Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 3453 of 2002
PETITIONER:
JINDAL STRIPE LTD. AND ORS.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 26/09/2003
BENCH:
RUMA PAL & P. VENKATRAMA REDDY
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
2003 Supp(4) SCR 154
The following Order of the Court was delivered : Leave granted in special
leave petitions.
In this batch of appeals, the constitutional validity of the Haryana Local
Area Development Tax Act, 2000 has been challenged primarily on two
grounds, first: that the Act is violative of Article 301 of the
Constitution and is not saved by Article 304 and second: that the Act in
fact seeks to levy sales tax on inter-state sales, which is outside the
competence of the State Legislature.
After we had been addressed at length on the first of these issues by both
sides, we were of the view, and the counsel for the appearing parties also
submitted, that the question needed to be referred to a larger Bench under
Article 145(3) of the Constitution. Arguments on the second issue were,
therefore, not concluded and will be necessary only if the first issue is
decided against the appellants.
The factual background in which the issues are raised is briefly stated.
The appellants are all industries or associations of industries
manufacturing their products within the State of Haryana. The raw material
for their respective products is purchased from outside the State. Most of
the finished products are sent to other states on stock transfer or on
consignment basis. It is the admitted position that sales tax both on the
’import of the raw material and on the ’export’ of finished products is not
payable nor paid by the appellants to the State of Haryana.
The Act came into force w.e.f. 5th May 2000 "to provide for levy and
collection of tax on the entry of goods into the local areas of the State
of Haryana for consumption for use therein and matters incidental thereto
and connected therewith". In 2001 the Preamble has been amended. The object
of the Act now reads "to provide for levy and collection of tax on the
entry into a local area of the State of Haryana, of a motor vehicle for use
or sale, and of other goods for use or consumption, therein and matters
incidental thereto and connected therewith". We do not consider it
appropriate to discuss the various provisions of the Act which have been
analyzed by the parties before us but only highlight the aspects of the Act
which, in our opinion, are relevant for the purpose of this reference under
Article 145(3).
The Act seeks to impose entry tax on all goods brought into a "local area".
The phrase ’local area’ has been defined in Section 2(14) of the Act as
meaning :
"an area within the limits of a Municipal corporation established under the
Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 (Haryana Act 16 of 1994), or a
municipality established under the Haryana Municipal Act, 1973 (Haryana Act
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24 of 1973), or a Town Board or a Cantonment Board established under the
Cantonment Act, 1924 (Central Act 2 of 1924), or a Zila Parishad
established under the Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 (Haryana Act No. 11
of 1994), or any other local authority constituted or continued under any
law for the time being in force".
The entire State is divided into local areas. The Act ostensibly covers not
only vehicles bringing goods into the state but also vehicles carrying
goods from one local area to another. However, those who pay sales tax to
the State are exempted from payment of the entry tax. Ultimately the entry
tax only falls on concerns like the appellants which, by virtue of the
provisions of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, pay sales tax on the
purchase of raw material and sale of finished goods to other States and do
not pay sales tax to the State of Haryana. Under section 22 of the Haryana
Act, "The tax collected under this Act shall be distributed by the State
Government amongst the local bodies to be utilised for the development of
local areas". This, shortly put, is the context in which the challenge to
the Act under Article 301 has been made.
Article 301 of the Constitution which guarantees freedom of trade, commerce
and intercourse says :
"Subject to the other provisions of this Part, trade, commerce and
intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free".
In Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd v. State of Assam. [1996] 1 SCR 809. it was held
that taxing laws are not excluded from the operation of Article 301; which
means that tax laws can and do amount to restrictions on the freedoms
guaranteed to trade under Part XIII of the Constitution. However the
prohibition of restrictions on free trade is not an absolute one. Statutes
restrictive of trade can avoid invalidation if they comply with Article 304
(a) or (b) In Atiabari Tea it is was held that only such taxes as directly
and immediately restrict trade would fail within the purview of Article
301 and that, any restriction in the form of taxes imposed on the carriage
of goods or their movement by the State Legislature can only be done after
satisfying the requirements of Article 304(b). The Statute which was
challenged in Atiabari Tea was the Assam Taxation (on goods carried by
Roads and Inland Waterways) Act, 1954. It was held that the Act had put a
direct restriction on the freedom of trade and since the State Legislature
had not complied with the provisions of Article 304(b), it was declared
void Similarly, the Act which is impugned before us imposes a restriction
on trade and would fall foul of Article 301, particularly when the
provisions of Article 304(b) have not been adhered to.
