Criminal Case No.50062 of 2019 under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”), seeking quashing of FIR
No.58 of 2019 registered at Police Station Mahila Thana,
Jabalpur, and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom.
8. By common order dated 07.05.2024, the High Court partly
allowed the petitions. The High Court quashed the criminal
proceedings against the mother-in-law and sister-in-law of
respondent No.2 in Misc. Criminal Case No.50062 of 2019 on the
ground that the allegations levelled against them were general in
nature and lacked specific attribution of any overt act. However,
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the High Court refused to quash the criminal proceedings
pending against the appellant and the appellant’s son in Misc.
Criminal Case No.30559 of 2022. The High Court observed that
the FIR contained specific allegations against the appellant and
his son, including a demand for dowry and an incident where the
appellant allegedly slapped respondent No.2 at the railway
station. It is in these circumstances that the appellant herein has
preferred the present appeal.
9. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned
counsel for the respondent No.1-State and perused FIR No. 58 of
2019 dated 21.07.2019 and other material on record. Respondent
No.2 has chosen not to appear before this Court.
10. During the course of the hearing, it was brought to the
notice of this Court that a decree of divorce had been granted
between the appellant’s son and respondent No.2 by the Family
Court at Bhubaneswar, by judgment and decree dated
24.08.2021.
11. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
appellant’s son had instituted a petition for divorce against
respondent No.2 on 20.06.2019. It was submitted that the filing
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of FIR No.58 of 2019, dated 21.07.2019, by respondent No.2 was
nothing but a counterblast, intended to pressurise the appellant’s
son and his family, and constituted an abuse of the process of
law. Drawing our attention to the nature of allegations, it was
submitted that respondent No.2 had alleged that the appellant
demanded a sum of Rs.5 lakhs by way of dowry and had slapped
her on 02.06.2019. However, no complaint or grievance was
raised immediately thereafter. The FIR, it was pointed out, came
to be lodged only after respondent No.2 received summons in the
divorce proceedings. Learned counsel further contended that if
such an incident had in fact occurred on 02.06.2019, respondent
No.2 would have raised it during the counselling session held at
the Mahila Police Station, Jabalpur, where both parties were
present. It was urged that the absence of any such complaint at
the relevant time renders the allegation baseless and motivated.
12. It was further submitted that the criminal proceedings have
been initiated by respondent No.2 solely with the intent to extort
money from appellant’s son, who is stated to have paid
substantial sums both prior to and after the marriage. Learned
counsel also drew our attention to the fact that the High Court,
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by the very same impugned order, had quashed the proceedings
as against the mother-in-law and sister-in-law of respondent
No.2, yet declined to extend similar relief to the appellant, who
stands on an identical footing, being the father-in-law. It was,
therefore urged that the present case merited quashing of the
FIR, and that the impugned order dated 07.05.2024 be set aside.
A prayer was accordingly made for quashing the criminal
proceedings arising out of FIR No.58 of 2019 dated 21.07.2019,
insofar as they relate to the appellant.
13. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1-
State opposed the prayer for quashing and submitted that the FIR
contains specific and detailed allegations not only against the
appellant but also against his son. It was submitted that the
appellant is alleged to have demanded a sum of Rs.5 lakhs
towards dowry at the time of marriage, along with other items,
including gold ornaments and a motor vehicle. The said demand
is further alleged to have been subsequently increased to Rs.10
lakhs. Learned counsel further submitted that the FIR contains
allegations of physical assault and wrongful confinement of the
complainant and that her mobile phone was allegedly taken away
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by appellant’s son, thereby preventing her from contacting her
family.
14. It was next submitted that specific incident is alleged to
have taken place at Jabalpur Railway Station, wherein the
appellant is said to have slapped the complainant and issued
threats. Pursuant thereto, a complaint was lodged at the Mahila
Thana, Jabalpur, and counselling proceedings were initiated.
Although a temporary settlement is stated to have been arrived at
during the said counselling, it is alleged that the demands and
harassment continued even thereafter.
15. Reliance was placed on the statements of five witnesses cited
in the chargesheet, including two brothers of the complainant-
respondent No.2 herein, who are stated to have supported the
allegations. The chargesheet was filed on 18.08.2019, and the
matter remains pending before the Court of the Judicial
Magistrate First Class at Jabalpur, though further proceedings
have been stayed by order dated 02.05.2025 passed by this
Court. It was submitted that the High Court, upon due
consideration of the material on record, rightly declined to quash
the proceedings as against the appellant and his son, while
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granting relief to the other co-accused in respect of whom no
specific role was attributed.
16. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and
upon perusal of the material placed on record, the only question
that arises for consideration is, whether, the allegations contained
in FIR No.58 of 2019 warrant quashing of the same having regard
to the facts and circumstances of the case.
