Full Judgment Text
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 7
PETITIONER:
STATE OF TAMIL NADU & ORS. ETC.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
S. K. KRISHNAMURTHI, ETC. ETC.
DATE OF JUDGMENT18/01/1972
BENCH:
REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN
BENCH:
REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN
HEGDE, K.S.
PALEKAR, D.G.
CITATION:
1972 AIR 1126 1972 SCR (3) 104
1972 SCC (1) 492
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1980 SC1285 (48)
ACT:
Madras Educational Rules and Text-Book Committee Rules-
Nature of-Rights of Publishers of approved text-books-
Government, if estopped from changing text books.
HEADNOTE:
In furtherance of the policy of the appellant-State to
nationalise textbooks for schools, directions were issued to
District Collectors and Local Board authorities that they
should intimate publishers of the text-books which were
prescribed for the year 1969-70, that, after the end of the
school year they will no longer be prescribed. The
publishers challenged the validity of the directions. Th
High Court allowed the petitions on the ground that though
the Madras Educational Rules and the Text-Book Committee
Rules-under which lists of approved text-books are published
in the Gazette-are administrative instructions and are not
framed for the benefit of publishers, nonetheless, under
those rules, a publisher of text-books could proceed on the
basis that he ha,% an assurance that once his books had been
selected and prescribed as text-books, they will continue to
be prescribed for 3 years.
Allowing the appeal to this Court,
HELD : (1) The Rules are in the nature of Departmental
Instructions and do not confer any right on the publishers,
nor are they designed to safeguard the interest of
publishers. They are conceived in public interest and the
Government is at liberty to change the textbooks and delete
from and add to the list of approved text-books or even
prescribe books which are not in the list. Therefore, the
impugned directions have been issued by the Government in
exercise of the power,,. reserved to it by the Rules
themselves. [108C-E F-G ]
(2) There is no warrant for concluding that the Rules held
out any kind of representation or assurance to the
publishers, or that the Rules envisaged their participation
in the scheme and as such the Government was estopped from
resiling from the representation that the period of 3 years
will not be altered. [107D-F]
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 7
The selection of text books by the Text-Book- Committee does
not involve any assurance to the publishers that their text-
books will be prescribed. The selection only implied that
the books have been approved. It any of the schools
prescribed any of the approved text-books there is no
assurance as to the number of books that may be required.
The period during which a text book once prescribed is to
continue, is an injunction to the Managers of schools to
avoid hardship to failed candidates or to poor students
intending to buy second band books. It is not an assurance
to the publishers, because, the Managers can change the
text-books within the specified period with the approval of
the prescribed authority. [108 E-H:109 A-C]
State of Assam v. Ajit Kumar Sharma & Ors., [1965] 1 S.C.R..
890, followed.
105
Union of India v. M/s. Indo-Afghgan Agencies Lid., [1968] 2
S.C.R. 366, Sankaranarayanan, etc. v. State of Kerala,
[1971] 2 S.C.R. 361 and M/s. Narinder chand Hemraj & Ors.
v. Lt. Governor, Union Territory Himachal Pradesh & Ors.,
C.A. No. 1313/70 dt. 5-10-71, referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : C.A. No. 557 to 575 of 1971.
Appeals from the judgment and order dated September 3, 1970
of the Madras High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 768, 1465
and 1483 of 1970.
S. Govind Swaminadhan, Advocate-General for the State of
Tamil Nadu, S. Mohan and A. V. Rangam, for the appellants
(in all the appeals).
K. K. Venugopal and K. R. Nambiar, for the respondents (in
(C.A.S No. 557 to 559 and 561 to 575 of 1971).
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
P. Jaganmohan Reddy, J. 22 Writ Petitions were filed in
the High Court of Madras by publishers of text-books for
Government Schools, Distt. Board and Municipal Council
Schools challenging the directions of the Deputy Secretary
to Government Education Department, contained in his D.O.
letter No. 454582/ E5/69, Education, dated 12th August 1969,
addressed to District Collectors and Local Board authorities
that they should intimate to the publishers of the books
which are prescribed for the year 1969-70 that after the end
of the School year they will no longer be prescribed. A
Division Bench of the High Court allowed the Writ Petitions.
