M/S CHEMINOVA INDIA LTD. vs. THE STATE OF PUNJAB

Case Type: Criminal Appeal

Date of Judgment: 04-08-2021

Preview image for M/S CHEMINOVA INDIA LTD. vs. THE STATE OF PUNJAB

Full Judgment Text

Crl.A.@S.L.P.(Crl.)No.4102 of 2020 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  749  OF 2021 [Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.)No.4102 of 2020] M/s. Cheminova India Ltd. & Anr. …..Appellants Versus State of Punjab & Anr. …..Respondents J U D G M E N T R. Subhash Reddy, J. 1. Leave granted.  2. This criminal appeal is filed, aggrieved by the order dated 12.05.2020   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Punjab   &   Haryana   at Chandigarh.   By the aforesaid order, High Court has dismissed the petition in CRM­M No.1162­2020 (O&M) so far as the appellants are concerned.     Appellants   have   approached   the   High   Court   seeking quashing of Complaint No.26 dated 25.03.2014 filed by the second respondent – The Insecticide Inspector, Attari, District Amritsar under 1 Crl.A.@S.L.P.(Crl.)No.4102 of 2020 Section 3(k)(i), 17, 18 and 33 punishable under Section 29 of the Insecticides Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) read with Rule 27(5) of the Insecticides Rules, 1971. 3. On   10.02.2011,   Insecticide   Inspector,   Attari,   District Amritsar, inspected the premises of firm – M/s. Navneet Singh – on Railway Road, Attari, District Amritsar where its sole proprietor Sh. Navneet Singh was present.   M/s. Navneet Singh is a dealer of the first   appellant­company   which   is   engaged   in   the   manufacture   of insecticides.   On the day of inspection, Inspecting Officer found 60 tins of insecticide, viz.,   Trizophos 40% E.C.   in the premises for sale. The Inspecting Officer has taken three tins, out of the 60 tins, as test samples and on the ground that samples sent for analysis were found to contain active ingredient to the extent of 34.70% only as against the labelled declaration of 40%,  alleging that it amounts to ‘misbranding’ within the meaning of Section 3(k)(i) of the Act and sale of such item is an offence under Sections 17, 18 and 33 punishable under Section 29 of the Act, the second respondent has lodged the complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amritsar in Complaint No.26 of 2014.   In the said complaint, along with the dealer from whom samples were seized,   the   first   appellant­company,   second   appellant­Managing Director and other persons are sought to be prosecuted.  2 Crl.A.@S.L.P.(Crl.)No.4102 of 2020 4. The appellants and other accused have approached the High Court seeking quashing of the complaint mainly on the ground that the   complaint   was   ex   facie   barred   by   limitation   and   procedure prescribed under Section 24 was not followed.  It was the case of the appellants that there were abnormal delays in testing the samples, as such the timelines fixed under Section 24 which are mandatory are breached, thus, the complaint is fit to be quashed.   It was also the case of the appellants that the necessary undertakings were already filed indicating the responsible officers of the quality control, as such the   appellants   herein   are   not   at   all   liable   for   prosecution   and complaint   was   filed   in   a   casual   manner   without   examining   the necessary aspects.   It was also the case of the appellants that the Magistrate has not followed the procedure prescribed under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.PC).   The High Court, by the   impugned   order,   has   dismissed   the   petition   so   far   as   the appellants are concerned while quashing the proceedings so far as the petitioner no.4 before the High Court, who was Godown Incharge of the firm.   5. We have heard Sri S. Gurukrishna Kumar, learned senior counsel assisted by Ms. Jaikriti S. Jadeja for the appellants and Ms. 3 Crl.A.@S.L.P.(Crl.)No.4102 of 2020 Jaspreet Gogia, learned counsel appearing for the State of Punjab, at length.   6. Sri   Gurukrishna   Kumar,   learned   senior   counsel   for   the appellants, while referring to page 10 of the impugned order, has submitted that samples were drawn from the dealer on 10.02.2011; they were sent to the Insecticide Testing Laboratory, Ludhiana on 17.02.2011; and  the report  of the  analysis was received  from  the Insecticide Testing Laboratory, Ludhiana on 14.03.2011.  Further, it is submitted that after necessary show cause notice was served on the appellant­manufacturer and its office bearers, they made a request, on 15.04.2011 by addressing a letter, for re­analysis of second sample and after depositing necessary demand draft, second sample was sent to Central Insecticide Testing Laboratory, Faridabad for re­analysis on 02.05.2011   and   re­analysis   report   was   received   belatedly   on 09.12.2011 which is clearly in contravention of Section 24(4) of the Act.  