17. In the present case, the allegations in FIR No.58 of 2019
pertain to offences punishable under Sections 498A and 34 of the
IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act. Section 498A of the
IPC relates to cruelty by the husband or his relatives, including
the father-in-law, against the wife. Section 34 concerns acts done
by several person in furtherance of common intention. The
provisions read as under:
“ 34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of
common intention.— When a criminal act is done by
several persons in furtherance of the common intention
of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the
same manner as if it were done by him alone.
xxx
498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
subjecting her to cruelty. —Whoever, being the husband
or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such
woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment
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for a term which may extend to three years and shall also
be liable to fine.
Explanation.—For the purpose of this section, “cruelty”
means—
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is
likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause
grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether
mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is
with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to
meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
security or is on account of failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such demand.”
18. Further, Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act talk about the
penalty for giving or taking or demanding a dowry.
“ Section 3. Penalty for giving or taking dowry.— (1) If
any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or
takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not
be less than five years, and with fine which shall not be
less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the
value of such dowry, whichever is more:
Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special
reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a
sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than five
years.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to, or in relation
to—
(a) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to
the bride without any demand having been made in that
behalf:
Page 10 of 23
Provided that such presents are entered in a list
maintained in accordance with the rules made under this
Act;
(b) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to
the bridegroom without any demand having been made in
that behalf:
Provided that such presents are entered in a list
maintained in accordance with the rules made under this
Act:
Provided further that where such presents are made by
or on behalf of the bride or any person related to the
bride, such presents are of a customary nature and the
value thereof is not excessive having regard to the
financial status of the person by whom, or on whose
behalf, such presents are given.
Section 4. Penalty for demanding dowry. —If any
person demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents
or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as
the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six
months, but which may extend to two years and with fine
which may extend to ten thousand rupees:
Provided that the court may, for adequate and special
reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a
sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six
months.”
19. Section 498A of the IPC prescribes punishment where a
woman is subjected to cruelty by her husband or his relatives.
The offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term which
may extend to three years and also provides for fine. The
Page 11 of 23
Explanation appended to the provision defines "cruelty" in two
parts. Clause (a) refers to wilful conduct which is of such a
nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to
cause grave injury or danger to her life, limb or health, whether
mental or physical. Clause (b) expands the scope of the term to
include harassment with a view to coercing the woman or her
relatives to meet any unlawful demand for property or valuable
security, or on account of failure to meet such demand.
20. Section 3 of the Dowry Act pertains to punishment for giving
or taking dowry. It prescribes a minimum sentence of five years
and imposes a fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand
rupees or the value of the dowry, whichever is higher.
21. Section 4 of the Dowry Act penalises the act of demanding
dowry. It provides that any person who, directly or indirectly,
demands dowry from the parents, relatives, or guardians of either
party to a marriage, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than six months but may extend to
two years, and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to ten
thousand rupees.
Page 12 of 23
22. A bare perusal of the FIR and the materials placed on record
reveals that the specific allegation against the appellant is that,
on 02.06.2019, he slapped the complainant at Jabalpur Railway
Station, reiterated a demand for dowry in the sum of Rs.5 lakhs,
and threatened to ruin her life. It is further alleged that the said
demand was later increased to Rs.10 lakhs. However, the FIR
came to be registered only on 21.07.2019. It appears to this Court
that the FIR lodged by respondent No.2 is highly belated and is
not free from doubt.
23. The complainant is stated to have left the matrimonial home
on 15.05.2019 and returned to her parental residence. Thereafter,
both parties were summoned to the Mahila Police Station,
Jabalpur, for counselling. Sessions were held on 26.05.2019 and
02.06.2019, attended by the appellant’s son and members of both
families. Notably, there is no material to indicate that any
allegation of physical assault or dowry demand by the appellant
was raised by the complainant during these sessions. On the
contrary, the record indicates that the counselling held on
02.06.2019 culminated in a mutual understanding that the
parties would remarry in accordance with Hindu rites within two
Page 13 of 23
months. This conduct is wholly irreconcilable with the allegations
that were subsequently made. FIR No.58 of 2019 came to be
lodged on 21.07.2019, nearly two months after the counselling
proceedings had concluded. In this FIR, allegations were levelled
not only against the husband but also against the appellant, the
mother-in-law, and the sister-in-law. It is alleged that the
appellant slapped the complainant in public at Jabalpur Railway
Station and reiterated the demand for dowry. However, no
explanation is forthcoming as to why such serious allegations
were not disclosed earlier, particularly when the parties were
engaged in conciliation. The complaint has been made
subsequent to the steps taken for filing a divorce petition by
respondent No.2’s husband.
24. It is not in dispute that the appellant’s son and respondent
No.2 have since parted ways pursuant to the decree of divorce
dated 24.08.2021 which has attained finality. Once the marital
relationship between the principal parties stands legally
dissolved, the continuation of criminal proceedings arising out of
the discord of that relationship serves little purpose. The
appellant before us is the father-in-law of respondent No.2. With
Page 14 of 23
the marriage of appellant’s son and respondent No.2 having come
to an end, the continuation of proceedings against the appellant
would neither advance the cause of justice nor serve any practical
purpose. On the contrary, it would only perpetuate hostility
between the parties who appear to have otherwise moved on with
their lives.
