Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
RAJATHA ENTERPRISES
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
S.K. SHARMA & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT03/02/1989
BENCH:
THOMMEN, T.K. (J)
BENCH:
THOMMEN, T.K. (J)
DUTT, M.M. (J)
CITATION:
1989 AIR 860 1989 SCR (1) 457
1989 SCC (2) 495 JT 1989 (1) 211
1989 SCALE (1)277
ACT:
Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976: ss. 342
& 505/Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961: s.
14"Construction of building in violation of statutory provi-
sions Compounding of deviation--Validity
of--Demolition--Whether called for.
Constitution of India: Articles 226, 32 & 14 Public
Interest Litigation--Construction of building in violation
of statutory provisions--Petitioner neither a resident in
the neighbourhood nor a person affected by
construction---Building not a source of danger either to
inmates or public--Quality of construction not under chal-
lenge---Held. public interest not prejudiced.
HELD:
The Government of Karnataka by a tender notification
dated 17 August, 1979 offered for lease Government land
measuring 6000 sq. It. in the city of Bangalore for con-
struction of a shopping complex-cumschool building on the
basis of a plan approved by the Government. The lessee had
to construct 15 class rooms each measuring 20’ X 15’ on the
second floor of the building and they had to be handed over
to the Government free of rent immediately upon construc-
tion. After the expiry of the lease period of 26 years, the
building with all its structures and fixtures was to vest in
the Government free of all encumbrances. By a corrigendum
issued pursuant to the tender notification, the area which
was to be leased out was corrected as 12166 sq. ft.
The appellant was granted lease of the said plot of land
the boundaries of which were described in the schedule to
the lease deed. On subsequent measurement the land within
the said boundaries was found to be 15517 sq.ft.
The appellant undertook to construct the Said shopping
complexcum-school on the basis of the licence granted by the
Municipal Corporation. While the construction was in
progress the respondent No. 1 questioned the legality of the
said licence in a public interest litigation by writ peti-
tion alleging violation of the Karnataka Municipal Corpora-
tions Act, 1976. Later, the Municipal Commissioner also
issued show
458
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cause notice to the appellant stating that the plan obtained
by them had violated the Zonal Regulations made under the
Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961. But after
going through their reply, the Commissioner by his letter
dated June 30, 1983 permitted them to proceed with the
construction. The High Court by its order dated July 18,
1986 partly allowed the writ petition and quashed the order
of the Commissioner, directing him to record findings on the
objections raised in the show cause notice.
The Commissioner in his order dated August 17, 1987
found that the appellant had not been guilty of any mis-
representation in his endeavour to obtain the permission of
the authorities. He further observed that it has been the
practice in the City Corporation not to insist upon a com-
mencement certificate from the planning authority for the
purpose of development and held that the absence of such a
certificate in the instant case did not violate the grant of
licence. However, he took measurements of the building and
by his order dated November 3, 1987 directed the appellant
to reduce the height of the building to 35’0" having a total
area of 30415 sq.ft. within thirty days failing which he
threatened to demolish the three upper floors of the build-
ing at the cost of the appellant. The building as it stood
then had six floors.
In an interlocutory application filed by the appellant
in the disposed of writ petition the High Court set aside
the Commissioner’s order requiring the appellant to demolish
the 4th floor. It also set aside the order of the Commis-
sioner to demolish the 5th floor but the Commissioner was
given liberty to take action for compounding the deviation
and till then restrained the appellant from occupying the
5th floor. The Commissioner’s order directing the appellant
to demolish the 6th floor was, however, confirmed.
In the special leave petition preferred by the petition-
er-respondent against that part of the order of the High
Court that went in favour of the appellant, it was contended
for him that the public interest was prejudiced in so far as
the building had been constructed contrary to the applicable
provisions of the Corporations Act and the Planning Act,
that the leasehold comprised 12166 sq. ft. while the appel-
lant was in possession of 15517 sq. ft. which was clear
evidence of encroachment on the part of the appellant over
an area of 3351 sq. ft., that if the area of the site, i.e.
12166 sq. ft., is multiplied by 2.5, the permissible floor
area of the building comes to 30415 sq. ft., that the con-
structed area being 45974 sq. ft. there was an excess of
15559 sq. ft. which was far too great a deviation to be
allowed for compounding.
