The State Of West Bengal vs. Jai Hind P.Ltd.

2026 INSC 132
REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.7407 OF 2012
STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS. ...APPELLANT (S)

VERSUS
JAI HIND PVT. LTD. …RESPONDENT (S)
J U D G M E N T

NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH, J.

THE CHALLENGE

1. The present Civil Appeal has been preferred by the State of
West Bengal and Ors. (hereinafter referred to as “the
appellants”), being aggrieved by the impugned judgment
and order dated 17.05.2012, passed in WPLRT No. 43 of
2010 by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
ASHA SUNDRIYAL
Date: 2026.02.06
17:05:10 IST
Reason:
at Calcutta. The High Court, by the impugned judgment,
Page 1 of 68


allowed the writ petition preferred by Jai Hind Private
Limited, the respondent–company herein, and set aside the
judgment and order dated 31.03.2010 passed by the West
Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal (“the Tribunal”
for short), thereby allowing the respondent-company to
retain 211.21 acres of land.
2. By the said judgment, the High Court also upheld the
review order dated 07.05.2008 passed by the Block Land
and Land Reforms Officer (hereinafter referred to as “B.L. &
L.R.O.”), Bharatpur–II, Murshidabad, West Bengal, as well
as the Government Order dated 26.02.2008 issued by the
Principal Secretary, Land and Land Reforms Department,
Government of West Bengal. Consequently, the High Court
directed the concerned authorities, including the Revenue
Officer to accept land revenue and cess from the
respondent–company in respect of 211.21 acres of land
which it had been permitted to be retained pursuant to the
order dated 07.05.2008 passed by the B.L. & L.R.O.,
Bharatpur-II, Murshidabad under Sections 6(1)(j), 6(1)(a)
and 6(1)(e) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953
(“the WBEA Act, 1953”, for short) and Section 14Q(1) of the
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West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (“the WBLR Act,
1955” for short).
FACTUAL MATRIX

3. The dispute has arisen from the respondent–company’s
claim to retain certain lands under the provisions of the
WBEA Act, 1953, which was allowed by the High Court in
the impugned judgment. The facts in brief essential for
adjudication of the present appeal are that the respondent–
company, incorporated in the year 1946 under the
provisions of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, had 23
shareholders as on 01.01.1952. It had purchased about
205.57 acres of agricultural land in its own name prior to
01.01.1952 and, subsequent to the aforementioned date,
purchased an additional 34.14 acres of land, including
agricultural land, homestead, ponds, etc.
4. The WBEA Act, 1953, enacted by the State of West Bengal,
which came into effect from 12.02.1954, allowed the State
to acquire the estates, the rights of intermediaries therein
and certain rights of raiyats and under- raiyats . An
intermediary is defined under Section 2(i) of the
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aforementioned Act as a proprietor, tenure-holder, under-
tenure-holder or any other intermediary above a raiyat or a
non-agricultural tenant and includes a service tenure-
holder and, in relation to mines and minerals, includes a
lessee and a sub-lessee. Under Section 4 of the said Act,
the State Government may, by notification, declare that all
estates and the rights of intermediaries in such estates
situated in any district or part of a district as specified in
the notification, shall vest in the State free from all
encumbrances. Further, Section 5 of the WBEA Act, 1953,
provides for the effect of such notification.
5. However, Section 6 (1) of the WBEA Act, 1953 preserves to
intermediaries a limited right to retain certain categories of
land, inter alia , (a) homestead land; (b) land comprised in
or appertaining to buildings and structures owned by
intermediary or by any person, not being a tenant, holding
under him by leave or license; (c) non-agricultural land in
khas possession up to certain area; (d) agricultural land in
khas possession, not exceeding 25 acres in area; (e) tank
fisheries, etc. Importantly, Section 6 (1)(j) of the WBEA Act,
1953 which assumes utmost relevance in the present case,
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permits a cooperative society registered or deemed to have
been registered under the Bengal Cooperative Society Act,
1940 or a company incorporated under the Indian
Companies Act, 1913 and engaged exclusively in farming to
retain agricultural land that was in its khas possession on
01.01.1952 and chosen for retention.
6. Rule 4A of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Rules, 1954
(hereinafter referred to as “the WBEA Rules, 1954”) framed
under the WBEA Act, 1953, provides the procedure under
which an intermediary entitled to retain the land under
Section 6 (1) of the 1953 Act, can apply to the concerned
authority i.e., Settlement Officer or Revenue Officer
authorised by the Settlement Officer in this behalf before
the expiry of 30.04.1958, a statement in writing in Form ‘B’
appended to Schedule ‘B’ appended to these Rules.
7. In exercise of this right conferred under Section 6(1)(j) of
the 1953 Act, after the State Government issued the
notification under Section 4 of the WBEA Act, 1953, as
claimed by the respondent–company, it submitted the duly
filed Form ‘B’ on 14.08.1956 claiming entitlement to retain
the entire extent of land measuring about 239.71 acres
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under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953 on the ground
that the respondent–company was engaged exclusively in
farming, which according to the respondent-company was
permitted by the concerned Revenue Officer. However,
according to the appellants, the respondent-company failed
to produce any copy of the alleged order of retention said to
have been passed by the Revenue Officer, at any stage in
any of the proceedings before the High Court, or prior to it.
It may also be noted that the High Court also did not accept
the existence of any such order passed by the Revenue
Officer in 1956 in favour of the respondent-company.
8. Be that as it may, the genesis of the legal proceedings with
which we are directly concerned with is the issuance of the
notice dated 01.04.1968 by the Revenue Officer to the
respondent-company under Section 57 of the WBEA Act,
1953, requiring the respondent-company to file the return
in Form ‘B’, so as to determine the extent of the land which
the respondent-company was entitled to retain out of the
area vested in the State. The aforesaid notice was
challenged by the respondent-company before the High
Court by filing a writ petition, being CR No. 4256 (W) of
Page 6 of 68


1968. The said writ petition was disposed of by the High
Court on 15.02.1971, holding inter alia that the impugned
notice dated 01.04.1968 was merely a notice for
adjudication and for ascertaining as to what extent the
respondent-company would be entitled to retain lands in its
possession and that there can be no ground of
apprehension on the part of the respondent-company that
its right/claim for retention has been overruled by such a
notice.
9. After disposal of the aforementioned writ petition, the
concerned Revenue Officer, in continuation of the earlier
notice dated 01.04.1968, issued a second notice dated
04.08.1971 requiring the respondent-company to appear
for a hearing to determine its entitlement under Section
6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953. In the said proceedings, being
No. 1/1971, the Revenue Officer passed an order on
07.10.1971 holding inter alia that the respondent–company
failed to produce any evidence to prove that the company
was created exclusively for agricultural purpose or for
carrying on business connected directly with agricultural
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farming, and accordingly it is not entitled to get the benefit
under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953.
10. The aforementioned order of the Revenue Officer was
challenged by the respondent-company before the High
Court by filing a writ petition bearing C.R. No. 3266 (W) of
1971, in which a Civil Rule was issued, and an order
directing maintenance of status quo was passed on
02.11.1971. However, by a subsequent order dated
03.12.1971, the High Court declined to extend the status
quo order, holding that the order of the Revenue Officer was
prima facie legal. Thereafter, the respondent-company
challenged the High Court’s order dated 03.12.1971
declining to extend the status quo order by filing an appeal
bearing FMAT No. 3241 of 1971 (later re-numbered as FMA
686 of 1971). In the said appeal, a Division Bench of the
High Court passed an order dated 14.12.1971 directing the
maintenance of the status quo .
11. Subsequently, the Civil Rule issued in the main writ
petition, being C.R. No. 3266 (W) of 1971, wherein the
order of the Revenue Officer was challenged, was
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discharged by the High Court, on 23.09.1975, due to non-
appearance by the respondent-company.
12. Later, the respondent-company filed a separate application
seeking restoration of the main writ petition, C.R. No. 3266
(W) of 1971, which was dismissed for default on
23.09.1975. The said restoration application, however, was
rejected by the High Court on 11.03.1987 on the ground of
inordinate delay of nearly twelve years. Against the said
dismissal of the restoration application, the respondent-
company filed an appeal, FMAT No. 791 of 1987, which also
came to be dismissed for default by the High Court on
07.02.2002.

