SRIRAM HOUSING FINANCE AND INVESTMENT INDIA LIMITED vs. OMESH MISRA MEMORIAL CHARITABLE TRUST

Case Type: Civil Appeal

Date of Judgment: 06-07-2022

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NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.  4649  OF 2022 [ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.12833 OF 2014] SRIRAM HOUSING FINANCE AND INVESTMENT  INDIA LTD.    …APPELLANT VERSUS OMESH MISHRA MEMORIAL CHARITABLE  TRUST    ...RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T J.K. Maheshwari, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal is arising out of the judgment dated 16.04.2014 passed   by   High   Court   of   Delhi   in   C.M.   (M)   No.493   of   2012, preferred   by   appellant   company   herein   under   Article   227   of Constitution of India, against the order dated 13.01.2012 passed in Execution Petition No.46 of 2006, vide which, the Executing Court entertained the objections filed by appellant company and Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Rachna Date: 2022.07.06 16:48:33 IST Reason: 1 proceeded to frame issues with a direction to the parties to lead evidence on those issues.  3. The   Execution   Petition   was   filed   by   respondent   trust, alongwith legal heirs of late Shri N.D. Mishra for execution of judgment and decree dated 01.02.2003 passed by Trial Court in Civil Suit No. 278 of 2002. The suit was filed by late Shri N.D. Mishra   making   prayer   for   a   decree   for:   (i)   possession   of   suit property; (ii) sum of Rs.8000/­ on account of arrear of rent for the   month   of   May,   1994;   (iii)   sum   of   Rs.30,000/­   towards damages/mesne profits/other charges for unauthorized use and occupation by the defendant with effect from 01.06.1994 till the date the defendant delivers back possession of suit property; (iv) permanent injunction against the defendant restraining her from using the suit property; and (v) mandatory injunction against the defendant   restraining   her   from   obstructing   the   plaintiff   in enjoying the right of passage from main entrance on ground floor to   the   terrace.   The   Trial   Court   decreed   the   suit   in   favour   of plaintiffs while restraining the defendant from obstructing the plaintiff   from   enjoying   the   right   of   passage   from   the   main entrance on ground floor to the terrace and from raising further construction. Further regarding damages and mesne profits, the 2 Trial   Court   directed   payment   of   Rs.30,000/­   per   month   with effect from 01.06.1994   till the date of delivery of possession of suit   property   by   the   defendant.   Execution   proceedings   were initiated by decree holders and being aggrieved, the appellant company   filed   objections   before   Executing   Court,   which   were duly   considered   and   decided   by   the   Court   vide   order   dated 13.01.2012. The said order was challenged by the respondent trust before   the  High  Court  by  filing   the   petition,   which  was allowed vide order dated 16.04.2014 setting aside the order of the Executing Court. 4. The facts briefly put are that, one late Shri N.D. Mishra (now deceased) was the owner of the property in dispute i.e. Kothi No.27,   situated   at   Ishwar   Nagar   in   New   Delhi.   The   disputed property was self­acquired by the deceased. Shri N.D. Mishra had a family consisting his wife Smt. Raj Mishra (now deceased), two sons namely Mr. Yogesh Mishra and Mr. Omesh Mishra (now deceased)   and   three   married   daughters   namely   Smt.   Dheera Sharma,  Smt.  Neena  Bharadwaj  and  Smt.  Meena  Sharma.  In memory   of   the   deceased   son,   the   respondent   trust   was established in year 1992 by Smt. Raj Mishra in the name and style of “Omesh Mishra Memorial Charitable Trust”.  3 5. The history of instant litigation starts from the time when late Shri N.D. Mishra in year 1986, lent a portion of the ground floor of the suit property on lease to one Ms. Nisha Chauhan (hereinafter referred to as ‘tenant’) for a period of two years at the monthly lease rent of Rs. 7000/­. On expiry of the period, the lease was terminated but the tenant failed to vacate the suit property, whereafter, Shri N.D. Mishra filed Civil Suit No.181 of 1994   (i.e.   suit   for   possession/recovery   of   arrears   of rent/damages/mesne   profit   and   mandatory/permanent injunction) against the tenant. During the pendency of suit, Shri N.D.   Mishra   died   on   27.05.1998.   On   13.08.1998,   by   filing application under Order XXII Rule 3 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’), substitution was allowed by Trial Court and Smt. Raj Mishra (wife), Mr. Yogesh Mishra (son),   Mrs.   Dheera   Sharma,   Mrs.   