WEST U.P. SUGAR MILLS ASSOCIATION vs. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7508 OF 2005 WEST U.P. SUGAR MILLS ASSOCIATION & ORS.     .. APPELLANTS VERSUS THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.   .. RESPONDENTS WITH C.A. No. 7509­7510/2005 CONMT. PET. (C) NO. 169/2006 IN C.A. NO. 7508/2005 C.A. NO. 150/2007 CONMT. PET. (C) NO. 254/2007 IN C.A. NO. 7508/2005 CONMT. PET (C) NO. 253/2007 IN C.A. NO. 7508/2005 C.A. NO. 2664/2007, C.A. NO. 4026/2009 C.A. NO. 4014­4023/2009, C.A. NO. 4024/2009 C.A. NO. 4025/2009, C.A. NO. 3911­3912/2009 C.A. NO. 3925/2009, C.A. NO. 3996­3997/2009 SLP (C) NO. 18681/2008, SLP (C) NO. 19183/2008 SLP (C) NO. 20206/2008, SLP (C) NO. 20205/2008 Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by JAYANT KUMAR ARORA Date: 2020.04.22 18:03:01 IST Reason: SLP (C) NO. 21576­21581/2008,  SLP (C) NO. 21585­21587/2008, SLP (C) NO. 23202/2008 2 SLP (C) NO. 26026/2008,  CONTMP. PET (C) NO. 263­264/2008 IN C.A. NO. 3996­ 3997/2009 CONTMP. PET (C) NO. 267­268/2008 IN C.A. NO. 3996­ 3997/2009 CONTMP. PET (C) NO. 265­266/2008 IN C.A. NO. 3996­ 3997/2009 C.A. No. 4764/2009 and T.C. (C) NO. 96/2013 J U D G M E N T M. R. Shah, J. 1. Having noted that there is a clear conflict between the two decisions of this Court, one in the case of   Ch. Tika Ramji & Others, Etc. vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Others [AIR  and another 1956 SC 676 = 1956 SCR 393 = 1956 SCJ 625] subsequent   decision   in   the   case   of   U.P.   Cooperative   Cane Unions Federations vs. West U.P. Sugar Mills Association and Others [(2004)5 SCC 430] , a three Judge Bench of this 3 Court has referred the matter to a larger Bench proposing the following questions of law to be considered by the larger Bench, preferably of a Bench consisting of seven Judges of this Court:  (1) Whether   by   virtue   of   Article   246   read   with Schedule VII List III Entry 33 of the Constitution the field is occupied by the Central legislation and hence the Central Government has the exclusive power to fix the price of sugarcane?  (2) Whether Section 16 or any other provision of the U.P.   Sugarcane   (Regulation   of   Supply   and Purchase) Act, 1953 confers any power upon the State   Government   to   fix   the   price   at   which sugarcane can be bought or sold?  (3) If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, then whether Section 16 or the said provision of the   U.P.   Sugarcane   (Regulation   of   Supply   and Purchase) Act, 1953 is repugnant to Section 3(2)(c) of   the   Essential   Commodities   Act,   1955   and Clause 3 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 [hereinafter referred to as “1966 Order”]? And if so, the   provisions   of   the   Central   enactments   will prevail over the provisions of the State enactment and the State enactment to that extent would be void under Article 254 of the Constitution of India. (4) Whether the SAP fixed by the State Government in exercise of powers under Section 16 of the U.P. Sugarcane   (Regulation   of   Supply   and   Purchase) Act, 1953 is arbitrary, without any application of mind or rational basis and is therefore, invalid and illegal?  4 (5) Does   the   State   Advised   Price   (for   short   “SAP”) constitute a statutory fixation of price? If so, is it within the legislative competence of the State?  (6) Whether the power to fix the price of sugarcane is without   any   guidelines   and   suffers   from conferment   of   arbitrary   and   uncanalised   power which is violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India?  2. The   core   issue   is   whether   the   State   of   U.P.   has   the authority to fix the State Advised Price (SAP) [hereinafter referred to as “SAP”], which is required to be paid over and above the minimum price fixed by the Central Government? 3. At the outset it is required to be noted that in  Tika Ramji case (supra) , a Bench of five Judges of this Court held as under: (i) That, section 16 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 [hereinafter referred to as “1953 U.P. Act”] does not include the power to fix a price; (ii) That, the price of cane fixed by the U.P. Government only   mean   the   price   fixed   by   the   appropriate Government   which   would   be   the   Central Government,   under   Clause   3   of   the   Sugarcane (Control)   Order,   1955   [hereinafter   referred   to   as “1955 Order”]; (iii) That, even the provisions in behalf of the agreement 5 contained in Clauses 3 and 4 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation   of   Supply   and   Purchase)   Order,   1954 [hereinafter referred to as “1954 U.P. Order”] provided that the price was to be the minimum price to be notified   by   the   Government   subject   to   such deduction,   if   any,   as   may   be   notified   by   the Government from time to time, meaning thereby the Central   Government,   the   State   Government   not having made any provision in that behalf at any time whatsoever;  (iv) That, there is no power to fix a price for sugarcane under   the   U.P.   Sugarcane   Act   or   Rules   and   the Orders made thereunder; It  is  to   be   noted   that  in   Tika   Ramji   case(supra) ,  this Court did not comment on whether a power which the State Government exercised under Section 16 of the 1953 U.P. Act would be repugnant to the Central legislation, since this Court found no such power exercised by the State Government.  4. However, subsequently, another five Judges Bench of this Court   in   the   case   of   U.P.   Coop.   Cane   Unions   Federations   has specifically gone into the question of repugnancy (Supra) and held that the inconsistency or repugnancy will rise if the State Government fixes a price which is lower than that fixed by the  Central   Government.   But,  if  the  price  fixed  by  the  State 6 Government   is   higher   than   that   fixed   by   the   Central Government, there will be no occasion for any inconsistency or repugnancy   as   it   is   possible   for   both   the   orders   to   operate simultaneously and to comply with both of them. A higher price fixed by the State Government would automatically comply with the provisions of clause 3(2) of 1966 Order. Therefore, any price fixed by the State Government which is higher than that fixed by the Central Government cannot lead to any kind of repugnancy.    In the case of  U.P. Coop. Cane Unions Federations (Supra) , this Court held that the State Government has power to fix the price which may be higher than the minimum price fixed by the Central Government.    This   Court   in   the   reference   order   observed   that   to   the aforesaid extent there is a difference of opinion and/or conflict.  5. We have called upon the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respective parties to first address on whether in fact there is any conflict between the decisions of this Court in the case   of   Tika   Ramji   (Supra)   and   U.P.   Coop.   Cane   Unions Federations (Supra) or not and whether there is a need to refer 7 the matter to a larger Bench of seven Judges? 6. Shri Jayant Bhushan, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants has submitted that this case raises the following important issues. (1) Whether the State Government / Cane Commissioner has any power or authority under the 1953 U.P. Act or the Rules and the Orders made thereunder to fix the sugarcane price? (2) If the State of U.P. had such a power, would such legislation be repugnant to the Central legislation i.e. Essential Commodities Act and the 1966 Order? (3) Whether   there   is   any   conflict   between   the Constitution   Bench   judgment   of   this   Court   in   the case of Tika Ramji (Supra) and in the case of U.P. Coop. Cane Unions Federations (Supra)? 6.1 So far as the question No.1 is concerned, it is submitted that the power to regulate the distribution, sale or purchase of cane under Section 16 of the 1953 U.P. Act does not include the power to fix the price. It is submitted that this aspect has been comprehensively dealt with in the case of Tika Ramji (Supra) which analyzed the legislative history of laws relating to sugar and sugarcane both Central and State and came to the specific 8 conclusion that the power reserved to the State Government to fix the minimum price of sugarcane which existed in U.P. Act 1 of 1938 was deleted from the 1953 U.P. Act since that power was being exercised by the Centre under Clause 3 of Sugar and Gur Control Order, 1950. Reliance is placed upon paragraph 34 of decision in the case of  Tika Ramji (Supra) .  6.1.1   It   is   submitted   that   in   the   aforesaid   decision   it   has specifically been held that the 1953 U.P. Act or the Rules and the Orders made thereunder made no provision for fixation of price of sugarcane whatsoever and therefore, there was no question of repugnancy with the Central law. It is submitted that in the case of  U.P. Coop. Cane Unions Federations (Supra) , this Court did not quote paragraph 34 and relevant paragraphs of the decision in the case of   Tika Ramji (Supra)   and erroneously holds that Tika Ramji (Supra)   only held that the State did not in fact exercise the power to fix the price. 6.1.2   It   is   submitted   that   the   argument   that   Tika   Ramji  only hold that the State Government did not fix the price (Supra) 9 as this was fixed for the first time in 1973, is totally misplaced. It is submitted that Tika Ramji case has specifically held that there was no power to fix the price for sugarcane under the 1953 U.P. Act   or   the   Rules   and   the   Orders   made   thereunder.   It   is submitted that although the judgment in   Tika Ramji (Supra) does not specifically quote section 16 of the 1953 U.P. Act, it is clear from the judgment that every section and every Rule was examined to see whether there was any power to fix cane price or any provision relating to price of cane. It is urged that the only provision that was found on detailed scrutiny of the 1953 U.P. Act   and   the   Rules   was   Rule   94  which   provided   for   a   notice showing the minimum price fixed by the Government, which was held   by   the   Constitution   Bench   to   mean   price   fixed   by   the Central Government.  6.2 Now, so far as question No.2 is concerned, it is argued that even if such a power exists under Section 16 of the 1953 U.P. Act,   such   power   would   be   totally   repugnant   to   the   power   of Central Government to fix the minimum price under Clause 3 of the 1955 Order and thereafter under 1966 Order. It is submitted 10 that although  Tika Ramji case   (supra)  has not commented on whether   such   a   power   with   the   State   Government   would   be repugnant to  the  Central  Legislation,  since  it  found  no  such power exercised by the State Government, the majority in the later Constitution Bench judgment in the case of   U.P. Coop. Cane Unions Federations (Supra)  held that this would not be repugnant to the Central Legislation. It is argued that basis for holding that there is no repugnancy is that it is possible for both the orders to operate simultaneously and to comply with both of them. It is argued that in the case of  U.P. Coop. Cane Unions , subsequently it is held that any price fixed Federations (Supra) by the State Government which is higher than that fixed by the Central Government cannot lead to any kind of repugnancy. It is argued   that   this   conclusion   and   its   use   for   determining repugnancy is incorrect and contrary to the earlier Constitution Bench judgment including in the case of  . It Tika Ramji (Supra) is argued that therefore this issue also needs to be referred to a larger Bench to resolve the conflict. Reliance is placed on some of the observations in the case of  Tika Ramji (Supra) ; in the case 11 of  State of Orissa vs. M.A. Tulloch & Co. [1964 (4) SCR 461] and in the case of  M. Karunanidhi vs. Union of India [(1979)3 SCC 431] .  6.2.1  It is argued that therefore there cannot be two minimum prices, one fixed by the Central Government as minimum price and other fixed by the State Government as SAP, which is also a minimum price. It is submitted that once the Centre has fixed a minimum price, any other price whether minimum price or SAP would be repugnant to the Centre’s decision and the Centre’s power and such power of the State Government would therefore have to yield to the Central legislation under Article 254 of the Constitution, both legislations being under the Concurrent List.  6.3 It   is   urged   that   there   is   a   direct   conflict   between   the Constitution Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of  Tika  on one hand and the later Judgment also of the Ramji (Supra) Constitution   Bench   in   the   case   of   U.P.   