13. Consequently, the order of the Revenue Officer dated
07.10.1971, whereby the respondent-company was denied
the benefit under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953,
attained finality, and the respondent-company’s judicial
challenge to the said order stood concluded. Accordingly,
the respondent-company stood divested of the agricultural
land held by it, the same having vested in the State
Government under Sections 4 and 5 of the WBEA Act,
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1953. Therefore, the respondent-company ceased to have
any right, title, or interest over the said agricultural land.
14. After the dismissal of the writ petition, CR No. 3266(W) of
1971 on 23.09.1975, the Revenue Officer, Salar, District
Murshidabad, West Bengal issued another notice on
02.02.1996 to the respondent-company under Sections 57
and 14T(3) of the WBLR Act, 1955, on the ground that the
quantum of the land held by the respondent-company was
beyond the ceiling limit prescribed under the WBLR Act,
1955. It is to be noted that the aforesaid proceeding
initiated under the WBLR Act, 1955 were entirely separate
and distinct from the earlier proceeding under the WBEA
Act, 1953, which had culminated in 1975 upon dismissal
of the writ petition on 23.09.1975 filed by the respondent-
company. The aforementioned notice under the WBLR Act,
1955, was in respect of the land which was allowed to be
retained under the WBEA Act, 1953, but was found to be
in excess of the ceiling limit placed by the WBLR Act, 1955.
This notice, challenged by the respondent-company vide a
writ petition being C.O. No. 3569 (W) of 1996, was
transferred to the Tribunal and re-numbered as T.A. No.
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1410 of 2000. The Tribunal, by its order dated 09.04.2001,
dismissed the T.A. No. 1410 of 2000, reasoning that the
Revenue Officer has jurisdiction under Section 14T(3) of the
WBLR Act, 1955, to initiate proceedings and determine the
ceiling area.
15. Assailing the abovementioned dismissal order of the
Tribunal, the respondent-company preferred a writ
petition, WPLRT No. 763 of 2001, before the High Court.
The same was admitted and remained pending until 2008.
Subsequently, it was ultimately withdrawn by the
respondent-company in 2009, after it was permitted to
retain about 211.21 acres of land pursuant to a review
order dated 07.05.2008, and the said writ petition was
accordingly disposed of by the High Court as withdrawn.
16. What is of great importance is what had transpired during
the pendency of the aforesaid writ petition, on the basis of
which the said writ petition was disposed of as withdrawn,
as the same would have a direct bearing on the decision in
this appeal.

17. During the pendency of the above-mentioned writ petition,
WPLRT No. 763 of 2001 before the High Court, it appears
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that the respondent-company submitted a proposal to
Chief Minister of the State of the West Bengal, seeking an
amicable settlement of the vested land in its favour, for
setting up an eco-friendly agro-based industry, and sought
review of the order dated 07.10.1971, passed by the
concerned Revenue Officer. Consequently, as claimed by
the respondent-company, the then Minister-in-Charge
made a note on the file as “Please discuss” . The erstwhile
Minister-in-Charge then recorded the following comments
on the file: “Discussed. This will be possible only when the
company first withdraws all the cases”. Accordingly, the
respondent-company submitted an affidavit on 22.02.2008
to withdraw all pending court cases, including the
aforementioned writ petition, WPLRT No. 763 of 2001,
pending before the High Court.
18. Acting on the aforesaid proposal of the respondent-
company which was apparently accepted by the State
government, the Land Reforms Commissioner-cum-
Principal Secretary on 26.02.2008, directed the concerned
Revenue Officer, Bharatpur -II, Murshidabad, West Bengal,
to take necessary steps for review of the proceeding No. 1 of
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1971 under Sections 6(1)(j), 6(1)(a) and 6(1)(e) of the WBEA
Act, 1953. The aforementioned government order dated
26.02.2008, being relevant, is reproduced in toto as follows:
“ The Government of West Bengal
Land 85 Land Reform Department
Land Reforms Branch
Writers Buildings, Kolkata - 700001.

No. 984 – L.R. GE (M)
Dated 26.02.08
IL – 240/07 – LR…
Whereas ‘M/s. Jai Hind Private Limited a company
incorporated in the year 1946 under the Indian
Companies Act, 1913 purchased more or less
234.00 acres of land in Block Bharatpur-II in the
district of Murshidabad as revealed from the memo
no. 174/2709/C/2007 dtd. 30.8.07 of the DLRS
and Jt. LRC, West Bengal;
And whereas the said company purchased the
aforesaid 234 acres of land before and after the
date 01.01.1952 and that it had 23
members/shareholders as on 01.01.1952 and that
the said company has produced the Panchayat
certificate and panchayat Tax receipt (for the year
2006-07) in support of its claim of possession on
200 acres of land as on 19.02.2007, as revealed
from the memo no. 3362/X-6A/C/01 dated
22.6.2007 of the DL&LRO - Murshidabad.
And whereas a proceeding bearing no. 1 of 1971
u/s 6 (1) (J) of the WBEA Act, 1953 was drawn up
and disposed of with vesting of 205.44 acres of
land of the said company by the BL&LRO,
Bharatpur-II in the year 1971 vide order dtd:
07.10.1971;
And whereas the said land could not be distributed
till now due to series of court cases and
compensation was also not paid to the said
company. The said company is still in possession
of the said land and claims that proper opportunity
Page 13 of 68


of being heard was not given during the said
proceeding as revealed from the memo no.
174/2709/C/2007 dtd : 30.8.07 of the DLRS and
Jt. LRC, West Bengal;
And whereas the said company wants to establish
eco-friendly agro-based Industry on the said land
to produce 'Mentha Oil' and 'Mentha crystals' and
'Mentha Arvensis' plants. 'Metha oil' is also known
as 'Peppermint Oil' and this cash-rich cultivation is
being done for the first time in West Bengal. This is
really a good innovation in West Bengal which
cultivators may like to follow. There is a possibility
of employment generation for nearly 500 people in
the said project;
And whereas said company's project has already
been approved by The Small Industry Services
Institute' under the Ministry of Small Scale
Industries, Govt. of India vide report dtd. 6.6.2007.
The Deptt. of Food Processing Industries &
Horticulture', Govt. of West Bengal has also
requested for the clearance of the said company's
land within the provision of law vide their memo
no. 568/FPI & H/0-1/580 dtd. 19.9.2007. The
District Industries Centre-Murshidabad' has also
approved the aforesaid project vide their memo no.
356/1 (1) dtd. 15.6.2007. The Principal
Agricultural Officer-Murshidabad' has also
inspected the Trial cultivation of 'Menthal Arvensis'
plants on the said land by the said company and
found it to be very vigorous and satisfactory as
certified vide his memo no. 245/Dev dtd. 28.2.07;
And whereas the ‘Local Gram Panchayat' has
already issued 'no objection certificate in favour of
the said company vide their letter dated 25.4.2007
recommending that the experimental plant set up
so far to extract Mentha oil/peppermint oil is
successful in the area and is accepted by the local
people. It is 'eco friendly' also;
And whereas the said company has already
submitted before the undersigned an undertaking
to withdraw all the pending court case (s) by way
of Affidavit dated 22.2.2008. as applicable for the
withdrawal of all the pending court cases and this
Page 14 of 68


may be used by L.R. officials at the relevant forum
of the court;
And whereas the said company has submitted an
undertaking by way of Affidavit dtd. 22.2.2008 to
st
the effect that as on 1 January 1952 neither the
company nor any of its 23 members/shareholder
had owned any other landed property in West
Bengal except the aforesaid agricultural land and
that the company has all along been engaged
exclusively in agriculture farming on its aforesaid
land;
And whereas the State Govt. after due
consideration has taken the decision to Review
Afresh the said proceeding bearing no. 1 of 1971
u/s 6 (1)(J) of the WBEA Act 1953 as per the
applicable provisions of the WBEA Act 1953;
Now, therefore the BL&LRO, Bharatpur-II block in
the district of Murshidabad is hereby directed to
take necessary steps for fresh Review of the said
proceeding for more or less 205.57 acres of land
which were purchased by the said company before
st
1 January 1952 as well as more or less 0.29
acres of homestead and also more or less 8.52
acres of pond (s) etc. for consideration for
exemption u/s 6 (1) (J) read with Section 6 (1) (a)
and sec. 6 (1) (e) of the WBEA Act 1953. However,
an area of more or less 19.62 acres, which were
purchased by the said company after 1.1.1952
and which do not come under the purview of the
said section of the aforesaid Act will be vested to
the State. The company may be given the
opportunity to exercise the option to earmark this
more or less 19.62 acres of land on any side of the
total land and then this more or less 19.62 acres of
land may be distributed amongst the eligible
landless persons of the area as per norms.
Sd/
(Dr. P. K. Agarwal)
L.R.C. & Principal Secretary,
Land & Land Reforms Deptt.,
Govt. of West Bengal ”
Page 15 of 68


