Full Judgment Text
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CRL.M.C. 1204/2010
nd
% Reserved on: 22 March, 2012
st
Decided on: 1 June, 2012
RAKESH KUMAR GOYAL ..... Petitioner
Through Mr. Rajeev K. Virmani, Sr. Adv. with
Mr. R.S. Bhatnagar, Adv.
versus
NCT OF DELHI & ANR. ..... Respondent
Through Mr. A.S. Chandhiok, ASG with Mr.
Satish Aggarwala, Adv.
Coram:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MUKTA GUPTA
th
1. By the present petition the Petitioner challenges the order dated 15
January, 2008 summoning the Petitioner for offences under Sections 174/175
IPC and quashing of the criminal complaint No. 8/1 of 2008 titled as “Shri
R.K. Chibber Vs. Rakesh Kumar Goyal” pending with the Learned
Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi.
2. Learned counsel for the Petitioner contends that none of the summons
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allegedly issued under Section 108 of the Customs Act from 13 July, 2006
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to 10 July, 2007 were issued by a person duly authorized by the Central
Government in this behalf. The authorization for the first time in favour of a
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Gazetted officer of Customs was given by the Central Government on 20
February, 2008 and thus even if the Petitioner did not appear before the
officer concerned pursuant to the summons issued, no offence under
Sections 174/175 IPC is made out and thus the learned Trial Court erred in
Crl.M.C. 1204/2010 Page 1 of 16
taking cognizance on the complaint filed by the Respondent and issuing
summons to the Petitioner. It is further contended that by way of
retrospective amendment to Section 108 (1) of the Customs Act, an act,
which was not an offence when the Petitioner was required to appear and
produce documents by various summons and letters, cannot be made an
offence with retrospective effect. This violates the Constitutional guarantee
provided under Article 20 of the Constitution of India. Reliance in this
regard is placed on Star India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise,
(2005) 7 SCC 203 and Superintendent Narcotics Control Vs. Parash Singh,
(2008) 13 SCC 499 . It is next contended that the Customs Act is a self-
contained Act and provides penalties and consequences of any non-
compliance of its provisions under Section 117 of the Customs Act and thus
assuming, though not admitting, that there was non-compliance, no action
under Section 174/175 IPC could be taken. Since the Customs Act is a
special statute and declares various acts as set out from Sections 132/135-A
as offences and the manner of cognizance of the offence is laid down in
Section 137 of the Act, the same will prevail over the Indian Penal Code
(IPC) unless the offences under IPC are made specifically applicable.
Reliance is placed on Delta Impex v. Commissioner of Customs, 110 (2004)
DLT 209 (DB). Relying on Enforcement Directorate Vs. M. Samba Siva Rao
(2000) 5 SCC 431 it is submitted that the provisions of the Customs Act
would prevail over IPC and any violation of Section 103 of the Customs Act
would be punishable as specifically provided therein and not under Section
174/175 IPC. Further even on merits summons were duly complied with and
the details sought therein were furnished. Thus, the charge of non-
compliance is baseless. Reliance is placed on Saroj K. Dutta Vs. R.L.
Crl.M.C. 1204/2010 Page 2 of 16
Thaplial, 2009 (7) AD (Delhi) 274. The filing of the complaint against the
Petitioner is mala-fide as the Petitioner had filed a complaint against Dr.
John Joseph, Additional Commissioner of the Respondent under whose
charge Respondent No.2 the Investigating Officer was functioning, and thus
as a counter-blast, the Petitioner is implicated in this complaint. Further,
violating the principles of natural justice, the details of the enquiry as
requested repeatedly by the Petitioner‟s company have not been furnished.
In the alternative, it is also contended that the complaint for non-compliance
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of summons dated 12 June, 2006 and 18 July, 2006 is barred by limitation
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under Section 468 Cr.P.C. The impugned order of cognizance is dated 15
January, 2008 and the notification and amendment by way of Section 69 of
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the Finance Act 2008 came into force only on 10 May, 2008. Thus, even
on the date of issuance of the summons by the learned Trial Court, the
Custom Officer was not authorized to summon the Petitioner.