Neena   Bharadwaj   and   Mrs. Meena Sharma (daughters) were substituted as legal heirs. Later, one   Subhash   Chander   Sabharwal   (the   authorized   trustee   of respondent trust herein) moved an application dated 02.08.1999 under Order I Rule 10 read with Section 151 of CPC before the Trial Court  and   sought  impleadment  as   plaintiff   in  Civil  Suit No.181/1994 on the anvil of ‘Will dated 29.08.1992’ executed by 4 Shri   N.D.   Mishra   in   his   lifetime,   whereby,   as   stated   in   the application,   Shri   N.D.   Mishra   in   terms   of   aforesaid   ‘Will’, bequeathed the property in question in favour of the respondent trust. It was at this time when the existence of the will dated 29.08.1992 executed by Shri N.D. Mishra was brought to the notice of the Trial Court. Reply to the said application filed on behalf of respondent trust seeking impleadment was sought by Trial   Court   from   the   substituted   legal   heirs.   Vide   application dated 03.12.1999, the plaintiff legal heirs filed their reply and stated that they were not in knowledge of the said will executed by Shri N.D. Mishra in favour of the Trust and admitted the ownership of respondent trust over the property in question in the following manner –  “4. ……..The legal heirs of Shri N.D. Mishra first time came to  know regarding the execution of Will of Shri N.D. Mishra on   06.06.1998   when  one  of   the   legal   heir  Smt.  Neena Bharadwaj has attended the meeting of Omesh Mishra Memorial  Trust  Pvt. Ltd.   It  is  correct  that  Shri N.D. Mishra   on   account   of   fact   and   by   virtue   of   said WILL,   the   property   bearing   Kothi   No.   27,   Ishwar Nagar, New Delhi has been bequeathed in favour of Omesh   Mishra   Memorial   Charitable   Trust ……It   is further correct that said Trust shall be entitled to get the aforesaid property transferred in its own name and trust is also competent to dispose­off the said property……It is further   correct   that   by   virtue   of   said   Will,   Omesh Mishra   Memorial   Charitable   Trust/applicant   has 5 become the owner of the suit property and entitled to substitute as plaintiff/co­plaintiffs in the present suit ….” It is worthwhile here to mention that the none of the legal heirs dispute  the  validity/genuineness  of  the  will and  admitted  the existence of same. Thereafter, vide order dated 30.11.2000, the Trial   Court   allowed   the   application   for   impleadment   and respondent   trust   became   the   co­plaintiff   in   Civil   Suit No.181/1994 alongwith plaintiffs legal heirs. 6. Eventually, vide judgment and decree dated 01.02.2003, the ‘decree for possession’ in respect of suit premises, ‘mandatory injunction’ as well as ‘mesne profits/damages’ were passed in favour of plaintiffs i.e. the legal heirs and against the defendant i.e. the tenant. The relevant portion of the said judgment and decree is reproduced below for ready reference –  "In view of my finding on the foregoing issues, the decree for possession in respect of the suit premises i.e. house bearing no.27, Ishwar Nagar, Main Mathura Road, New Delhi – 110025 as shown in red in Ex. PW1/3 as well as decree for possession in respect of portion shown in yellow in site plan Ex. PW 1/3 is passed   in   favour   of   the   plaintiff   and   against   the . Further, decree of mandatory injunction is passed in defendant favour   of   plaintiff   thereby   restraining   the   defendant   from obstructing the plaintiff from joying the right of passage from the main entrance on the ground floor to the terrace and from raising further construction. The suit of plaintiff is also been decreed in respect of the relief of mesne profits/damages and decree for 6 damages/mesne   profits   @   Rs.30,000/­   per   month   passed   in favour   of   the   plaintiff   and   against   the   defendants   w.e.f. 01.06.1994 till date the defendant delivers back the possession of the suit premises…..”  Originally, in the judgment and decree dated 01.02.2003, the name   of   the   respondent   trust   herein   was   not   incorporated, whereafter,   vide   order   dated   16.10.2004,   the   correction   with respect to name of parties was carried out by Trial Court and name of   respondent  trust  was   included   as   one   of   the  decree holders.   Henceforth,   for   the   purpose   of   judgment   and   decree dated 01.02.2003, the legal heirs of Shri N.D. Mishra alongwith respondent trust herein became the decree holders, whereas the obligations of the judgment debtor vested with the tenant for execution.   Pursuant   thereto,   vide   possession   letter   dated 22.12.2003,   the   tenant   handed   over   the   vacant   and   physical possession of the suit property to one Shri S.R. Pandey who was acting as power of attorney holder and authorized agent of Mr. Yogesh Mishra. 