19. In compliance with the above-mentioned order, the B.L. &
L.R.O. (Revenue Officer), by his final order dated
07.05.2008, allowed the review and set aside the earlier
order dated 07.10.1971 passed by the earlier Revenue
Officer, thereby allowing the respondent-company to retain
a total of about 211.21 acres of land and vesting nearly
28.50 acres in the State. In furtherance of the review order,
the respondent-company furnished a cheque to the
Revenue Officer towards payment of land revenue, which
was eventually returned by the Revenue Officer. Aggrieved
by the non-acceptance of the land revenue, the respondent-
company filed an application, being OA No. 1463 of 2009,
before the Tribunal seeking a direction to the concerned
authorities to accept the said land revenue and provide the
certified copies of the record of rights. The Tribunal, by its
judgment dated 31.03.2010, dismissed the respondent-
company’s application and quashed the review order dated
07.05.2008 by holding that the concerned Revenue Officer
was incompetent to undertake the review proceedings as no

such power of review was specifically given.
Page 16 of 68


20. Assailing the said judgment of the Tribunal, the
respondent-company filed a writ petition, being WPLRT No.
43 of 2010, before the High Court. The High Court vide
impugned judgment dated 17.05.2012 allowed the said writ
petition and directed the concerned Revenue Officer to
accept the land revenue and cess from the respondent-
company in respect of the lands in question, which were
allowed to be retained pursuant to the review order, dated
07.05.2008, passed by the Revenue Officer.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS
21. The arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants can
be summarised, inter alia , as follows:
Firstly , it has been submitted that the Revenue Officer
had no jurisdiction to review the vesting order dated
07.10.1971. Relying on the judgment in Kalabharati
1
Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania & Ors. , it
was argued that the power of review must be statutorily
conferred, and in the absence of the same, the review
of an earlier order becomes ultra vires , illegal, and
without jurisdiction. Additionally, it was contended
that neither Section 57A nor any other provision of the

1
(2010) 9 SCC 437.
Page 17 of 68


WBEA Act, 1953, confers any power of review on the
Revenue Officer.
In addition, the appellants assailed the review
order by submitting that Sections 57A and 57B of the
WBEA Act, 1953, bar the Revenue Officer from
reopening/reviewing any decision which has already
been decided.
Thus, the appellants submitted that the
Government Order dated 26.02.2008 issued by the
Principal Secretary and the consequent fresh review
order dated 07.05.2008 passed by the B.L. & L.R.O.,
Bharatpur–II, Murshidabad, West Bengal were illegal.
Secondly , the vesting order dated 07.10.1971 passed
by the Revenue Officer earlier could not have been
reviewed as it had attained finality once the writ
petition filed by the respondent-company challenging
the same was dismissed on 23.09.1975, its restoration
rejected on 11.03.1987, and the appeal against the
same eventually dismissed on 07.02.2002.
Thirdly , since the review order passed by the Revenue
Officer on 07.05.2008 was bereft of any jurisdiction,
the plea of invalidity of the same can be raised at any
stage. In this regard, reliance was placed on decisions
2
in Kiran Singh & Ors. v. Chaman Paswan & Ors. and
3
Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. P.J. Pappu & Anr . .

2
(1954) 1 SCC 710.
3
1965 SCC OnLine SC 145.
Page 18 of 68


Furthermore, relying on Assistant Custodian E.P. &
4
Ors. v. Brij Kishore Agarwala & Ors . , and it was argued
that action taken by an officer without jurisdiction is
not binding upon the State.
Moreover, it was submitted by the appellants,
relying upon the judgment in the Maharishi Dayanand
5
University v. Surjeet Kaur , that the doctrine of estoppel
cannot override statutory provisions.
Fourthly , the review order dated 07.05.2008 was
passed on irrelevant considerations. As submitted by
the appellants, the respondent-company had been
granted adequate opportunities to establish its
entitlement under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act,
1953, which it failed to do.
It was further claimed that the documents relied
upon by the respondent-company, i.e., a resolution of
25.01.1951 and a certificate dated 12.10.1979, were
never produced during the earlier vesting proceedings.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

22. In response, the respondent-company has advanced the
following submissions:
Firstly , it was submitted that the respondent-company
had always engaged exclusively in ‘agricultural
farming’, as authorised by Clause 13 of its

4
1975 (1) SCC 21.
5
(2010) 11 SCC 159.
Page 19 of 68


Memorandum of Association (MOA). To support its
claim that it was engaged exclusively in ‘agricultural
st
farming’ as on 1 January 1952, the respondent-
company relied upon various documents, i.e., a
certificate of the agricultural income tax officer, audited
balance sheets of the respondent-company, auditor’s
certificates for the years from 1951, income tax
scrutiny order for 2006-2007 and special resolution of
1951.
Secondly , the respondent-company had filed a return
in Form ‘B’, claiming entitlement to retain the entire
extent of land measuring 239.71 acres under Section
6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953, on 14.08.1956, and that
it was permitted to retain such land by the concerned
Revenue Officer. The aforementioned status, as
claimed, remained in place for more than 15 years. To
substantiate the same, the respondent-company
placed its reliance upon the ‘finally published’ Record
of Rights, which is, as claimed, to be presumed to be
correct under Section 44(4) of the WBEA Act, 1953.
Thirdly , the vesting order dated 7.10.1971 was passed
by the Review Officer without considering the
aforementioned documents, such as the special
resolution of 1951 and Clause 13 of the MOA.
Fourthly, assailing the 1971 vesting order, the
respondent-company submitted that the notice
pursuant to the statutory requirement of Section 10(2)
Page 20 of 68


of the WBEA Act, 1953, was ‘not served’, and the
possession of the said lands was never taken over by
the appellants. Moreover, the compensation as
provided for under Section 23 of the WBEA Act, 1953,
was also not paid.
Fifthly , the 1971 vesting order was erroneous and a
nullity as it was itself a review order of the 1956
determination proceeding, recorded in the Record of
Rights for which the Revenue Officer was not even
authorised by the State government under Section 57
of the WBEA Act, 1953. Pertinently, the 1971 order as
submitted did not even set aside the 1956 proceeding.
Sixthly , the main writ petition challenging the 1971
vesting order was never decided on the merits.
Seventhly , the appellant-State duly recommended the
amicable settlement, which was approved by the
Minister-in-charge of the Land and Land Reforms
Department. Consequently, the B.L. & L.R.O. legally
passed his order in favour of the respondent-company.
Moreover, the final order dated 07.05.2008 and the
Government order dated 26.02.2008 were never
withdrawn at any point in time.
Eighthly
, the appellants are hit by the doctrine of
estoppel and thus cannot retract the final order dated
07.05.2008 and the Government order dated
26.02.2008. Additionally, the respondent-company
withdrew the pending Court case and handed over
Page 21 of 68


28.50 acres of land, relying on the terms of the
amicable settlement. In support of the contentions,
reliance was placed on M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar
6
Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State of UP .
Ninthly , the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by going
beyond the scope of prayers, as it quashed the review
order dated 07.05.2008, without any prayer or
application for the same. The respondent-company
placed its reliance on Akhil Bhartvarshiya Marwari
7
Agarwal Jatiya Kosh & Ors. v. Brijlal Tibrewal & Ors.
and Bharat Amratlal Kothari v. Dosukhan Samadkhan
8
Sindhi & Ors in this regard.
Tenthly , the conferment of the power of review upon
the B.L. & L.R.O. under Sections 57A and 53 of the
WBEA Act, 1953, was in accordance with law.
Lastly , it was submitted that under Rule 19 of the
Rules of Business of the Government of West Bengal
framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution,
decisions relating to a particular department are
required to be taken by the Minister-in-charge.
Moreover, any omission to make or authenticate an
executive decision strictly in the form contemplated
under Article 166 does not render such decision void or
illegal. In this regard, reliance was placed upon

6
(1979) 2 SCC 409.
7
(2019) 2 SCC 684.
8
(2010) 1 SCC 234.
Page 22 of 68


9
Narmada Bachao Andolan v. State of Madhya Pradesh ,
10
and R. Chitralekha v. State of Mysore .
ISSUES INVOLVED

23. As noted above, the genesis of the problem can be traced
to the act of the respondent-company in seeking to
resurrect the claim for retaining the agricultural land on
the ground that the company had been engaged exclusively
in agricultural farming by making an application before the
State Authorities sometime in between 2007-2008 after the
land had already been vested in the State pursuant to the
Revenue Officer’s order dated 07.10.1971 denying any
claim of the respondent-company to retain the agricultural
land as it failed to prove that it had been engaged
exclusively in agricultural activities. That apart, the
attempt of the respondent-company to judicially challenge
the said order of the Revenue Officer dated 07.10.1971 also
culminated in the closure of the same in 1975 after the
respondent-company’s writ petition was closed on
23.09.1975. Subsequently, its application for restoration of