3. Learned Additional Solicitor General on the other hand contends that
since the Petitioner admits having received the summons, the non-
compliance thereof attracts Sections 174/175 IPC and thus the complaint and
the order summoning the Petitioner cannot be quashed. In view of the
amendment in the Financial Act, 2008 retrospectively amending the Section
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108(1) of the Act with effect from 13 July, 2006, the contention of the
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Petitioner that the Custom Officer had no authority to issue summon on 12
th
June, 2006 and 18 July, 2006 is without merit. Vires of the amendment
have not been challenged and in absence thereof, this Court in a petition
under Section 482 cannot hold that the Officer was not duly empowered and
competent to issue summons for appearance to the Petitioner, consequently,
Crl.M.C. 1204/2010 Page 3 of 16
the Petitioner can be prosecuted for non-compliance of the summons issued
by the Customs Officer. The essential requisites of Section 108 of the
Customs Act are “either to give evidence” or “to produce a document” or
“any other thing in any enquiry”. Thus, these are all procedural aspects for
which any retrospective amendment can be made. When an enquiry is
conducted the person summoned cannot be informed in advance about the
nature of enquiry and it is only on enquiry, offence, if any, committed can be
ascertained. Referring to the summons issued and the replies of the
Petitioner, it is stated that there was continuous default in appearance which
default continues till today and in view thereof this being a continuing
offence thus the provisions of Section 468 Cr.P.C. does not apply. The
moment the notification giving retrospective effect to the amendment is
made, the offence then committed by the Petitioner continues to be offence
till date and thus it cannot be said that on the date of offence the officer was
not empowered to issue summons. Thus, even if there was any defect
earlier, the same stood rectified. Section 117 of the Customs Act has no
application to the facts of the present case as the same applies to penalties
where no express penalty is provided in the Customs Act. Further Article 20
of the Constitution bars a person from being convicted for any offence
except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the
alleged offence. Reliance is also placed on Enforcement Directorate Vs. M.
Samba Siva Rao (2000) 5 SCC 431 wherein it was held that non-compliance
of the summons issued under Section 40 of the Foreigners Exchange
Regulation Act, 1973 (in short „FERA‟) is to be viewed seriously. Assuming
the contention of the Petitioner to be correct, though not admitting, the
procedural irregularity of the Custom Officer having no authority to summon
Crl.M.C. 1204/2010 Page 4 of 16
cannot dilute Section 174 IPC. The proceedings under Section 108 of the
Customs Act are judicial proceedings and any person who violates the same
is liable to face the rigmarole of Section 174 IPC. As regards the mala fide,
nothing has been placed on record to show that there is any mala fide on the
part of the Investigating Officer. Referring to various summons issued and
the reply of the Petitioner, it is contended that not once did the Petitioner join
the enquiry and only on one occasion incomplete documents were sent. In
any case the issues raised in the present petition are required to be decided
by the Trial Court and are not the matter for consideration in a petition under
Section 482 Cr.P.C. Further a person, who does not comply with procedural
rigour of the law, cannot seek a relief under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Briefly the case of the
Respondents is that the Respondent No.2 issued summons to the Petitioner
M/s. Bronze Logistics Pvt. Ltd. through its proprietor/ partner/ authorized
th
representative vide its letter dated 12 June, 2006 for giving necessary
evidence or producing documents in respect of the enquiry being conducted
by Respondent No.2 for the alleged exports by M/s. Bronze Logistics Pvt.
Ltd. It may be noted that this summon did not ask for any documents nor
directed the presence of Petitioner and the company could be represented
th
through authorized representative. In reply to the said summons, on 16
June, 2006 the Petitioner sent the authorized representative on behalf of the
company. In response to the summons, it was replied on behalf of the
company that they were surprised and shocked to receive the summons as
the company held one Star status and the summons were without any basis
and non-speaking. It was further stated that the Director of the company was
Crl.M.C. 1204/2010 Page 5 of 16
out of station and hence was unable to appear on the date and time fixed in
the summons and the record was lying with the auditors for the purpose of
audits, and thus the company M/s. Bronze Logistics Pvt. Ltd. is not able to
rd
produce it. Thereafter on 3 July, 2006 a fresh summon was issued to M/s.