459
In the appeal by special leave assailing the order of the
High Court authorising demolition of the sixth floor, it was
contended for the appellant that the respondent was neither
a resident in the neighbourhood of the building nor was a
person affected by the construction of the building; that no
member of the public had come forward to say that his priva-
cy had been affected by the construction of the building or
the safety of the neighbourhood or of the inmates of the
building had been in any manner endangered, the respondent
therefore had neither any personal grievance to vindicate
nor any public cause to espouse in challenging the validity
of the licence granted; that the actual area demised to them
was the total extent of the land comprised within the speci-
fied "boundaries, that is, 15517 sq. ft. and that was the
area utilised for construction, that in calculating the
floor area ratio in respect of floors 3 to 6 the Corporation
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failed to exclude the floor area meant for common use, that
when the floor area is so computed the total floor area
would not be 45974 sq. ft., as alleged but only 41014 sq.
ft., that the appellant derived no right under the lease in
respect of an area of 4500 sq. ft. on the second floor uti-
lised exclusively for the Government Girls’ School,the
possession and enjoyment of which had vested in the Govern-
ment immediately upon the completion of construction of that
space, and that the Commissioner having held that the ab-
sence of a commencement certificate did not violate the
grant of licence for the purpose intended,it could not be
said that the construction of the building was in violation
of the licence granted.
Allowing the appeal and dismissing the special leave peti-
tion,
HELD: 1. There is no material whatsoever on the record
to suggest that the appellant has at any time acted fraudu-
lently or dishonestly, or that the building has in any
manner become a source of danger either to its inmates or to
the neighbouring public. The quality of the construction of
the building was also not under any challenge. It could not,
therefore, be said that the public interest was prejudiced
in any manner whatsoever. [463B-D]
2. The tender notification mentioned an area of 6000
sq.ft., whereas the corrigendum issued by the Commissioner
stated that the extent of the land under lease was 12166
sq.ft. On subsequent measurement the land within the bound-
aries mentioned in the schedule to the lease-deed was found
to be 15517 sq.ft. in extent. [465C]
This shows that the appellant was put into possession of
an area of 15517 sq.ft. by the State Government in terms of
the lease deed. It could
460
not. therefore, be said that there was any encroachment on
the part of the appellant. [465D]
3. The total site area being 15517 sq.ft., and the
permissible FAR in relation to the site area being 38792 sq.
ft., as against the determined area of 45974 odd sq. ft.,
the excess FAR is only 7182 sq.ft. When an area of 4500 sq.
ft. occupied by the school is excluded from the excess area
by reason of the school having vested in the Government upon
the completion of the building, the actual excess area in
the possession and enjoyment of the appellant is only 2682
sq.ft. The permissible limit of compounding being 5 per cent
of the permissible FAR, which works out to 1940 sq.ft., the
actual area of deviation outside the permissible compounding
limit is not larger than 742 sq.ft. [467H; 468A-C]
4. On the facts found and, in the light of what the
Commissioner says about the practice of the Corporation in
regard to the commencement certificate there was neither
justice nor equity in the High Court authorising the demoli-
tion of the sixth floor. [468C; 467H]
5. In the absence of any evidence of public safety being
in any manner endangered or the public or a section of the
public being in any manner inconvenienced by reason of the
construction of the building, whatever may be the grievance
of the Ist respondent, the High Court was not justified, at
the instance of the Ist respondent claiming himself to be
the champion of the public cause, in ordering the demolish-
ing of any part of the building, particularly when there is
no evidence whatsoever of dishonesty or fraud or negligence
on the part of the builder. [468C-D]
Ramsharan Autyanuprasi & Anr. v. Union of India, [1988]
2 SCALE 1399 and Sachidanand Pandey & Anr. v. State of West
Bengal & Ors., [1987] 2 SCC 295, relied on.
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The impugned order of the High Court in so far as it
permits or directs the demolition of the sixth floor is,
therefore, set aside. The rest of the order of the High
Court is affirmed. [468E]
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 634 of
1989 Etc.
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.3.1988 of the
Karnataka High Court in W.P. No. 15996 of 1981 and I.A. No.
XIII.
T.S. Krishnamurthy lyer, Dr. Y.S. Chitale, A.K. Sen, H.B.