9
AIR 2011 SC 3199.
10
AIR 1964 SC 1823.
Page 23 of 68


the writ petition was rejected on 11.03.1987, and its appeal
against the same was also dismissed on 07.02.2002.
24. However, the State Government directed the Revenue
Officer to review its earlier order dated 07.10.1971 by
passing the order on 26.02.2008, and the concerned
Revenue Officer passed the review order on 07.05.2008,
enabling the respondent-company to retain agricultural
land already vested in the State.
25. Having regard to the facts and circumstances as
mentioned above, we have to examine as to whether the
B.L. & L.R.O. (Revenue Officer) could have, by its order
dated 07.05.2008, reviewed the earlier order of the Revenue
Officer dated 07.10.1971.
26. The attending and consequential issue that arises for
consideration is whether the respondent-company had
fulfilled the conditions to be entitled to retain the lands in
question under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953 —
that is, whether it was “exclusively engaged in agricultural
st
farming” as on 1 January 1952 to claim exemption from
vesting under the 1971 determination?
Page 24 of 68


THE FIRST ISSUE

27.
Coming to the primary issue of whether the Revenue
Officer was competent to review its earlier order of 1971.
Notably, the respondent-company defends the power of the
Revenue Officer to review its earlier order by relying on
Section 57A of the WBEA Act, 1953, and the order of the
State Government of 26.02.2008 directing the Revenue
Officer to review the earlier order. Section 57A of the Act
reads as follows:-
“ 57A. The State Government may by order invest
any authority referred to in section 53 with all or any
of the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil
Procedure. 1908 . ”

The Authorities referred to under Section 53 are as follows:
“ 53. (1) There shall be the following authorities for
the purposes of this Act, namely:-
(a) The Board or Revenue;
(b) Director of Land Records and Surveys;
(c) Settlement Officers;
(d) Assistant Settlement Officers;
(e) Compensation Officers;
(f) Revenue Officers;
(ff) Officers appointed by the State Government for
the purposes of sub-clause (iv) of clause (a) of sub-
section (I) of section 16;
(g) Mining Experts for the purposes of sections 32,
33 or 34.

(2) The State Government may appoint any person
as a Compensation Officer or a Revenue Officer or
may vest any officer with the powers of a
Page 25 of 68


Compensation Officer or a Revenue Officer under
this Act. ”

28. It appears that in exercise of the powers conferred under
Section 57A of the WBEA Act, 1953, the State Government
issued a notification bearing no. 340L, dated 09.01.1958,
by which all the Settlement Officers, Assistant Settlement
Officers and Revenue Officers were invested with all the
powers of the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908. The said notification reads as follows:

“ Land Reforms
ORDER
th
No.340L.Ref.-9 January 1958.- In exercise of the
power conferred by section 57A of the West Bengal
Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (West Bengal Act I of
1954), the Governor is pleased to invest each of the
authorities mentioned in the schedule below, being
authorities referred to in section 53 of the said Act, with
all the powers of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908):-
The schedule
1. All Settlement Officers.
2. All Assistant Settlement Officers.
3. All Revenue Officers.

By order of the Governor,
S. BANERJEE, Secy. ”
29. Thus, according to the respondent-company, the Revenue
Officer, having been invested with all the powers of the Civil
Court, was competent and had jurisdiction to review the
earlier order dated 07.10.1971, as also directed by the State
Page 26 of 68


Government vide their order dated 26.02.2008. This is the
foundational claim of the respondent-company as regards
the competency of the Revenue Officer to review its earlier
order.
30. To examine this contention, which ex-facie appears to be
in order, we must minutely examine the scope of Section
57A of the WBEA Act, 1953 and also the power of review,
more particularly of quasi-judicial authorities, keeping in
mind that the Authorities mentioned under Section 53 of
the WBEA Act, 1953, are not judicial but administrative
authorities exercising certain quasi-judicial powers under
the WBEA Act, 1953, for the effective implementation of the
aforesaid Act.
31. It is well-settled that the power of review is not an inherent
power of the Court. It is also equally well settled that quasi-
judicial authorities can exercise only those powers which
are expressly conferred upon them by the statute. Hence,
the power of review, which is not inherent, must be
conferred upon the quasi-judicial authority by means of a
specific provision in the statute. Highlighting this principle,
Page 27 of 68


a three-judge Bench of this Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi
11
v. Pradyuman Singhji had observed as follows:

32.
In the same vein, it was held by the Supreme Court in
12
Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania
that,
“ 12. It is settled legal proposition that, unless the
statute/rules so permit, the review application is
not maintainable in case of judicial/quasi-judicial
orders. In the absence of any provision in the Act
granting an express power of review, it is manifest
that a review could not be made and the order in
review, if passed, is ultra vires, illegal and without
jurisdiction… ”

33. This Court has time and again, through various
judgments, including in Patel Chunibhai Dajibhai v.
13
Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar , Major Chandra Bhan
14
Singh v. Latafat Ullah Khan , Patel Narshi Thakershi v.
15
Pradyuman Singhji Arunsinghji , State of Orissa and Others

11
(1971) 3 SCC 844.
12
(2010) 9 SCC 437.
13
AIR 1965 SC 1457.
14
(1979) 1 SCC 321.
15
(1971) 3 SCC 844.
Page 28 of 68


v. Commissioner of Land Records & Settlement, Cuttack &
16 17
Others , Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh , and Kuntesh
18
Gupta (Dr.) v. Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya , has
underscored that an order of review cannot be passed by a
quasi-judicial authority without a statutory jurisdiction
bestowed upon it.
34. In the light of the above well-settled principle, in our
opinion, unless a specific provision has been made in the
WBEA Act of 1953, investing the power of review in the
Revenue Officer or such other authorities mentioned under
Section 53 of the Act, these authorities could not have
possessed the power or authority to review an earlier order.
The omnibus expression used in the State notification
dated 09.01.1958 investing all the Settlement Officers,
Assistant Settlement Officers and Revenue Officers with all
the powers of the Civil Court, in our opinion, does not
amount to conferment of power of review as well to these
authorities.

16
(1998) 7 SCC 162.
17
AIR 1966 SC 641.
18
(1987) 4 SCC 525.
Page 29 of 68


35. In our view, there has to be a specific conferment of the
power of review to these authorities as observed by this
Court in a catena of decisions as referred to above, which
is absent in the present case.
36. In addition, there are other sound jurisprudential reasons
for holding so.
37. Separation of power and independence of the judiciary
have been considered integral parts of the basic structure
of our Constitution as propounded in Kesavananda Bharati
19
v. State of Kerala , and reiterated in subsequent decisions
20
of Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India , I.R. Coelho v. State
21
of T.N . , etc.

38. The French Philosopher Montesquieu, in The Spirit of the
Laws (1748), while propounding the theory of separation of
powers, argues that political authority must be divided
among distinct legislative, executive, and judicial branches
to protect liberty and prevent tyranny. He proposed that
each branch should have its own distinctive functions and
ideally be manned by different personnel, ensuring that no

19
(1973) 4 SCC 225.
20
(1980) 3 SCC 625.
21
(2007) 2 SCC 1.
Page 30 of 68


single person or body holds all three powers, thereby
creating a system of checks and balances to safeguard
against despotic rule, a concept crucial to modern
democratic Constitutions like ours. His theory finds
acceptance in the aforesaid doctrine of basic structure
propounded by this Court. Montesquieu said the following
in The Spirit of Laws :
“When the legislative and executive powers are united
in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates,
there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may
arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact
tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical
manner. Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary
power be not separated from the legislative and
executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life
and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary
control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were
it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave
with violence and oppression. There would be an end
of everything, were the same man or the same body,
whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those
three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing
the public resolutions, and of trying the causes of
individuals.”