From this decision, 19 appeals are before us by certificate.
It appears that the Government of Tamil Nadu in furtherance
of its policy to nationalise text-books for schools, was
intending to publish them through the Tamil Nadu Text Books
Corporation pursuant to which it had issued the impugned
D.O. letter. The writ petitions which are the subject
matter of these appeals raise similar grounds and we will
adopt the averments in writ Petition No. 768/ 70 as being
typical of the other Writ Petitions. which course was also
adopted by the High Court.
The respondent in that appeal, alleged that the impugned
D.O. letter giving the aforesaid directions is illegal and
void as being contrary to the Madras Educational Rules and
the Text-Book Committee Rules made by the Governor of Tamil
Nadu in pursuance of the powers vasted under Article 162 of
the Constitution and affected respondent’s fundamental
rights under Article 19 (I) (g) of the Constitution inasmuch
as his business of publishing TextBooks has been seriously
jeopardised and has practically been brought to a stand-
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 7
stilt; that it is not open to the Government of Tamil Nadu
to act contrary to the general rules made under Article 162
of the Constitution-, that the policy of nationalisation of
the
-L864SupCI/72
106
text-books is itself illegal and void; that the principles
of natural justice have been violated in that under the
rules once textbooks have been approved and selected for the
schools and have been prescribed, they remained current for
three years, as such to cancel this continuance for the
remaining period without notice and without hearing would
result in heavy financial loss; and that as under Article
19(6) of the Constitution the trade carried out by the
private citizens can be restricted only in pursuance of a
law which enables the State to have a monopoly of that
trade, it will not be open to the State to set up a Text
Books Society to have a monopoly over the text-books trade
without the authority of law and an executive order
purporting to do this would be violative of Article 19 (1)
(f ) & (g) of the Constitution. It was further averred that
even if it is assumed that Article 19(6) does not apply to
their case, their fundamental rights cannot be restricted
only for the purpose of enabling a State, or the Corporation
owned or controlled by the State to carry on the particular
trade to the exclusion of private citizens. The- High Court
disposed of the Writ Petitions merely on the ground that
even though the Madras Education Rules like the Text Book
Committee rules have been issued in exercise of the
administrative powers vested in the Government, the
inhibition against change of selected text-books within a
period of three years is not for the purposes of
safeguarding the interest of the publishers but is
conceived in public interest, namely, that the institution
concerned should not be at liberty to change the books every
year which may involve hardships to the students.
Nonetheless it was of the view that a publisher of text-
books could proceed on the basis that he has some sort of
assurance that once his books have been selected and
prescribed as text-books, those books will remain to be so
prescribed for three years, on which expectation he may,
from a business point of view, have the requisite number of
text-books printed in advance or stock the same. It further
observed that the publisher can well say unless the rules
are changed, by no administrative instructions, the three
years’ period can be curtailed to his prejudice. On this
assumption it held that "if a representation is made to some
one of a particular state of affairs to continue over a time
and he acts on it and as a result, does something which has
cost him time and money the representator or the person who
induced the belief and expectation will not be at liberty to
go back upon his representation or holding out of
expectation and withdraw his stand to, the prejudice of the
one who has acted upon it". The petitioner was, therefore.
entitled to invoke this principle in his favour in the
instant case. The contention urged on behalf of the State
of Tamil Nadu that the rules being merely in the nature of
administrative instructions, do not have the force of law
and cannot be enforced in courts was negatived on two
grounds, firstly, that even as an administrative
instruction, if it has the force of representation which a
publisher
107
may well rely on and commit himself to a certain position,
it is not open to the authority to resile from it to his
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 7
prejudice and secondly, that the rules referred to are
obviously traceable to the executive power of the Government
under Article 162 of the Constitution and provide for the
procedure for registration of publishers, submission of
books by them for approval and their selection, which books
if approved and selected, are to be valid for a certain
duration. For these reasons the High Court observed that
"even as an administrative instruction when it is codified
in that form, it is bound to be followed", and therefore,
the executive cannot say that because they have the
administrative power they are entitled to use and invoke
such administrative power and act for the purpose of its
adoption in individual cases contrary to the generality and
tenor of the rules.