461
Datar, R. Ramachandran, R.B. Datar, Ranjit Kumar, N.D.B.
Raju, N. Nettar, M. Veerappa, and S.S. Javali for the ap-
pearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
THOMMEN, J. Special leave is granted in Special Leave
Petition (Civil) No. 5275 of 1988 and we now proceed to
dispose of the appeal.
This appeal arises from the judgment and order dated
25th March, 1988 of the Karnataka High Court in Writ Peti-
tion No. 15996 of 1981 filed by the Ist respondent who
claims to espouse a public cause in what is styled as a
public interest litigation.
The appellant, Rajatha Enterprises represented by K.V.
Shivakumar is a contractor in whose favour, pursuant to
tender notification dated 17.8.1979, a lease was granted by
the Karnataka Government in terms of lease deed dated
22.12.1979 whereby the appellant undertook to construct at 8
12/1, Old Taluk Kutchery Road, Chickpet, Bangalore City a
shopping complex-cum-school on the basis of a licence grant-
ed by the Corporation of the City of Bangalore (the ’Corpo-
ration’). The appellant commenced the construction of the
building. The legality of the licence was questioned by the
Ist respondent, S.K. Sharma in the Karnataka High Court in
Writ Petition No. 15996 of 1981 alleging that the licence
was granted in violation of the provisions of the Karnataka
Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 (the ’Corporations Act’).
On 1.3. 1983 the Commissioner of the Corporation issued a
show cause notice stating that the plan obtained by the
appellant violated the Zonal Regulations made under the
Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, 1961 (the ’Planning
Act’). The appellant denied the allegations by his reply
dated 24.3.1983. On receipt of that reply, the Commissioner
made the following order dated 30.6.1983:
"After going through your reply cited at S1. No. 2 above,
you are permitted to proceed with the construction directly
in accordance with the sanctioned plan."
The High Court by its order dated 18.7.1986 partly allowed
the writ petition of S.K. Sharma and quashed the order of
the Commissioner of the Corporation dated 30.6.1983. The
Court further directed the Commissioner to record his find-
ings on the objections raised in the show cause notice dated
1.3.1983.
462
Thereafter, Special Leave Petition (C) No. 1122 of 1986
was filed in this Court by the appellant challenging the
judgment of the High Court. During the pendency of that
petition the Commissioner took measurements of the building
and made orders dated 17.8.1987, 21.8. 1987 and 3.11.1987.
The appellant was directed to reduce that height of the
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building to 350" having a total floor area of 30,415 sq. ft.
within 30 days from the date of receipt of the order dated
3. 11. 1987, failing which the Corporation threatened to
demolish the three upper floors of the building at the cost
of the appellant. The appellant was also directed to provide
space for car parking. In the light of the orders of the
Commissioner, this Court left open the questions raised by
the appellant in the special leave petition and disposed of
the same with freedom to it to file a writ petition or
interlocutory application in the High Court to question the
correctness of the order of the Commissioner.
The appellant accordingly approached the High Court by
filing IA No. XIII in the disposed of Writ Petition No.
15996 of 198 1. That petition was disposed of by the High
Court by its impugned order dated 25.3. 1988. The High Court
accepted some of the contentions of the appellant and re-
jected certain other contentions. The High Court set aside
the Commissioner’s order requiring the appellant to demolish
the 4th floor of the building. The High Court also set aside
the order of the Commissioner to demolish the 5th floor of
the appellant’s building but the Commissioner was given
liberty to take action for compounding the deviation indi-
cated by the Court. Until the deviation was so compounded,
the appellant was restrained from occupying the 5th floor of
the building. The Commissioner’s order directing the appel-
lant to demolish the 6th floor was, however, confirmed by
the High Court and it held that the Corporation should
proceed to demolish the 6th floor and recover the cost of
demolition from the appellant if the appellant failed to
demolish that floor as directed by the Commissioner. The
appellant was further directed to reserve the basement floor
of the building exclusively for car parking.
Aggrieved by the order of the High Court authorising and
directing the demolition of the 6th floor, the appellant has
approached this Court by special leave in the present pro-
ceedings under Article 136 of the Constitution. The Ist
respondent in this appeal, S.K. Sharma who was the petition-
er before the High Court, has sought leave of this Court in
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 5562 of 1988 to challenge
the order of the High Court dated 25.3.1988 insofar as it
has set aside the order of the Commissioner ordering the
demolition of the 4th and
463
5th floors of the building and given liberty to the Commis-
sioner to compound the deviation in respect of the 5th
floor.