39. Closely and intrinsically linked to the aforesaid idea is the
concept of the independence of the judiciary. Separation of
powers provides the guarantee for the independence of the
judiciary and also acts as a safeguard against arbitrariness,
upholding democratic values and the rule of law.
Page 31 of 68


40. The importance and applicability of these principles have
been reiterated from time to time by this Court, especially
in the context of the creation of Tribunals seeking to
supplement/substitute Courts. While tribunalisation in
India has been judicially recognised, this Court has
emphasised the need to ensure independence of the
judiciary and separation of powers in the functioning of
Tribunals and, wherever this Court has found that any
such tribunalisation has violated these core principles, this
Court has not hesitated to strike down such offensive
provisions or pass appropriate remedial directions.
41. In one of the earliest decisions of this Court on the
Tribunals jurisprudence in S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of
22
India , the Constitution Bench of this Court, while
upholding the constitutional validity of the Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985, which provided for the establishment
of administrative tribunals to adjudicate service disputes of
public servants, held that “the Tribunal should be a real
substitute of the High Court-not only in form and de jure

22
(1987) 1 SCC 124.
Page 32 of 68


but in content and de facto ”. More importantly, the Bench
also decided that the Chairman of the Tribunal “office
should for all practical purposes be equated with the office
of Chief Justice of a High Court”, and that a retiring or
retired Chief Justice of a High Court or when such a person
is not available, a Senior Judge of proved ability either in
office or retired should be appointed. The Bench observed
that the position of Chairperson should not be held by an
individual who has merely served as a Secretary to the
Government of India. What weighed with the Court was the
necessity that the holder of the office must be an individual
whose decision-making is informed by the institutional
discipline of the judiciary, a quality that emerges from
adequate judicial training and judicial temperament and
experience rather than mere administrative exposure.
23
42. In R.K. Jain v. Union of India , a three-judge Bench of this
Court observed that the Tribunals set up under Articles
323-A and 323-B of the Constitution or under an Act of the
legislature are creations of the legislature and in no case

23
(1993) 4 SCC 119.
Page 33 of 68


can claim the same status as High Courts or their judges
or parity or as substitutes of the same. It was, however,
emphasised that as the personnel appointed to hold those
offices under the State are called upon to discharge judicial
or quasi-judicial powers, they must have a judicial
approach and also knowledge and expertise in that
particular branch of constitutional, administrative and tax
laws. The Court accordingly underscored that it is
necessary that those who adjudicate upon these matters
should have legal expertise, judicial experience and a
modicum of legal training.
43. Subsequently, the seven-judge Bench of the Supreme
Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and
24
Others , held that the High Courts’ power of judicial
superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals within their
jurisdiction forms part of the basic structure of the
Constitution. The Court held that although Tribunals
cannot exercise judicial review of legislative action to the
exclusion of the High Courts or the Supreme Court, they

24
(1997) 3 SCC 261.
Page 34 of 68


may perform a supplementary, though not a substitutive,
role in this regard. Further, the Court held Article
323A(2)(d) and Article 323B(3)(d) to be unconstitutional
insofar as they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts.
25
44. In Union of India v. Madras Bar Assn. , this Court
highlighted the importance of the independence of the
judiciary and observed as follows:
“ 64. Only if continued judicial independence is assured,
tribunals can discharge judicial functions. In order to
make such independence a reality, it is fundamental
that the members of the tribunal shall be independent
persons, not civil servants. They should resemble the
courts and not bureaucratic Boards. Even the
dependence of tribunals on the sponsoring or parent
department for infrastructural facilities or personnel
may undermine the independence of the tribunal (vide
Wade & Forsyth: Administrative Law, 10th Edn., pp.
774 and 777). ”


45. Further, the Supreme Court, in the above case,
emphasising the concept of separation of powers, also held
that:
“ 107. …if a Tribunal is packed with members who are
drawn from the civil services and who continue to be
employees of different Ministries or Government
Departments by 30 maintaining lien over their
respective posts, it would amount to transferring judicial
functions to the executive which would go against the
doctrine of separation of power and independence of
judiciary. ”


25
(2010) 11 SCC 1.
Page 35 of 68


46. Later, the judgment in Madras Bar Association v. Union of
26
India and Another , etc., further strengthened judicial
independence by underscoring judicial primacy in
discharging judicial functions. Thus, this Court has been
emphasising the competence, ability, and independence of
the judicial mind for those who man the Tribunals clothed
with judicial functions for upholding the independence of
the judiciary and the separation of powers.
47. If we allow such executive authorities exercising quasi-
judicial power which draw their limited powers from the
statutes which create them, to review their earlier orders on
merit, it will tantamount to converting Tribunals to regular
Courts which eventually will undermine the independence
of the judiciary, which will ultimately affect the justice
delivery system and be contrary to the principles evolved so
far as the functioning of Tribunals is concerned.
48. We, therefore, must eschew any such interpretation of the
statute which seeks to confer a blanket power of the Civil

26
(2015) 8 SCC 583.
Page 36 of 68


Court, including the power of review to such administrative
authority in the exercise of quasi-judicial power.
49. Seen from the above judicial perspective, this Court must
be circumspect and ought not countenance any blanket
investing of all powers of the Civil Court, which would
include the power of review on such non-judicial
administrative functionaries like the Revenue Officer in
terms of Section 57A of the WBEA Act, 1953, as the
respondent-company would insist. In our view, Section 57A
of the WBEA Act, 1953, cannot be construed to include
vesting of power of review in the absence of a clear statutory
provision to such quasi-judicial authority manned by an
executive functionary like the Revenue Officer, bereft of any
judicial training or judicial qualification, as it would run
contrary to the aforesaid judicial position adopted
concerning Tribunals.
50. In spite of the aforesaid provision under Section 57A of the
WBEA Act, 1953, that the legislature did not intend to
confer the power of review to the authorities provided under
the said Act is evident from the proviso to sub-section (3) of
Section 57B of the 1953 Act which provides that in deciding
Page 37 of 68


a dispute under this sub-section, the Revenue Officer shall
not re-open any matter which has already been enquired
into, investigated, determined or decided by the State
Government or any authority under any of the provisions of
this Act. Section 57B reads as follows:
“ 57B (1) Where an order has been made under sub-
section (1) of section 39 directing the preparation or
revision of a record-of-rights, no Civil Court shall
entertain any suit or Application for the determination or
rent or determination of the status of any tenant. Or the
incidents of any tenancy to which the record-of rights
relates, and if any suit or application, in which any of
the aforesaid matters, is in issue, is pending before a
Civil Court on the date of such order, it shall be stayed,
and it shall, on the expiry of the period prescribed for an
appeal under subsection (3) of section 44 or when an
appeal has been filed under that sub-section , as the
case may be, on the disposal of such appeal, abate so
far as it relates to any of the aforesaid matters.

(2) No Civil Court shall entertain any suit or application
concerning any land or any estate, or any right in such
estate, if it relates to---
(a) alteration of any entry in the record-of-rights finally
published, revised, made, corrected or modified under
any of the provisions of Chapter V,
(b) a dispute involving determination of the question,
either expressly or by implication, whether a raiyat, or
an intermediary, is or is not entitled to retain under the
provisions of this Act such land or estate or right in such
estate, as the case may be, or
(c) any matter which under any of the provisions of this
Act is to be, or has already been, enquired into, decided,
dealt with or determined by the State Government or
any authority specified therein.
and any such suit or application which is pending before
a Civil Court immediately before the commencement of
the West Bengal estates Acquisition (Second
Amendment) Act, 1973, shall abate so far as it relates
to all or any of the matters referred to in clause (a),
clause (b) or clause (c).
Page 38 of 68


(3) any dispute referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (2)
may be decided by a Revenue Officer not below the rank
of an Assistant Settlement Officer, specially empowered
by the State Government in this behalf, who shall
dispose of the same in such manner as may be
prescribed:
Provided that in deciding a dispute under this sub-
section, the Revenue Officer shall not re-open any
matter which has already been enquired into,
investigated, determined or decided by the State
Government or any authority under any of the
provisions of this Act.
(4) Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Revenue
Officer made under sub-section (3) may appeal to the
prescribed authority not below the rank of a Settlement
Officer, within such time, in such manner and subject to
payment of such fees as may be prescribed.
(5) A decision made by an Appellate Authority under
sub-section (4) shall be final.

Explanation ----In this section, -----
(i) suit includes an appeal, and
(ii) an authority includes an authority to hear an
appeal. ”

51. Having regard to the above-mentioned proviso in Section
57B (3) of the 1953 Act, it can be said that the 1971 vesting
order passed by the Revenue Officer after full inquiry and
adjudication, constitutes such a determination which also
attained finality after it was unsuccessfully challenged
before the Court of law. The concerned Revenue Officer
thus stood barred from re-opening, revisiting, or re-
deciding its earlier vesting order in view of the aforesaid
proviso.
Page 39 of 68


52. What is thus evident is that the scheme of the WBEA Act,
1953 does not contemplate any executive authority
reopening a vesting determination or substituting a
decision already rendered after due inquiry. It is also clear
that the authorities enumerated under Section 53 of the
WBEA Act, 1953, such as Revenue Officers, Settlement
Officers and Compensation Officers, among others, are
vested only with such limited adjudicatory powers as the
statute expressly confers upon them. To permit these
authorities to undertake a wholesale re-adjudication of a
vesting order by exercising the power of review would be to
attribute to them a power far wider than what the
legislature had envisaged. Such an interpretation would
render the carefully structured legislative framework otiose,
contrary to the settled principle that statutory authorities
must operate strictly within the bounds of the powers
conferred upon them.
53. In this context, we have also considered certain decisions
of the Calcutta High Court regarding the lack of power of
review qua executive authorities, such as the Revenue
Authority. The Calcutta High Court in Satyanarayan
Page 40 of 68