25. This Court, in Dara Lakshmi Narayana vs. State of
Telangana, (2025) 3 SCC 735 , has made it clear that family
members of the husband ought not to be unnecessarily roped into
criminal proceedings arising out of matrimonial discord. The
Court observed that it has become a recurring tendency to
implicate every member of the husband’s family, irrespective of
their role or actual involvement, merely because a dispute has
arisen between the spouses. It was further held that where the
allegations are bereft of specific particulars, and particularly
where the relatives sought to be prosecuted are residing
separately or have had no connection with the matrimonial home,
allowing the prosecution to proceed would amount to an abuse of
the process of law. The Court noted that criminal law is not to be
Page 15 of 23
deployed as an instrument of harassment, and that judicial
scrutiny must be exercised to guard against such misuse.
26. Furthermore, this Court has consistently taken the view that
where the matrimonial relationship has come to an end by way of
divorce, and the parties have since settled in their respective
lives, criminal prosecution emanating from that past relationship
ought not to be permitted to linger as a means of harassment. In
the cases of Mala Kar vs. State of Uttarakhand, Criminal
Appeal No.1684 of 2024 dated 19.03.2024 (“Mala Kar”) and
Arun Jain vs. State of NCT of Delhi , Special Leave Petition
(Criminal) No.9178 of 2018 dated 01.04.2024 (“Arun Jain”),
this Court, while exercising its powers under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India, quashed the criminal proceedings arising
out of matrimonial discord against the husband. The Court took
note of the fact that the couple therein had divorced and held that
in such a situation, to continue with criminal prosecution would
amount to abuse of the process of law. The reasoning adopted
therein applies with equal force to the facts of the present case.
Paragraph 12 of Mala Kar and the relevant paragraph in Arun
Jain are extracted respectively as under:
Page 16 of 23
“12. Following the aforesaid judgment, in the instant
case, we have already noted that there has been a decree
of divorce passed between the parties dated 18.10.2014.
It is thereafter that on 06.04.2015, the FIR was registered
in respect of the criminal complaint filed on 09.08.2014.
More significantly, both the appellant No.2 and
respondent No.2 have since remarried and are leading
their independent lives. Therefore, both parties have
accepted the decree of divorce passed by the Family
Court on 18.10.2014. Moreover, the appellant No.2-
former husband of the respondent No.2 has agreed to pay
a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) as ex-
gratia to the respondent No.2 herein in full and final
settlement of all her claims, with a prayer to this Court to
do complete justice in this matter and for invoking its
powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.”
xxx
“Following the aforesaid judgments, in the instant case, it
is noted that the appellants and respondent No.2 were
married on 01.11.1996 and a daughter was born to them
on 19.04.2001. It is also stated by learned counsel for the
appellants that appellant No.1 left the matrimonial home
on 23.04.2007 and thereafter respondent No.2 sought
divorce which was granted by the Competent Court on
04.04.2013. It was only thereafter on 31.10.2013 that
respondent No.2 filed the complaint against the
appellants herein and the FIR was registered on
13.02.2014 and the chargesheet was filed on 22.09.2015.
It is also to be noted that the proceedings initiated under
the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,
2005 in the year 2008 by respondent No.2 herein
culminated in the dismissal of the said proceeding on
merits by order dated 28.07.2017 which has attained
finality. Having regard to the aforesaid peculiar and
crucial aspects of the present case and by following the
order dated 19.03.2024, the appeal is liable to be allowed
as we find that this is a fit case where we can exercise
powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.”
Page 17 of 23
27. This Court, in the case of Ramawatar vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh, (2022) 13 SCC 635 , while considering quashing of
proceedings under Section 482 CrPC in the context of the
provisions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, took into consideration the
fact that there had been a settlement arrived at between the
parties in the said case and therefore, exercising jurisdiction
under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, quashed the
complaint and the FIR and the subsequent criminal proceedings
against the accused therein. The relevant portion of the said
judgment is at paragraph 15, which is extracted as under:
“15. The Constitution Bench decision in the case of
Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India & Anr.,
(1998) 4 SCC 409 has eloquently clarified this point as
follows:
“48. The Supreme Court in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 142 has the power to
make such order as is necessary for doing
complete justice “between the parties in any
cause or matter pending before it”. The very
nature of the power must lead the Court to set
limits for itself within which to exercise those
powers and ordinarily it cannot disregard a
statutory provision governing a subject, except
perhaps to balance the equities between the
conflicting claims of the litigating parties by
“ironing out the creases” in a cause or matter
before it. Indeed this Court is not a court of
restricted jurisdiction of only dispute-settling. It
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is well recognised and established that this Court
has always been a law-maker and its role travels
beyond merely dispute-settling. It is a “problem
solver in the nebulous areas” (see K. Veeraswami
v. Union of India) but the substantive statutory
provisions dealing with the subject matter of a
given case cannot be altogether ignored by this
Court, while making an order under Article 142.
Indeed, these constitutional powers cannot, in
any way, be controlled by any statutory
provisions but at the same time these powers are
not meant to be exercised when their exercise
may come directly in conflict with what has been
expressly provided for in a statute dealing
expressly with the subject.”
