Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
SRI VARADARAJA PERUMAL TEMPLE
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
K. RAMACHANDRA (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT11/10/1995
BENCH:
PUNCHHI, M.M.
BENCH:
PUNCHHI, M.M.
MANOHAR SUJATA V. (J)
CITATION:
1995 SCC Supl. (4) 87 1995 SCALE (6)25
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
O R D E R
This is an appeal by special leave against an order
dated 14-9-1978 in S.T.A. 146 of 1975 passed by the Special
Appellate Tribunal, Madras, set up under the Tamil Nadu
Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Royatwari) Act,
1963. As statutorily required, the Tribunal is manned by two
Hon’ble Judges of the Madras High Court. The appellant-
temple had put to challenge before the Special Appellate
Tribunal an order dated February 22, 1971 passed by the
Minor Inams Tribunal, Coimbatore on the merit of the matter.
By means of the appellate order afore-referred to the
Tribunal dismissed the said appeal of the appellant-temple
as time barred.
Under Section 30(1) of the Tamil Nadu Minor Inams
(Abolition and Conversion into Royatwari) Act, 1963, the
limitation for filing an appeal before the Special Appellate
Tribunal is three months from the date of the order. But,
under the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 30, the
Special Appellate Tribunal may, in its discretion, allow
further time not exceeding three months for the filing of
such appeal. It is plain that the maximum time available to
file an appeal before the Special Appellate Tribunal is six
months. The appellant-temple’s appeal before the Special
Appellate Tribunal was admittedly filed beyond a period of
six months. The explanation for delay rendered by it became
of no avail. It is to challenge that order that the
appellant-temple is before us.
The disputed temple-property was trust property and
noticeably it was a trustee who was following it to
safeguard the interests of the temple against another set.
The period of limitation for filing an appeal before the
Special Appellate Tribunal may have been three months,
extendible by another three months, but in so far as the
trust properties coming within the sweep of the above-said
Act were concerned, a way need to have been found out to
prevent manipulations and grabbing of temple/trust property.
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Section 10 of the Limitation Act, 1973 covers certain
situations. The said provision reads as follows:
"10. SUITS AGAINST TRUSTEES AND THEIR
REPRESENTATIVES-
Notwithstanding anything contained in
the foregoing provisions of this Act, no
suit against a person in whom property
has become vested in trust for any
specific purpose, or against his legal
representatives or assigns (not being
assigns for valuable consideration) for
the purpose of following in his or their
hands such property, or the proceeds
thereof, or for an account of such
property or proceeds, shall be barred by
any length of time.
Explanation - For the purposes of this
section any property comprised in a
Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious or
charitable endowment shall be deemed to
be property vested in trust for a
specific purpose and the manager of the
property shall be deemed to be the
trustee thereof."
Though the said provision cannot strictly apply to the
facts of the case in hand, but the spirit and purpose behind
Section 10 of the Limitation Act would as it is reflective
of the public policy to protect trust properties.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 5 and 29 of the
Limitation Act, and the limitation of six months provided in
the aforesaid Act, if, by interpretative process, such time
is made extendable, no violation to the statute would be
caused in pursuing that public policy in reading down the
provisions of Section 30(1) of the aforesaid Act, to promote
justice and permit of trust/temple-properties, lest they get
into the hands of property-grabbers and be subjected to
manipulations. With this object in view, we come to the
opinion that for the recovery of trust property, the temple
could approach the Special Appellate Tribunal beyond the
period of six months, for the delay of which there was a
reasonable explanation, initially accepted by the Special
Appellate Tribunal. It should have, in the facts and
circumstances, stuck to its original view and kept
entertained the appeal so as to decide it on merit. We are
therefore of the view that the delay in filing the appeal,
it being for the purpose of protecting temple property from
the hands of adversaries, should deserve condonation, as it
did serve a public purpose, deserving reading down the
provision, carving an exception in favour of temple/trust-
properties. We hold accordingly.
We thus set aside the impugned order of the Special
Appellate Tribunal dated 14-9-1978 and effect a remand to it
for re-deciding the matter on its own merits. The appeal is
thus allowed in these terms. No costs.