Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
MOHD. SULAIMAN
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
MOHD. AYUB & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
09/12/1964
BENCH:
WANCHOO, K.N.
BENCH:
WANCHOO, K.N.
GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ)
SHAH, J.C.
AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA
SIKRI, S.M.
CITATION:
1965 AIR 1319 1965 SCR (2) 398
ACT:
Civil dispute-Person hiring article for own use later
claiming ownership by purchase-Dispute about nature of
agreement-Hirer whether guilty of breach of trust-Indian
Penal Code ss. 405 and 406.
HEADNOTE:
The appellant took an electric motor from an electrical
Works in which the respondent was employed. Dispute arose
about the terms on which the motor had been taken. The
appellant wrote a letter to the Works that he had purchased
the motor after paying its full price; on behalf of the
works it was said that it had only been given on hire. The
Works, through the respondent, filed a complaint against the
appellant alleging breach of trust. The complaint was
dismissed by the trying magistrate but in appeal under s.
417(3) Criminal Procedure Code the High Court held that the
claim of ownership made by the appellant in his letter was
not bona fide and that by writing the said letter he had
sought to cause wrongful gain to himself and wrongful loss
to the works in violation of the entrustment, which made him
guilty under s. 406 of the Indian Penal Code. In appeal to
the Supreme Court by special leave,
HELD:The appeal must succeed.
Clearly s. 405 contemplates something being done with
respect to the property which would indicate either
misappropriation or conversion to the offender’s own use, or
its use or disposal in violation of the contract express or
implied. But when as in the present case nothing was done
with respect to the use of the property which was not in
accordance with the hiring agreement between the parties it
cannot be said there was misappropriation or conversion of
the property or its use or disposal in violation of the
contract. The appellant did not part with the possession of
the motor to any body else; he put it to his own use-the
purpose for which he had taken it. The use of the motor
remained the same after the letter in question as before it.
The said letter merely raised a dispute of a civil nature
between the parties and there was no question of any
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criminal breach of trust punishable under s. 406 with
respect to the matter on the basis of that letter. [401 D-F;
402 E]
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 128 of
1962.
Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 30, 1962,
of the Calcutta High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 429 of
1960.
S. C. Mazumdar, for the appellant.
P. K. Chakravarti and P. K. Bose, for the respondent no.
2.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Wanchoo, J. This is an appeal on a certificate granted by
the Calcutta High Court. The appellant hired a westing
house,
399
D. C. motor from the Modem Electrical Works (hereinafter
referred to as the Works) on April 4, 1958 on a rent of Rs.
40 per month. The hiring period was to last for at least
three months and it was agreed that if the motor or parts
thereof were lost or damaged by the appellant, he would be
bound to pay the whole cost of the motor and the parts. The
motor remained in the use of the appellant and hire-charges
were paid by him from April 1958 to January 1959.
Thereafter it is said that no hire-charges were paid. On
June 8, 1959, the appellant wrote a letter to the Works in
which he said that he had purchased the motor in question
for Rs. 600 on condition that the same would be tried for
three months, and if it was found satisfactory the money
would be paid and the purchase completed. The letter also
stated that the agreement was that if the motor was not
found satisfactory, the appellant would pay three months’
hire at Rs. 40 per month and the motor would be returned
thereafter. Finally, the appellant said in the letter that
the Works had been paid Rs. 620 in all and thus the purchase
had been completed. The appellant therefore requested the
Works to give him a slip saying that the motor had been sold
to the appellant, as no further money was due to the Works.
On June 15, 1959, the Works sent a reply to the appellant
denying that any such agreement as was alleged by the
appellant had been made. It was also denied that Rs. 620
had been paid, and therefore the purchase was complete.
Finally it was said that the appellant had only paid Rs. 400
and Rs. 200 were still due from him for the months of
February to June 1959. The appellant replied to this letter
in which he reiterated his stand taken in the earlier letter
and gave details of how the payment of Rs. 620 had been
made. Thereafter the Works filed a complaint through its
servant Mohd. Ayub on July 1, 1959 in which after stating
its case it urged that the appellant had committed criminal
breach of trust and was therefore guilty under s. 406 of the
Indian Penal Code.
On this complaint the appellant was summoned by the Presi-
dency Magistrate 9th Court, Calcutta and after taking some
evidence for the prosecution, the Magistrate discharged the
appellant holding that there was no satisfactory evidence of
dishonest misappropriation or conversion of the motor by the
appellant to his own use and that the dispute between the
parties was essentially of a civil nature. Mohd. Ayub then
went in revision to the High Court. The High Court set
aside the order of discharge and directed further enquiry in
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the matter by another Magistrate. The case then went back
to the Third Presidency Magistrate, Calcutta,
400
who eventually found the appellant not guilty and ordered
his acquittal on the ground that there was dispute between
the parties as to the actual nature of the transaction and
it could not be said that there was any dishonest intention
on the part of the appellant to misappropriate the motor.