28. We now turn to the facts at hand as already noted as
under:
(i) the complainant and the appellant’s son have been
separated by a decree of divorce dated 24.08.2021, which
has attained finality and has not been assailed by either
side.
(ii) Both parties are stated to be leading their independent
lives.
(iii) The inevitability of separation has thus been accepted by
both sides.
In such a scenario, the continuation of criminal proceedings
against the appellant (father-in-law of the respondent No.2),
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which emanate solely from the erstwhile matrimonial relationship,
in our view, would serve no useful purpose. In our considered
view, further prosecution would only prolong bitterness and prove
counterproductive to the ends of justice.
29. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of M.P. vs.
Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688, observed in paragraph 15.5
thereof that while exercising power under Section 482 CrPC to
quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable
offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious
impact on society, on the ground that there is a
settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, it is
necessary to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct
of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and
why he was absconding, how he had managed with the
complainant to enter into a compromise, etc.
30. Applying the aforesaid to the present case, we find that the
appellant herein would not come within the scope of the aforesaid
observations by which the plea of the appellant for quashing of
the FIR and consequent proceedings against him could be
declined.
Page 20 of 23
31. We also refer to Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2012) 10
SCC 303 wherein this Court observed that where the High Court
quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the
dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled,
although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its
opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise
in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute
between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored,
securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. In
this regard, a specific reference was made to offences arising out
of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or a family
dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim but the
offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them
amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been
made compoundable. The High Court may, within the framework
of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal
complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such
settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being
convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice
shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated.
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32. In Naushey Ali vs. State of U.P., (2025) 4 SCC 78, one of
us (Viswanathan, J.) observed in paragraph 32 that proceeding
with the trial, when the parties have amicably resolved the
dispute, would be futile and the ends of justice require that the
settlement be given effect to by quashing the proceedings. It would
be a grave abuse of process particularly when the dispute is
settled and resolved.
33. In the considered opinion of this Court, the power under
Article 142 must be invoked to advance the cause of complete
justice in matters of this nature. Once the marital relationship
has ended in divorce and the parties have moved on with their
lives, the continuation of criminal proceedings against family
members, especially in the absence of specific and proximate
allegations, serves no legitimate purpose. It only prolongs
bitterness and burdens the criminal justice system with disputes
that are no longer live. The law must be applied in a manner that
balances the need to address genuine grievances with the equally
important duty to prevent its misuse. In appropriate cases, the
power to quash such proceedings is essential to uphold fairness
Page 22 of 23
and bring about a quietus to personal disputes that have run
their course. In this regard, we follow the abovesaid dicta.
34. Accordingly, in order to do complete justice between the
parties, this Court deems it appropriate to invoke its powers
under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. We, therefore, allow
the appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court dated
07.05.2024 in MCRC No.30559 of 2022 filed under Section 482
CrPC. The said petition filed under Section 482 CrPC stands
allowed. Consequently, FIR No.58 of 2019 registered at Mahila
Police Station, Jabalpur, dated 21.07.2019, under Sections 498A
and 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act, as well
as the charge sheet dated 18.08.2019 filed before the Court of the
Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jabalpur against the appellant
herein, are hereby quashed.
…….……………………………..J.
(B. V. NAGARATHNA)
.…………………………………..J.
(K.V. VISWANATHAN)
NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 12, 2025.
Page 23 of 23
NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.10817 of 2024)
MANGE RAM ...APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
& ANOTHER ...RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T
NAGARATHNA, J.
Leave granted.
2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the appellant is
the father-in-law of respondent No.2. In April 2017, respondent
No.2 came into contact with the appellant’s son through a
matrimonial website. What began as a digital acquaintance soon
developed into a personal relationship.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
RADHA SHARMA
Date: 2025.08.12
16:33:30 IST
Reason:
Page 1 of 23
3. The marriage between respondent No.2 and the appellant’s
son was solemnised on 23.12.2017 in accordance with the
provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. However, by April
2019, differences appear to have arisen between the couple. On
15.05.2019, respondent No.2 left the matrimonial home and
returned to her parental residence at Jabalpur. It is stated that
she informed her family of the mental and physical cruelty
allegedly meted out to her by her husband and his family
members.
4. Respondent No.2 approached the Mahila Police Station,
Jabalpur and pursuant to her complaint, both parties were called
for counselling. While the appellant’s son was to appear for the
first session of counselling which took place on 26.05.2019, he
was in fact present during the second session conducted on
02.06.2019. That session, which was also attended by members
of both families, culminated in an understanding that the
marriage would be solemnised again, this time through
customary Hindu rites, within two months.