Learned counsel, by referring to relevant provisions of the Act, has submitted that for the offence of misbranding, as alleged in the complaint,   the   maximum   punishment   is   imprisonment   for   a   term which may extend to two years or a fine which shall not be less than ten thousand rupees or with both.   It is further submitted that the limitation for filing the complaint in such cases is three years from the 4 Crl.A.@S.L.P.(Crl.)No.4102 of 2020 date of commission of offence.     It is submitted that limitation for lodging complaint from the date of report of analysis of Insecticide Testing Laboratory, Ludhiana was only upto 14.03.2014, however, the complaint was filed on 25.03.2014, which is beyond the period of limitation.  Inspite of the same, the High Court has not considered the same in proper perspective.   Learned counsel, while referring to the provisions   under   Section   24   of   the   Act,   has   submitted   that   the timeline for second report also is fixed, i.e., thirty days from the date of sending the sample, but, inspite of the same the Central Insecticide Testing   Laboratory,   Faridabad   has   delayed   the   report   by   seven months,   which   is   in   clear   violation   of   Section   24(4)   of   the   Act. Learned counsel also has submitted that while issuing the summons, the   procedure,   as   contemplated   under   Section   202,   Cr.PC,   is   not followed by the Magistrate. On   the   other   hand,   Ms.   Jaspreet   Gogia,   learned   counsel 7. appearing for the State, while refuting the various submissions made by the learned senior counsel for the appellants, has submitted that though   the   first   report   of   analysis   from   the   Insecticide   Testing Laboratory,   Ludhiana   was   received   on   14.03.2011,   the   appellants have made a request for sending the other sample to the Central Insecticide Testing Laboratory, Faridabad which was duly sent, after 5 Crl.A.@S.L.P.(Crl.)No.4102 of 2020 deposit of demand draft, on 02.05.2011 and the re­analysis on the second   sample   was   received   from   the   Central   Insecticide   Testing Laboratory, Faridabad on 09.12.2011.  While referring to Section 24(4) of the Act, learned counsel has submitted that the report on such second sample shall be the conclusive evidence, as such, it cannot be said,   the   complaint   is   barred   by   limitation.     Further,   it   is   the submission of the learned counsel that the timelines under Section 24(4) of the Act were followed and the complaint filed is not barred by limitation and is also not in violation of the procedure contemplated under Section 202, Cr.PC. 8. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we have perused the impugned order and other material placed on record. 9. In view of the undisputed fact that after drawing the sample from the dealer on 10.02.2011 report of analysis was received from the Insecticide Testing Laboratory at Ludhiana on 14.03.2011, we are of the firm view that the complaint filed is barred by limitation.  It is not   in   dispute   that   report   from   Insecticide   Testing   Laboratory, Ludhiana was received by the Inspector on 14.03.2011.  Section 29 of the Act deals with the ‘offences and punishment’.  The appellants are sought   to   be   prosecuted   on   the   ground   of   misbranding   of   the insecticide,   i.e.,   Trizophos   40%   E.C.     It   is   the   allegation   in   the 6 Crl.A.@S.L.P.(Crl.)No.4102 of 2020 complaint   that   upon   analysis   of   the   sample,   same   was   found   to contain active ingredient to the extent of 34.70% only as against the labelled declaration of 40%.  Thus, it is a case of ‘misbranding’ within the   meaning   of   Section   3(k)(i)   of   the   Act   and   selling   of   such misbranded item is in violation of Sections 17, 18, and 33 punishable under Section 29 of the Act.  From a reading of Section 29, it is clear that the maximum punishment for such offence, if it is first offence, is imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or with fine which shall not be less than ten thousand rupees which may extend to fifty thousand rupees, or with both.  For a second and subsequent offence, the punishment is imprisonment for a term which may extend to   three   years   or   with   fine   which   shall   not   be   less   than   fifteen thousand rupees which may extend to seventy­five thousand rupees, or with both.  Section 468 of Cr.PC prohibits taking cognizance of an offence after the lapse of period of limitation.  