S.K. Sharma challenges the permission granted to the
appellant to construct the building. He contends that the
public interest is prejudiced insofar as the building has
been constructed contrary to the applicable provisions of
the Corporations Act and the Planning Act. It may, however,
be stated at this stage that no contention has been urged
before us as regards the safety of the building consequent
upon the alleged violation of the statutory provisions. It
is not suggested that the appellant has acted fraudulently
or dishonestly. In fact, the Commissioner categorically
finds in his order dated 17.8.1987 that the appellant has
not been guilty of any misrepresentation in his endeavour to
obtain the permission of the authorities. There is no mate-
rial whatsoever to suggest that the appellant has at any
time acted dishonestly or that the building has in any
manner become a source of danger either to its inmates or to
the neighbouring public. The quality of the construction of
the building is not under any challenge whatsoever.
We shall now refer to certain facts relating to the
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construction of the building.
Offers were invited by the Deputy Commissioner, Banga-
lore District for lease,of Government land measuring 6000
sq. ft. within the boundaries specified in the tender no-
tice. The object of the lease was construction of a shopping
complex-cum-school building on the basis of a plan approved
by the Government. On the 2nd floor of the building the
lessee had to construct 15 class rooms each measuring 20 f.
X 15 f. and they had to be handed over to the Government
free of rent immediately upon construction. These class
rooms were meant for running a Government Girls’ School.
After the expiry of the lease period, the building with all
its structures and fixtures would vest in the Government
free of all encumbrances. The lessee had to construct the
building on the land in question within a period of two
years or within a further period of one year as extended by
the Government. By a corrigendum issued pursuant to the
tender notification, the area which was to be leased out was
corrected as 12166 sq. ft. instead of the notified area of
6000 sq. ft. The boundaries were specified in the tender
notification as well as in the corrigendum. On the North of
the land in question runs the D.K. Lane and on the South the
O.T.C. Road. On the West of the land is Vidyavathi’s Kapur-
chand Building. On the East runs the D.K. Lane. The bound-
aries are thus clear and
464
well-specified. The lease deed was executed on the 22nd day
of December, 1979 describing the boundaries in the Schedule
to the deed and stating the demised area as comprising 12
166 sq. ft. The appellant, the lessee, was permitted by the
Government, the lessor, to erect the building and structures
in accordance with the plan submitted by the appellant along
with the tender. The lease was for a period of 26 years.
The lease deed reads:
"Clause 24--The Lessee should construct in the
2nd floor, fifteen class rooms, each measuring
20 feet x 15 feet, with necessary sanitary
arrangements, which should be handed over to
Government, free of rent immediately on con-
struction, for running Girls’ School."
"Clause 25--After expiry of the lease period
fixed, all structures, including electrical,
water and sanitary fittings in the building so
constructed and all other structures and
fixtures pertaining thereto shall vest in
State Government, free from all encumbrances."
However, the explanatory statement filed by the Commis-
sioner in the High Court shows that, on actual measurement,
the area within the boundaries described in the lease deed
was found to comprise 15517 sq .ft.
The building as it now stands has 6 floors, apart from
the basement comprising 4570 sq.ft. which is reserved for
car parking. In paragraph 5 of the impugned order of the
High Court, the total area, excluding the basement, is
stated as follows:
(i) Ground floor 8779.52 sq. ft.
(ii) First Floor 8285.95 sq. ft.
(iii) Second floor 8800.03 sq. ft.
(iv) Third floor 5027.15 sq. ft.
(v) Fourth floor 5027.15 sq. ft.
(vi) Fifth floor 5027.15 sq. ft.
(vii) Sixth floor 5027.15 sq. ft.
Total: 45974.10 sq. ft.
The 2nd floor having an area of 8800.03 sq. ft. houses
the school in an area of 4500 sq. ft. This school, as stipu-
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lated in the lease, became
465
vested in the Government immediately upon its construction.