Page 2 of 23
5. However, the accord reached did not last long. Disputes
appear to have resurfaced shortly thereafter. Respondent No.2
once again left the matrimonial home. On 21.07.2019, she lodged
First Information Report (“FIR”) No.58 of 2019 at Mahila Police
Station, Jabalpur, naming her husband i.e., the appellant’s son,
the appellant herein (her father-in-law), mother-in-law and sister-
in-law as accused under Sections 498A and 34 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 (“Dowry Act”). As per the contents of the
FIR, respondent No.2 alleged that soon after the counselling
sessions, fresh demands were made by the appellant and his wife,
including a sum of Rupees five lakhs in cash, gold ornaments, a
motor car, clothing, and other customary articles. It was further
alleged that they insisted upon the ceremonial Hindu marriage
being held at a respectable hotel.
6. While there was, at first, some indication of conciliation, the
situation deteriorated soon thereafter. The appellant is alleged to
have called respondent No.2 to Jabalpur Railway Station, where
he publicly admonished her, slapped her, and threatened to ruin
her life, expressing his displeasure at having been summoned to
Page 3 of 23
the police station. It is further alleged that he reiterated the dowry
demand, which, according to the complainant, was subsequently
enhanced to Rupees ten lakhs. Thereafter, the charge sheet was
filed on 18.08.2019 against the appellant, the appellant’s son and
other family members.
7. Being aggrieved by the continuation of the criminal
proceedings, the appellant herein, who is the father-in-law of
respondent No.2, along with his son, who is the husband of
respondent No.2 and other family members, approached the High
Court by filing Misc. Criminal Case No.30559 of 2022 and Misc.
Criminal Case No.50062 of 2019 under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”), seeking quashing of FIR
No.58 of 2019 registered at Police Station Mahila Thana,
Jabalpur, and all consequential proceedings arising therefrom.
8. By common order dated 07.05.2024, the High Court partly
allowed the petitions. The High Court quashed the criminal
proceedings against the mother-in-law and sister-in-law of
respondent No.2 in Misc. Criminal Case No.50062 of 2019 on the
ground that the allegations levelled against them were general in
nature and lacked specific attribution of any overt act. However,
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the High Court refused to quash the criminal proceedings
pending against the appellant and the appellant’s son in Misc.
Criminal Case No.30559 of 2022. The High Court observed that
the FIR contained specific allegations against the appellant and
his son, including a demand for dowry and an incident where the
appellant allegedly slapped respondent No.2 at the railway
station. It is in these circumstances that the appellant herein has
preferred the present appeal.
9. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned
counsel for the respondent No.1-State and perused FIR No. 58 of
2019 dated 21.07.2019 and other material on record. Respondent
No.2 has chosen not to appear before this Court.
10. During the course of the hearing, it was brought to the
notice of this Court that a decree of divorce had been granted
between the appellant’s son and respondent No.2 by the Family
Court at Bhubaneswar, by judgment and decree dated
24.08.2021.
11. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
appellant’s son had instituted a petition for divorce against
respondent No.2 on 20.06.2019. It was submitted that the filing
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of FIR No.58 of 2019, dated 21.07.2019, by respondent No.2 was
nothing but a counterblast, intended to pressurise the appellant’s
son and his family, and constituted an abuse of the process of
law. Drawing our attention to the nature of allegations, it was
submitted that respondent No.2 had alleged that the appellant
demanded a sum of Rs.5 lakhs by way of dowry and had slapped
her on 02.06.2019. However, no complaint or grievance was
raised immediately thereafter. The FIR, it was pointed out, came
to be lodged only after respondent No.2 received summons in the
divorce proceedings. Learned counsel further contended that if
such an incident had in fact occurred on 02.06.2019, respondent
No.2 would have raised it during the counselling session held at
the Mahila Police Station, Jabalpur, where both parties were
present. It was urged that the absence of any such complaint at
the relevant time renders the allegation baseless and motivated.
12. It was further submitted that the criminal proceedings have
been initiated by respondent No.2 solely with the intent to extort
money from appellant’s son, who is stated to have paid
substantial sums both prior to and after the marriage. Learned
counsel also drew our attention to the fact that the High Court,
Page 6 of 23
by the very same impugned order, had quashed the proceedings
as against the mother-in-law and sister-in-law of respondent
No.2, yet declined to extend similar relief to the appellant, who
stands on an identical footing, being the father-in-law. It was,
therefore urged that the present case merited quashing of the
FIR, and that the impugned order dated 07.05.2024 be set aside.
A prayer was accordingly made for quashing the criminal
proceedings arising out of FIR No.58 of 2019 dated 21.07.2019,
insofar as they relate to the appellant.
13. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1-
State opposed the prayer for quashing and submitted that the FIR
contains specific and detailed allegations not only against the
appellant but also against his son. It was submitted that the
appellant is alleged to have demanded a sum of Rs.5 lakhs
towards dowry at the time of marriage, along with other items,
including gold ornaments and a motor vehicle. The said demand
is further alleged to have been subsequently increased to Rs.10
lakhs. Learned counsel further submitted that the FIR contains
allegations of physical assault and wrongful confinement of the
complainant and that her mobile phone was allegedly taken away
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by appellant’s son, thereby preventing her from contacting her
family.