As per sub­section (2)(c) thereof,   the   period   of   limitation   is   three   years,   if   the   offence   is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding   three   years.     Section   469   of   Cr.PC   deals   with   the ‘commencement of the period of limitation’.  As per the said provision, the period of limitation, in relation to an offender, shall commence on the date of offence or where the commission of the offence was not 7 Crl.A.@S.L.P.(Crl.)No.4102 of 2020 known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or to any police officer, whichever is earlier. nd 10. In the present case, it is not in dispute, the complainant­2 respondent has received the report of analysis on 14.03.2011 from the Insecticide   Testing   Laboratory,   Ludhiana   and   the   complaint   was lodged on 25.03.2014 which is beyond a period of three years from 14.03.2011.  The only submission of the learned counsel for the State is that further report from the Central Insecticide Testing Laboratory was received on 09.12.2011 which is the conclusive evidence of the facts, as such, the complaint is within the period of limitation.  We are not convinced with such submission made by learned counsel for the State.  When it is clear from the language of Section 469, Cr.PC that the period of limitation shall commence on the date of offence, there is no reason to seek computation of limitation only from the date of receipt   of   report   of   the   Central   Insecticide   Testing   Laboratory, Faridabad.   As per the procedure prescribed under the Statute, i.e., Insecticide Act, 1968 and the rules made thereunder, the Insecticide Testing Laboratory, Ludhiana was the competent authority to which the sample was sent on 17.02.2011, after drawing on 10.02.2011, and the report of analysis was received on 14.03.2011, as such the said 8 Crl.A.@S.L.P.(Crl.)No.4102 of 2020 date is said to be the crucial date for commencement of period of limitation.  By virtue of the said report received on 14.03.2011 which states that the active ingredient of the sample was only to the extent 34.70% as against the labelled declaration of 40%, it is clear that it is the   date   of   offence   allegedly   committed   by   the   accused.     Merely because  a further request  is made  for  sending  the sample to  the Central Insecticide Testing Laboratory, as contemplated under Section 24(4) of the Act, which report was received on 09.12.2011, receipt of such   analysis   report   on   09.12.2011   cannot   be   the   basis   for commencement of limitation.  The report of analysis received from the Insecticide   Testing   Laboratory,   Ludhiana   on   14.03.2011   itself indicates misbranding, as stated in the complaint, thus, the period of limitation within the meaning of Section 469, Cr.PC commences from 14.03.2011 only.  In that view of the matter, we are clearly of the view that   the   complaint   filed   is   barred   by   limitation   and   allowing   the proceedings to go on, on such complaint, which is  ex facie  barred by limitation is nothing but amounts to abuse of process of law.  Though the   learned   counsel   has   also   raised   other   grounds   in   support   of quashing,   as   we   are   persuaded   to   accept   his   submission   that complaint filed is barred by limitation, it is not necessary to deal with such other grounds raised. 9 Crl.A.@S.L.P.(Crl.)No.4102 of 2020 11. For the aforesaid reasons, this criminal appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 12.05.2020 passed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRM­M No.1162­2020 (O&M) is set aside.  Consequently, Complaint No.26 dated 25.03.2014 filed by the second respondent before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Amritsar stands quashed.  ………………………………J. [Navin Sinha] ………………………………J. [R. Subhash Reddy] New Delhi. August 04, 2021. 10 SLP(Crl.) No. 4144 of 2020 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 750 OF 20 21 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.4144 OF 2020) M/s. Cheminova India Limited & Anr. ...Appellant(s) vs. State of Punjab & Ors. ...Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T R.SUBHASH REDDY,J . 1. Leave granted. 