7. On the said factual premise, Execution Petition No.13/2004 was filed by decree holders seeking enforcement of judgment and decree dated 01.02.2003 against the tenant. It was at this time when   the   dispute   arose,   once   it   came   to   the   notice   of   the 7 respondent   trust   that   based   on   mutation   entry   in   revenue records in his favour, Mr. Yogesh Mishra had transferred the suit property   to   the   appellant   company   vide   sale   deed   dated 12.04.2004. The appellant company while acting as the agent of Mr. Yogesh Mishra even took the possession of the suit property directly from tenant i.e., the judgment debtor on 22.12.2003. On the   perusal   of   the   possession   letter,   it   was   found   that   the appellant   company   termed   itself   as   bona­fide   agent/power   of attorney holder of Mr. Yogesh Mishra.  8. Subsequently, the appellant company filed an application dated   23.09.2004   under   Order   XXI   Rule   58   of   CPC   in   the execution   proceedings   and   prayed   for   dismissal   of   execution petition   on   the   ground   that   vide   registered   sale   deed   dated 12.04.2004,   appellant   company   became   owner   of   the   suit property.   Vide   order   dated   27.11.2004,   the   Executing   Court dismissed the aforesaid application filed by appellant company as non­maintainable   on   the   ground   that   respondent   trust   was impleaded as co­plaintiff in the main suit based on ‘Will dated 29.08.1992’ which was never disputed/objected by legal heirs of late Shri N.D. Mishra. The relevant portion of order reads as under – 8 “(A) ……I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival contention of the parties. It is clear from the record that vide   order   dated   30.11.2000,   Omesh   Mishra   Memorial Charitable Trust was impleaded as co­plaintiff in the main suit   as   there   was   a   WILL   in   favour   of   Trust   dated 29.08.1992 and   this  WILL  was not  objected  by  the LR’s  of late Shri  N.D.  Mishra . Considering all  these facts a decree has been passed in favour of DH, thus, applicant have got no right to stay in the property and is liable to handover the vacant and peaceful possession to the   DH.   It   is   also   clear   that   judgment/decree   for possession has been passed in favour of the trust and thus Sh. Yogesh Mishra has/had got no right to transfer the title/possession of the suit property to anyone. Decree dated 01.02.2003 passed in favour of the Omesh Mishra Memorial Charitable Trust. LR’s of Sh. N.D. Mishra has not been challenged by the JD or anyone else, thus, the same has become final …..”  Review against such dismissal was also preferred by appellant company, though the same came to be dismissed by Executing Court vide order dated 24.12.2004.  9. Thereafter,   appellant   company   preferred   Civil   Revision No.34/2005   challenging   the   aforesaid   order   of   rejection   of application   alongwith   the   order   passed   in   Review.   The   said Revision also came to be dismissed by High Court vide order dated 27.11.2008 with the observation that since the appellant company   was   a   ‘purchaser   pendente   lite’,   it   could   not   have instituted the objections and the only remedy available to it was to file a separate suit to get the dispute adjudicated regarding 9 title and ownership of suit property. The order passed in Civil Revision was impugned by the appellant company before this Court in Special Leave Petition (C) No.31457 of 2008, which also came   to   be   dismissed   vide   order   dated   12.01.2009,   with   an observation that “since the High Court has permitted filing of a suit, it goes without saying that observation made in present proceedings will not be determinative issue if the suit is filed.” Following the dismissal of Special Leave Petition with aforesaid observation, the appellant company filed separate suit bearing no. CS (OS) No.434/2009 before High Court for ‘declaration and permanent   injunction’   against   the   respondent   trust   and   legal heirs of Shri N.D. Mishra. Written statement and objections were taken on record and after hearing both the parties, the said suit vide order dated 22.12.2010 was ‘dismissed as withdrawn’ by High Court with liberty as under–  “5. Since   the   learned   Senior   Counsel   for   the   plaintiff   has sought permission to withdraw the suit with liberty to file objections, the same is allowed subject to all objections being raised by defendants herein as may be permissible under law. 6. The   suit   is   accordingly   dismissed   as   withdrawn   with liberty as prayed for.” 10 10. In view of the liberty granted by High Court vide order dated 22.12.2010,   the   appellant   company   on   03.01.2011   filed   its objections under Order XXI Rules 97 to 101 CPC in Execution Petition   No.46/2006   (i.e.,   the   same   proceedings   previously numbered as Execution Petition No.13/2004) and reiterated the same objections as raised by it under Order XXI Rule 58 in the previous round of litigation. The respondent trust filed objections and challenged the maintainability of the application. Vide order dated 13.01.2012, the Executing Court while dealing with the objections framed the issues and directed the parties to lead their evidence. Being aggrieved, the respondent trust preferred CM(M) No.493/2012   and   C.M.   