However, an exception to Article 301 and its operation was judicially
crafted in Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan,
[1962] 1 SCR 491. The challenge in that case was to the Rajasthan Motor
Vehicles Taxation Act, 1951. The challenge under Article 301 was rejected
by the Constitution Bench by holding that "the taxes are compensatory taxes
which instead of hindering trade, commerce and intercourse facilitate them
by providing and maintaining the roads". The following observation at
paragraph 21 of the report also merit attention :
"If a statute fixes a charge for a convenience or service provided by State
or an agency of the State and imposes it upon those who choose to avail
themselves of the service or convenience, the freedom of trade and commerce
may well be considered unimpaired."
Art 304(a) impose on goods imported from other States [or the Union
territories] any tax to which similar goods manufactured or produced in
that State are subject, so. however, as not to discriminate between goods
so imported and goods so manufactured or produced, and b) impose such
reasonable restrictions on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse
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with or within that State as may be required in the public interest :
Thus the concept of "compensatory taxes’" was propounded. Therefore taxes
which would otherwise interfere with the unfettered freedoms under Article
301 will be protected from the vice of unconstitutionality if they are
compensatory. The question therefore is. is the Act impugned in the present
case compensatory?
In Automobile Transport, it was said :
".....a working test for deciding whether a tax is compensatory or not is
to enquire whether the trades people are having the use of certain
facilities for the better conduct of their business and pining no! patently
much more than what is required for providing the facilites. "
(Emphasis added)
Right from 1962 upto 1995, this working test was applied by this Court only
in relation to Motor Vehicles Taxes for deciding Whether it was
compensatory or not. The decisions proceeded on the principle adumbrated m
Automobile Transport which Was paraphrased by Mathew, J speaking for a
Bench of three Judges in G. K. Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1975] 1
SCC 375 that "the very idea of compensatory tax is service more or less
commensurate with the tax levied". As the operation of motor vehicles has
direct relation to the use of roads/bridges, the statistics relating to
receipts and expenditure for constructing road and bridges for some years
were considered in each case in order to judge whether the tax was not
patently more than what was required to provide the facility, and
therefore compensatory. [See : Shaik Madar Saheb & Ors. v. The State of
Adhra Pradesh. [1972] 4 SCC 635; Bolani Ores Ltd v. State of Orissa, [1974]
2 SCC 777; G.K. Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1975] 1,SCC 375; M/s.
International Tourist Corporation y, Stale of Haryana, [1981] 2 SCC 318;
Malwa Bus Service (P) Ltd. v. Stale of Punjab, [1983] 3 SCC 237; Mrs.
Meenakshi v. State of Karnataka, AIR (1983) SC 1283; B. A. Jayaram v.
Union of India [1984] 1 SCC 168 and State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar
Balkrishna Badiya,[l988]4 SCC 290.
The only case cited at the bar dealing with tax other than motor vehicles
tax during the aforementioned period is the case of Kamalit Singh v.
Municipal Board, [1986] 4 SCC 174. In that case the toll tax levied under
the U.P. Municipalities Act on vehicles and other conveyances entering the
Municipal limits was tested from the standpoint of Article 301. It was held
that the tax cannot be treated to be compensatory tax for the reason that
the Municipal Board provided no facilities whatever to the owners of
vehicles like State carriages making use of national highway in question.
The following propositions are deducible from these cases :
1) The essence of article 301 is a right of free movement of trade without
any obstructions by way of barriers - inter-state or intra-state or
impediments operating as such barriers. Taxes which have a direct impact on
the flow of trade and commerce constitute a violation of Article 301 unless
the legislation is brought within the scope of Article 304(b).