2. This Criminal Appeal is filed by the Petitioners / Accused nos. 3 and 4 in CRM-M-12082- 2016 (O & M) before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh, aggrieved by the Order dated 12.05.2020. By the aforesaid order, the Petitioners’ application of quashing of Complaint No. 313 dated 19.08.2015, filed by the Respondent No.2 – The 1 SLP(Crl.) No. 4144 of 2020 Quality Control Inspector, Bhikhiwind, District Tarn Taran, Punjab for offences under Sections 3(k)(i), 17, 18 and 33, punishable under Section 29 of the Insecticides Act, 1968 (for short, “the Act”), was dismissed. The petition was allowed by the High Court for other accused, who was working as Godown Incharge, and quashed the proceedings. st 3. The 1 Appellant is a Company, having its office in Mumbai, which is engaged in manufacturing of nd insecticides. The 2 Appellant was the Ex-Managing Director of the Company. On 31.12.2013, Quality Control Inspector, Bhikhiwind, District Tarn Taran, Punjab inspected the premises of M/s. Dhillon Kheti Store in the presence of its sole Proprietor, Shri Nishan Singh. The said Nishan Singh was the st authorised dealer for 1 Appellant – Company, to sell its insecticides. At the time of inspection, the inspecting officer found six boxes containing 25 packets each, of Piroxofop Propanyl (Clodinafop Propargyl 15% WP) , with each packet weighing 160 grams, stocked in the premises. From the abovesaid stock, samples were drawn and one of the samples was sent to Senior Analyst, Insecticide Testing 2 SLP(Crl.) No. 4144 of 2020 Laboratory, Amritsar. When the report dated 15.01.2014 was received, active ingredient of Piroxofop Propanyl was found only to the extent of 11.72% as against the labelled declaration of 15%. A copy of the report was sent to the dealer at Amritsar along with a Show Cause Notice. On production of copy of the invoice by the dealer, indicating that he had st purchased the insecticides in question from the 1 Appellant – Company, Show Cause Notice was also st issued to the 1 Appellant – Company, which is having its manufacturing unit in Bharuch, Gujarat and to other responsible officers of the Company. On receipt nd of the report, the 2 Appellant herein, on behalf of the Company, also made a request to send another sample to Central Insecticide Testing Laboratory at Faridabad vide letter dated 27.03.2014 and after depositing necessary charges, another sample was sent to Central Insecticide Testing Laboratory, which has reported that the sample was misbranded as the same was found to contain 10.09% of active ingredient only as against 15%, as labelled on the packet. After obtaining necessary sanction from the competent authority, a complaint was lodged before the Judicial 3 SLP(Crl.) No. 4144 of 2020 Magistrate to prosecute the appellants and other accused for offences under Sections 3(k)(i), 17, 18 and 33, punishable under Section 29 of the Act. 4. The appellants and other accused approached the High Court, seeking quashing of the said complaint on various grounds. By impugned order, High Court has dismissed the petition, so far as appellants are concerned, and allowed the application for the Godown Watchman. 5. Heard Mr. Sidharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the Appellants and Ms. Jaspreet Gogia, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents. 6. Learned Counsel for the appellants by referring to Section 33 of the Act has submitted that appellants have already filed an undertaking dated 22.01.2013 before the respondents, nominating the incharge and responsible officers of the Company to maintain quality of the pesticides manufactured by the Company along with the resolution of the Company’s meeting held on 28.12.2012. Learned Counsel has submitted that by making vague and bald 4 SLP(Crl.) No. 4144 of 2020 allegations, the appellants, who were the Company and the Managing Director, are also sought to be prosecuted. 6(a). It is submitted that unless there is a clear and categorical averment in the complaint, indicating the role played by the appellants, there cannot be st any vicarious liability on the 1 Appellant – Company nd and the 2 Appellant–Managing Director for commission of the alleged offence. In support of his arguments, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Managing Director, Castrol India Limited vs. State of 1 Karnataka & Anr. , and also another judgment of this Court in the case of Shiv Kumar Jatia vs. State of 2 NCT of Delhi . 6(b). It is also further contended by the learned Counsel that before taking cognizance of the offence on the complaint, learned Magistrate has not followed the procedure, contemplated under Section 24 (4) of the Act and Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is submitted that though, the 1 2018 (17) SCC 275 2 2019 (17) SCC 193 5 SLP(Crl.) No. 4144 of 2020 appellants are not residing within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, without making proper inquiry and ordering investigation, cognizance of the offence is taken. Further, it is submitted that the prosecution against the appellants, is nothing but abuse of the process of law. The High Court has not considered various grounds raised by the appellants in proper perspective and dismissed their application for quashing the complaint. In support of his argument that the Magistrate has not followed the procedure under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in Re: Expeditious Trial of Cases under Section 138 of N.I. Act, 1881 ( Suo Motu 3 Writ Petition (Crl.) No.2 of 2020) . 