Coop.   Cane   Unions Federations (Supra) , which needs to be referred to the larger 12 Bench of seven Judges.  7. On   the   other   hand,   Shri   Krishnan   Venugopal,   learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the State of U.P. has vehemently argued that as such there is no apparent conflict between the two decisions of Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of   Tika Ramji (Supra)   and   U.P. Coop. Cane Unions Federations   (Supra) .  In   support,   he   has  made   the   following submissions.  (1) That, there is a sea change in the law prevailing and considered by this Court in the case of  Tika Ramji   and   thereafter   in   the   case   of   (Supra) U.P.   Coop. Cane Unions Federations (Supra) ; (2) That, by the time of the challenge to the 1953 U.P. Act and the 1954 U.P. Order made under Section 16 of the 1953 U.P. Act in the  U.P. Coop. Cane Unions ,   there   was   a   fundamental Federations   (Supra) change in the substratum on which  Tika Ramji case was   decided   to   the   extent   that   the   Central Government had repealed and substituted the 1955 Order   by   the   1966   Order.   The   1966   Order   issued under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 expressly left room for the State to advise a price higher than the minimum price fixed by the Central Government under Clause 3(1) of the 1966 Order   at   which   agreements   for   cane   procurement could   be   reached   between   farmers   or   cooperative 13 societies, especially in the context of the reservation of cane­growing areas for exclusive procurement by sugar factories.  (3) That, the ratio of  Tika Ramji (Supra)  is not premised solely on the complete absence of power under the 1953 U.P. Act to fix prices. It is submitted that if so, there was no need for this Court to hold premise its reasoning on the “fact” that the State of U.P. had not actually fixed the price for sugarcane.  (4) That,   in   the   case   of   ,   though Tika   Ramji   (Supra) there is a brief mention of section 16 of the impugned 1953 U.P. Act, neither was the issue raised and the issue No.(iii) was whether section 16 of the Essential Commodities Act read with clause 7 of 1955 Order could have purported to repeal Section 16 of the 1953 U.P.   Act   and   the   1954   U.P.   Order   in   light   of   the proviso  to Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India, neither   was   the   issue   raised   nor   was   there   any argument or discussion on the effect or implications of section 16 of the 1953 U.P. Act on the fixation of the “minimum price” under the 1955 Order in the context of the discussion of repugnancy of 1953 U.P. Act.  (5) That, there has been a sea change in the law relating to repugnancy between Central law and State law in the context of laws made under the Concurrent List, List   III   in   the   VII   Schedule   to   the   Constitution   of India, where both, the Union and the States have power to make law.  (6) That, being fully aware of the judgment of this Court in   the   case   of   ,   the   Central Tika   Ramji   (Supra) Government   retreated   from   the   field   of   fixing   “the price” of sugarcane and only retain the power to fix “the minimum price” while permitting an agreement 14 for fixing higher price for sugarcane. It is submitted that therefore, the Central Government left it open for the State to fix the price above the minimum price for purposes of the agreement to be reached between the sugarcane   growers   and   sugarcane   cooperative society,   on   the   one   hand,   and   the   sugarcane factories, on the other. It is submitted that therefore the Central Government expressly indicated its intent to   vacate   a   particular   portion   of   the   field   of   price fixation in relation to sugarcane and left it open to the State,   the   doctrine   of   occupied   field   has   no application whatsoever.  (7) It   is   submitted   that   the   reliance   placed   upon   the decision of this Court in the case of  M.A. Tulloch & Co. (Supra)   on the occupied field doctrine shall not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand as that case   relates   to   regulation   of   mines   and   mineral development and the regulation which involves the relationship between the Entry 23 in List II and Entry 54 in List I of the Seventh Schedule, both of which make it clear that the field of legislation can be taken over by Parliament by making the declaration to that effect. 7.1 Shri Venugopal, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondent ­ State of U.P. has made following submissions in support of his submission that there has been a fundamental change in the provisions of the 1955 Order to the extent that it was repealed by the 1966 Order.  (1) That,   Clause   3   of   the   1955   Order   empowered   the Central Government to fix “the price or the minimum 15 price” to be paid by a producer of sugar for sugarcane purchased by him. The 1955 Order has been repealed by the 1966 Order and clause 3 of the 1966 Order provides that the Central Government may fix “the minimum price” of sugarcane to be paid by producers of sugar. (2) That, there is a difference between “the price” which is a fixed amount and “the minimum price” which only indicates the lowest­permissible rate. The 1966 Order was further amended in 1976 and 1978 and clauses   3(3)   and   3­A   were   introduced,   which   now contemplated   an   “agreed   price”.   In   view   of   the prohibition in clause 3(2) on transacting below the minimum price, the “agreed price” necessarily had to be   higher   than   the   “minimum   price”   fixed   under clause 3(1). (3) That, it is evident from the amended provisions of the 1966 Order, as amended in 1976 and again in 1978, that   the   Central   Government   intentionally   vacated space in favour of the State Legislature to regulate the   price   at   which   agreements   could   be   reached between sugarcane farmers and cooperative societies of sugarcane farmers for procurement of sugarcane, especially in the context of reservation of areas for procurement by sugar factories.  (4) That, therefore, it is clear that as long as the State Advised Price fixed by the State Government of Uttar Pradesh by exercising powers under Section 16 of the 1953 U.P. Act remains over and above the minimum price fixed by the Central legislature under the 1966 Order, there is no repugnancy to the extent that both laws can be obeyed without infringing the other.   7.2 It is further argued that in the case of   U.P. Coop. Cane 16 Unions Federations (Supra) , this Court has rightly observed and held that so long both, the Union law and the State law can be   obeyed,   the   State   law   does   not   become   repugnant   to   the Union law when both the laws can operate in the same field without   conflict.   In   support,   heavy   reliance   has   been   placed upon   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of   Dr.   Preeti .  Srivastava vs. State of M.P. [(1999) 7 SCC 120] 7.3 It is further argued that in the case of   M. Karunanidhi , while examining the issue of repugnancy with respect to (Supra) State   enactment   of   Tamil   Nadu   Public   Men   (Criminal Misconduct)   Act,   1973   in   light   of   the   Central   enactments   of Indian Penal Code, 1860, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 and after considering the relevant Entries in List I, List II and Concurrent List – List III and Article 254 of the Constitution of India, it is held that so far as Clause (1) of Article 254 is concerned, it clearly lays down that where there is a direct collision between a provision of a law made by the State and that made by the Parliament with respect 17 to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the State law would be void to the extent of the repugnancy. It is submitted that it is further held that so far as the Concurrent List is concerned, both,   Parliament   and   the   State   Legislatures   are   entitled   to legislate in regard to any of the Entries appearing therein, but that is subject to the condition laid down by Article 254(1). It is submitted that in the aforesaid decision it is held that (1)Where the provisions of a Central Act and a State Act in the Concurrent List are fully inconsistent and are absolutely irreconcilable, the Central Act will prevail and the State Act will become void in view of the repugnancy; (2) Where, however a law passed by the State comes into collision with a law passed by the Parliament on an Entry in the Concurrent List, the State Act shall prevail to the extent of the repugnancy and the provisions of the Central Act would become void provided the State Act has been passed in accordance with clause (2) of Article 254; (3) Where, a law passed by   the   State   Legislature   while   being   substantially   within   the scope of the entries in the State List entrenches upon any of the Entries in the Central List the constitutionality of the law may be 18 upheld by invoking the doctrine of pith and substance if on an analysis of the provisions of the Act it appears that by and large the   law   falls   within   the   four   corners   of   the   State   List   an entrenchment, if any, is purely incidental or inconsequential; (4) Where,   however,   a   law   made   by   the   State   Legislature   on   a subject covered by the Concurrent List is inconsistent with and repugnant to a previous law made by Parliament, then such a law can be protected by obtaining the assent of the President under Article 254(2) of the Constitution. The result of obtaining the assent of the President would be that so far as the State Act is   concerned,   it   will   prevail   in   the   State   and   overrule   the provisions of the Central Act in their applicability to the State only. Such a state of affairs will exist only until Parliament may at  any   time  make   a   law  adding  to,   or  amending,  varying   or repealing   the   law   made   by   the   State   Legislature   under   the proviso to Article 254.  7.4 It is submitted that therefore applying the law laid down by this Court in the case of   to the facts of M. Karunanidhi (Supra) the case on hand, it is clear that in the present case, as the 19 Essential   Commodities   Act   and   the   1966   Order,   on   the   one hand, and 1953 U.P. Act and the 1954 U.P. Order, have both been enacted under the Concurrent List, and there is no direct conflict between the fixation of the minimum price by the Central Government under Clause 3 of the 1955 Order and the fixation of   a   higher   SAP   by   the   State   of   U.P.,   there   is   no   real   and irreconcilable conflict between the provisions of the two Acts to the extent that both can be obeyed without violating the order. Therefore, it is submitted that the decision of this Court in the case of  U.P. Coop. Cane Unions Federations (Supra)  must be upheld as there is no conflict with the decision in the case of Tika Ramji (Supra) . 8. While considering whether there is any apparent conflict between the decisions of the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of     and   Tika Ramji (Supra) U.P. Coop. Cane Unions   and   whether   the   matter   requires   to   be Federations   (Supra) referred   to   the   larger   Bench   of   seven   Judges,   the   legislative history as well as the chronology of lists and events which led to 20 the controversy in the case of   Tika Ramji (Supra)   and   U.P. Coop.   Cane   Unions   Federations   (Supra)   and   the   relevant provisions   which   fell   for   consideration   before   this   Court   are required to be referred to, which are noted in  U.P. Coop. Cane Unions Federations (Supra)  , as under:  th a. On 8   April, 1932, the Central Legislature, in the then   British   India,   passed   the   Sugar   Industry (Protection) Act, 1932 [Act 13 of 1932] to provide for the fostering and development of Sugar Industry in India. This led to a large number of farmers taking up sugarcane   cultivation   and   the   establishment   of   a number of sugar factories coming up, particularly in the then Province of U.P. To protect the interest of the sugarcane­growers', and for the purpose of assuring them a fair price, the Central Legislature enacted on st 1  May, 1934 the Sugarcane Act, 1934, 1934 [Act 15 of  1934]  to   regulate  the   price  at   which   sugarcane intended   for   manufacture   of   sugar   could   be purchased by or for the factories. Since, sugarcane was grown in various Provinces and the Sugarcane Act, 1934 left the declaration of controlled areas and the   fixing   of   minimum   price   for   the   purchase   of sugarcane in any controlled area to the discretion of the   Provincial   Governments,   the   Provincial Governments were also empowered to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the objects of the Act.  b. As a result of the Government of India Act, 1935, there was a distribution of legislative powers between 21 the   Dominion   Legislature   and   the   Provincial Legislatures. Consequently, the entire subject matter of Act 15 of 1934 fell within the Provincial Legislative List.   