27
Banerjee v. Charge Officer and A.S.O. Birbhum , while
dealing with the question as to whether the successor
Assistant Settlement Officer could have any jurisdiction to
initiate proceedings for review for reopening an earlier
order by the previous Assistant Settlement Officer under
the WBEA Act, 1953, answered the aforesaid question in
the negative. It was held that:
“ 5. … There can be no dispute on principle now that a
Tribunal like the Assistant Settlement Officer possesses
no inherent power of review. This position is now well
settled by the three decisions of the Supreme Court,
namely, Chunibhai v. Narayanrao, AIR 1965 SC 1457,
Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh, AIR 1966 SC 641 and
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balkrishan Nathani, AIR
1967 SC 394.”
“7. … A successor Assistant Settlement Officer has
certainly no authority or jurisdiction to take a different
view and reopen the said proceeding for review on the
ground that all the lands of the endowment had not
earlier been taken into consideration… ”

54. Relying on the above-mentioned judgment in the case of
Satyanarayan Banerjee in a later case of Ramaprasanna
28
Roy v. State of West Bengal , the Calcutta High Court held
that the successor Revenue Officer has no power and/or
jurisdiction to reopen the finding of the earlier Revenue
Office under the WBEA Act, 1953. It was held that:

27
1974 SCC OnLine Cal 1.
28
1987 SCC OnLine Cal 228.
Page 41 of 68


“ 14. But firstly, since the writ petitioners have a
“strong prima facie case”. In their favour that the
“successor Revenue Officer” has no power and/or
jurisdiction “to reopen” the finding of the earlier Revenue
Officer, having “concurrent jurisdiction”, the impugned
order of reopening and/or review was wholly
unwarranted since the very beginning and should be set
aside by issue of an appropriate writ in the nature
of Certiorari.
15. Secondly, in my view, as there is no provision for
“review” of the order passed under s. 5A(3)(ii) of the
West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953, pari
materia to the provisions of s. 14T(3a) of the West
Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, which has been
inserted by way of legislative amendment, by the West
Bengal Legislature in 1978, and as such , in the
absence of any such enabling provision a
“Successor Officer” in any event is incompetent to
exercise such power of review as, such power is not
“inherent” in the Officer .
16. In this respect. I may rely on a Single Bench decision
of this Court reported in the case of Satyanarayan
Banerjee v. Charge Officer and A.S.O. Birbhum,
Suri reported in AIR 1975 Cal. 43 : (1974 CHN (N) 127)
where Anil Kumar Sen, J. (as His Lordship then was)
held that a “successor Revenue Officer” having
“concurrent jurisdiction” cannot reopen the finding of the
earlier Revenue Officer, having concurrent jurisdiction.
17. I, respectfully, agree with that view and hold that
the entire move including the reopening and/or vesting
of the land by successor Revenue Officer who is sitting
over the judgment of the earlier Revenue Officer, in this
matter was unwarranted and is accordingly set aside. ”

55. We are in agreement with the aforesaid view taken by the
Calcutta High Court.
56. At a more fundamental level, allowing a Revenue Officer to
review its own concluded quasi-judicial order would trench
upon the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers,
which constitutes part of the basic structure of the
Page 42 of 68


Constitution. Though vested with limited adjudicatory
functions, authorities under the WBEA Act, 1953, remain
essentially members of the executive branch and are
neither part of the judicial organ nor equipped with the
institutional safeguards that attend judicial office, such as
independence from executive control.
57. The power of review is essentially a core judicial function,
and conferring such a power upon executive authorities,
absent an express legislative mandate, would blur the
constitutionally mandated demarcation between the
executive and the judiciary, permit the executive
authorities to sit in judgment over their own decisions, and
erode the rule of law by diluting finality. Any contrary
construction would, therefore, be inconsistent with
legislative intent and would impermissibly encroach upon
the basic structure of the Constitution.
58. Therefore, the fresh order of review dated 07.05.2008 by
the Revenue Officer by setting aside the 1971 vesting order
is in direct contravention of the statutory command
embodied in the WBEA Act, 1953, and hence wholly void
and illegal.
Page 43 of 68


THE SECOND ISSUE

59.
Even though we have held that the Revenue Officer did not
have the power of review, we have nevertheless examined
the order of review passed on 07.05.2008 to ascertain if
such a review undertaken conformed to the principles
governing law of review or not.
60. As regards the scope of review, it is well settled that it is of
a limited and narrow one, unlike the case of appeal, where
the appellate Court could revisit the entire facts and could
re-hear the complete matter on merits. On the other hand,
the purpose of a review is to rectify manifest or exceptional
wrongs. It is not for reappreciating facts or seeking a
different conclusion. Thus, a review could not be an appeal
in disguise by reappreciating the evidence and grounds
which have already traversed or come to a conclusion.
61. Review is essentially to strike a balance between the rule
of finality, which is crucial for maintaining legal certainty
and to avoid irremediable injustice caused by patent
mistakes, fraud, failure of natural justice or similar
exceptional situations, as was held in M/s. Northern India
Page 44 of 68


29
Caterers Limited v. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi . It is for
this reason that the Courts have emphasised from time to
time that review must be exercised with great caution and
only when the requisite limited criteria are satisfied, in
which the error must be evident and not one which requires
elaborate arguments to discover.
62. One can find the basic legal postulates of the scope of
review in Section 114 read with Rule 1 of Order XLVII of the
CPC, which are applied in all proceedings in which the
power of review is exercised. Thus, only on the following
grounds, a review would lie:
i. Discovery of new and important matter or
evidence; or
ii. Mistake or error apparent on the face of the
record; or
Any other sufficient reason.
63. Before we proceed to discuss the applicability of the above
principles in the present case, we may recapitulate the
background in which the review was sought and exercised
by the Revenue Officer. The respondent-company had

29
(1980) 2 SCC 167.
Page 45 of 68


sought the review of the earlier order of the Revenue Officer
dated 07.10.1971 which denied the benefit of retention of
agricultural land by the respondent-company as
contemplated under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953.
Section 6(1)(j) reads as follows:
“ (j) where the intermediary is a co-operative society
registered or deemed to have been registered under the
Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1940, or a company
incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1913,
engaged exclusively in farming (and in business, if
any, connected directly with such farming), -
agricultural land in the khas possession of the society
st
or the company on the 1 day of January, 1952 , and
chosen by the society or the company, not exceeding in
area the number of acres which persons, who were the
members of the society or the company on such date,
would have been entitled to retain in the aggregate
under clause (d), if every such person were an
intermediary;
Provided that where any such person retains any land
under clause (d), such person shall not be taken into
account in calculating the aggregate area of the land
which the society or the company may retain.”
64. To get the benefit contemplated under Section 6(1)(j) of the
WBEA Act, 1953 a company incorporated under the Indian
Companies Act, 1913 must establish, inter alia , the
following two essentials: (i) that it was engaged exclusively
in farming (and in business, if any, connected directly with
Page 46 of 68


st
such farming); and (ii) that it was so engaged as on 1
January 1952.
65. In the instant case, records reveal that the respondent-
company even after being given sufficient opportunities,
failed to discharge its onus of proving the first condition
before the vesting authority (Revenue Officer) in the earlier
proceedings in 1971 under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act,
1953. Hence, it was not granted the benefit of exemption
from vesting in the vesting order dated 07.10.1971.
Highlighting the same, the concerned Revenue Officer in
the said vesting order rightly observed:
“ The representative of the company has not produced
any evidence whatsoever to show that the company
after its creation adopted any resolution for carrying on
business exclusively connected with agricultural
farming.
The papers produced merely show that the company
has some agricultural lands and it is paying agricultural
income tax and others on account of the incomes that it
might have derived from such lands. These papers do
not prove that the company is not engaged with any
other business or trade in terms of memorandum and
articles of association. ”

66. A careful examination of the 1971 vesting order reveals
that, although the respondent-company sought to rely on
its MOA — particularly clauses 7, 8 and 13 — to
demonstrate that it was engaged in agricultural activities,
Page 47 of 68


the Revenue Officer rightly declined to treat these clauses
as conclusive proof of “exclusive” engagement in farming.
Accordingly, as per the vesting order dated 07.10.1971, the
respondent-company’s about 205.44 acres of land were
then vested in the appellant-State, and an area of about 25
acres of agricultural land, nearly 0.25 acres of non-
agricultural land, and 0.24 acres of homestead were
allowed to be retained by the respondent-company.
67. In our view, the 1971 vesting order does not suffer from
any legal flaw, and it correctly concluded that the
respondent-company failed to prove the statutory pre-
condition of Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953, despite
being given sufficient time. Most importantly, the records
reflect that the Revenue Officer afforded the respondent-
company ample opportunities to substantiate its claim. A
notice dated 05.07.1971 was duly served, calling upon the
respondent-company to produce evidence in support of its
assertion of exclusive engagement in agricultural farming
on the date of the hearing on 20.07.1971. At the
respondent-company’s request, the hearing was adjourned
first to 17.08.1971 and then to 30.08.1971.
Page 48 of 68