No.7470/2012   before   High   Court   and assailed the order dated 13.01.2012 passed by Executing Court in Execution Petition  No.46/2006.   The  High Court  vide  order dated 16.04.2014 allowed the petition and set aside the order passed  by   Executing   Court   primarily   on   the   ground   that   the Executing Court at the stage of execution proceedings framed the issues to lead parties to evidence without keeping in mind that once the objections under Order XXI Rule 58 of CPC filed by the appellant   company   against   the   execution   of   the   decree,   were already decided by the Executing Court, High Court as well as 11 this   Court   against   the   appellant   company   in   previous proceedings with the observation that the only remedy left with appellant company is to file an ‘independent/separate suit’ to decide the  dispute  with  respect to  title/ownership  of the  suit property, the objections filed by appellant company again at the stage of execution proceedings were not maintainable. The High Court further observed that, if the objections were to be held maintainable, it would amount to a fresh trial and hence, the decree holder may not be able to get the fruits of the decree for the next couple of decades while the illegal possession obtained by appellant company with respect to suit property shall remain with it. 11. The   appellant   company   has   assailed   the   impugned judgment inter­alia on the following grounds –  a) The appellant company is a bona­fide purchaser of the suit property as it was purchased from Mr. Yogesh Mishra (son of Shri N.D. Mishra) vide registered sale deed dated 12.04.2004; b) Mr. Yogesh Mishra was the sole and absolute owner of the suit property by virtue of ‘Will dated 23.05.1998’ and same was sold to appellant company by Mr. Yogesh Mishra being a 12 decree  holder   after   the   decree   was   passed.   Therefore,  the appellant   company   is   legally   entitled   to   raise   objections under Order XXI Rule 97 to 101 of CPC; c) High Court erred in interpreting Order XXI Rule 102 of CPC as it is only applicable when judgment debtor has transferred the   property   after   the   institution   of   suit,   whereas,   in   the instant case, the suit property was sold by decree holder; d) It is well settled that the Executing Court has discretion to frame   issues   and   to   conduct   a   trial   in   the   matter   while adjudicating the objections filed under Order XXI Rule 97 to 101 of CPC. e) Reliance is placed on following case laws to substantiate the grounds as raised above –  i. Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Rajiv Trust and Another, (1998) 3 SCC 723. ii. Vateena Begum Vs. Shamim Zafar & Anr., (2020) SCC OnLine Del 1617. 12. Per contra, the counsel for the respondent trust supported the impugned judgment passed by High Court and contended as follows –  13 a. The appellant company is claiming the suit property on the anvil of ‘Will dated 23.05.1998’ which has not been proved in any court of law by leading primary evidence in terms of Section 64 of Indian Evidence Act; b. The Executing Court has gone into the claim or objection preferred by appellant company and once finality has been bestowed upon adjudication made under Order XXI and Rule 58, it can only be supplanted by another decree in Civil Suit. Therefore, having already invoked Order XXI Rule 58 of CPC, the appellant cannot invoke proceedings under Order XXI Rule 97 to 101 of CPC under doctrine of election; c. The   appellant   company   cannot   invoke   proceedings   under Order XXI Rule 97 as only the ‘decree­holder’ or an ‘auction purchaser’ is entitled to make an application thereto. The appellant company does not fall under both the categories. Further, for purpose of Rule 99, the applicant has to make a statement that he/she has been ‘dispossessed of immoveable property’ by either the decree­holder or auction purchaser. In the  instant  case,  the   appellant company   is   very  much  in possession of suit property; 14 d. The judicial records sufficiently show that Mr. Yogesh Mishra had   no   title   over   the   suit   property   which   he   could   have transferred to appellant company; e. ‘Will dated 29.08.1992’ stands proved in Court in Civil Suit No.181 of 1994 and hence, the said Will cannot be disputed merely by oral evidence; 13. Heard   the   rival   contentions   of   learned   counsel   for   both parties   and   perused   the   material   available   on   record.   