It   was   felt   that   Act   15   of   1934   was   not sufficiently   comprehensive   for   dealing   with   the problems of the sugar industry. The Governments of U.P.  and Bihar  decided  to  introduce  legislation  on similar   lines   in   both   the   provinces   since,   between them, they accounted for nearly 85% of production of sugar in India.  c. The U.P. Legislature enacted on 10th February, 1938 the U.P. Sugar Factories Control Act, 1938 [U.P. Act I of 1938]. This Act provided for (i) licensing of sugar factories, (ii) regulation of the supply of sugarcane intended for use in such factories, (iii) the minimum price for sugarcane, (iv) the establishment of Sugar Control Board and Advisory Committee, and (v) a tax on the sale of sugarcane intended for use in factories. Though this Act was to remain in force initially until th 30   June, 1947, its life was extended from time to th time   and   finally   up   to   30   June   1952.   Parallel developments during this period were the outbreak of the Second World War and the legislative measures taken to meet the situation by the then Government of India for controlling the production, regulation of distribution and supply of essential commodities. The Dominion   Legislature   acquired   the   power   to   make laws   for   the   Provinces   with   respect   to   any   of   the matters enumerated in the Provincial Legislative List. Under the Defence of India Act, sugar was made a controlled   commodity   in   the   year   1942   and   its production and distribution as well as the fixation of sugar prices were regulated by the Sugar Controller. The proclamation of emergency was revoked by the st Governor General on 1  April 1946. Simultaneously, the laws made by the Dominion Legislature in the field of the Provincial Legislative List were to cease to 22 be effective after 30th September 1946.  th d. On 26  March 1946, the British Parliament enacted the India (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 [9 & 10 Geo.6, Chapter 39] which provided that, notwithstanding anything in the Government of India Act,   1935,   the   Indian   Legislature   shall   during   the periods  specified  in  Section  4  of  the  Act   have  the power   to   make   laws   with   respect,   inter   alia ,   to “foodstuffs”. Though the period provided in Section 4 was one year from the expiration of the declaration of the emergency by the Governor General, this period was   extended   from   time   to   time   and   would   have st ended on 31  March 1948. th e. On 18  July 1947, the Indian Independence Act came to   be   passed   leading   to   the   Indian   (Central Government and Legislature) Act, 1946 which by way of   adaptation   provided   that   the   powers   of   the Dominion   Legislature   shall   be   exercised   by   the Constituent Assembly. With the Constitution coming th into force on 26  January 1950, Article 369 invested Parliament with the power for a period of 5 years from the commencement of the Constitution to make laws with respect to some of the matters as if they were enumerated in the Concurrent List. One such matter was “trade and commerce within a State in, and the production, supply and distribution of, .....foodstuffs (including edible oil seeds and oil), ......”  th f. On   7   October   1950,   the   Central   Government,   in exercise of the powers conferred upon it by Section 3 of the Act, promulgated the Sugar and Gur Control Order,   1950   which,   inter   alia,   empowered   it   to prohibit movement of sugarcane from any area and also   to   direct   that   no   gur   or   sugar   should   be manufactured from sugarcane except under and in accordance with a licence issued by it. Power was 23 also   given   to   the   Central   Government   to   fix   the minimum price of sugarcane and no person was to sell or agree to sell sugarcane to a producer and no producer   was   to   purchase   or   agree   to   purchase sugarcane at a price lower than that notified. This power of fixing the price of sugarcane was exercised by   the   Central   Government   from   time   to   time   by issuing notifications which fixed the minimum price to be paid by the producer of sugar by vacuum pan process. An Act for similar purposes, by name, Bihar Sugar Factories Control Act 7 of 1937 came to be enacted   in   the   State   of   Bihar.   As   a   result   of   the recommendations   of   the   Khaitan   Committee,   the report of the Indian Tariff Board in the year 1938 and the   U.P.   Sugar   Industry   Enquiry   Committee,   1951 [Swaminathan   Committee],   it   was   desired   that   the U.P. Act I of 1938 should be amended in order to make regulation of the supply of sugarcane possible.  g. The   Industries   (Development   and   Regulation   Act, th 1951 [Act 65 of 1951] was brought into effect from 8 May   1952.   In   view   of   this   Act   coming   into   force, certain provisions of the U.P. Act I of 1938 became th inoperative. The U.P. Legislature passed on 29  June, 1952, the U.P. Sugar Factories Control (Amendment) Act, 1952, deleting those provisions and putting the amended Act permanently on the Statute Book. The U.P. Act I of 1938, thus amended, continued in force till it was repealed by the U.P. Sugarcane Act, 1953. The object of the enactment of the 1953 Act is stated thus:  “With   the   promulgation   of   the   Industries (Development   and   Regulation   Act,   1951 th with   effect   from   8   May   1952,   the regulation   of   the   sugar   industry   has become exclusively a Central subject. The State Governments are now only concerned 24 with the supply of sugarcane to the sugar factories.   The   Bill   is   being   introduced   in order to provide for a rational distribution of   sugarcane   to   factories,   for   its development on organised scientific lines, to protect the interests of the cane­growers and of the industry and to put the new Act permanently on the Statute Book”  In exercise of the rule making power conferred by Section 28 of the Act, the U.P. Government made the U.P. Sugarcane Rules, 1954 and also in exercise of the   powers   conferred   by   Section   16   of   the   Act, promulgated the U.P. Sugarcane Order, 1954.  st h. On 1   April 1955, Parliament enacted the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 [Act 10 of 1955] to provide in the interests of the general public “for the control of production, supply and distribution of, and trade and commerce in, certain commodities”. This Act defines “essential   commodity”   in   Section   2(a)(v)   to   be   any “foodstuffs,   including   edible   oilseeds   and   oils”.   By clause (b), “food­crops” is defined to include crops of sugarcane.   By   clause   (a)(xi),   the   definition   of “essential commodity” extends to any other class of commodity   which   the   Central   Government   may declare to be an essential commodity for the purpose of the Act, being a commodity with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws by virtue of Entry 33   in   List   III   in   the   Seventh   Schedule   to   the Constitution.  i. Section   3(1)   empowers   the   Central   Government,   if necessary or expedient to do so “for maintaining or increasing the supplies of any essential commodity or for   securing   their   equitable   distribution   and availability at fair prices”, by an order to provide “for 25 regulating or prohibiting the production, supply and distribution   thereof   and   trade   and   commerce therein.” Under clause (c) of sub­section (2) of Section 3, such an order may provide for controlling the price at which essential commodity may be bought or sold.  j. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, the Central Government th promulgated on 27  August 1955, the Sugar Control Order, 1955 and the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955. Clause   3(a)   of   the   Sugarcane   Control   Order,   1955 empowers the Central Government, after consultation with appropriate authorities, to fix in respect of any area 'the price or the minimum price' to be paid by a producer of sugar for sugarcane purchased by him in that area. It also empowers fixation of different prices for different areas or different qualities of sugarcane or on the basis of recovery of sugar from sugarcane having regard to various factors enumerated therein. Clause 3(2) provides that no person shall sell or agree to sell sugarcane to a producer of sugar or factory and no producer or factory shall purchase or agree to purchase   sugarcane   at   a   price   lower   than   that notified under this clause. Clause (4) empowers the Central   Government   to   prohibit   or   restrict   or otherwise regulate the export of sugarcane from any area for supply to different factories and also to direct that   no   gur   or   sugar   shall   be   manufactured   from sugarcane except under and in accordance with the conditions specified in a licence issued in this behalf. Clause   (5)   requires   every   producer   or   factory   to comply with the directions made under the order. By clause (7) of this order, the Sugar and Gur Control Order, 1950 was repealed.  th k. On 16  July, 1966, the Central Government notified the   Sugarcane   (Control)   Order,   1966.   Clause   2(g) defines “price” to mean the price or the minimum price fixed by the Central Government, from time to time, for sugarcane delivered,   inter alia , to a sugar 26 factory.   Clauses   3   and   3­A   bear   reproduction   and read thus :­  “ 3:  Minimum price of sugarcane payable by producer   of   sugar­   (1)   The   Central Government may, after consultation with such authorities, bodies or associations as it may deem fit, by notification in the official Gazette, from time to time, fix the minimum price of sugarcane to be paid by producers of sugar or their agents for the sugarcane purchased by them, having regard to ­  (a) the cost of production of sugarcane;  (b) the return to the grower from alternative crops   and   the   general   trend   of   prices   of agricultural commodities;  (c) the availability of sugar to the consumer at a fair price;  (d)   the   price   at   which   sugar   produced   from sugarcane is sold by producers of sugar; and  (e) the recovery of sugar from sugarcane :  Provided that the Central Government or, with the approval   of   the   Central   Government,   the   State Government, may, in such circumstances and subject to such conditions as specified in Clause 3­A, allow a suitable rebate in the price so fixed.]  Explanation ­ (1) Different prices may  be fixed for different   areas   or   different   qualities   or   varieties   of sugarcane. (2) No person shall sell or agree to sell sugarcane to a producer of sugar or his agent, and no such producer or agent shall purchase or agree to purchase sugarcane, at a price lower than that fixed under sub­clause (1). (3) Where a producer of sugar purchases any sugarcane from a grower of sugarcane or  from  a  Sugarcane­grower's  Co­operative Society, 27 the producer shall, unless there is an agreement in writing   to   the   contrary   between   the   parties,   pay within fourteen days from the date of delivery of the sugarcane to the seller or tender to him the price of the   cane   sold   at   the   rate   agreed   to   between   the producer and the sugarcane­ grower or Sugarcane­ growers' Co­operative Society or that fixed under sub­ clause (1), as the case may be, either at the gate of the factory or at the cane collection centre or transfer or deposit the necessary amount in the bank account of the seller or the co­operative society, as the case may be. [Subs. by G.S.R. 945, dated 18.5.1968] (3­A). Where a producer of sugar or his agent fails to make payment for the sugarcane purchased within 14 days of the date of delivery, he shall pay interest on the amount due at the rate of 15 per cent per annum for the   period   of   such   delay   beyond   14   days.   Where payment of interest on delayed payment is made to a cane­growers' society, the society shall pass on the interest   to   the   cane­growers   concerned   after deducting administrative charges, if any, permitted by the rules of the said society. [Ins. by G.S.R. 62(E) dated 2.2.1978].  (4) Where sugarcane is purchased through an agent, the   producer   or   the   agent   shall   pay   or   tender payment of such price within the period and in the manner aforesaid and if neither of them has so paid or tendered payment, each of them shall be deemed to have contravened the provisions of this clause.  (5) At the time of payment at the gate of the factory or at the cane collection centre, receipts, if any, given by the   purchaser,   shall   be   surrendered   by   the   cane­ grower or co­operative society. (6) Where payment has been made by transfer or deposit of the amount to the bank account of the seller or the co­operative society as   the   case   may   be,   the   receipt   given   by   the purchaser, if any, to the grower or the co­ operative society if not returned to the purchaser, shall become 28 invalid.   (7)   In   case,   the   price   of   the   sugarcane remains unpaid on the last day of the sugar year in which   cane   supply   was   made   to   the   factory   on account of the suppliers of cane not coming forward with their claims therefore or for any other reason, it shall be deposited by the producer of sugar with the Collector   of   the   district   in   which   the   factory   is situated,   within   three   months   of   the   close   of   the sugar year. The Collector shall pay, out of the amount so deposited, all claims, considered payable by him and preferred before him within three years of the close   of   the   sugar   year   in   which   the   cane   was supplied to the factory. The amount still remaining undisbursed   with   the   Collector,   after   meeting   the claims from the suppliers, shall be credited by him to the Consolidated Fund of the State, immediately after the expiry of the time limit of 3 years within which claims therefore could be preferred by the suppliers. The State Government shall, as far as possible, utilise such amounts, for development of sugarcane in the State.  3­A. Rebate that can be deducted from the price paid for sugarcane ­ A producer of sugar or his agent shall pay,   for   the   sugarcane   purchased   by   him,   to   the sugarcane­grower   or   the   sugarcane­   growers'   co­ operative   society,   either   the   minimum   price   of sugarcane fixed under Clause 3, or the price agreed to   between   the   producer   or   his   agent   and   the sugarcane­grower   or   the   sugarcane­growers'   co­ operative   society,   as   the   case   may   be   (hereinafter referred   to   as   the   agreed   price)*   [Ins.   by   G.S.R. 815(E) dated 24.9.1976]”  Clause   4   empowers   the   Central   Government   “or   a State   Government,   with   the   concurrence   of   the Central Government”, to fix the minimum price or the price of sugarcane to be paid by producers of the khandsari   sugar   for   the   sugarcane   purchased   by them with the proviso that the minimum price or the 29 price   of   sugarcane   so   fixed   shall   not   exceed   the minimum price of sugarcane fixed by producers of sugar in the region with a further proviso that no person   shall   sell   or   agree   to   sell   sugarcane   to   a producer of khandsari sugar  or his agent, and no such producer or his agent shall purchase or agree to purchase sugarcane, “at a price lower than that fixed under clause (4)”.  Clause 5­A provides that where a producer of sugar purchases   sugarcane,   from   a   sugarcane­grower during each sugar year, he shall be liable to pay, in addition to the minimum sugarcane price fixed under Clause   3,   an   additional   price,   if   found   due   in accordance with the formula enumerated in Second Schedule to the Order.  Under sub­clause (2) of Clause 5­A, an appropriate authority   may   be   authorised   to   determine   the additional price payable under sub­ clause (1) who shall intimate the same in writing to the producer of sugar and the sugarcane­grower. Under sub­clause (4), the manner of payment of the additional price may be prescribed as directed by the Central Government or the State Government, from time to time.  Under sub­clause (5), no additional price determined under sub­ clause (2) or sub­clause (3) is required to be paid by  a  producer  of sugar  who  pays a  price higher than the minimum price fixed under Clause 3 to the sugarcane­grower, provided that, “the price so paid is not less than the total price comprising the minimum sugarcane price fixed under Clause 3 and the additional price determined under sub­clause (2) or sub­clause (3).”  Under sub­clause (6), it is provided that any extra price paid by the producer of sugar to the sugarcane­ grower over and above the minimum sugarcane price fixed under Clause 3, shall be adjusted against the 30 additional   sugarcane   price   determined   under   sub­ clause (2) or sub­clause (3) and the balance, if any, shall be paid to the sugarcane­ grower.  Sub­clause (7) provides that, additional price shall be payable to the sugarcane­grower if he, in performance of   his   agreement   with   a   producer   of   sugar,   has supplied   not   less   than   85%   of   the   sugarcane   so agreed.  Clause 6 empowers the Central Government to: (i) reserve areas where sugarcane is grown to determine the quantity of sugarcane which a factory will require for crushing during any year; (ii) to fix, with respect to   any   specified   sugarcane­grower   or   sugarcane­ growers generally in a reserved area, the quantity or percentage of sugarcane which he by himself or as a member   of   a   co­operative   society   of   sugarcane­ growers operating in such area, shall supply to the factory concerned; (iii) direct a sugarcane­grower or a sugarcane­growers'   co­   operative   society,   supplying sugarcane to a factory, and the factory concerned, to enter into an agreement to supply or purchase the quantity of sugarcane fixed; (iv) direct that no gur or khandsari   sugar   shall   be   manufactured   from sugarcane except in accordance with the conditions specified in the licence; and (v) “prohibit or restrict or otherwise regulate” the export of sugarcane from any area (including a reserved area) except under and in accordance with a permit issued in his behalf. Sub­ clause (2) makes it obligatory on every sugarcane­ grower, Sugarcane­growers' Co­operative Society and factory, to whom an order is issued under sub­clause (1), to supply or purchase the quantity of sugarcane covered   by   the   agreement   entered   into.   Any   wilful failure   on   the   part   of   the   sugarcane­grower, sugarcane­growers' co­ operative society and factory to do so, is constituted a breach of the provisions of the Order.  31 Under Clause 11, the powers under the Order shall, subject to specified conditions, be exercisable also by an officer or authority of the Central Government and the State Government or any officer or authority of the State Government.  8.1 The provisions of Section 16 of the Act of 1953 read as under: 16. Regulation of purchase and supply of cane in the reserved   and   assigned   areas   –(1)   The   State Government may, for maintaining supplies, by order, regulate­ (a) the distribution, sale or purchase of any case in any reserved or assigned area; and (b) purchase   of   cane   in   any   area   other   than   a reserved or assigned area. (2) Without   prejudice   to   the   generality   of   the foregoing powers such order may provide for­ (a) the   quantity   of   cane   to   be   supplied   by   each Cane­grower or Cane­growers’ Co­operative Society in such area to the factory for which the area has so been reserved or assigned; (b) the manner in which cane grown in the reserved area or the assigned area, shall be purchased by the factory for which the area has been so reserved or assigned   and   the   circumstance   in   which   the   cane grown   by   a   cane­grower   shall   not   be   purchased except through a Cane­growers’ Co­operative Society; (c) the form and the terms and conditions of the agreement to be executed by the occupier or manager of   the   factory   for   which   an   area   is   reserved   or assigned for the purchase of cane offered for sale; (d) the circumstances under which permission may 32 be granted­ (i) for the purchase of cane grown in reserved or   assigned   area   by   a   [Gur,   Rab   or   Khandsari Manufacturing   Unit   or   any   person   or   factory] (Substituted by UP ACT IV of 1964) other than the factory   for   which   area   has   been   reserved   or assigned; and (ii) for the sale of cane grown in a reserved or assigned   area   to   a   [Gur,   Rab   or   Khandsari Manufacturing   Unit   or   any   person   or   factory] (Substituted by UP ACT IV of 1964) other than the factory for which the area is reserved or assigned; (e) such  incidental   and   consequential  matters  as may   appear   to   be   necessary   or   desirable   for   this purpose.  9. Thus,   from   the   legislative   history   and   the   relevant provisions of Essential Commodities Act, 1953 U.P. Act, 1954 U.P. Order, 1955 Order, 1966 Order which fell for consideration by this Court in the case of Tika Ramji (Supra) and U.P. Coop. Cane Unions Federations (Supra), it appears that as such there has been a sea change in the law and the relevant provisions which can be summarized as under:  a. That,   the   Central   Government   repealed   and substituted the 1955 Order by 1966 Order; b. That, in the 1966 Order issued under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, from the word “price and 33 the minimum price”, word “price” came to be deleted and the power to fix “minimum price” came to be retained; c. Clause 3 of the 1955 Order empowered the Central Government to fix “price” or “minimum price” to be paid   by   the   producer   of   sugar   for   sugarcane purchased by him. However, 1955 Order came to be repealed by the 1966 Order and Clause 3 of 1966 Order provides that the Central Government may fix the “minimum price” of sugarcane to be paid by the producers of the sugar; d. That,   1966   Order   came   to   be   further   amended   in 1976 and 1978 and Clauses 3(3) and 3­A came to be introduced which now contemplates “agreed price”; 9.1 Considering the Clause 3 of the 1955 Order by which the Central   Government   was   empowered   to   fix   “price”   or   the “minimum price” which fell for consideration by this Court in the case of Tika Ramji (Supra) and as even the time when the matter was decided by this Court in the case of  Tika Ramji (Supra) , no price was determined and/or fixed by the State and therefore, having felt there is no repugnancy and/or conflict, this Court in the case of   did not as such enter into the Tika Ramji (Supra) question of repugnancy. Therefore, as such in the case of  Tika Ramji (Supra) , this Court considered Clause 3 of 1955 Order 34 which specifically empowered the Central Government to fix the “price or minimum price” and also considered that the State Government has not exercised the power by fixing the price and therefore, the question of conflict does not arise. However, in the case   of   U.P.   Coop.   Cane   Unions   Federations   (Supra) ,   this Court   was   considering   the   subsequent   change   in   law   more particularly the 1966 Order and Clause 3 of the 1966 Order and other relevant Clauses of 1966 Order.  10. The relevant observations  and findings recorded by this Court in the case of  Tika Ramji (Supra)  and in the case of  U.P. Coop. Cane Unions Federations (Supra)  are as under: 10.1 RELEVANT   EXTRACTS   AND   OBSERVATIONS   IN   THE CASE OF TIKA RAMJI “..… It   is   clear,   therefore,   that   all   the   Acts   and   the notifications issued thereunder by the Centre in regard to sugar and sugarcane were enacted in exercise of the concurrent jurisdiction . The exercise of such concurrent jurisdiction would not deprive the Provincial Legislatures of  similar  powers   which  they   had  under  the   Provincial Legislative List and there would, therefore, be no question of legislative incompetence qua the Provincial Legislatures 35 in regard to similar pieces of legislation enacted by the latter.   The   Provincial   Legislatures   as   well   as   the Central Legislature would be competent to enact such pieces   of   legislation   and   no   question   of   legislative competence would arise . It also follows as a necessary corollary   that,   even   though   sugar   industry   was   a controlled   industry,   none   of   these   Acts   enacted   by   the Centre was in exercise of its jurisdiction under Entry 52 of List I. Industry in the wide sense of the term would be capable   of   comprising   three   different   aspects:   (1)   raw materials   which   are   an   integral   part   of   the   industrial process, (2) the process of manufacture or production, and (3) the distribution of the products of the industry. The raw materials would be goods which would be comprised in   Entry   27   of   List   II.   