Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
MALOJIRAO NARASINGHRAO SHITOLE
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
07/03/1969
BENCH:
MITTER, G.K.
BENCH:
MITTER, G.K.
HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ)
RAMASWAMI, V.
CITATION:
1969 AIR 953 1969 SCR (3) 901
1969 SCC (2) 723
ACT:
Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act 28 of 1951, s. 29-
Appeal to Board of Revenue-No provision in Act for exclusion
of time for obtaining copies or to condone delay S. 30 of
Act makining Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act Samwat
2007 applicable to proceedings under Act-Effect of ss. 34
and s. 149(2) of Ryotwari Act--Construction of s. 149(2)-
Applicability of s. 12 of Indian Limitation Act 1908.
HEADNOTE:
Section 29 of the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act 28
of 1951 provided for appeals against orders of the Jagir
Commissioner to the Board of Revenue. The appeal was to be
filed within 90 days of the communication of the decision to
the party concerned. The Act did not in terms contain any
provision for exclusion of time taken in obtaining copies or
for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. However
under s. 30 of the Act the procedure under the Ryotwari Land
Revenue and Tenancy Act, Samwat 2007 was made applicable to
the proceedings. Section 34 of the said Ryotwari Act
provided for extension and computation of the period of
limitation and s. 149(2) theredf was in the following terms
: "Excpt where it is otherwise provided" in the general
principles of law of Limitation for the time being in force
in the United State regarding extension of the principles of
limitation shall apply to claims made under this Act before
a Revenue officer".
The appellant was a Sardar and Jagirdar in the erstwhile
Gwalior State. His Jagir was resumed by the State on
December 4, 1952 under the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs
Act 1951. He received a memorandum from the Jagir
Commissioner on February 23, 1958 regarding the compensation
payable to him under s. 13 of the Act. On February 24, 1958
he applied to the Jagir Commissioner for a copy of the
judgment as the memorandum supplied to him did not show how
the compensation had been determined. The application was
returned to the appellant on March 11, 1958 with an
endorsement that the copy could be had on payment of fees.
The very next day the appellant complied with the demand and
a copy of a judgment was given to him on March 18, 1958.
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Tne appellant preferred his appeal to the Board of Revenue
on June 2, 1958 but the Board dismissed it as time barred
under s.29 of the Act. The High Court upheld the order of
the Board. In appeal to this Court,
HELD:The High Court was not right in upholding the
order of the Board of Revenue which ignored the provisions
of ss. 34 and 149(2) of the Ryotwari Act and the relevant
provisions of the Limitation Act. [907 B-C]
(i)Under s. 34 of the Ryotwari Act the Board must guide
itself by the provisions of the Limitation Act in force for
extension, and computation of the period of limitation. It
would appear that s. 149(2) was aimed at giving a similar
guide line to the Revenue Officer. To give the said
interpretation to s. 149(2) it is necessary to read
"extension of the principles of limitation" occurring
therein as "extension of the period of limitation" for
otherwise the section would be devoid of any meaning.
902
The word ’principles’ therein was inserted due to inept or
careless drafting and what was meant was ’period’ and not
’principles’. However, even if the statute is read as it
stands the principle of the Limitation Act is not only to
dismiss a suit, appeal or application if filed beyond time
but also to extend the time for filing an appeal if the
delay is explained. That principle was clearly capable of
extension in the present case. [905 D; 906 E]
(ii)The general principles of limitation are those
contained in the Limitation Act of 1908 which was in force
at the date when the present appeal was filed before the
Board of Revenue. Sections 3, 4, 5 and 29(2) of the
Limitation Act 1908 show that unless excluded by the Jagirs
Act or Ryotwari Act, s. 12 of the Limitation Act would be
applicable to appeals filed before the Board of Revenue
under any of those Acts. [905 E; 906 C]
(iii)In view of the applicability of ss. 34 and 149(2)
of the Ryotwari Act to the case, the time spent in obtaining
a copy of the judgment forming the basis or giving the
reasons of the decision should have been excluded in
computing the period of 90 days under s. 29 of the Jagirs
Act. The appellant was not guilty of any laches. If there
was any delay in filing the appeal the Board of Revenue
’should have considered whether in the circumstances of the
case the same should have been condoned. The Board did not
act judicially in throwing out the appeal. [906 F-907 B]
Brijrajsingh v. The Board of Revenue and Another, Misc.
Civil Case No. 22 of 1962 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court
decided on 18-3-63, referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 302 of 1966.
referred to.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order
dated November 13, 1962 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court,
Gwalior Bench in Misc. Civil Petition 64 of 1961.-
B.Sen, P. W. Sahasrabudhe, A. G. Ratnaparkhi and S. V.
Tambwekar, for the appellant.
I. N. Shroff, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Mitter, J. This is an appeal by special leave from an order
of the Madhya Pradesh High Court under Art. 227 of the Con-
stitution refusing to quash an order made by the Board of
Revenue of the State throwing out the appeal of the
appellant on the ground that it was barred by time.
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The facts are as follows. The appellant was a Sardar and a
Jagirdar in the former Gwalior State. His Jagir known as
Pohari Jagir was resumed by the State on December 4, 1952
under the Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, 28 of 1951.