Bronze Logistics Pvt. Ltd. through its Director for giving evidence and
producing documents. The summons itself provided that all documents
relating to the exports made through Shipping bill Nos. 5880793 and
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5880795 both dated 14 November, 2005 be forwarded. Even this summon
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was replied to by the Petitioner on 18 July, 2006 in the same manner.
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Again on 3 November, 2006 a summon was issued to the authorized
signatory of M/s. Bronze Logistics Pvt. Ltd. asking him to submit the bank
realization certificates (BRCs) in respect of Shipping Bill Nos. 5880793 and
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5880795 both dated 14 November, 2005 and seeking copies of the Shipping
th
bills along with copies of the BRC. Again a summon was issued on 10
July, 2007 by Respondent No.2 regarding its satisfaction that the documents
required for enquiry were in the possession or under control of the Petitioner
and thus his presence was required along with the copies of the BRCs in
th
respect of the goods exported through Shipping Bill No. 5880793 dated 14
November, 2005, copies of the bills relating to goods exported in the last
financial year along with attested copies of BRCs and copies of purchase
order in respect of goods exported against abovementioned Shipping bills.
In response to these summons, the authorized representative of the company
of the Petitioner sent a letter stating that the Petitioner was out of station and
was expected to return within a fortnight and sent copies of the BRCs and
copies of Shipping bill Nos. 5880793 and 5880795. However, the said
nd st
documents were not complete. Similarly on 2 April, 2007, 21 May, 2007
Crl.M.C. 1204/2010 Page 6 of 16
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and finally on 10 July, 2007 similar summons were issued, however the
Petitioner did not comply with the same and every time it was stated that the
Petitioner was out of the town and not available. Referring to the earlier
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summons dated 25 July, 2007 the Deputy Commissioner of Customs
st
Department wrote another letter on 21 August, 2007, which was replied to
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on 5 September, 2007 asking Respondent No.2 to apprise them of the
nature and basis of the so-called investigation against the Petitioner‟s
company. Thus, non-compliance of the summons issued repeatedly by
Respondent No.2 resulted in filing of the complaint before the Learned
th
ACMM and passing of the order dated 15 January, 2008 summoning the
Petitioner for offence under Sections 174/175 IPC.
5. The primary contention of the Petitioner is that at the relevant time
Respondent No.2 had no authority to summon the Petitioner and since it did
not have the authority to summon at the relevant time, the non-compliance of
the summons cannot be made an offence. The retrospective operation of the
amendment cannot create an offence retrospectively. It would be appropriate
to reproduce Section 108 of the Customs Act.
“ 108. POWER TO SUMMON PERSONS TO GIVE
EVIDENCE AND PRODUCE DOCUMENTS .
(1) Any gazetted officer of customs shall have power to
summon any person whose attendance he considers necessary
either to give evidence or to produce a document or any other
thing in any inquiry which such officer is making in connection
with the smuggling of any goods.
(2) A summons to produce documents or other things may be
for the production of certain specified documents or things or
for the production of all documents or things of a certain
Crl.M.C. 1204/2010 Page 7 of 16
description in the possession or under the control of the person
summoned.
(3) All persons so summoned shall be bound to attend either in
person or by an authorised agent, as such officer may direct;
and all persons so summoned shall be bound to state the truth
upon any subject respecting which they are examined or make
statements and produce such documents and other things as
may be required :
Provided that the exemption under section 132 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), shall be applicable
to any requisition for attendance under this section.