Before us it is submitted on behalf of the State of Tamil
Nadu by the learned Advocate General that the High Court
adopted two contradictory positions in that while holding
that the rules approving the text-books and prescribing them
for schools though administrative in character are not for
the benefit of the publisher nonetheless a representation is
said to have been made to then that once they are prescribed
they will not be changed for three years. There is in our
view no warrant for concluding that the Madras Education
Rules and the Text Book Committee Rules hold out any
representation or even an assurance to the publishers that
the books once prescribed will not be changed nor as
contended by the respondent’s advocate is there any
justification for the assumption that these rules envisage
the participation of the Publishers in the scheme and as
such the Government will be estopped from resiling from the
representation that the period will not be altered. The
Madras Education Rules though called rules are
administrative instructions for the guidance of the
Department. Rule 58 which deals with the text-books, states
that a consolidated list of text-books authorised by the
Government to be used under the several subjects is
published annually in the Fort St. George Gazette; that
Managers of schools are, at liberty to select from the
latest list such books as they may deem most suitable
provided that the text-books so selected shall not be
changed within three years of their introduction in any of
the schools except with the previous approval of the
District Education Officer in the case of boys’ schools and
the Inspectress in the case of girls’ schools. It further
states that no books (other than books for religious
instruction) not authorised by the Government shall be used
in any recognised school. The Government, however, reserve
to itself the right to forbid or to prescribe the use of any
book or books in the recognised schools. The rules relating
to Madras text-books Committee which were issued on November
26, 1965, set out the objects of the Committee, its
constitution, the general grounds on
1 08
which the books may be described as unsuitable, expression,
printing and get-up, registration of publishers, rules
relating to recognised schools, fees for scrutiny of books
submitted for approval of the text-book committee, etc. In
Rule 2", it is provided that any book approved for use in
recognised schools as text-book shall retain its approval
for five years and in Rule 30 it is provided that 11 text-
books used in recognised schools shall be selected only from
the approved list of text-books issued during the year
excepting books published by or on behalf of the Government.
It is also provided in Rule 32 that under the powers
delegated to him by the Government, the Director retains on
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 7
behalf of the Government the right to prescribe text-books
in a particular subject for use in recognised schools, even
though such books have not been approved by the text-book
committee. A perusal of these rules show that they are in
the nature of Departmental instructions and do not confer
any right on the publishers. Nor are they, as held by the
High Court, designed to safeguard the interests of the
publishers but are conceived in public interest. The
Government is at liberty to change those text-books or to
delete from or add to the list or even prescribe books which
are not in the list. When once it is accepted that those
instructions do not confer any right on nor create an
interest in the publishers but are conceived in the public
interest and the Government has full liberty in the matter
of approval as well as the power of control over the kind of
books that should be prescribed in the ,schools, the
publishers cannot say that once they are prescribed they
cannot be changed within the period for which they are
stated to be current. The period during which a Text-book
once prescribed is to continue is more an injunction to the
Managers of the schools than an assurance to the publishers
that they will not be changed because that power, even if it
is conferred by administrative rules made under Article 162,
which in our view they are not, empower the managers subject
to the approval of the authority concerned to change them
within the period specified therein or the Government to
forbid or prescribe the use of any book or books in the
recognised schools. The impugned letter in this case can,
therefore, be said to have been issued by the Government in
exercise of the power reserved to it under those very rules.
Even dehors these provisions the instructions do not extend
to the publishers any kind of representation or assurance.
The selection of any text-books by the Committee does not
confer any rights on the publishers that their text-books
will be prescribed. All that the selection implies is that
the books have been approved as fit and of the standard
which can be prescribed for respective classes in the
schools by their managers. There is no undertaking that
they will be prescribed. If any of the schools prescribe
the books in the approved list for their classes there is no
109
assurance or a holding out by them that a particular number
of books will be required. If the books that are printed
are, not sold the risk is that of the publishers. Nor can
the schools which have prescribed the book hold the
publishers responsible if they cannot at any time supply
sufficient number of books to cope with the needs of the
school. All that the instructions that a book prescribed
should not be changed for three years imply, as the High
Court rightly recognised, is to avoid any hardship to the
students. Students may fail and have to repeat the course
the next year, or those who are promoted may not afford new
books but might go in for second hand books used in the
previous years. These are some of the hardships that may be
sought to be avoided by requiring the books prescribed to be
current for three school years.