He received a memorandum from the Jagir Commissioner on
February 23. 1958 regarding the compensation payable to him
under s. 13 of the Act in respect of the resumption of his
jagir. On February 24, 1958 he applied to the Jagir
Commissioner, for a copy of the
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judgment. The memorandum received by him gave the total
amount of compensation determined and the deductions to be
made therefrom. It did not contain the, data forming the
basis of the calculations nor did it show how the authority
disposed of the appellant’s claim to compensation and made
its own computation. At the hearing, a copy of the judgment
of the Jagir Commissioner running into twenty three pages
was handed up to us giving full details of the claim and
showing how the same were dealt with for fixing the amount
payable to the appellant.
It appears that the application of the appellant for a copy
of the judgment was returned to him on March 11, 1958 with
an endorsement that the same could be had on payment of
fees. On the very next day the appellant applied for a copy
of the judgment after paying the fees mentioned and a copy
of the judgment was given to him on March 18, 1958. The
appellant preferred his appeal to the Board of Revenue on
June 2, 1958. As already stated, the Board did not go into
the merits of the case holding the appeal to be barred by
time under the provisions of s. 29 of the Act.
It is necessary to note a few of the provisions of the
Madhya Bharat Abolition of Jagirs Act, 1951 (hereinafter
referred to as the ’Act’) to find out whether the appeal to
the Board of Revenue was out of time. Under s. 3 of the Act
the Government had to appoint a date for the resumption of
all, jagir lands in the State, as soon as may be, after the
commencement of the Act. The consequences of the resumption
of the jagir land are given in s. 4. By the operation of
that section the right, title and interest of every jagirdar
and of every other person claiming through him in his jagir
lands including forests, trees etc. whether being worked or
mot, were to stand resumed to the State free of all encum-
brances and certain other consequences were to follow.
Section 5 of the Act however enabled the Jagirdar to
continue to remain in possession of lands personlly
cultivated by him and of certain other items of property
mentioned in cl. (b) of the said section. Under s. 8 the
Government was to be liable to pay to every jagirdar whose
jagir land was resumed under s. 3 such compensation as would
be determined in accordance with the principles laid down in
Schedule 1. Under s. 12 every Jagirdar whose jagir land had
been resumed under s. 3 was to file in the prescribed form
within two months from the date of resumption, a statement
of claim for compensation before the Jagir Commissioner.
Sub-s. (2) of the section prescribed the particulars which
such statement of claim had to furnish. on receipt of a
statement of claim under s. 12 or if no statement was
received by him within the period fixed, it was the duty of
the Jagir Commissioner to determine (a) the amount of
compensation payable to the Jagirdar
904
under s. 8, (b) the amount recoverable from him under cl.
(e) of sub-S. (1) ’of s. 4, (c) the amounts of the annual
maintenance allowances payable to maintenance holders, if
any, under s. 9; (d) the amounts payable annually to-the
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Zamindars of the Jagirdar, if any under s. 10 and (e) the
amount payable to the cosharers of a Jagirdar, if any, under
s. 11. The section casts a duty on the Jagir Commissioner to
communicate his decision to the Government, the Jagirdar,
the maintenance holders, the co-sharers and the Zamindars,
if any, as soon as may be practicable. Under s. 29 the
Government or any person aggrieved by the decision of the
Jagir Commissioner under ss. 4, 10, 11, 13 or 14 had the
right to appeal to the Board of Revenue within 90 days from
the date of the communication of such decision to it or him
and the decision of the Board of Revenue was to be final.
From the above provisions of the Act, it is amply clear that
neither the Government nor the Jagirdar nor any person
aggrieved by the decision of the Jagir Commissioner under s.
13 can file an appeal to the Board of Revenue to any purpose
without a copy of the judgment showing how the decision
under s. 13 was arrived at. In this case, the memorandum of
compensation merely showed that a sum exceeding Rs. 17 lakhs
had been determined as the amount payable to the appellant.
The memorandum did not show how the same was computed or how
the clam for compensation preferred by the petitioner under
various heads was dealt with In order that an appeal may be
effective the appellant must be able to formulate his
grounds for challenging the judgment which has gone against
him.
The question therefore arises as to whether the time taken
in obtaining a copy of the judgment which forms the basis of
the decision in determining the compensation can be excluded
from the period of 90 days mentioned in s. 29 of the Jagirs
Abolition Act. There is no provision in the Act which
expressly empowers the Board of Revenue to entertain an
appeal filed beyond the period of 90 days from the date of
the communication of the decision under s. 13. Under s. 30
of the Act
"The Jagir Commissioner, or any other officer
conducting an enquiry under this Act, and the
Board of Revenue ’and the Collector hearing
appeals from the orders of the Jagir
Commissioner or the Tahsildar, as the case may
be, shall follow the procedure aapplicable to
proceedings under the Revenue Administration
and Ryotwari Land Revenue and Tenancy Act,
Samvat 2007, so far as may be and shall have
the same powers, in relation to proceedings
before them as a revenue officer has in
relation to original or appellate proceed-
90 5
ings, as the case may be, under the Act."