14. It was next submitted that specific incident is alleged to
have taken place at Jabalpur Railway Station, wherein the
appellant is said to have slapped the complainant and issued
threats. Pursuant thereto, a complaint was lodged at the Mahila
Thana, Jabalpur, and counselling proceedings were initiated.
Although a temporary settlement is stated to have been arrived at
during the said counselling, it is alleged that the demands and
harassment continued even thereafter.
15. Reliance was placed on the statements of five witnesses cited
in the chargesheet, including two brothers of the complainant-
respondent No.2 herein, who are stated to have supported the
allegations. The chargesheet was filed on 18.08.2019, and the
matter remains pending before the Court of the Judicial
Magistrate First Class at Jabalpur, though further proceedings
have been stayed by order dated 02.05.2025 passed by this
Court. It was submitted that the High Court, upon due
consideration of the material on record, rightly declined to quash
the proceedings as against the appellant and his son, while
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granting relief to the other co-accused in respect of whom no
specific role was attributed.
16. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and
upon perusal of the material placed on record, the only question
that arises for consideration is, whether, the allegations contained
in FIR No.58 of 2019 warrant quashing of the same having regard
to the facts and circumstances of the case.
17. In the present case, the allegations in FIR No.58 of 2019
pertain to offences punishable under Sections 498A and 34 of the
IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act. Section 498A of the
IPC relates to cruelty by the husband or his relatives, including
the father-in-law, against the wife. Section 34 concerns acts done
by several person in furtherance of common intention. The
provisions read as under:
“ 34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of
common intention.— When a criminal act is done by
several persons in furtherance of the common intention
of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the
same manner as if it were done by him alone.
xxx
498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman
subjecting her to cruelty. —Whoever, being the husband
or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such
woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment
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for a term which may extend to three years and shall also
be liable to fine.
Explanation.—For the purpose of this section, “cruelty”
means—
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is
likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause
grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether
mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is
with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to
meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
security or is on account of failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such demand.”
18. Further, Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act talk about the
penalty for giving or taking or demanding a dowry.
“ Section 3. Penalty for giving or taking dowry.— (1) If
any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or
takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not
be less than five years, and with fine which shall not be
less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the
value of such dowry, whichever is more:
Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special
reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a
sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than five
years.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to, or in relation
to—
(a) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to
the bride without any demand having been made in that
behalf:
Page 10 of 23
Provided that such presents are entered in a list
maintained in accordance with the rules made under this
Act;
(b) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to
the bridegroom without any demand having been made in
that behalf:
Provided that such presents are entered in a list
maintained in accordance with the rules made under this
Act:
Provided further that where such presents are made by
or on behalf of the bride or any person related to the
bride, such presents are of a customary nature and the
value thereof is not excessive having regard to the
financial status of the person by whom, or on whose
behalf, such presents are given.
Section 4. Penalty for demanding dowry. —If any
person demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents
or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as
the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six
months, but which may extend to two years and with fine
which may extend to ten thousand rupees:
Provided that the court may, for adequate and special
reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a
sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six
months.”
19. Section 498A of the IPC prescribes punishment where a
woman is subjected to cruelty by her husband or his relatives.
The offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term which
may extend to three years and also provides for fine. The
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Explanation appended to the provision defines "cruelty" in two
parts. Clause (a) refers to wilful conduct which is of such a
nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to
cause grave injury or danger to her life, limb or health, whether
mental or physical. Clause (b) expands the scope of the term to
include harassment with a view to coercing the woman or her
relatives to meet any unlawful demand for property or valuable
security, or on account of failure to meet such demand.
20. Section 3 of the Dowry Act pertains to punishment for giving
or taking dowry. It prescribes a minimum sentence of five years
and imposes a fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand
rupees or the value of the dowry, whichever is higher.
21. Section 4 of the Dowry Act penalises the act of demanding
dowry. It provides that any person who, directly or indirectly,
demands dowry from the parents, relatives, or guardians of either
party to a marriage, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than six months but may extend to
two years, and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to ten
thousand rupees.
Page 12 of 23
22. A bare perusal of the FIR and the materials placed on record
reveals that the specific allegation against the appellant is that,
on 02.06.2019, he slapped the complainant at Jabalpur Railway
Station, reiterated a demand for dowry in the sum of Rs.5 lakhs,
and threatened to ruin her life. It is further alleged that the said
demand was later increased to Rs.10 lakhs. However, the FIR
came to be registered only on 21.07.2019. It appears to this Court
that the FIR lodged by respondent No.2 is highly belated and is
not free from doubt.