The rest of the building remains in the possession and
enjoyment of the appellant for the period of the lease,
which is 26 years, upon the expiry of which it would vest in
the Government. The appellant has thus possession and enjoy-
ment of the building only in respect of the total area
excluding 4500 sq. ft.
Counsel for the first respondent contends that the
leasehold comprises 12 166 sq. ft. while the appellant is in
possession of 155 17 sq. ft. This, Counsel points out, is
clear evidence of encroachment on the part of the appellant
over an area of 335 1 sq. ft. We see no merit in this con-
tention. As stated above, the tender notification mentioned
an area of 6000 sq. ft., whereas the corrigendum issued by
the Commissioner stated that the extent of the land under
lease was 12166 sq. ft. On subsequent measurement, the land
within the boundaries mentioned in the Schedule to the lease
deed was found to be 15517 sq. ft. in extent. This shows
that the appellant was put into possession of an area of 155
17 sq. ft. by the Government of Karnataka in terms of the
lease deed. The entire property together with the structures
standing thereon will have to be duly handed over by the
appellant to the Government in terms of the lease upon its
expiry.
The 1st respondent’s Counsel, however, points out that,
as found by the High Court, the total floor area of the
building is 45974 sq. ft. while the permissible area should
not exceed 2.5 times the total area of the site. The area of
the site, as mentioned in the lease deed, is only 12166 sq.
ft. That, if multiplied by 2.5, comes to 30415 sq. ft. The
constructed area being 45974 sq. ft., there is an excess of
15559 sq .ft. It is far too great a deviation for compound-
ing and the High Court was wrong in ordering the compounding
of such a major deviation.
The appellant’s Counsel, Shri T.S. Krishnamurthy Iyer,
on the other hand, submits that the actual area demised to
the appellant is the total extent of the land comprised
within the specified boundaries. Although the area, as
mentioned in the lease deed, is 12166 sq. ft. the actual
area, as determined on further verification, is not less
than 155 17 sq. ft., and that is the area that is utilised
by the appellant for the construction of the building. The
approved plan on the basis of which construction was com-
pleted by the appellant must be understood as a plan for the
utilisation of the total area of 155 17 sq. ft. This is
clear from the explanatory statement filed by the Commis-
sioner in the High Court. With reference to this area, the
constructed area, according to the Commissioner, Counsel
points out, is 10198 sq. ft. which works out to 65.72 per
cent coverage.
466
Shri lyer further points out that in calculating the
Floor Area Ratio (FAR) in respect of floors 3 to 6, the
Corporation failed to exclude the common passages comprising
1260 sq. ft. in each floor. Zonal Regulations of 1972 pro-
vide that in calculating the floor areas, the areas covered
by the staircase, lift rooms and water tanks etc. should be
excluded. This means, Counsel says, the floor areas meant
for common use or for providing services to the occupants of
the building and not meant for habitation or commercial
purpose should be left out of the computation of the Floor
Area Ratio. When the floor area is so computed, Counsel
submits, the total floor area would not be 45974.10 sq. ft.,
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as determined by the authorities, but only 41014 sq. ft. So
computed, the excess floor area would be negligible and is,
therefore, compoundable.
Assuming the total area of all the seven floors, includ-
ing the ground floor, is 45974.10 sq. ft., as found by the
authorities, the FAR permissible with reference to the site
area of 155 17 sq. ft., according to Shri Iyer, works out to
38792 sq. ft. There can be no doubt about the site area as
on measurement it is found to be 155 17 sq. ft. comprised in
the specified boundaries. This being the position, the
excess area is 7182 sq. ft. It is on this basis that the
High Court prohibited the demolition of any floor other than
the 6th floor, but the High Court failed to notice, Counsel
points out, that 4500 sq. ft. on the 2nd floor is utilised
exclusively for the Government Girls’ School the possession
and enjoyment of which vested in the Government immediately
upon the completion of construction of that space. The
appellant thus derived no right under the lease in respect
of an area of 4500 sq. ft. Neither possession nor enjoyment
which are the attributes of a lease vested in the appellant
at any material time and at all material times they vested
in the Government. The High Court failed to take note of the
fact that what is constructed is a shopping complex-cum-
school building and what is demised to the appellant is only
the shopping complex and not the school area. Furthermore,
Counsel says, Section 342 of the Corporations Act grants
exemption from the requirement of any licence or permission
in respect of any place in the occupation or under the
control of the Central Government or State Government or in
respect of any property of the Central Government or State
Government. That the land in question is the property of the
State Government Counsel says, is not in doubt. That 4500
sq. ft. of the area on the 2nd floor is a place in the
occupation and control of the State Government is also
absolutely clear from the terms of the lease. Accordingly,
Counsel says, Section 342 exempts the area covered by the
School from the requirements of any licence.