Mohd. Ayub then filed an appeal before the High Court under
S. 417(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Eventually the
matter was heard by a Division Bench of the High Court, and
it came to the conclusion that it was clear from the letter
of June 8, 1959 (to which we have already referred) that the
same could not have been written unless the appellant
dishonestly in violation of the entrustment wanted to cause
wrongful loss to the complainant and wrongful gain to
himself. It was further held that the letter did not show
that there was a bona fide claim of ownership over the
property and the claim was merely a pretence which could not
exonerate the appellant from being punished under S. 406 of
the Indian Penal Code. ’The appellant then applied for a
certificate to enable him to file an appeal to this Court,
which was granted; and that is how the matter has come up
before us.
We are of the opinion that this appeal must succeed. It is
not in dispute between the parties that the motor was
entrusted to the appellant by the Works for his use. The
dispute was whether this entrustment was merely by way of
hire (which was the case of the Works) or, as was the case
of the appellant, was on the basis of an agreement between
the parties that the appellant would purchase the motor if
he found it satisfactory after trying it for .three months
and pay Rs. 600 as the price and that he would return it if
he found it unsatisfactory during this period of three
months and pay Rs. 40 each month as hire for that period.
The real dispute between the parties therefore was as to the
nature of the agreement between them when the motor was
entrusted to the appellant in April 1958. That dispute was
clearly of a civil nature. The Works however contended that
by writing the letter of June 8, 1959 the appellant
committed breach of trust and was guilty under S. 406 of the
Indian Penal Code. Now in that letter the appellant put
forward his side of the case as to the terms of the
agreement when he took delivery of the motor in April 1958.
The question is whether by writing that letter the appellant
could be said to have committed the offence defined in s.
405 of the Indian Penal Code and punishable under S. 406
thereof. Now s. 405 runs as follows :-
"Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property,
or with any dominion over property, dishonestly mis-
401
appropriates or converts to his own use that
property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of
that property in violation of any direction of
law prescribing the mode in which such trust
is to be discharged, or of any legal contract,
express or implied, which he has made touching
the discharge of such trust, or wilfully
suffers any other person so to do, commits
criminal breach of trust."
It may be accepted that the appellant was entrusted with the
motor by virtue of the agreement between him and the Works,
the terms of which are seriously in dispute. The question
however is whether the ’appellant dishonestly
misappropriated or converted to his own use that motor. On
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the facts in the present case the motor was handed over to
the appellant for his use even according to the case of the
Works. Unless therefore it can be shown that the appellant
by doing something to the motor which he was not entitled to
do dishonestly misappropriated or converted the motor to his
own use, he cannot be guilty of breach of trust under this
part of s. 405. Now the case of the Works is that the
appellant must be deemed to have misappropriated or
converted to his own use the motor by writing the letter of
June 8th. It is clear however that the letter shows no
change in the use of the motor, which, according to the
Works, the appellant had hired for his own use. Therefore
it cannot be said that merely by writing that letter of June
8, the appellant dealt with the motor in such manner as
would amount to its misappropriation or conversion to his
own use by him. Clearly the appellant was using the motor
for his own purpose before that letter and continued to use
it in the same way after the letter. That letter therefore
cannot in our opinion result in the misappropriation or
conversion of the motor to his own use by the appellant
within the meaning of these words in s. 405 in the
circumstances of the present case.
It is however urged that even if that be so, the appellant
must be held to have dishonestly used or disposed of the
motor in violation of the legal contract, express or
implied, which he had made touching the discharge of such
trust, because of the letter of June 8. Now it is clear from
the receipt given by the appellant to the Works when he took
the motor in April 1958 that he was taking it for his own
use on certain terms. There is however nothing to show that
by writing the letter of June 8 the appellant used the motor
in violation of any legal contract, express or implied,
which he bad made with respect to it for use of the motor
was the same before the letter as well as after it. Nor can
it be
402
said that the appellant had disposed of the motor in
violation of any legal contract which he had made with
respect thereto for it is not the case of the Works that the
appellant had parted with the possession of the motor to
somebody else. If, for example, the appellant had sold that
motor, there might have been something to be said for the
view that he had disposed of the motor in violation of the
contract with respect to it even if it was a hirepurchase
contract. But on the facts of this case all that the letter
of June 8 does is to put forward the case of the appellant
with respect to the transaction of April 4, 1958. So far as
the use of the motor is concerned there has not been any
change in it to indicate either misappropriation or
conversion or disposal of it in any manner against the terms
of the contract, express or implied. Clearly s. 405
contemplates something being done with respect to the
property which would indicate either misappropriation or
conversion or its use or disposal in violation of the
contract, express or implied. But where, as in the present
case, nothing was done with respect to the use of the
property which was not in accordance with the hiring
agreement between the parties, it cannot be said that there
was misappropriation or conversion of the property or its
use or disposal in violation of the contract. We are not
expressing any opinion as to the correctness of the case
either of the appellant or of the Works in this behalf. All
that we emphasise is that the letter of June 8 merely raises
a’ dispute of civil nature between the parties and there is
no question of any criminal breach of trust with respect to
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the motor on the basis of that letter. In this view of the
matter we allow the appeal, set aside the conviction of the
appellant and order his acquittal. The fine, if paid. will
be refunded to him.
Appeal allowed.