(4) Every such inquiry as aforesaid shall be deemed to be a
judicial proceeding within the meaning of section 193 and
section 228 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (45 of 1860).”
th
6. It may be noted that prior to the amendment on 13 July, 2006 Section
108 of the Customs Act enabled any Gazetted officer of Customs to summon
any person to give evidence. By Section 25 of the Taxation Laws
Amendment Act, 2006 Section 108 of the Customs Act was amended with
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effect from 13 July, 2006 and it entitled a Gazetted officer of Customs
specifically empowered by the Central Government in this behalf to summon
a person, to give evidence or produce documents. By M.F.(D.R.)
th
Notification No. 8/2008-Cus.(N.T.) dated 20 February, 2008 Central
Government empowered all Gazetted officers of the Customs for the purpose
of Section 108 of the Customs Act. By Section 69 of the Finance Act, 2008
Section 108 (1) of the Act was amended so as to remove the words “duly
empowered by the Central Government in this behalf”. This Finance Act
th
came into force on 10 May, 2008 however the amendment was made
Crl.M.C. 1204/2010 Page 8 of 16
th
retrospectively with effect from 13 July, 2006. It would be thus evident
that when the summons were issued, Respondent No.2 was not empowered
by the Central Government to summon a person, to give evidence or produce
documents under Section 108 of the Customs Act. This empowerment was
th
conferred on 20 February, 2008, and thereafter the words “duly empowered
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by the Central Government in this behalf” were deleted on 10 May, 2008
th
with retrospective effect from 13 July, 2006.
7. The issue before this Court is whether this retrospective amendment
brought by Section 69 of the Finance Act though procedurally can empower
an officer to summon retrospectively, however can retrospectively create an
offence for non-compliance of the summons issued under Section 108 of the
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Customs Act. All the summons issued to the Petitioner i.e. on 12 June,
rd rd th nd
2006, 3 July, 2006, 3 November, 2006, 10 January, 2007, 2 April,
st th
2007, 21 May, 2007 and finally on 10 July, 2007 were issued when
Respondent No.2 was not duly authorized to issue summons. Even on the
date when the cognizance of the offences under Sections 174/175 IPC was
taken by the Learned ACMM on the complaint of Respondent No.2, the
Respondent No.2 was not authorized to issue summons to a person to give
evidence or to produce documents. The retrospective amendment by Section
69 of the Finance Act, 2008 can ex-post facto ratify the acts of officers in
issuing summons under Section 108 of the Customs Act, however cannot
make them liable for the offence for the non-compliance thereof because
when the non-compliance of the summons was done the same was not an
offence. It is well settled that by a retrospective amendment no offence can
be created as the same is contrary to Article 20 of the Constitution of India.
Crl.M.C. 1204/2010 Page 9 of 16
8. A plain reading of Section 108 of the Customs Act shows that the
offence is attracted only if a summon being issued by the officer duly
authorized in this behalf is intentionally disobeyed. Thus, violation or
avoidance of summons issued by an officer who is not authorized or
competent to issue the same cannot sustain a conviction under Section
174/175 IPC. Dealing with this issue in Shiam Lal Vs. Emperor. 15 (1914)
Crl.L.J. 595 it was held that:
“Shiam Lal has been convicted under Section 174 of the Indian
Penal Code and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 30. The case has
been submitted to this Court by the Additional Sessions Judge
with the recommendation that the conviction and sentence be
set aside. It appears that a decree was transferred to the
Collector by the Civil Court for execution inasmuch as the
property to be sold was ancestral property. In the course of the
proceedings held in this execution case a Tahsildar, who is an
Assistant Collector of the second Class, issued a summons to
Shiam Lal to attend his Court in order to enable the Tahsildar to
ascertain whether there was any incumbrance on the property
ordered to be sold. Shiam Lal did not attend and thereupon he
was prosecuted and sentenced as stated above. In order to
sustain a conviction under Section 174 it must be shown that
the summons issued was issued by a public servant legally
competent as such public servant to issue the same and the
accused intentionally omitted to attend in pursuance of the
summons. In this case under the rules framed by the Local
Government in regard to the sale of ancestral land, the Collector
is empowered to summon any person whom he thinks it
necessary to summon for the purpose of ascertaining the
matters to be specified in the proclamation of sale and under
rule 44 he can delegate his powers only to an Assistant
Collector of the first Class. He could not delegate his authority
to an Assistant Collector of the second class and, therefore, the
Tahsildar, was not legally competent to issue the summons
which Shiam Lal did not obey. Furthermore, in this case there
Crl.M.C. 1204/2010 Page 10 of 16
is nothing to show that the non-compliance with the summons
was intentional. Under these circumstances the conviction of
Shiam Lal was illegal. I accordingly set it aside and direct that
the fine imposed on him, if paid, be refunded.”