2) The tax levied upon the entry of goods into a local area for the
purpose of use, consumption or sale therein has a direct effect on the
movement of goods and therefore it can be saved only if the levy is in the
nature of compensatory tax for the use of trading facilities or it comes
under the protective umbrella of Article 304.
3) So long as a tax remains compensatory or regulatory, it cannot operate
as a hindrance to trade. Regulatory measures or compensatory taxes imposed
to provide facilities and services to traders do not affect the freedom
contemplated by Article 301 and such measure/taxes need not comply with the
requirements of Article 304.
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4) Tax imposed for augmenting general revenues of the State such as Sales
Tax, is not compensatory. However, Motor Vehicles Tax is a typical instance
of compensatory tax because, in substance, it is a tax imposed for the use
of roads in the State and the tax enables the State to provide and maintain
roads.
5) It is of the essence of compensatory tax that the service rendered or
facility provided should be more or less commensurate with the tax levied.
6) A tax does not cease to be compensatory in nature merely because the
precise or specific amount collected is not actually used in providing the
facilities. However, the existence of a specific, identifiable object
behind the levy and a nexus between the subject and the object of the levy
is necessary to uphold a regulatory and compensatory tax.
7) The expenditure for providing the facilities may be met from other
sources.
8) The actual user of the facility pay the tradesmen who are subject to the
tax is immaterial.
Apart from these principles, the appellants have urged additional grounds
for holding that the impugned Act is not compensatory. It has been
submitted that (1) A taxation measure which seeks to impose tax only on a
section or a class of traders and exclude substantial section of the
traders cannot be called compensatory tax. Uniformity in the incidence of
taxation so as to bring all the traders who use the facility within the net
of taxation is an essential attribute of compensatory tax, (2) Tax imposed
on ad valorem basis can never be compensatory tax, and (3) if an amenity or
service is already taxed under other laws, the tax in question cannot be
regarded as compensatory.
Another question of importance which needs an answer to decide the
controversy in the case on hand is whether the compensatory nature of tax
should be self-evident from the taxing law itself or could it be judged
from the manner in which the tax revenue is utilized in course of time?
In 1995, some of the principles set out supra appear to have been deviated
from when the principle of compensatory tax was applied to entry tax in
Bhagat Ram v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, [1995] 1 SCC 673 which was decided
by a Bench of three Judges.
In Bhagat Ram v. Commissioner of Sales Tax (supra), the subject matter of
challenge was the M.P. Sthaniya Kshetra Me Mal Ke Pravesh Par Kar
Adhiniyam, (1976). In that case, although it was demonstrated by the
appellant-State and not disputed by the respondents that the levy was
compensatory nevertheless the court went on to say :
"The submission of Shri Ashok Sen, learned senior counsel that compensation
is that which facilitates the trade only does not appear to be sound. The
concept of compensatory nature of tax has been widened and if there is
substantial or even some link between the tax and the facilities extended
to such dealers directly or indirectly the levy cannot be impugned as
invalid. The stand of the State that the revenue earned is being made over
to the local bodies to compensate them for the loss caused, makes the
impost compensatory in nature, as augmentation of their finance would
enable them to provide municipal services more efficiently, which would
help or ease free flow of trade and commerce, because of which the impost
has to be regarded as compensatory in nature, in view of what has been
stated in the aforesaid decisions, more particularly in Hansa Corpn. Case."
The reference to State of Karnataka v. Hansa Corporation, [1980] 1 SCC 697
by the Court was inapposite. In Hansa’s case although the challenge was to
the levy of entry tax, the issue whether the tax was compensatory in nature
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was expressly left open. This is what the Court had said :
"The State did not attempt in the High Court to sustain the validity of the
impugned tax law on the submission that it was compensatory in character.
No attempt was made to establish that the dealers in scheduled goods in a
local area would be availing of municipal services and municipal services
can be efficiently rendered if the municipality charged with a duty to
render services has enough and adequate funds and that the impugned tax was
a measure for compensating the municipalities for the loss of revenue or
for augmenting its finances. As such a stand was not taken, it is not
necessary for us to examine whether the tax is compensatory in character "
In fact the impugned Act was saved because Article 304 had been complied
with. It was for that reason alone that the Act could not be struck down on
the ground that it was violative of Article 301. We find nothing in Hansa
Corpn. ’s case which seems to support the proposition enunciated in the
passage quoted above.