Before adverting to the rival contentions raised by both the parties, it is apt to reproduce the Order XXI alongwith Rules 97 to 102 for ready reference –  “Order XXI – Execution of decrees and orders 97. Resistance or obstruction to possession of immovable property –  (1) Where   the   holder   of   a   decree   for   the   possession   of immovable property or the purchaser of any such property sold in execution of a decree is resisted or obstructed by any person obtaining possession of the property, he may make   an   application   to   the   Court   complaining   of   such resistance or obstruction. (2) [Where any application is made under sub­rule (1), the Court shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained.] 98. Orders after adjudication –  (1) Upon the  determination of  questions  referred  to  in rule 101,   the   Court   shall,   in   accordance   with   such 15 determination and subject to the provisions of sub­rule (2), ­  a. make   an   order   allowing   the   application   and directing   that   the   applicant   be   put   into   the possession   of   the   property   or   dismissing   the application; or b. pass such other order as, in the circumstances of the case, it may deem fit. (2) Where,   upon  such  determination,  the   Court  is  satisfied that the resistance or obstruction was occasioned without any just cause by the judgment­debtor or by some other person   at   his   instigation   or   on   his   behalf,   or   by   any transferee,   where   such   transfer   was   made   during   the pendency of the suit or execution proceeding, it shall direct that the applicant be put into possession of the property, and where the applicant is still resisted or obstructed in obtaining possession, the Court may also, at the instance of the applicant, order the judgment­debtor, or any person acting at his instigation or on his behalf, to be detained in the civil prison for a term which may extend to thirty days. 99. Dispossession by decree­holder or purchaser –  (1) Where   any   person   other   than   the   judgment   debtor   is dispossessed of immovable property by the holder of a decree for the possession of such property or, where such property has been sold in execution of a decree, by the purchaser   thereof,   he   may   make   an   application   to   the Court complaining of such dispossession. (2) Where   any   such   application   is   made,   the   Court   shall proceed to adjudicate upon the application in accordance with the provisions herein contained. 100. Order to be passed upon application complaining of dispossession –  Upon the determination of questions referred to in rule 101,   the   Court   shall,   in   accordance   with   such determination, – 16 a. make   an   order   allowing   the   application   and directing   that   the   applicant   be   put   into   the possession   of   the   property   or   dismissing   the application; or b. pass such other order as, in the circumstances of the case, it may deem fit. 101. Question to be determined –  All questions (including questions relating to right, title or interest in the property) arising between the parties to a proceeding on an application under rule 97 or rule 99 or their representatives, and relevant to the adjudication of the application, shall be determined by the Court dealing with the application, and not by a separate suit and for this purpose, the Court shall, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to have jurisdiction to decide such questions. 102. Rules not applicable to transferee pendente lite –  Nothing in rules 98 and 100 shall apply to resistance or obstruction in execution of a decree for the possession of immovable property by a person to whom the judgment­ debtor has transferred the property after the institution of the   suit   in   which   the   decree   was   passed   or   to   the dispossession of any such person. Explanation – In this rule, “transfer” includes a transfer by operation of law. 14. From bare reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is clear that Order XXI Rule 97 deals with the resistance or obstruction to possession   of   immovable   property   by   ‘any   person’   obtaining possession of the property against the decree holder. It empowers the ‘decree  holder’  to  make  an  application  complaining   about 17 such resistance or obstruction. On the other hand, Rule 99 of Order XXI deals with the right of ‘any person’ other than the