9. In Khota Ram and Ors. Vs. Emperor, 6 (1907) Crl.L.J. 107 it was
held:
“There is nothing in the Revenue Act authorizing the issue of
such summons. Section 149 of that Act only provides for the
attendance of persons within the limits of the estate within
which they reside.
Queen-Empress v. Subanna (1) shows that in the Madras
Presidency there is an act III of 1869, giving power to issue
summons for attendance of persons for purposes connected
with the Revenue administration, but there is no such Act in the
Punjab.
Crown v. Kashi Ram (2) and Crown v. Kuria (3), show
that arbitrators cannot be such be required to attend Court, and
Ghulam Khan v. Empress (4) decided that it had not been
shown that the attendance of a lambardar for the purpose of
appointing a village chaukidar could be legally enforced.
We are of opinion that the Tahsildar was not legally
competent to issue summons for the attendance in Court of
those munsifs, and we set aside the convictions and sentences.
The fines, if paid, will be refunded.”
10. It is well settled that though by a retrospective legislation, the
Legislature can confer a procedural competency on an officer, however an
act or omission is not punishable as an offence unless it existed on the day
when it was committed. In Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and Anr. Vs. State of
Vindhya Pradesh AIR 1953 SC 394, the Constitution Bench of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court held:
Crl.M.C. 1204/2010 Page 11 of 16
“7. The next and the only serious question that arises in this
case is with reference to the objections raised in reliance on Art.
20 of the Constitution. This question arises from the fact that
the charges as against the two appellants, in terms, refer to the
offences committed as having been under the various sections
of the Indian Penal Code as adapted in the United States of
Vindhya Pradesh by Ordinance No. 48 of 1949. This Ordinance
was passed on 11-9-1949, while the offences themselves are
said to have been committed in the months of February, March
and April, 1949, i.e., months prior to the Ordinance. It is urged
therefore that the convictions in this case which were after the
Constitution came into force are in respect of an ex post facto
law creating offences after the commission of the acts charged
as such offences and hence unconstitutional. This contention
raises two important questions, viz., (1) the proper construction
of Article 20 of the Constitution and (2) whether the various
acts in respect of which the appellants were convicted
constituted offences in this area only from the date when
Ordinance No. 48 of 1949 was passed or were already so prior
thereto.
8. Article 20(1) of the Constitution is as follows :
"No person shall be convicted of any offence except for
violation of a law in force at the time of the commission
of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a
penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted
under the law in force at the time of the commission of
the offence."
This Article, in its broad import has been enacted to prohibit
convictions and sentences under ex post facto laws. The
principle underlying such prohibition has been very elaborately
discussed and pointed out in the very learned judgment of
Justice Willes in the well known case of „Phillips v. Eyre‟,
(1870) 6 Q.B. 1, at pp 23 and 25 (D), and also by the Supreme
Court of U.S.A. in „Calder v. Bull‟ (1798) 3 Dallas 386; 1 Law
Ed 648 at p. 649 (F).]. In the English case it is explained that ex
post facto laws are laws which voided and punished what had
Crl.M.C. 1204/2010 Page 12 of 16
been lawful when done. There can be no doubt as to the
paramount importance of the principle that such ex post facto
laws, which retrospectively create offences and punish them are
bad as being highly inequitable and unjust. In the English
system of jurisprudence repugnance of such laws to universal
notions of fairness and justice is treated as a ground not for
invalidating the law itself but as compelling a beneficent
construction thereof where the language of the statute by any
means permits it. In the American system, however, such ex
post facto laws are themselves rendered invalid by virtue of Art.