The   process   of   manufacture   or production   would   be   comprised   in   Entry   24   of   List   II except where the industry was a controlled industry when it would fall within Entry 52 of List I and the products of the industry would also be comprised in Entry 27 of List II except   where   they   were   the   products   of   the   controlled industries when they would fall within Entry 33 of List III. This   being   the   position,   it   cannot   be   said   that   the legislation which was enacted by the Centre in regard to sugar and sugarcane could fall within Entry 52 of List I . Before sugar industry became a controlled industry, both sugar and sugarcane fell within Entry 27 of List II but, after a declaration was made by Parliament in 1951 by Act LXV of 1951, sugar industry became a controlled industry and the product of that industry, viz., sugar was comprised in Entry 33 of List III taking it out of Entry 27 of List II. Even so, the Centre as well as the Provincial Legislatures had concurrent jurisdiction in regard to the same.   In no event could the legislation in regard to sugar and sugarcane be thus included within Entry 52 of List 1. The pith and substance argument also cannot be   imported   here   for   the   simple   reason   that,   when both the Centre as well as the State Legislatures were 36 operating   in   the   concurrent   field,   there   was   no question   of   any   trespass   upon   the   exclusive jurisdiction vested in the Centre under Entry 52 of List   1,   the   only   question   which   survived   being whether, putting both the pieces of legislation enacted by the Centre and the State Legislature together, there was any repugnancy, a contention which will be dealt with hereafter .  “…..A   more   effective   answer   is   furnished   by comparison of the terms of the  U.P. Act  I of 1938 with those of the impugned Act. Whereas the U.P. Act I of 1938 covered both sugarcane and sugar within its compass, the impugned   Act   was   confined   only   to   sugarcane,   thus relegating sugar to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Centre thereby   eliminating   all   argument   with   regard   to   the encroachment by the U.P. State Legislature on the field occupied by the Centre. The U.P. Act I of 1938 provided for the establishment of a Sugar Control Board, the Sugar Commissioner,   the   Sugar   Commission   and   the   Cane Commissioner.   The   impugned   Act   provided   for   the establishment   of   a   Sugarcane   Board.   The   Sugar Commissioner   was   named   as   such   but   his   functions under   rules   106   and   107   were   confined   to   getting information   which   would   lead   to   the   regulation   of   the supply   and   purchase   of   sugarcane   required   for   use   in sugar factories and had nothing to do with the production or the disposal of sugar produced in the factories. The Sugar   Commission   was   not   provided   for   but   the   Cane Commissioner   was   the   authority   invested   with   all   the powers in regard to the supply and purchase of sugarcane. The Inspectors appointed under the U.P. Act I of 1938 had no doubt powers to examine records maintained at the factories showing the amount of sugarcane purchased and crushed  but they  were  there  with  a  view  to  check  the production   or   manufacture   of   sugar   whereas   the Inspectors appointed under the impugned Act  were, by rule 20, to confine their activities to the regulation of the 37 supply   and   purchase   of   sugarcane   without   having anything to do with the further process of the manufacture or production of sugar. Chapter 3 of  U.P. Act  I of 1938, dealing   with   the   construction   and   extension   of   sugar factories,   licensing   of   factories   for   crushing   sugarcane, fixing of the price of sugar, etc., was deleted from  the impugned   Act.   The   power   of   licensing   new   industrial undertakings was thereafter exercised by the Centre under Act LXV of 1951 as amended by Act XXVI of 1953, vide sections 11(a), 12 and 13,  and the power of fixation of price   of   sugar   was   exercised   by   the   Centre   under section 3 of Act XXIV of 1946 by issuing the Sugar Control   Order,   1950 .   Even   the   power   reserved   to   the State   Government   to   fix   minimum   prices   of   sugarcane under Chapter V of U.P. Act I of 1938 was deleted from the impugned   Act   the   same   being   exercised   by   the   Centre under clause 3 of Sugar and Gur Control Order, 1950, issued  by  it in  exercise  of  the  powers  conferred  under section 3 of Act XXIV of 1946. The prices fixed by the Centre were adopted by the State Government and the only thing which the State Government required under rule   94   was   that   the   occupier   of   a   factory   or   the purchasing   agent   should   cause   to   be   put   up   at   each purchasing centre a notice showing the minimum price of cane fixed by the Government meaning thereby the centre. The   State   Government   also   incorporated   these   prices which were notified by the Centre from time to time in the forms of the agreements which were to be entered between the cane growers, the cane growers co­operative societies, the factories and their purchasing agents for the supply and   purchase   of   sugarcane   as   provided   in   the   U.P. Sugarcane Supply and Purchase Order, 1954. The only provision which was retained by the State Government in the   impugned   Act   for   the   protection   of   the   sugarcane growers was that contained in section 17 which provided for the payment of price of sugarcane by the occupier of a factory to the sugarcane growers. It could be recovered from such occupier as if it were an arrear of land revenue. 38 This   comparison   goes   to   show   that   the   impugned   Act merely confined itself to the regulation of the supply and purchase of sugarcane required for use in sugar factories and did not concern itself at all with the controlling or licensing of the sugar  factories, with the production or manufacture of sugar or with the trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of, sugar. If that   was   so,   there   was   no   question   whatever   of   its trenching upon the jurisdiction of the Centre in regard to sugar   industry   which   was   a   controlled   industry   within Entry 52 of List I and the U.P. Legislature had jurisdiction to   enact   the   law   with   regard   to   sugarcane   and   had legislative competence to enact the impugned Act.”  “..…It   was   next   contended   that   the   provisions   of   the impugned Act were repugnant to the provisions of Act LXV of   1951   and   Act   X   of   1955   which   were   enacted   by Parliament  and,  therefore,  the  law   made   by  Parliament should prevail and the impugned Act should, to the extent of   the   repugnancy,   be   void.   Before   dealing   with   this contention it is necessary to clear the ground by defining the   exact   connotation   of   the   term   "repugnancy". Repugnancy falls to be considered when the law made by Parliament   and   the   law   made   by   the   State   Legislature occupy   the   same   field   because,   if   both   these   pieces   of legislation deal with separate and distinct matters though of a cognate and allied character, repugnancy does not arise.”  “…..We are concerned here with the repugnancy, if any, arising   by   reason   of   both   Parliament   and   the   State Legislature having operated in the same field in respect of a   matter   enumerated   in   the   Concurrent   List,   i.e., foodstuffs comprised in Entry 33 of List III.” “…..The Calcutta High Court in  G. P. Stewart v. B. K. Roy Chaudhury   had   occasion   to   consider   the   meaning   of 39 repugnancy and B. N. Rau, J. who delivered the judgment of the Court observed at page 632:  “It is sometimes said that two laws cannot be said to be properly repugnant unless there is a direct conflict between them, as when one says 'do" and the   other   “don't”,   there   is   no   true   repugnancy, according to this view, if it is possible to obey both the   laws.   For   reasons   which   we   shall   set   forth presently, we think that this is too narrow a test: there may well be cases of repugnancy where both laws   say   “don't”   but   in   different   ways.   For example, one law may say, “No person shall sell liquor by retail, that is, in quantities of less than five gallons at a time” and another law may say, “No person shall sell liquor by retail, that is, in quantities of less than ten gallons at a time”. Here, it   is   obviously   possible   to   obey   both   laws,   by obeying the more stringent of the two, namely the second one; yet it is equally obvious that the two laws are repugnant, for to the extent to which a citizen is compelled to obey one of them, the other, though not actually disobeyed, is nullified”.  The learned Judge then discussed the various authorities which laid   down   the   test   of   repugnancy   in   Australia,   Canada,   and England and concluded at page 634:  “The principle deducible from the English cases, as from the Canadian cases, seems therefore to be the same as that enunciated by Isaacs, J. in the Australian   44   hour   case   (37   C.L.R.   466)   if   the dominant law has expressly or impliedly evinced its   intention   to   cover   the   whole   field,   then   a subordinate law  in the  same  field is repugnant 40 and therefore inoperative. Whether and to what extent in a given case, the dominant law evinces such an intention must necessarily depend on the language of the particular law”. “…..In   the   instant   case,   there   is   no   question   of   any inconsistency in the actual terms of the Acts enacted by Parliament and the impugned Act. The only questions that arise   are  whether   Parliament   and  the   State   Legislature sought to exercise their powers over the same subject­ matter or whether the laws enacted by Parliament were intended to be a complete exhaustive code or, in other words, expressly or impliedly evinced an intention to cover the whole field.” “…..Act   X   of   1955   included   within   the   definition   of essential commodity food stuffs which we have seen above would include sugar as well as sugarcane. This Act was enacted   by   Parliament   in   exercise   of   the   concurrent legislative power under Entry 33 of List III as amended by the Constitution Third Amendment Act, 1954. Foodcrops were there defined as including crops of sugarcane and section   3(1)  gave   the   Central   Government   powers   to control   the   production,   supply   and   distribution   of essential commodities and trade and commerce therein for maintaining   or   increasing   the   supplies   thereof   or   for securing their equitable distribution and availability at fair prices. Section 3(2)(b) empowered the Central Government to   provide   inter   alia   for   bringing   under   cultivation   any waste or arable land whether appurtenant to a building or not for growing thereon of foodcrops generally or specified foodcrops and section 3(2)(c) gave the Central Government power   for   controlling   the   price   at   which   any   essential commodity may be bought or sold. These provisions would certainly bring within the scope of Central legislation the regulation   of   the   production   of   sugarcane   as   also   the controlling of the price at which sugarcane may be bought or sold, and in addition to the Sugar Control Order, 1955 which   was   issued   by   the   Central   Government   on   27th 41 August, 1955, it also issued the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955, on the same date investing it with the power to fix the price of sugarcane and direct payment thereof as also the power to regulate the movement of sugarcane.”  “…..Parliament   was   well   within   its   powers   in legislating   in   regard   to   sugarcane   and   the   Central Government was also well within its powers in issuing the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 in the manner it did because all this was in exercise of the concurrent power of legislation under Entry 33 of List III. That, however, did not affect the legislative competence of the U. P. State Legislature to enact the law in regard to sugarcane and the only question which remained to be considered   was   whether   there   was   any   repugnancy between the provisions of the Central legislation and the U. P. State legislation in this behalf. As we have noted above, the U. P. State Government. did not at all provide   for   the   fixation   of   minimum   prices   for sugarcane   nor   did   it   provide   for   the   regulation   of movement of sugarcane as was done by the Central Government  in clauses (3) and  (4) of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955. The impugned Act did not make any provision for the same and the only provision in regard to the price of sugarcane which was to be found in the U. P. Sugarcane Rules, 1954, was contained in Rule 94 which provided that a notice of suitable size in clear bold lines showing the minimum price of cane fixed by the Government and the rates at which the cane is being purchased by the centre was to be put up by an occupier of a factory or the purchasing agent as the case may be at each purchasing centre. The price of   cane   fixed   by   Government   here   only   meant   the price   fixed   by   the   appropriate   Government   which would be the Central Government, under clause 3 of 42 the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955, because in fact the U.   P.   State   Government   never   fixed   the   price   of sugarcane to be purchased by the factories. Even the provisions in behalf of the agreements contained in clauses 3 and 4 of the U. P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954, provided that the price was to be the minimum price to be notified by the Government subject to such deductions, if any, as may be notified by the Government from time to time meaning thereby the Central Government, the State Government  not  having  made   any  provision  in  that behalf at any time whatever. The provisions thus made by the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955, did not find their place either in the impugned Act or the Rules made thereunder or the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954, and the provision contained in section 17 of the impugned Act in regard to   the   payment   of   sugarcane   price   and   recovery thereof as if it was an arrear of land revenue did not find its place in the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955. These provisions, therefore, were mutually exclusive and did not impinge upon each other there being thus no trenching upon the field of one Legislature by the other.   Our   attention   was   drawn   to   the   several provisions contained in the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 and the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase   Order,   1954   and   the   agreements   annexed thereto and it was pointed out that they differed in material particulars, the provisions of the latter being more   stringent   than   those   of   the   former.   It   is   not necessary to refer to these provisions in any detail. Suffice   it   to   say   that   none   of   these   provisions   do overlap, the Centre being silent with regard to some of the provisions which have been enacted by the State and the State being silent with regard to some of the 43 Provisions   which   have   been   enacted   by   the   Centre. There   is   no   repugnancy   whatever   between   these provisions and the impugned Act and the Rules framed thereunder as also the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954 do not trench upon the field covered by Act X of 1955. There being no repugnancy at all, therefore, no question arises of the operation of article 254(2) of the Constitution and no provision of the  impugned   Act  and   the   Rules  made thereunder is invalidated by any provision contained in Act LXV of 1951 as amended by Act XXVI of 1953 or Act X of 1955 and the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 issued thereunder.” 11. RELEVANT   EXTRACTS   AND   OBSERVATIONS   IN   THE CASE   OF   U.P.   COOPERATIVE   CANE   UNIONS FEDERATIONS: “27. It has been urged by learned counsel for the respondents  that  the  expression  “at   the   minimum  price notified   by   Government”   used   in   the   proforma   of   the agreement which is to be executed between a cane­grower and the occupier of the factory as given in Form B and that which   is   to   be   executed   between   a   cane­growers' cooperative society and the occupier of the factory as given in Form C in the appendix to the 1954 Order indicates that it   is   only   the   minimum   price   fixed   by   the   Central Government which can be the consideration or price for the sale of sugarcane to the sugar factory. Strong reliance in support of this submission has been placed upon certain observations made by this Court in  Tika Ramji v. State of U.P.   The proforma of agreement viz. Forms B and C are contained in the appendix to U.P. Sugarcane Supply and Purchase Order, 1954. This Order has been made by U.P. 44 Government in exercise of the power conferred by Section 16  of   the   1953   Act,   which   provides   that   the   State Government   may   for   maintaining   supplies   by   Order regulate the distribution, sale or purchase of cane in any reserved   or   assigned   area,   etc.   The   Order   having   been made   by   the   State   Government   in   exercise   of   a   power conferred   by   an   Act   made   by   U.P.   legislature,   the   only logical   inference   which   can   be   drawn   is   that   the   word “Government”   refers   to   State   Government.   There   is   no indication in the proforma of the agreement or in the 1954 Order that the word “Government” would refer to Central Government.   If   the   State   Government   is   prescribing   a proforma of an agreement which is to be executed by a cane­grower or a cane­growers' cooperative society and the occupier   of   the   factory   regarding   sale   and   purchase   of sugarcane wherein the word “Government” is used, it can only   mean   the   State   Government   and   not   the   Central Government   unless   there   is   clear   indication   to   the contrary. 28. The   observations   made   in   Tika   Ramji ,   strong reliance   on   which   is   placed   by   learned   counsel   for   the respondents, have to be understood in the context in which they were made. It may be noted that the writ petitions in the said case were filed in this Court in the year 1954 and the judgment was delivered on 24­4­1956. At the relevant time, it was the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1955 which was in operation. Clause 3 of this Order empowered the Central Government to fix  the price or the minimum price  to be paid by a producer of sugar for sugarcane purchased by him.   The   1955   Order   has   been   repealed   by   Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 and Clause 3 of this Order provides that the Central Government may fix   of the minimum price sugarcane to be paid by producers of sugar. There is a difference between “the price” which is a fixed amount and “the   minimum   price”   which   only   indicates   the   lowest­ permissible rate. The 1966 Order which itself was made by the   Central   Government   more   than   a   decade   after   the judgment   was   rendered   in   Tika   Ramji   was   amended   in 45 1978  and   Clauses   3(3)   and  3­A   thereof  contemplate  an “agreed price” which in view of the mandate of Clause 3(2) is   bound   to   be   higher   than   the   “minimum   price”   fixed under Clause 3(1). Naturally it is this “agreed price” which is to be mentioned in the agreements for sale and purchase of sugarcane in Forms B and C otherwise the very purpose of entering into agreements would be defeated. The State Government   had   not   fixed   any   price   for   the   sugarcane under  its   regulatory   power  by  the   time   Tika   Ramji   was decided by this Court in April, 1956 and only the Central Government had taken a step for fixing the price. It was in these circumstances that it was observed that the “price fixed   by   the   Government”   would   mean   “the   Central Government”. The observations relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents were made while considering the question whether there was any repugnancy between the provisions of the Sugarcane Control Order 1955 and the 1953 Act, the Rules and 1954 Order and they should be understood in that context. The relevant portion of the judgment on SCR p.434 is being reproduced below:  (AIR p.704, para 36) “The price of cane fixed by Government here only   meant   the   price   fixed   by   the   appropriate Government   which   would   be   the   Central Government,   under   clause   3   of   the   Sugarcane Control Order, 1955,  because in fact the U.P. State Government never fixed the price   of sugarcane to be purchased by the factories. Even the provisions in behalf of the agreements contained in clauses 3 and 4 of the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply and Purchase Order, 1954, provided that the price was to be the minimum price to be notified by the Government subject to such deductions, if any, as may be notified by the Government from time to time   meaning   thereby   the   Central   Government, the   State   Government   not   having   made   any provision in that behalf at any time whatever .  46 The provisions thus made by the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955, did not find their place either in   the   impugned   Act   or   the   Rules   made thereunder or the U.P. Sugarcane Regulation of Supply   and   Purchase   Order,   1954;   and   the provision contained in Section 17 of the impugned Act in regard to the payment of sugarcane price and recovery thereof as if it was an arrear of land revenue did not find its place in the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955.”  “28.1 Having regard to the factual situation then existing that U.P. Government had not fixed the price of the sugarcane, it was held that the price of the cane fixed by   the   Government   could   only   mean   “Central Government”. It has not been laid down as a principle of law   that   the   words   “minimum   price   notified   by Government” must necessarily mean the minimum price fixed   by   the   Central   Government   or   that   under   no circumstances it can mean the price fixed by the State Government.  “34. Learned Senior Counsel for the respondents has strenuously   urged   that   the   Central   Government   having made the 1966 Order which contains a specific provision for   fixation   of   price   of   sugarcane,   under   Clause   3(1) thereof, the regulatory power under the 1953 Act cannot embrace within its fold the same power of fixation of price as this will be clearly repugnant to a law made by the Parliament and would be void in view of Article 254(1) of the Constitution. In  it has been held that the Tika Ramji  EC Act under which the Central Government made the 1966 Order and the 1953 Act made by U.P. Legislature have been enacted with reference to Entry 33 of List III of the Seventh Schedule. The constitutional validity of the 1953 Act was upheld by the Constitution Bench in the said decision. On p. 437 of the Reports (SCR) the Court quoted   with   approval   the   following   passage   from   the judgment of Sulaiman J. in  Shyamakant Lal v. Rambhajan Singh   (FCR at p. 212 : AIR at p. 83) for the principle of 47 construction in regard to repugnancy : (AIR p. 700, para 32) “When the question is whether a Provincial legislation is repugnant to an existing Indian law, the onus of showing its repugnancy and the extent to which it is repugnant should be on the party attacking   its   validity.   There   ought   to   be   a presumption in favour of its validity, and every effort   should   be   made   to   reconcile   them   and construe both so as to avoid their being repugnant to each other; and care should be taken to see whether the two do not really operate in different fields without encroachment.  Further, repugnancy must exist in fact, and not depend merely on a possibility :”     (Emphasis supplied) And then went to hold : (AIR p. 700, para 33) “33. In the instant case, there is no question of any inconsistency in the actual terms of the Acts enacted by Parliament and the impugned Act. The   only   questions   that   arise   are   whether Parliament   and   the   State   Legislature   sought   to exercise their powers over the same subject­matter or whether the laws enacted by Parliament were intended to be a complete exhaustive code or, in other   words,   expressly   or   impliedly   evinced   an intention to cover the whole field.”  35. In   M.   Karunanidhi   v.   