7. On the other hand, learned Counsel, appearing for the Respondents, has submitted that the High Court has considered all the grounds raised by the petitioners and rejected the petition to quash the nd proceedings. It is submitted that the 2 Appellant, st being the Managing Director of the 1 Appellant – Company, which is the manufacturer of the product in 3 2021 SCC ONLINE SC 325 6 SLP(Crl.) No. 4144 of 2020 nd question, was rightly prosecuted by the 2 Respondent – Quality Control Inspector, Bhikhiwind, District Tarn Taran, Punjab. Learned Counsel has submitted that there is no violation of provision under Section 24 (4) of the Act and Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and there are no grounds to interfere with the order of the High Court. It is submitted that the Appellant No.2 was the Managing Director of the Company at the relevant point of time, as such, he is overall responsible person for quality control of the products of the Company, as such, he is also liable for prosecution. 8. Having heard the learned Counsels on both sides, we have perused the impugned Order and other material placed on record. 9. Section 33 of the Act deals with ‘offences by companies’. A reading of Section 33(1) of the Act, makes it clear that whenever an offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person who at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, or was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of, the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence 7 SLP(Crl.) No. 4144 of 2020 and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. In the case on hand, it is not st in dispute that on behalf of the 1 Appellant – nd Company, 2 Appellant – Managing Director has furnished an undertaking dated 22.01.2013, indicating that Shri Madhukar R. Gite, Manager of the Company, has been nominated in the resolution passed by the Company on 28.12.2012 to be in charge of and responsible to the said Company, to maintain the quality of the pesticides manufactured by the said Company and he was authorized to exercise all such powers and to take all such steps, as may be necessary or expedient to prevent the commission of any offence under the Act. Filing of such undertaking with the respondent is not disputed. Even, at Para 5.10 in the counter affidavit filed before this Court, it is pleaded by the Respondents that by appointing persons responsible for affairs of the nd Company, quality control, etc., 2 Appellant – Managing Director cannot escape his liability from st offences committed by 1 Appellant – Company. In view of the specific provision in the Act dealing with the offences by companies, which fixes the responsibility 8 SLP(Crl.) No. 4144 of 2020 and the responsible person of the Company for conduct of its business, by making bald and vague nd allegations, 2 Appellant – Managing Director cannot be prosecuted on vague allegation that he being the st Managing Director of the 1 Appellant – Company, is overall responsible person for the conduct of the business of the Company and of quality control, etc. In the instant case, the Company has passed a resolution, fixing responsibility of one of the Managers namely Mr. Madhukar R. Gite by way of a resolution and the same was furnished to the nd respondents by the 2 Appellant in shape of an undertaking on 22.01.2013. When furnishing of such undertaking fixing the responsibility of the quality control of the products is not in dispute, there is nd no reason or justification for prosecuting the 2 Appellant – Managing Director, on the vague and spacious plea that he was the Managing Director of the Company at the relevant time. A reading of Section 33 of the Act also makes it clear that only responsible person of the Company, as well as the Company alone shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against. 9 SLP(Crl.) No. 4144 of 2020 Though, the Managing Director is overall incharge of the affairs of the company, whether such officer is to be prosecuted or not, depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and the relevant provisions of law. Having regard to specific provision under Section 33 of the Act, and the undertaking filed in the present case, respondent nd cannot prosecute the 2 Appellant herein. Thus, we find force in the contention of Mr. Sidharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel, that allowing the prosecution nd against 2 Appellant – Managing Director is nothing but, abuse of the process of law. At the same time, we do not find any ground at this stage to quash the st proceedings against the 1 Appellant – Company. 