judgment debtor who is dispossessed by holder of a decree for possession of such property or in case where such property is sold in furtherance of execution of a decree. The said provision vests   ‘any   person’   with   a   right   to   make   an   application complaining about such dispossession of immovable property in the manner prescribed above. Rule 98 and Rule 100 deal with the power   of   the   Court   to   pass   appropriate   orders   upon   an application preferred under Rule 97 and Rule 99 respectively. In so far as Rule 101 is concerned, it confers jurisdiction on the Court as well as casts an obligation to determine the questions relating to right, title or interest in the property, if any, arising between parties on an application made by the concerned person under   Rule   97   or   Rule   99   in   the   same   proceedings   for adjudication and not in a separate suit. Lastly, Rule 102 clarifies that   Rule   98   and   Rule   100   shall   not   apply   in   a   case   where resistance   or   obstruction   in   execution   of   a   decree   for   the possession   of   immovable   property   is   offered   by   ‘transferee pendente­lite’ i.e., the person to whom the property is transferred 18 by the judgment debtor after institution of the suit in which the decree sought to be executed was passed.  15. On conjoint reading of the aforesaid provisions, it can be observed that under Rule 97, it is only the ‘decree holder’ who is entitled   to   make   an   application   in   case   where   he   is   offered resistance or obstruction by ‘any person’. In the present case, as admitted by the appellant itself, it is a bona­fide purchaser of the property   and   not   the   ‘decree   holder’.   As   available   from   the material placed on record, it is the respondent trust alongwith legal heirs of late N.D. Mishra who are the decree holders and not the appellant. Therefore, it is obvious that appellant cannot take shelter of Rule 97 as stated above to raise objections against execution of decree passed in favour of respondent. Further, Rule 99   pertains   to   making   a   complaint   to   the   Court   against ‘dispossession’   of   the   immovable   property   by   the   person   in ‘possession’ of the property by the holder of a decree or purchaser thereof. It is factually not in dispute that appellant purchased the said   property   from   Mr.   Yogesh   Mishra   vide   sale   deed   dated 12.04.2004 and has been in vacant and physical possession of the property since then. Had it been the case that the appellant was dispossessed by the respondent trust in execution of decree 19 dated 02.09.2003, the appellant would have been well within the ambit of Rule 99 to make an application seeking appropriate relief to be put back in possession. On the contrary, the appellant in the instant case was never dispossessed from the property in question   and   till   date,   as   contended   and   unrefuted,   the possession   of   same   rests   with   the   appellant.   Considering   the aforesaid, the appellant cannot be said to be entitled to make an application   under   Rule   99   raising   objections   in   execution proceedings since he has never been dispossessed as required under Rule 99.  16. Now, as stated above, applications under Rule 97 and Rule 99 are subject to Rule 101 which provides for determination of questions relating to disputes as to right, title or interest in the property arising between the parties to the proceedings or their representatives on an application made under Rule 97 or Rule 99. Effectively, the said Rule does away with the requirement of filing   of   fresh   suit   for   adjudication   of   disputes   as   mentioned above. Now, in the present case, Order XXI Rule 101 has no applicability   as   the   appellant   is   neither   entitled   to   make   an application under Rule 97 nor Rule 99 for the reasons stated above. Accordingly, we find no substance in the argument raised 20 by   learned   counsel   for   the   appellant.   In   such   circumstances, Executing   Court   had   no   occasion   to   frame   issues   and   give direction   to   parties   to   lead   evidence   on   objections   raised   by appellant.   By  doing  so,  the   Executing   Court  transgressed   the scope   of   Order   XXI   Rule   97   and   Rule   99.   Therefore,   in   our considered view, the High Court has rightly set aside the order of Trial Court entertaining the objections filed by appellant under Order XXI Rule 97 to Rule 102. 17.  Resultantly, this appeal is dismissed with a direction to the Executing Court to decide the execution case as expeditiously as possible not later than six months.  ………..………………...J.  (INDIRA BANERJEE)       .….………………………J.  (J.K. MAHESHWARI) New Delhi; July 06, 2022 21