Union   of   India ,   the principles   to   be   applied   for   determining   repugnancy between a law made by Parliament and law made by State legislature were considered by a Constitution Bench. In pursuance of an FIR lodged against Shri M. Karunanidhi the   CBI   after   investigation   had   submitted   chargesheet against him under  Section 161,  468  and  471  IPC  and Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Madras Legislature had passed an Act 48 known as Tamil Nadu Public Men (Criminal Misconduct) Act, 1973 which had received the assent of the President. It was contended that by virtue of  Article 254(2)  of the Constitution,   the   provisions  of   Indian   Penal   Code, Prevention   of   Corruption   Act  and  Criminal   Law Amendment   Act  stood   repealed.   After   review   of   all   the earlier authorities Court laid down the following tests : (SCC pp.448­49, para 35) “35. 1. That in order to decide the question of   repugnancy   it   must   be   shown   that   the   two enactments   contain   inconsistent   and irreconcilable   provisions,   so   that   they   cannot stand together or operate in the same field.  2.   That   there   can   be   no   repeal   by   implication unless the inconsistency appears on the face of the two statutes.  3. That where the two statutes occupy a particular field, but there is room or possibility of both the statutes   operating   in   the   same   field   without coming   into   collision   with   each   other,   no repugnancy results.  4.   That   where   there   is   no   inconsistency   but   a statute occupying the same field seeks to create distinct   and   separate   offences,   no   question   of repugnancy arises and both the statutes continue to operate in the same field."  “37. Under Sub­section (1) of Clause 3 of the 1966 Order, the Central Government can only fix a minimum price of sugarcane. This clause should be read along with Sub­clause (2) which creates an embargo or prohibition that no person shall sell or agree to sell sugarcane to a producer of sugar and no such producer shall purchase or agree to purchase sugarcane at a price lower than that fixed   under   Sub­clause   (1).   The   inconsistency   or repugnancy will arise if the State Government fixed a price 49 which is lower than that fixed by the Central Government. But, if the price fixed by the State Government is higher than that fixed by the Central Government, there will be no occasion for any inconsistency or repugnancy as it is possible for both the orders to operate simultaneously and to comply with both of them. A higher price fixed by the State Government would automatically comply with the provisions of Sub­clause (2) of Clause 3 of 1966 Order. Therefore, any price fixed by the State Government which is   higher   than   that   fixed   by   the   Central   Government cannot lead to any kind of repugnancy.” “39. …..that   under   the   1966   Order   the   Central Government only fixes the minimum price and it is always open to the State Government to fix a higher price. Under the enactments made by the State Legislatures areas are reserved   for   the   sugar   factories   and   the   cane­growers therein are compelled to supply sugarcane to them and therefore the State Government has incidental power to fix the price of sugarcane which will also be statutory price. They further lay down that the Cane Commissioner can direct the cane­growers and the sugar factories to enter into agreements for purchase of sugarcane at a price fixed by the State Government and such agreements cannot be branded as having been obtained by force or compulsion.” “43. One   of   the   main   reasons   given   by   the   High Court for allowing the writ petition and quashing the order of   fixation   of   State   Advised   Price   is   that   power   to   fix sugarcane price had been given to the State Government under the  Sugarcane Act, 1934 and hence it would be redundancy to say that the same power to fix cane price also flows from Section 16 of the 1953 Act. The High Court has also held that when the 1953 Act was enacted there was already a law, viz., the  Sugarcane Act, 1934, which enabled the State Government to fix the minimum cane price and hence, it could not have been the intention of the U.P. Legislature while enacting 1953 Act that Section 16  thereof would include the power to fix the minimum cane price as such a power was already there with the 50 State   Government  under  Section   3(2)  of   the  Sugarcane Act,   1934.   The   High   Court,   therefore,   concluded   that Section 16  of the 1953 Act only gave power to the State Government   to   regulate   the   supply   and   purchase   of sugarcane  in the narrower sense and not in the wider sense so as to include the power to fix the minimum price. This reasoning of the High Court proceeds on the footing that the Sugarcane Act, 1934 was in existence and was in operation   when   the   1953   Act   was   enacted   by   U.P. Legislature. It appears that the correct legal position was not   brought   to   the   notice   of   the   learned   judges.  The Sugarcane Act, 1934 was repealed by U.P. Sugar Factories Control Act, 1938  (UP Act 1 of 1938). Section 26 of U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply &  Purchase) Act, 1953 repealed the U.P. Sugar Factories Control Act, 1938. With the enforcement of the Government of India Act, 1935, there was distribution of legislative powers between the Dominion Legislature and the Provincial Legislature and the   entire   subject   matter   of  Sugarcane   Act,   1934   fell within   the   Provincial   Legislative   list.   It   was   in   these circumstances that the U.P. Legislature enacted the U.P. Sugar   Factories   Control   Act,   1938   which   repealed   the Sugarcane Act, 1934 in its application in the State of U.P. This position has been noticed in  Tika Ramji v. State of U.P.,  SCR   at   pp.   400,   401   and   417.   Therefore,   the aforesaid reasoning given by the High Court has no legal basis.”  “44. The second reasoning given by the High Court is that even if the State Government had the power to fix the minimum cane price under  Section 16  of the 1953 Act, this power came to an end in view of Article 254(1) of the Constitution   on   the   enactment   of   the   EC   Act   and   the promulgation of the Sugarcane Control Order, 1955 (later replaced by the 1966 Order), which now gives exclusive power   to   the   Central   Government   to   fix   the   minimum price. As discussed earlier we are not in agreement with the   aforesaid   reasoning   as   the   question   of   repugnancy does not arise. The High Court has also held that the 51 Central Government, while fixing the price of the sugar under   Section   3(3­C)   of   the   EC   Act,   takes   into consideration the minimum price of sugarcane fixed under 1966 Order and if the sugar mills are compelled to pay a higher price than that fixed by the Central Government, it will   disturb   the   price   of   the   levy   sugar   and   such   an eventuality   could   not   have   been   contemplated   by   the legislature. Over a period of time, the quota of levy sugar has gone down from 40 per cent to 10 per cent of the total production of sugar and the sugar mills are now free to sell 90 per cent of their production in open market. Under Section 3(3­C) of the EC Act, the Central Government has to determine the price of the levy sugar having regard to several   factors   enumerated   in   the   sub­section   and   the minimum price fixed under 1966 Order is only one of the factors. The manufacturing cost of sugar and securing of reasonable return on the capital employed in the business of manufacturing sugar are also relevant  factors under Clauses (b) and (d) of Section 3(3­) EC Act and, therefore, the   fixation   of   higher   price   for   sugarcane   by   the   State Government by itself cannot have any major or substantial impact on the fixation of the price of the levy sugar by the Central Government.”     12. The question involved in Ch. Tika Ramji & Ors., etc. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. AIR 1956 SC 676 was concerning the validity of the Uttar Pradesh Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and   Purchase)   Act,   1953   (for   short,   “Act   of   1953”)   and notifications   dated   27.9.1954   and   9.11.1955   issued   by   the Government of Uttar Pradesh thereunder.  The notification dated 27.9.1954 was issued in exercise of the powers/ conferred under 52 sub­section 1(a) read with sub­section 2(b) of Section 16 of the Act of 1953 which provided that not less than 3/4 of the cane growers of the area of operation of a Cane Growers Cooperative Society to be members of the society. The occupier of the factory for which the area is assigned shall not purchase or enter into an agreement   to   purchase   cane   grown   by   a   cane   grower   except through such Cane Growers Co­operative Society. 13. The   notification   dated   9.11.1955   which   was   issued   in exercise of the powers conferred by section 15 of the Act of 1953, reserved or assigned to the sugar factories mentioned in column 2 of the Schedule annexed to it, the cane purchasing centers, with the authorities attached to them, specified against them in column   3   for   the   supply   of   sugarcane   during   the   crushing season 1955­56. Thus, it is apparent that the notification dated 27.9.1954 related to the agency of supply of sugar cane to the factories   and   the   notification   dated   9.11.1955   related   to   the creation of the zones for particular factories were questioned. Various submissions were raised to assail the validity of the Act and the notification. 14. Firstly, it was urged that the State of Uttar Pradesh had no 53 power to enact the Act of 1953 as it relates to the subject of industries,  the  control  of which  by  the Union  is  declared  by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest within the meaning of Entry 52 of List I. The Act of 1953 was repugnant to   Essential   Commodities   Act,   1955   and   the   Industries Development Regulation Act, 1951. The Act of 1953 infringes the fundamental right carved out under Article 14 as vast powers were given to the Cane Commissioner, which could be used in a discriminatory manner. The notification dated 27.9.1954 violated the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(c).   The cane growers were compelled to become a member of the society before they could sell sugarcane to a factory. The Act of 1953 and the notifications infringe the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(f) and (g) and Article 31 of the Constitution.  15. This Court held that the State of Uttar Pradesh had the legislative   competence   to   enact   the   Act,   and   there   was   no repugnancy   of   the   Act   of   1953   with   the   Act   of   1951   or   the Essential Commodities Act, 1955.  This Court upheld the validity of the Act and notifications and also held that there was no unreasonable   restriction   imposed.     There   was   no   violation   of 54 fundamental right under Article 19(1)(f) and (g) and Article 31 of the Constitution. 16. The question of fixation of price by the State Government under the Act of 1953 did not fall for consideration in Ch. Tika Ram   (supra).     This   Court   noted   that   the   Uttar   Pradesh Government   had   never   fixed   the   price   of   sugarcane   to   be purchased   by   the   factories   by   the   time   the   decision   was rendered.   While examining the repugnancy, passing reference has been made to the provisions contained in the Act of 1954. 17. During the pendency of petitions, the Sugar Control Order, 1955, was issued on 27.8.1955, which was referred to in the judgment. It was not even submission raised or considered that the   power   of   regulation   under   Section   16   of   the   Act   would include the power to  fix the advised price of sugarcane. The concept of fixation of minimum price by Central Government vis a vis to State Advised Price to be fixed by State Government, never fell for consideration of this Court in the said decision. The ratio of decision has to be considered in the light of questions considered and answered. In Tika Ramji (supra), it was held that there was no repugnancy in the Act of 1953 with Act of 1955 or 55 with the Act of 1951, and notifications which were impugned did not infringe the fundamental rights.  18. Thus, from the above, it is clear that the factual matrix and the relevant provisions which fell for consideration before this Court  in   the   case   of   Tika   Ramji   (supra)   and   which   fell   for consideration   by   this   Court   in   the   case   of   U.P.   Coop.   Cane   were   altogether   different.   