68. On 30.08.1971, when the final hearing was going on, in
spite of the opportunity given again, the respondent-
company failed to produce the requisite documents,
particularly its balance sheet, that it had itself adverted to
as material. Significantly, at the conclusion of the hearing,
the respondent-company expressly stated before the
Revenue Officer that it had nothing further to submit. Even
on the date when the vesting order was pronounced, the
promised balance sheet remained unproduced in spite of
further opportunity granted to do so by the Revenue Officer.
In these circumstances, the finding by the Revenue Officer
that in spite of several opportunities granted, the
respondent-company could not prove the essential
statutory requirement was inevitable and unimpeachable,
and the vesting of the land in the State had to follow as a
natural consequence.
69. Even before this Court, nothing has been brought to our
notice by the respondent-company of the existence of
sufficient material evidence to establish the fact that it was
exclusively engaged in farming as on 01.01.1952. In its
Page 49 of 68


submissions before this Court, the reliance was again
placed on Clause 13 of its MOA. It reads as under:
“ (13) To sell, improve, manage, develop or otherwise
exchange, lease, mortgage, disposed of turn to account
or deal in all or any part of the property and rights of the
company and to do agriculture farming and agri
business. ”

70. The aforementioned Clause does not establish that the
respondent-company was established exclusively for
farming. It mentions agricultural and agri-business as one
of its activities. Its MOA reveals that the respondent-
company was incorporated with a host of business
objectives unrelated to agriculture, such as manufacturing
or selling of all kinds of machines, purchasing, selling,
taking on lease any movable/immovable property, patent
licences, among many others. The mere presence of
agricultural objectives in a company’s MOA does not
establish that such activities were, in fact, its sole or
predominant operation, nor does it rule out the pursuit of
other commercial objectives expressly permitted by the very
same document.

71. Moreover, after perusing the documents relied upon by the
respondent-company, viz., (i) Certificate of ‘Agricultural
Page 50 of 68


Income Tax Officer’ dated 12.10.1979, (ii) Audited Balance
Sheets dated 25.07.1952, (iii) Auditors’ Certificates dated
25.07.1952, 30.12.1971, 09.08.2007, 27.09.2007, and
11.04.2008. (iv) Income-Tax Scrutiny Order for the
assessment year 2007-2008, (v) Special-Resolution’
submitted to ROC’ dated 25.01.1951, we are of the view,
without expressing any opinion on their veracity, that these
materials majorly do not support the claim of the
respondent-company that it was exclusively engaged in
agricultural farming as on 01.01.1952, as either these came
into existence long after the vesting order dated 07.10.1971
culminated or were not produced timely by the respondent-
company before the Revenue Officer at the time of the 1971
vesting proceedings, despite multiple opportunities being
granted. Consequently, these documents cannot furnish a
basis for the review of the 1971 vesting determination,
especially in the absence of any statutory provision allowing
the same. A belated reliance on such material, after a lapse
of nearly four decades, cannot constitute a legally
sustainable ground for reopening a concluded vesting
determination by a Revenue Officer.
Page 51 of 68


72. In addition to the above, the submission reiterated by the
respondent-company that it filed a return in Form ‘B’ on
14.08.1956 claiming entitlement to retain the concerned
land and that it was permitted to retain such land by the
Revenue Officer cannot be accepted, as neither any record
of acknowledgment of filing of Form ‘B’ nor any order
passed by the said Revenue Officer granting the retention
of the aforesaid land was ever produced by the respondent-
company. In any event, such a plea was rejected by the
High Court in the impugned judgment, as no copy of such
an order passed by the Revenue Officer was produced
before the High Court.

73. In view of the above discussion, it can be concluded that
the respondent-company is not entitled to retain the lands
in question under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953, as
it could not prove its claim that it was “exclusively engaged
in agricultural farming” as on 01.01.1952. Therefore, the
1971 vesting order does not suffer from any legal infirmity.
74. Having held that the vesting order dated 07.10.1971 is
legally valid, we will now proceed to examine if any case of
review is made out or not by applying the facts of the case
Page 52 of 68


on the anvil of the legal principles governing the law of
review.
First, on the discovery of new and important matter or
evidence.
75. A review can be sought under this ground by an aggrieved
litigant on the discovery of a certain new and important
matter or evidence, which, after exercise of due diligence,
was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by
him at the time when the decree was passed. A review of a
judgment is a drastic step, and a reluctant resort to it is
proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or
a grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. A
mere repetition, through different counsel, of old and
overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually
covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential
import, are obviously insufficient, as was rightly held in
30
Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk. Habib . The provision is not
meant to give a second chance to the aggrieved party who
has lost their case due to their own negligence.

30
(1975) 1 SCC 674.
Page 53 of 68


76. Now, if we apply this principle to the facts of the present
case, it cannot be believed that crucial documents such as
the 1951 Resolution and Audited Balance Sheets dated
25.07.1952, relied upon by the respondent-company in the
2008 review, were not within its possession and knowledge
earlier. The respondent-company failed to produce such
documents despite being afforded several opportunities
during the 1971 vesting process. A party cannot justify a
review by producing old documents lying in its own
custody, as this does not constitute “discovery” nor satisfy
the “due diligence” requirement.
Second, on a mistake or error apparent on the face of the
record.

77. This condition is also equally inapplicable in the present
case. It must be noted that the error under this ground
must be self-evident and should not require an exhaustive
examination or argument to establish it, as was held by a
three-judge Bench of this Court in the case of
Page 54 of 68


31
Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P. The material
portion of the judgment reads as under:
“7…. A review is by no means an appeal in disguise
whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and
corrected, but lies only for patent error. We do not
consider that this furnishes a suitable occasion for
dealing with this difference exhaustively or in any great
detail, but it would suffice for us to say that where
without any elaborate argument one could point to the
error and say here is a substantial point of law which
stares one in the face, and there could reasonably be no
two opinions, entertained about it, a clear case of error
apparent on the face of the record would be made
out…. ”

78. In light of the facts and circumstances as noted above, it
can be conclusively said that the 1971 vesting order was
passed after issuing proper notice, granting multiple
adjournments on the request of the respondent-company,
conducting a full hearing, and recording the respondent-
company’s categorical statement that it had “nothing
further to produce.” The findings were based on the
respondent-company’s failure to prove exclusive
engagement in farming, which is the statutory requirement
under Section 6(1)(j) of the WBEA Act, 1953. No patent
error, self-contradiction, or legal misconception is visible on

31
1963 SCC OnLine SC 94.
Page 55 of 68


the face of the record. Accordingly, the second condition is
also not met.
Third, on any other sufficient reason.

79. Insofar as this ground is concerned, recently, this Court in
32
the case of State (NCT of Delhi) v. K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd. ,
held as follows:

32
(2024) 7 SCC 315.
Page 56 of 68

80. Further, the Courts have time and again decided what can
fall under the term “any other sufficient reason”. For
instance, inter alia , where the Court omits to notice or
Page 57 of 68


consider relevant statutory provisions was held to be a
33
sufficient reason in Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D.H. Mehta .
Additionally, an order arising out of a lack of jurisdiction
was held to be a sufficient reason in Budhia Swain v.
34
Gopinath Deb . However, in the case at hand, there exists
no such “sufficient reason” within the meaning of Rule 1 of
Order XLVII of the CPC.
81. In view of the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the
respondent-company failed to satisfy any of the
conditions for review as also contemplated under Order
XLVII, Rule 1 of the CPC. Consequently, even assuming
for argument’s sake that the Revenue Officer possessed
the jurisdiction to entertain a review, which he
demonstrably did not have, as already held above, the
review order of 2008 was devoid of any legal foundation.
The review was thus fundamentally misconceived,
contrary to settled principles governing the exercise of
review power

