Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
ION EXCHANGE (INDIA) LTD.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION OFINDFU & ORS
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 06/11/1998
BENCH:
S.P.BHARUCHA, K.VENKATASWAMI, A.P.MISRA,
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
BHARUCHA. J.
Leave granted.
The appellant manufactures water purifiers. It
issued advertisements staling that these water purifiers
provided lOO% safe drinking water instantly and that the
water stayed bacteria free in storage. An enquiry was
instituted by the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices
Commission at the behest of its Director General of
Investigation and Registration. A Notice of Enquiry- was
issued to the appellant. At the hearing thereof the
appellant did not contest the allegation made in the Notice
of Enquiry and expressed willingness on the very first date
of hearing before the Commission to submit tea Cease and
Desist Order, which was passed. What is objected to on
behalf of the appellant is this further direction of the
Commission : "If the respondent wants to issue an
advertisement in future about its product, it will get a
draft of its advertisement approved by the Commission. "
Impugning the power of the Commission to issue such
further direction, the appellant filed a writ petition in
the High Court at Bombay. The High Court considered the
provisions of Section 36-B of the Monopolies & Restrictive
Trade Practices Act as amended, and observed that the
impugned direction was given to subserve the object of
effectively checking repetition of the unfair trade practice
affecting a large number of people. The High Court modified
the impugned direction thus:
The Petitioner - manufacturer shall submit
the proposed draft advertisement to the
Director General along with the necessary
documents supporting or substantiating the
contents of the advertisement. If they do
not receive any objection from the
Director General within four weeks, the
Petitioner manufacturer shall be at
liberty to publish the said
advertisement."
The appellant is in appeal by special leave. It is
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submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that Section
36-B. as it read at the relevant time, clearly conferred no
power on the Commission to issue the impugned direction.
Even the amended Section 36-B, which really had no
application to the particular case, did not confer on the
Commission the power to give such direction. Emphasis was
laid on the tact that the direction, whether as issued by
the Commission or as amended by the High Court, would
operate for all time to come. It was also submitted that
the Commission had ample powers to deal with any infraction
of its Cease and Desist Orders. The learned Additional
Solicitor General, appearing for the respondents.
emphasized the amended provision upon which the High Court
had relied and submitted that there was power in the
Commission to Issue the impugned direction.
Section 36-D, as it originally stood,
read as follows :
"36-D(l) The Commission may inquire
into any unfair trade practice which may
come before it for inquiry and. if, after
such inquiry, it is of opinion that the
practice is prejudicial to the public
interest, or to the interest of the consumer
or consumers generally, it may, by order
direct that -
(a) the practice shall be discontinued or
shall not be repeated; and
(b) any agreement relating to such unfair
trade practice shall be void or shall stand
modified in respect thereof in such manner
as may be specified in the Order.
(2) The Commission may, instead of making
any order under this section, permit any
party to carry on any trade practice, if it
so applies and take such steps within the
time specified by the Commission as may be
necessary to ensure that the trade practice
is no longer prejudicial to the public
interest or to the interest of any consumer
or consumers generally, and, in any such
case, if the Commission is satisfied that
necessary steps have been taken within the
time so specified, it may decide not to make
any order under this section in respect of
that trade practice,
(3) No order shall be made under sub-section
(1) in respect of any trade practice which
is expressly authorised by any law for the
time being in force."
This is the provision which ruled at the relevant time.
There is, very clearly, no empowerment of the Commission
thereunder to issue a direction of the kind which is
impugned.
The amended provision, upon which the High Court
rested its order reads thus:
"(c) any information, statement or
advertisement relating to such unfair trade
practice, shall be disclosed , issued or
published, as the case may be, in such
manner as may be specified in the order."
The amended provision cannot be so read as enabling the
Commission to require all advertisements that the appellant
might issue in the future to be approved by the Commission
in advance. The requirement to disclose information relates
only to the unfair trade practice then under inquiry. As to
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public interest, the Commission is sufficiently armed under
the Act with powers to take action against those who breach
its Cease and Desist Orders. We do not think that it
requires the additional power of supervision of the kind
indicated either in the impugned direction of the Commission
or in the order under challenge to effectively carry out its
obligations. The Commission cannot incorporate such
direction in its final Cease and Desist Orders.
Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The judgment
and order of the High Court under appeal is set aside. The
writ petition filed by the appellants before the High Court
is allowed to the extent aforestated. No order as to costs.