23. The complainant is stated to have left the matrimonial home
on 15.05.2019 and returned to her parental residence. Thereafter,
both parties were summoned to the Mahila Police Station,
Jabalpur, for counselling. Sessions were held on 26.05.2019 and
02.06.2019, attended by the appellant’s son and members of both
families. Notably, there is no material to indicate that any
allegation of physical assault or dowry demand by the appellant
was raised by the complainant during these sessions. On the
contrary, the record indicates that the counselling held on
02.06.2019 culminated in a mutual understanding that the
parties would remarry in accordance with Hindu rites within two
Page 13 of 23
months. This conduct is wholly irreconcilable with the allegations
that were subsequently made. FIR No.58 of 2019 came to be
lodged on 21.07.2019, nearly two months after the counselling
proceedings had concluded. In this FIR, allegations were levelled
not only against the husband but also against the appellant, the
mother-in-law, and the sister-in-law. It is alleged that the
appellant slapped the complainant in public at Jabalpur Railway
Station and reiterated the demand for dowry. However, no
explanation is forthcoming as to why such serious allegations
were not disclosed earlier, particularly when the parties were
engaged in conciliation. The complaint has been made
subsequent to the steps taken for filing a divorce petition by
respondent No.2’s husband.
24. It is not in dispute that the appellant’s son and respondent
No.2 have since parted ways pursuant to the decree of divorce
dated 24.08.2021 which has attained finality. Once the marital
relationship between the principal parties stands legally
dissolved, the continuation of criminal proceedings arising out of
the discord of that relationship serves little purpose. The
appellant before us is the father-in-law of respondent No.2. With
Page 14 of 23
the marriage of appellant’s son and respondent No.2 having come
to an end, the continuation of proceedings against the appellant
would neither advance the cause of justice nor serve any practical
purpose. On the contrary, it would only perpetuate hostility
between the parties who appear to have otherwise moved on with
their lives.
25. This Court, in Dara Lakshmi Narayana vs. State of
Telangana, (2025) 3 SCC 735 , has made it clear that family
members of the husband ought not to be unnecessarily roped into
criminal proceedings arising out of matrimonial discord. The
Court observed that it has become a recurring tendency to
implicate every member of the husband’s family, irrespective of
their role or actual involvement, merely because a dispute has
arisen between the spouses. It was further held that where the
allegations are bereft of specific particulars, and particularly
where the relatives sought to be prosecuted are residing
separately or have had no connection with the matrimonial home,
allowing the prosecution to proceed would amount to an abuse of
the process of law. The Court noted that criminal law is not to be
Page 15 of 23
deployed as an instrument of harassment, and that judicial
scrutiny must be exercised to guard against such misuse.
26. Furthermore, this Court has consistently taken the view that
where the matrimonial relationship has come to an end by way of
divorce, and the parties have since settled in their respective
lives, criminal prosecution emanating from that past relationship
ought not to be permitted to linger as a means of harassment. In
the cases of Mala Kar vs. State of Uttarakhand, Criminal
Appeal No.1684 of 2024 dated 19.03.2024 (“Mala Kar”) and
Arun Jain vs. State of NCT of Delhi , Special Leave Petition
(Criminal) No.9178 of 2018 dated 01.04.2024 (“Arun Jain”),
this Court, while exercising its powers under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India, quashed the criminal proceedings arising
out of matrimonial discord against the husband. The Court took
note of the fact that the couple therein had divorced and held that
in such a situation, to continue with criminal prosecution would
amount to abuse of the process of law. The reasoning adopted
therein applies with equal force to the facts of the present case.
Paragraph 12 of Mala Kar and the relevant paragraph in Arun
Jain are extracted respectively as under:
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“12. Following the aforesaid judgment, in the instant
case, we have already noted that there has been a decree
of divorce passed between the parties dated 18.10.2014.
It is thereafter that on 06.04.2015, the FIR was registered
in respect of the criminal complaint filed on 09.08.2014.
More significantly, both the appellant No.2 and
respondent No.2 have since remarried and are leading
their independent lives. Therefore, both parties have
accepted the decree of divorce passed by the Family
Court on 18.10.2014. Moreover, the appellant No.2-
former husband of the respondent No.2 has agreed to pay
a sum of Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakhs only) as ex-
gratia to the respondent No.2 herein in full and final
settlement of all her claims, with a prayer to this Court to
do complete justice in this matter and for invoking its
powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.”
xxx
“Following the aforesaid judgments, in the instant case, it
is noted that the appellants and respondent No.2 were
married on 01.11.1996 and a daughter was born to them
on 19.04.2001. It is also stated by learned counsel for the
appellants that appellant No.1 left the matrimonial home
on 23.04.2007 and thereafter respondent No.2 sought
divorce which was granted by the Competent Court on
04.04.2013. It was only thereafter on 31.10.2013 that
respondent No.2 filed the complaint against the
appellants herein and the FIR was registered on
13.02.2014 and the chargesheet was filed on 22.09.2015.
It is also to be noted that the proceedings initiated under
the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,
2005 in the year 2008 by respondent No.2 herein
culminated in the dismissal of the said proceeding on
merits by order dated 28.07.2017 which has attained
finality. Having regard to the aforesaid peculiar and
crucial aspects of the present case and by following the
order dated 19.03.2024, the appeal is liable to be allowed
as we find that this is a fit case where we can exercise
powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.”