(hereinafter referred to as the Ryotwari Act).
Section 34 of the Ryotwari Act provides
"Subject to the provisions of the Limitation
Act in force for the time being regarding the
extension and computation of the period of
limitation :-
(1)no appeal to the Board shall be brought
after the expiry of ninety days from the date
of the decision or the order complained of;
(2).....................................
Section 149(2) of the Ryotwari Act provides
that
"Except where it is otherwise specially
provided the general principles of law of
Limitation for the time being in force in the
United State regarding extension of the
principles of limitation shall apply to claims
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made under this Act before a Revenue Officer."
It is clear from the language of s.34 that in hearing an
appeal under the Ryotwari Act the Board must guide itself by
the provisions of the Limitation Act in force for extension
and computation of the period of limitation. It would
appear that s. 149(2) was aimed at giving a similar guide
line to the Revenue Officer. To give the said
interpretation to s. 149(2) it is necessary to read "
extension of the principles of limitation" occurring therein
as "extension of the period of limitation" for otherwise the
section would be devoid of any meaning. The general
principles of limitation are those contained in the
Limitation Act of 1908 which were in force at the date when
the appeal was filed before the Board of Revenue. Section 3
of the Limitation Act, 1908 laid down that subject to the
provisions contained in ss. 4 to 25 (inclusive), every suit
instituted, appeal preferred, and application made, after
the period of limitation prescribed therefor by the First
Schedule was to be dismissed although limitation had not
been set up as a defence. Under s. 5 of the Limitation Act
of 1908 an appeal could be admitted after the period of
limitation prescribed therefor when the appellant satisfied
the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring or
making the application within such period. Under s. 29(2)
of the Limitation Act
"Where any special or local law prescribes for
any suit appeal or application a period of
limitation different from the period
prescribed therefor by the First Schedule, the
provisions of section 3 shall apply, as it
such period were prescribed therefor in that
Schedule and for the purpose of determining
any period of limitation
906
prescribed for any suit, appeal or application
by the special or local law--
(a)the provisions contained in section 4,
sections 9 to 18 and section 22 shall apply
only in so far as, and to the extent to which,
they are not expressly excluded by such
special or local law; and
(b)the remaining provisions of this Act
shall not apply."
These sections go to show that unless excluded by the Jagirs
Act or Ryotwari Act section 12 of the Limitation Act would
be applicable to appeals filed before the Board of Revenue
under any of those Acts.
It has been held by a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh
High Court in Brijrajsingh v. The Board of Revenue and
another(1) that the expression "principles of limitation" in
s. 149(2) mentioned above should be construed as extension
of the period of limitation. For the reasons given above,
we are in agreement with the said conclusion of the Madya
Pradesh High Court. In our view, the word ’principle’
therein was inserted due to inept or careless drafting and
what was meant was "period" and not principles’.
Even if we were to read the Statute as it is, the principle
of the Limitation Act is to dismiss a suit appeal or
application if filed beyond time but also to extend the time
for filing an appeal if the delay is explained. That
principle is clearly capable of extension in the present
case.
If sections 34 and 149(2) were applicable to the facts of
the case before the Board of Revenue and we hold to that
effect, the time spent in obtaining a copy of the judgment formi
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ng the basis or giving the reasons of the decision
should have been excluded in computing the period of 90 days
under s. 29 of the Jagirs Act. The appellant was not
guilty of any laches in his appeal to the Board of Revenue.
He applied for a copy of the judgment of the Jagir Com-
missioner on the day next after communication to him of the
order of the Jagir Commissioner. Even if the application
was unaccompanied by any fees prescribed for the purpose,
the Board of Revenue should have taken this fact into
consideration before holding the appellant’s appeal to be
out of time. If the application for the copy of the
judgment made on the 24th February was in order, the appeal
was in time. Even if the time taken in obtaining the copy
of the judgment be reckoned from the 12th March to 18th
March, 1958, the appellant was out by two days only in
filing the appeal to the Board of Revenue. If the 1st of
June 1958 which
(1) Misc. Civil Case No. 22/1962 decided on 18-3-63.
90 7
happened to be a Sunday be left out of consideration, the
appellant was out by one day only.
As appears from the order dated September 28, 1961 the Board
of Revenue refused to entertain the appeal on the ground of
limitation without considering the question as to whether
the appellant had made out a case for condonation of delay,
if any. In our view, the Board of Revenue had not acted
judicially in throwing out the appeal. The High Court was
therefore not right in upholding the order of the Board of
Revenue which ignored the provisions of ss. 34 and 149 (2)
of the Ryotwari Act and the relevant provisions of the
Limitation Act. A sounder view of the law was taken by
another Division Bench of the same High Court in
Brijrajsingh’s case(1) noted above.
For the reasons given the appeal is allowed, the order of
the Board of Revenue is quashed and the matter sent back to
the Board for disposal of the appeal according to law and in
the light of the observations made by us. The appellant
will have the costs of this appeal.
G.C. Appeal allowed.
(1) Misc. Civil case No. 22/1962 decided on 18-3-63.
908