10. Further, from the averments in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of Respondents 1 & 2 and other material placed on record, we are of the view that no case is made out to quash the proceedings at this stage, by accepting the plea of the appellants that the procedure contemplated under Section 24 (4) of the Act and Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is not followed. With regard to the procedure under Section 24 (4) of the Act, we are 10 SLP(Crl.) No. 4144 of 2020 st satisfied that after the 1 Appellant – Company has nd deposited necessary Demand Draft for sending 2 sample to the Central Insecticide Testing Laboratory, steps were taken promptly and report was also sent by the Central Insecticide Testing Laboratory within the prescribed period of 30 days. Similarly, with regard to the procedure contemplated under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the same is to be viewed, keeping in mind that the complainant is a public servant who has filed the complaint in discharge of his official duty. The legislature in its wisdom has itself placed the public servant on a different pedestal, as would be evident from a perusal of proviso to Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Object of holding an inquiry / investigation before taking cognizance, in cases where accused resides outside the territorial jurisdiction of such Magistrate, is to ensure that innocents are not harassed unnecessarily. By virtue of proviso to Section 200 of Code of Criminal Procedure, the Magistrate, while taking cognizance, need not record statement of such public servant, who has filed the complaint in discharge of his official 11 SLP(Crl.) No. 4144 of 2020 duty. Further, by virtue of Section 293 of Code of Criminal Procedure, report of the Government Scientific Expert is, per se, admissible in evidence. The Code of Criminal Procedure itself provides for exemption from examination of such witnesses, when the complaint is filed by a public servant. In the nd present case, 2 Respondent / Public Servant, in exercise of powers under provisions of the Insecticides Act, 1968, has filed complaint, enclosing several documents including reports of the Government Laboratories, it is always open for the Magistrate to issue process on such complaint which is supported by documents. In any event, we do not find any merit in the submissions of the learned Counsel that proceedings are to be quashed only on the ground that, the Magistrate has taken cognizance without conducting inquiry and ordering investigation. In absence of showing any prejudice caused to the appellant at this stage, the same is no ground to quash the proceedings in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 11. As all other nominated / responsible persons of the Company are already accused in the Complaint, we 12 SLP(Crl.) No. 4144 of 2020 are of the view that there is no basis to proceed nd against the 2 Appellant – Managing Director to prosecute him for the alleged offences. The judgment of this Court relied on by Mr. Sidharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel, which is with reference to provisions under Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 in Re: Expeditious Trial of Cases under Section 138 of N.I. Act, 1881 (Suo Motu Writ Petition (Crl.) No.2 of 3 2020) , is also of not much help to the Appellants at this stage, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 12. For the aforesaid reasons this Criminal Appeal is partly allowed, so far as the Appellant No.2 – Managing Director is concerned and the impugned Order of the High Court dated 12.05.2020, passed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRM- M-12082-2016 (O & M), is set aside. Consequently, nd Complaint No. 313 dated 19.08.2015, filed by the 2 Respondent – Quality Control Inspector, Bhikhiwind District Tarn Taran, Punjab, pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Patti stands quashed qua the Appellant No.2 namely Mr. Pramod N. Karlekar / Accused No.4. Further, it is made clear 13 SLP(Crl.) No. 4144 of 2020 that the observations and findings recorded in this order are made only for the purpose of disposal of this Appeal arising out of quash petition and it is open for the Trial Court to record its own findings, based on the evidence on record, and take such other steps, in accordance with law. ……………………………………………………………………J (NAVIN SINHA) ……………………………………………………………………J (R.SUBHASH REDDY) NEW DELHI; August 4, 2021 14