33
(1971) 3 SCC 189.
34
( 1999) 4 SCC 396.
Page 58 of 68


82. As discussed above, the power of review is to be exercised
on the limited grounds recognised under law, as
postulated under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC. In the
present case, however, it is evident that the trigger for
reopening the earlier vesting order of 1971 was not the
existence of any legally permissible ground for review, but
was primarily based on the claimed “amicable settlement”
between the respondent-company and the State
government. It is the respondent-company’s own case
that during the pendency of WPLRT No. 763 of 2001
before the High Court, it submitted a representation to
the Chief Minister of the State seeking reconsideration of
the 1971 vesting determination for the purpose of
establishing an eco-friendly agro-based industry,
purportedly involving employment generation and
economic benefits. Acting upon this proposal, the State
Government proceeded to direct a review of the vesting
order dated 07.10.1971. The record thus clearly
demonstrates that the decision to initiate the review was
driven by considerations of perceived economic
advantage, such as prospective employment generation,
Page 59 of 68


rather than by any of the grounds recognised in law for
invoking the power of review. Such considerations,
however laudable in the executive or policy domain, are
wholly extraneous to the limited and strictly
circumscribed jurisdiction of review. A concluded
determination cannot be reopened on the basis of
subsequent policy preferences or economic expediency, in
the absence of a legally sustainable ground contemplated
under the law governing review.
83. As discussed above, it is also important to note that the
direction issued by the State Government vide
Government Order dated 26.02.2008 to review the earlier
vesting determination was made after an inordinate and
unexplained lapse of about four decades from the passing
of the vesting order dated 07.10.1971, which had attained
finality. While it is true that Constitutional Courts are not
strictly bound by limitation in exercising their
jurisdiction, the position is markedly different in respect
of the review jurisdiction of Civil Courts governed by the
CPC. Under Article 124 of the Schedule of the Limitation
Act, 1963, an application for review is required to be filed
Page 60 of 68


within a period of thirty days from the date of the decree
or order sought to be reviewed, subject only to extension
upon sufficient cause being shown. In the present case,
no sufficient explanation whatsoever has been offered for
the extraordinary delay of nearly forty years, except for
the observations contained in the Government Order
dated 26.02.2008, referring, inter alia , to non-distribution
of land due to a series of Court cases, non-payment of
compensation, and the respondent-company’s continued
possession of the land apart from the potential to generate
employment from the proposed project. None of these
reasons, in our view, constitutes a legally sustainable
ground to justify reopening a concluded determination
after such an inordinate lapse of time. Non-distribution of
land or continued physical possession by the respondent-
company cannot confer upon it any right, title, or interest
once vesting has taken place by operation of law.
Similarly, non-payment of compensation, even if
assumed, does not invalidate vesting but merely gives rise
to a statutory entitlement to compensation. Significantly,
the record does not substantiate the assertion of any
Page 61 of 68


pending litigation that prevented distribution of the land,
particularly when the writ petition challenging the vesting
order was dismissed on 23.09.1975, and subsequent
attempts to revive the proceedings failed on 11.03.1987
and 07.02.2002 . There was thus no subsisting judicial
impediment as far as the respondent-company was
concerned. The proposed project of the respondent–
company, which had the potential to generate
employment, cannot be the reason for the review of the
earlier vesting order. In these circumstances, the exercise
of review jurisdiction in 2008 to reopen a vesting
determination that had attained finality decades earlier
was wholly impermissible in law.
84. Before we conclude, we may address other issues raised
by the respondent-company. It was submitted that the
Government order dated 26.02.2008 was never recalled by
the Government, and this order was the consequence of
the amicable settlement arrived at between the
respondent-company and the State Government. Hence, it
was contended that the order dated 31.03.2010 passed by
the Tribunal was illegal.
Page 62 of 68


85. As regards the Government order dated 26.02.2008
indicating the amicable settlement, it is to be noted that
there was no subsisting dispute per se between the
Government and the respondent-company concerning the
issue relating to retention of land under Section 6(1)(j) of
the WBEA Act, 1953 inasmuch as the said issue was
already settled by the earlier vesting order dated
07.10.1971 and the said order had attained finality upon
dismissal on default of the petition filed by the respondent-
company challenging the said order.
86. Thus, when the so-called amicable settlement was said to
have been arrived at, there was no subsisting dispute
between the parties at the relevant time. The claimed
amicable settlement was arrived at in a proceeding arising
out of the issue of the ceiling of land under a different
statute, i.e., WBLR Act 1955. Thus, the very foundation of
the passing of the Government order dated 26.02.2008 was
non-existent. It thus becomes irrelevant as to whether
such an order was recalled by the Government or not.

87. Additionally, it was also submitted by the respondent-
company that the plea of the appellant-State is hit by the
Page 63 of 68


doctrine of promissory estoppel, as the respondent-
company withdrew all the pending Court cases relying on
its amicable settlement with the State. Nevertheless, in our
view, once the 2008 review by the Revenue Officer is found
to be without jurisdiction and contrary to law, the question
of invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel does not
arise.
88. Moreover, the contention advanced by the respondent-
company that the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by
going beyond the scope of prayers, as it quashed the review
order dated 07.05.2008, without any prayer or application
for the same, is without merit, because it is a well-
established law that a decree passed by a Court without
jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its invalidity could be set
up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or
relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in
collateral proceedings. The Court in the case of Kiran Singh
35
v. Chaman Paswan held as follows:
“6. … It is a fundamental principle well established that
a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a
nullity, and that its invalidity could be set up whenever
and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon,

35
(1954) 1 SCC 710.
Page 64 of 68


even at the stage of execution and even in collateral
proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is
pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the
subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority
of the court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot
be cured even by consent of parties …”


89. In the instant case, as the Revenue Officer did not have
the jurisdiction to review the earlier vesting
determination, the 2008 review order strikes at the very
root of the matter and is a non-curable defect.
Importantly, “competence of a Court to try a case goes to
the very root of the jurisdiction, and where it is lacking, it
is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction”, as was held in
36
Hira Lal Patni v. Kali Nath . A decree or order passed by
a Court which lacks inherent jurisdiction in passing such
an order or decree is non-est and void ab initio, as was
held by this Court in the case of Balvant N. Viswamitra v.
37
Yadav Sadashiv Mule . In the said case, a three-judge
Bench of this Court held that:
“9 …The main question which arises for our
consideration is whether the decree passed by the trial
court can be said to be “null” and “void”. In our opinion,
the law on the point is well settled. The distinction
between a decree which is void and a decree which is
wrong, incorrect, irregular or not in accordance with
law cannot be overlooked or ignored. Where a court
lacks inherent jurisdiction in passing a decree or

36
1961 SCC OnLine SC 42.
37
(2004) 8 SCC 706.
Page 65 of 68


making an order, a decree or order passed by such
court would be without jurisdiction, non est and void
ab initio. A defect of jurisdiction of the court goes to the
root of the matter and strikes at the very authority of
the court to pass a decree or make an order. Such
defect has always been treated as basic and
fundamental and a decree or order passed by a court
or an authority having no jurisdiction is a nullity.
Validity of such decree or order can be challenged at
any stage, even in execution or collateral proceedings. ”

90. Another submission was made by the respondent-
company that the appellant-State had not taken physical
possession of the land, and no compensation was paid to
the respondent-company. This, in our view, does not alter
the nature of the status of land inasmuch as that vesting
order dated 07.10.1971 had attained finality, and mere
holding of some parts of the land would not endow any
right to the respondent-company to claim ownership or
title over the same.
CONCLUSION

91. For the reasons discussed above, we hold that the review
undertaken by the Revenue Officer culminating in the
fresh order dated 07.05.2008 was wholly without
jurisdiction and void ab initio. The WBEA Act, 1953, does
not confer any power of substantive review upon the
Revenue Officer, either expressly or by necessary
Page 66 of 68


implication. The Government Order dated 26.02.2008,
even though approved at the ministerial level, could not
create or confer such jurisdiction on the Revenue Officer.
The review further fails on merits, as none of the conditions
prescribed under Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the CPC were
satisfied.
92. The Tribunal, in setting aside the fresh review order dated
07.05.2008 and restoring the vesting determination of
1971, rightly appreciated the statutory scheme of the
WBEA Act, 1953, and well-settled principles governing the
limits of quasi-judicial power. The conclusion of the
Tribunal that the Revenue Officer lacked jurisdiction to
reopen by way of review of a concluded vesting order is
consistent with both legislative intent and binding
precedents.
93. The High Court, however, fell into error in reversing the
Tribunal’s decision. It incorrectly proceeded on the premise
that the Government Order issued under Section 57A of
the WBEA Act, 1953, having been approved by the
Minister-in-Charge, constituted sufficient authority to
confer review jurisdiction upon the Revenue Officer. This
Page 67 of 68


approach conflated executive direction with statutory
conferment of substantive power and treated review as a
mere procedural incident of Civil Court powers. The High
Court also overlooked the limits on vesting the judicial
function of review power in executive authorities.
94. Consequently, for the reasons discussed above, the appeal
filed by the appellant-State is allowed.
The impugned judgment of the High Court dated
17.05.2012, passed in WPLRT No. 43 of 2010, is set aside.
The order of the Tribunal dated 31.03.2010 is restored,
and the review order dated 07.05.2008 passed by the
Revenue Officer stands quashed.
The vesting order dated 07.10.1971 shall continue to
operate in accordance with the law.



……………………………J.
(M. M. SUNDRESH)



…………….…………………………J.
(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)


NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 06, 2026.
Page 68 of 68