The dicta in Bhagat Ram’s case (supra) was relied on by a Bench of two
Judges in the case of State of Bihar v. Bihar Chamber of Commerce, [1966] 9
SCC 136 which reiterated the position that "some-connection" between the
tax and the trading facilities is sufficient to characterize it as
compensatory tax. The Court went further and took judicial notice of the
fact that the State provides several facilities to the trade such as laying
and maintenance of roads, waterways, markets etc.. and on this premise,
held that the entry tax was compensatory in nature. The learned Judges did
not consider it necessary to insist on the State coming forward with the
details of facilities provided to the traders and the expenditure incurred
or incurrable thereafter. Even though the Act was upheld on an independent
ground i.e. compliance with Article 304(b), nevertheless the
characterization of the Act impugned in that case as compensatory and the
reasoning adopted for that conclusion cannot be brushed aside as mere
obiter dicta.
It is contended by the appellants, with considerable force, that if the
concept of compensatory tax has to be understood in the manner in which it
has been viewed by the Court in the decisions of Bhagat Ram and Bihar
Chamber of Commerce, there will be no practical distinction between a tax
raised for general revenue purposes and a compensatory tax meant for the
specific purpose of providing facilities or services to the persons
subjected to the tax. All State revenues are presumably expended or at
least are expendible only for the welfare of the nation or the State as a
whole. This may result in a general economic upliftment and the betterment
of all facets of life including ultimately and in an indirect sense the
trading community. The approach in the two decisions noted does away with
the difference between taxes in general and compensatory taxes. If that is
the law then any tax could pass the test of compensatory tax judged from
the standard applied. Then no tax can impinge on the freedom ordained by
Article 301, a result which, it is pointed out, would go counter to the
Court’s decision in Atiabari Tea and the long line of authorities referred
to earlier starting with the Automobile Transport case.
In the present case, Section 22 which we have quoted earlier, says that the
tax shall be given to local bodies for utilization for the development of
local areas. There is nothing in Section 22 to indicate that the
"development of local area" means development of roads or other trading
facilities. It is argued by the appellants that the tax levied on the
appellants could in fact be used purely for ’non trading facilities’ such
as setting up schools, hospitals, housing etc. No attempt has been made by
the respondents in any of the special appeals to produce figures to show a
nexus between the levy collected and any service or facility rendered or to
be rendered. But the High Court rejected the challenge to the Haryana Act
on the basis of the aforesaid observation in Bihar Chamber of Commerce.
To sum up : the pre-1995 decisions held that an exaction to reimburse/
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recompense the State the cost of an existing facility made available to the
traders or the cost of a specific facility planned to be provided to the
traders is compensatory tax and that it is implicit in such a levy that it
must, more or less, be commensurate with the cost of the service or
facility. The decisions emphasised that the imposition of tax must be with
the definite purpose of meeting the expenses on account of providing or
adding to the trading facilities either immediately or in future provided
the quantum of tax sought to be generated is based on a reasonable relation
to the actual or projected expenditure on the cost of the service or
facility.
The decisions in Bhagat Ram and Bihar Chamber of Commerce now say that even
if the purpose of imposition of the tax is not merely to confer a special
advantage on the traders but to benefit the public in general including the
traders, that levy can still be considered to be compensatory. According to
this view, an indirect or incidental benefit to traders by reason of
stepping up the developmental activities in various local areas of the
State can be legitimately brought within the concept of compensatory tax,
the nexus between the tax known as compensatory tax and trading facilities
not being necessarily either direct or specific.
Since the concept of compensatory tax has been judicially evolved as an
exception to the provisions of Article 301 and as the parameters of this
judicial concept are blurred particularly by reason of the decisions in
Bhagat Ram (supra) and Bihar Chamber of Commerce (supra). We are of the
view that the interpretation of Article 301 vis-a-vis compensatory tax
should be authoritatively laid down with certitude by the Constitution
Bench under Article 145(3).
In the circumstances let all these matters be placed before the Hon’ble
Chief Justice for appropriate directions.