467
Referring to the criticism of the 1st respondent’s
Counsel as regards the failure on the part of the appellant
to obtain the written permission of the Planning Authority
in terms of Section 14 of the Planning Act, 1961 read with
Section 505 of the Corporation Act, Shri Iyer refers to the
order of the Commissioner dated 17.8. 1987 stating:
"It has been the practice in the Bangalore
City Corporation that no such commencement
certificate is insisted upon from the planning
authority for the purpose of "development"
only ................................. As
permission for running a school in the pro-
posed building was already accorded by Govern-
ment and as the land is located in the commer-
cial zone, it was not necessary to obtain
clearance from the planning authority for
change of land use.
Considering these facts, I hold that
the absence of a Commencement Certificate from
the B.D.A. does not violate the grant of
licence for the purpose intended and it will
not amount to contravention of the provisions
of Section 505 of the KMC Act, 1976."
Considering these aspects, Shri Iyer submits that there
is no merit in the contention that the construction of the
building by the appellant was in violation of the licence
granted or that the licence under which construction was
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undertaken was contrary to statutory provisions or other
orders. The public is in no manner aggrieved by the con-
struction of the building. No member of the public has come
forward to say that his privacy has been affected by the
construction of the building or the safety of the neighbour-
hood or of the inmates of the building has been in any
manner endangered. The 1st respondent. Counsel says, is
neither a resident in the neighbourhood of the building nor
is he a person affected by the construction of the building.
He has neither any personal grievance to vindicate nor any
public cause to espouse in challenging the validity of the
licence granted to the appellant.
We have perused the records and considered the arguments
on both sides. We are not satisfied that, on the facts and
in the circumstances of this case, the learned Judges of the
Division Bench of the High Court were justified in permit-
ting and much less directing the demolition of the 6th
floor. On the facts found, there is neither justice nor
equity in authorising the demolition. The total site area
being
468
155 17 sq. ft., as found by the High Court, and the permis-
sible FAR in relation to the site area being 38792 sq. ft.,
as against the determined area of 45974 odd sq. ft., the
excess FAR is only 7182 sq. ft. When an area of 4500 sq. ft.
occupied by the school is excluded from the excess area of
7182 sq. ft. by reason of the school having vested in the
Government upon the completion of the building, the actual
excess area in the possession and enjoyment of the appellant
is only 2682 sq. ft. The permissible limit of compounding
being 5 per cent of the permissible FAR, which works out to
1940 sq. ft., the actual area of deviation outside the
permissible compounding limit seems to be not larger than
742 sq. ft. In the circumstances, in the light of what the
Commissioner says about the practice of the Corporation in
regard to the commencement certificate and in the absence of
any evidence of public safety being in any manner endangered
or the public or a section of the public being in any manner
inconvenienced by reason of the construction of the build-
ing, whatever may be the personal grievance of the Ist
respondent, the High Court was not justified, at the in-
stance of the Ist respondent claiming himself to be a cham-
pion of the public cause, in ordering the demolition of any
part of the building, particularly when there is no evidence
whatsoever of dishonesty or fraud or negligence on the part
of the builder. See the principle stated by Sabyasachi
Mukharji, J. in Ramsharan Autyanuprasi & Anr. v. Union of
India, [1988] 2 SCALE 1399 and by Khalid J. in Sachidanand
Pandey & Anr. v. State of West Bengal & Ors., [1987] 2 SCC
295. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned order of the
High Court insofar as it permits or directs the demolition
of the 6th floor and affirm the rest of the order. The
appeal is allowed in the above terms. We make no order as to
costs.
SLP (C) No. 5562 of 1988
For the reasons aforesaid, the Special Leave Petition
(Civil) No. 5562 of 1988 filed by S.K. Sharma is dismissed.
P.S.S. Appeal allowed & Petition
dismissed.
469