1, Ss. 9 and 10 of its Constitution. It is contended by the learned
Attorney-General that Art. 20 of the Constitution was meant to
bring about nothing more than the invalidity of such ex post
facto laws in the post-Constitution period but that the validity
of the pre-Constitution laws in this behalf was not intended to
be affected in any way.”
11. Thus, by revival of the procedure the officer can be made competent
to issue summons however it cannot make the act an offence which was not
an offence when it was allegedly committed in view of the want of
competency of the officer issuing summons. No offence having been
committed at the time when it is alleged, the Petitioner cannot be prosecuted
for an offence by giving retrospective competence to the officer issuing
summons.
12. The contention of the Learned Additional Solicitor General that this
Court will not decide the issue regarding the competency of the officer to
issue summons at the relevant time and thus the violation thereof being an
offence as the same would be an issue to be decided during trial and in
exercise of its power under 482 Cr.P.C. this Court by considering the same
will not quash the criminal proceedings pending before the Learned Trial
Court deserves to be rejected. In State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal &
Crl.M.C. 1204/2010 Page 13 of 16
Ors. 1992 Supp(1) SCC 335 the Court considered in detail and summarized
the legal position by laying down the following guidelines to be followed by
the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers to quash criminal
complaint.
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the
principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of
decisions relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power
under Article 226 or the inherent powers Under Section 482 of
the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we
give the following categories of cases by way of illustration
wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse
of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of
justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise,
clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of
myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
1. Where the allegations made in the First Information
Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima-
facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
the accused.
2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and
other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not
disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation
by police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code
except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview
of Section 155(2) of the Code.
3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
complaint and the evidence collected in support of the
same do not disclose the commission of any offence and
make out a case against the accused.
4. ……
5. ……
6. ……
Crl.M.C. 1204/2010 Page 14 of 16
7. ……
104. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the
power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised
very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the
rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in
embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness
or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the
complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not
confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to
its whim or caprice.”
13. It may be noted that the competence of issuing summons by the officer
is sine-qua-non for a valid summon. In the absence of a valid summon the
violation thereof cannot be an offence and even taking the allegations in the
complaint as they are, no offence is made out. In such a situation this Court
is duty bound to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and not
relegate the Petitioner to the trial.
14. Learned Additional Solicitor General has contended that since the
offence committed by the Petitioner is a continuing offence as the Petitioner
has not joined the enquiry till date and as on date the officer is competent to
summon the Petitioner, the same is a continuing offence. The offence being
a continuing one and the amendment in the Act having been introduced since
the Petitioner has till date not complied with the summons he is liable to be
prosecuted for offences under Sections 174/175 IPC. In this regard, it may
be noted that the summons were sent to the Petitioner for joining enquiry on
nd st th
2 April, 2007, 21 May, 2007 and 10 July, 2007. No summons has been
sent thereafter. A summon to appear is issued for a particular date and
unlike a warrant, a summon is not a continuous mandate directing the
Crl.M.C. 1204/2010 Page 15 of 16
Petitioner to appear on a particular date or thereafter at any time. Thus, I
find no force in the contention of the learned Additional Solicitor General
that the offence under Sections 174/175 IPC is a continuing offence.
15. Further the contention that non-conferring of the authorization on
Respondent No.2 was a procedural defect, which could be cured is not
disputed. However, a retrospective procedural amendment cannot make the
non-compliance of a procedural provision a substantive offence.
16. In view of the aforesaid discussion and the fact that the Respondent
No.2 was not authorized to issue summons for appearance on the dates when
the summons were issued, the Petitioner cannot be prosecuted for offences
under Sections 174/175 IPC. Consequently, the criminal complaint No. 8/1
of 2008 under Sections 174/175 IPC titled as “Shri R.K. Chibber Vs. Rakesh
Kumar Goyal” pending with the Learned Additional Chief Metropolitan
th
Magistrate, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi and the order dated 15
January, 2008 summoning the Petitioner for offences under Sections 174/175
IPC are hereby quashed.
17. Petition is disposed of.
(MUKTA GUPTA)
JUDGE
JUNE 01, 2012
‘ga’
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