Page 17 of 23
27. This Court, in the case of Ramawatar vs. State of Madhya
Pradesh, (2022) 13 SCC 635 , while considering quashing of
proceedings under Section 482 CrPC in the context of the
provisions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, took into consideration the
fact that there had been a settlement arrived at between the
parties in the said case and therefore, exercising jurisdiction
under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, quashed the
complaint and the FIR and the subsequent criminal proceedings
against the accused therein. The relevant portion of the said
judgment is at paragraph 15, which is extracted as under:
“15. The Constitution Bench decision in the case of
Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India & Anr.,
(1998) 4 SCC 409 has eloquently clarified this point as
follows:
“48. The Supreme Court in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 142 has the power to
make such order as is necessary for doing
complete justice “between the parties in any
cause or matter pending before it”. The very
nature of the power must lead the Court to set
limits for itself within which to exercise those
powers and ordinarily it cannot disregard a
statutory provision governing a subject, except
perhaps to balance the equities between the
conflicting claims of the litigating parties by
“ironing out the creases” in a cause or matter
before it. Indeed this Court is not a court of
restricted jurisdiction of only dispute-settling. It
Page 18 of 23
is well recognised and established that this Court
has always been a law-maker and its role travels
beyond merely dispute-settling. It is a “problem
solver in the nebulous areas” (see K. Veeraswami
v. Union of India) but the substantive statutory
provisions dealing with the subject matter of a
given case cannot be altogether ignored by this
Court, while making an order under Article 142.
Indeed, these constitutional powers cannot, in
any way, be controlled by any statutory
provisions but at the same time these powers are
not meant to be exercised when their exercise
may come directly in conflict with what has been
expressly provided for in a statute dealing
expressly with the subject.”
28. We now turn to the facts at hand as already noted as
under:
(i) the complainant and the appellant’s son have been
separated by a decree of divorce dated 24.08.2021, which
has attained finality and has not been assailed by either
side.
(ii) Both parties are stated to be leading their independent
lives.
(iii) The inevitability of separation has thus been accepted by
both sides.
In such a scenario, the continuation of criminal proceedings
against the appellant (father-in-law of the respondent No.2),
Page 19 of 23
which emanate solely from the erstwhile matrimonial relationship,
in our view, would serve no useful purpose. In our considered
view, further prosecution would only prolong bitterness and prove
counterproductive to the ends of justice.
29. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of M.P. vs.
Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688, observed in paragraph 15.5
thereof that while exercising power under Section 482 CrPC to
quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable
offences, which are private in nature and do not have a serious
impact on society, on the ground that there is a
settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, it is
necessary to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conduct
of the accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding and
why he was absconding, how he had managed with the
complainant to enter into a compromise, etc.
30. Applying the aforesaid to the present case, we find that the
appellant herein would not come within the scope of the aforesaid
observations by which the plea of the appellant for quashing of
the FIR and consequent proceedings against him could be
declined.
Page 20 of 23
31. We also refer to Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab, (2012) 10
SCC 303 wherein this Court observed that where the High Court
quashes a criminal proceeding having regard to the fact that the
dispute between the offender and the victim has been settled,
although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its
opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise
in futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute
between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored,
securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding factor. In
this regard, a specific reference was made to offences arising out
of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or a family
dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim but the
offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them
amicably, irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been
made compoundable. The High Court may, within the framework
of its inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal
complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face of such
settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender being
convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice
shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated.
Page 21 of 23
32. In Naushey Ali vs. State of U.P., (2025) 4 SCC 78, one of
us (Viswanathan, J.) observed in paragraph 32 that proceeding
with the trial, when the parties have amicably resolved the
dispute, would be futile and the ends of justice require that the
settlement be given effect to by quashing the proceedings. It would
be a grave abuse of process particularly when the dispute is
settled and resolved.
33. In the considered opinion of this Court, the power under
Article 142 must be invoked to advance the cause of complete
justice in matters of this nature. Once the marital relationship
has ended in divorce and the parties have moved on with their
lives, the continuation of criminal proceedings against family
members, especially in the absence of specific and proximate
allegations, serves no legitimate purpose. It only prolongs
bitterness and burdens the criminal justice system with disputes
that are no longer live. The law must be applied in a manner that
balances the need to address genuine grievances with the equally
important duty to prevent its misuse. In appropriate cases, the
power to quash such proceedings is essential to uphold fairness
Page 22 of 23
and bring about a quietus to personal disputes that have run
their course. In this regard, we follow the abovesaid dicta.
34. Accordingly, in order to do complete justice between the
parties, this Court deems it appropriate to invoke its powers
under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. We, therefore, allow
the appeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court dated
07.05.2024 in MCRC No.30559 of 2022 filed under Section 482
CrPC. The said petition filed under Section 482 CrPC stands
allowed. Consequently, FIR No.58 of 2019 registered at Mahila
Police Station, Jabalpur, dated 21.07.2019, under Sections 498A
and 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act, as well
as the charge sheet dated 18.08.2019 filed before the Court of the
Judicial Magistrate First Class, Jabalpur against the appellant
herein, are hereby quashed.
…….……………………………..J.
(B. V. NAGARATHNA)
.…………………………………..J.
(K.V. VISWANATHAN)
NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 12, 2025.
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