It is true that a representation can be made- to a person
either directly or indirectly if it was intended to be made
to him when it is brought to his notice. But that is not
the case here as it was in the Union of India & Ors v. M/s.
Indo-Afghan Agencies Ltd.(1), where under a scheme to
increase exports of woollen textiles, as an incentive it was
provided that an exporter will be granted certificates to
import raw materials of a total amount equal to 100% of the
f.o.b. value of his exports. The scheme was under the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 7
Imports (Control) Order 1955 made pursuant to section 3 of
the Imports and Exports (Control) Act 1947. Clause 10 of
the scheme provided that the Textile Commissioner could rant
an import certificate for a lesser amount if he is
satisfied, after holding an enquiry, that the declared value
of the goods exported is hi-her than the real value of the
goods. The Textile Commissioner collected evidence ex-parte
and acting upon the report of a Committee appointed by him,
passed orders reducing the import entitlement,-, of the
respondents without informing them or giving them an
opportunity to explain the materials on the basis of which
the said action was taken. This Court held that it could
not be assumed merely because the policy Is general in terms
and deals with the grant of licences for import of goods and
related matters, that it is statutory in character. But
even it is only executive or administrative in character,
courts have power in appropriate cases to compel performance
of the obligations imposed by the scheme upon the
Departmental authorities. On the terms of the scheme and
the facts of the case, the action of the Textile
Commissioner in reducing the "import entitlement" was
considered to be bad and struck down. This case was later
considered and explained in Sankaranarayanan, etc. etc. v.
The State of Kerala (2), and in ’an unreported decision in
M/s.
(1) [1968] 2 S.C.R. 366. (2) [1971] 2 S.C.R. 361.
110
Narinderchand Hemraj and Ors. V. Lt. Governor, Union
Territory, Himachal Pradesh & Ors.(1), to both of which one
of us (Hegde, J.) was a party. In the former case it was
pointed out that "there is no question of any representation
having been made by the Government which was acted upon to
their detriment by the appellants". In the later case one
of us, Hegde J, pointed out that in the Indo-Afghan
Agencies’ case "This Court did not hold that the Government
was not competent to change the scheme. If the scheme had
statutory force, it bound the Government as much as it bound
the exporters. In that event the% Court was competent to
compel the Government to act according to the scheme. If on
the other hand the scheme contained merely administrative
instructions then the Government having made the
representation referred to earlier, on the basis of which
the exporters had exported certain goods, the Government was
estopped from going back on the representation made by it".
The case which is more analogous to the one before us is The
State of Assam and Another v. Ajit Kumar Sharma and
Others(2) where a Constitution Bench of this Court which
considered the claim of the teacher of a private College
affiliated to the Gauhati University in Assam which received
grants-in-aid from the State on certain conditions set out
in the form of Rules held that the was not entitled to
maintain a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution. In that case Rule 7 of the Rules provided
that if a teacher stood for elections to the Legislature, he
should be on compulsory leave without pay from the date of
the filing of his nomination till the end of the next
academic session or till the termination of the term of
office to which he may be elected as the case may be. The
respondent who had recourse to this Rule had after obtaining
permission, stood as a candidate for Parliament and was
defeated. Thereafter, he rejoined his post but was informed
that he has been granted compulsory leave without pay till
the end of the academic session. It was against this
direction that he filed a Writ Petition challenging the
rules as being without legal, force and not binding on the
http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 7
Governing Body or the respondent, which contention was
negatived on the ground that the rules were merely
administrative instructions not having the force of the law
as statutory rules and govern matters between private
colleges and the Government. In any view of the matter, the
claim of the respondents that there was any representation
made to them or intended to be made is not justified. In
this view, the appeals are allowed but as some of the
contentions raised in the petitions have not been considered
by the High Court, the matter is remanded to it for disposal
according to law. There will be no order as to costs.
V.P.S. Appeals allowed.
(1) C.A. 1313/70 decided on 5-10-71.
(2) [1965] 1 S.C.R. 890.
111