As Unions   Federations(supra) observed hereinabove, Clause 3 of 1955 Order empowered the Central Government to fix “the price or the minimum price”. The aforesaid Clause 3 of 1955 Order was under consideration by this   Court   in   the   case   of   Tika   Ramji(supra) .   However, subsequently, 1955 Order has been repealed by 1966 Order and Clause 3 of 1966 Order provides that the Central Government may fix “the minimum price” of the sugarcane. Therefore, when the   legislature   consciously   deleted   the   word   “the   price”   and retained   the   power   with   the   Central   Government   to   fix   “the minimum   price”,   some   meaning   has   to   be   given   to   such   a deletion. The intention of the legislature is also required to be considered when certain words in the provisions of a statute are 56 deleted   or   added   and/or   substituted.   In   the   case   of   Tika Ramji(supra) , this Court though specifically observed and held that in the field of sugar and sugarcane, both, the Parliament and the State legislature would have the concurrent Jurisdiction as the same will fall under Entry 33 in the Concurrent List of seventh   Schedule.   Considering   the   fact   that   the   State Government   did   not   exercise   the   power   of   fixing   the   price, though the powers were available and the Central Government fixed the price/minimum price which came to be adopted by the State Government, this Court in  Tika Ramji’s case(supra)  held that in such a situation there is no conflict and the question of repugnancy does not arise. Therefore, we are of the opinion that as such there is no apparent conflict between the decisions in Tika Ramji’s case  and  U.P. Coop. Cane Unions Federations , which require to be referred to a larger Bench of seven Judges. 19. Under clause 3 of the 1966 order, the minimum price can be fixed. Under clause 3A of the said order, as amended in 1978, the agreed price is to be mentioned in the agreement, which can be higher than the minimum price and not less than that. Under 57 clause 3(2), no person shall sell or agree to sell sugarcane to a producer of sugar or his agent, and no such producer or agent shall purchase or agree to purchase sugarcane at a price lower than that fixed under sub­clause (1). Thus, the price fixed under clause 3(1) has to be treated as a minimum price. Under clause 3(A), as inserted on 2.2.1978, agreement in writing is required, and the price has to be paid as agreed to within 14 days. 20. Even otherwise and on merits and for the reasons stated hereinbelow, we are in complete agreement with the view taken by this Court in the case of U.P. Coop. Cane Unions Federations, which lays down that   the inconsistency or repugnancy will arise if the State Government fixed a price which is lower than that fixed by the Central Government. But, if the price fixed by the State Government is higher than that fixed by the Central Government, there will be no occasion for any inconsistency or repugnancy as it is possible for both the orders to operate simultaneously and to comply with both of them. A higher price fixed by the State Government would automatically comply with the provisions of Sub­clause (2) of 58 Clause 3 of 1966 Order. Therefore, any price fixed by the State Government which is higher than that fixed by the Central Government cannot lead to any kind of repugnancy . 20.1 Question   of   repugnancy   under   Article   254   of   the Constitution:   Concerning laws in List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, where both the Union and the States have the power to enact a law, the question of repugnancy arises only in a case where there is an actual irreconcilable conflict between the   two   laws.   Inconsistency   between   the   two   laws   is irreconcilable,   then   the   question   of   repugnancy   arises.   It   is necessary to find the dominant intention of both the legislatures, partial or incidental coverage of the same area in a different context, and to achieve a different purpose, does not attract the doctrine of repugnancy. In Rajiv Sarin v. State of Uttarakhand, (2011) 8 SCC 708, the Court held : “ 33. It is trite law that the plea of repugnancy would be attracted only if both the legislations fall under the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Under Article 254 of the Constitution, a 59 State law passed in respect of a subject-matter comprised in List III i.e., the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution would be invalid if its provisions are repugnant to a law passed on the same subject by Parliament and that too only in a situation if both the laws i.e., one made by the State Legislature and another made by Parliament cannot exist together. In other words, the question of repugnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution arises when the provisions of both laws are completely inconsistent with each other or when the provisions of both laws are absolutely irreconcilable with each other, and it is impossible without disturbing the other provision, or conflicting interpretations resulted into when both the statutes covering the same field are applied to a given set of facts. That is to say, in simple words, repugnancy between the two statutes would arise if there is a direct conflict between the two provisions and the law made by Parliament and the law made by the State Legislature occupies the same field. Hence, whenever the issue of repugnancy between the law passed by Parliament and of State Legislature are raised, it becomes quite necessary to examine as to whether the two legislations cover or relate to the same subject-matter or different. x x x 45. For repugnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution, there is a twin requirement, which is to be fulfilled: firstly, there has to be a “repugnancy” between a Central and State Act; and secondly, the Presidential assent has to be held as being non-existent. The test for determining such repugnancy is indeed to find out the dominant intention of both the legislations and whether such dominant intentions of both the legislations are alike or different. To put it simply, a provision in one legislation in order to give effect to its dominant purpose may incidentally be on the same subject as covered by the provision of the other legislation, but such partial or incidental coverage of the same area in a different context and to achieve a different purpose does not attract the doctrine of repugnancy. In a nutshell, in order to attract the doctrine of repugnancy, both the 60 legislations must be substantially on the same subject.” 20.2 In M. Karunanidhi v. Union of India & Anr., (1979) 3 SCC 431,   the   Court   opined   that   where   there   is   a   direct   collision between the law made by the State and the law made by the Parliament, State law would be void to the extent of repugnancy. It is only when the provisions are irreconcilable. The Court held: “8. It would be seen that so far as clause (1) of Article 254 is concerned it clearly lays down that where there is a direct collision between a provision of a law made by the State and that made by Parliament with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), the State law would be void to the extent of the repugnancy. This naturally means that where both the State and Parliament occupy the field contemplated by the Concurrent List then the Act passed by Parliament being prior in point of time will prevail, and consequently, the State Act will have to yield to the Central Act. In fact, the scheme of the Constitution is a scientific and equitable distribution of legislative powers between Parliament and the State Legislatures. First, regarding the matters contained in List I, i.e., the Union List to the Seventh Schedule, Parliament alone is empowered to legislate, and the State Legislatures have no authority to make any law in respect of the Entries contained in List I. Secondly, so far as the Concurrent List is concerned, both Parliament and the State Legislatures are entitled to legislate in regard to any of the Entries appearing therein, but that is subject to the condition laid down by Article 254(1) discussed above. Thirdly, so far as the matters in List II, i.e., the State List are concerned, the State Legislatures alone are competent to legislate on them, and only under certain conditions, Parliament can do so. It is, therefore, obvious that in such matters, repugnancy may 61 result from the following circumstances: 1. Where the provisions of a Central Act and a State Act in the Concurrent List are fully inconsistent and are absolutely irreconcilable, the Central Act will prevail, and the State Act will become void in view of the repugnancy. 2. Where however a law passed by the State comes into collision with a law passed by Parliament on an Entry in the Concurrent List, the State Act shall prevail to the extent of the repugnancy and the provisions of the Central Act would become void provided the State Act has been passed in accordance with clause (2) of Article 254. 3. Where a law passed by the State Legislature while being substantially within the scope of the entries in the State List entrenches upon any of the Entries in the Central List the constitutionality of the law may be upheld by invoking the doctrine of pith and substance if on an analysis of the provisions of the Act it appears that by and large the law falls within the four corners of the State List and entrenchment, if any, is purely incidental or inconsequential. 4. Where, however, a law made by the State Legislature on a subject covered by the Concurrent List is inconsistent with and repugnant to a previous law made by Parliament, then such a law can be protected by obtaining the assent of the President under Article 254(2) of the Constitution. The result of obtaining the assent of the President would be that so far as the State Act is concerned, it will prevail in the State and overrule the provisions of the Central Act in their applicability to the State only. Such a state of affairs will exist only until Parliament may at any time make a law adding to, or amending, varying or repealing the law made by the State Legislature under the proviso to Article 254. So far as the present State Act is concerned, we are called upon to consider the various shades of the constitutional validity of the same under Article 254(2) of the Constitution. X x x 24. It is well settled that the presumption is always in 62 favour of the constitutionality of a statute and the onus lies on the person assailing the Act to prove that it is unconstitutional. Prima facie, there does not appear to us to be any inconsistency between the State Act and the Central Acts. Before any repugnancy can arise, the following conditions must be satisfied: 1. That there is a clear and direct inconsistency between the Central Act and the State Act. 2. That such an inconsistency is absolutely irreconcilable. 3. That the inconsistency between the provisions of the two Acts is of such nature as to bring the two Acts into direct collision with each other and a situation is reached where it is impossible to obey the one without disobeying the other.” 20.3 Clause (1) of Article 254 of the Constitution gives primacy to central legislations in case of conflict with State laws whether enacted before or after. The central law operates only in case of repugnancy and not in a case of mere possibility when such an order might be issued under state law, as opined in Belsund Sugar Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar  & Ors., (1999) 9 SCC 620; Punjab   Dairy   Development   Board   &   Anr.   v.   Cepham   Milk Specialities   Ltd.   &   Ors,   (2004)   8   SCC   621;   Southern Petrochemicals Industries Ltd. v. Electricity Inspector and ETIO & Ors., (2007) 5 SCC 447 and Bharat Hydro Power Corporation Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Assam & Anr. (2004) 2 SCC 553.       63 20.4 It   is   apparent   that   in   U.P.   Cooperative   Cane   Unions Federations   (supra),   a   Constitution   Bench   has   rightly   opined that under section 16 of the Act of 1953, there is the power to fix a price with State, which is State advised price. It cannot be said that   the   Central   legislation   occupies   the   field,   the   Essential Commodities   Act,   1955,   and   the   Order   of   1966   issued thereunder deals with minimum price. The Central Government has the power to fix the minimum price in clause 3. The State Government is not denuded of the power under the Act of 1953 to fix the “State Advised Price” under section 16 as held in U.P. Cooperative   Cane   Unions   Federations   (supra).   The   power   to regulate includes the power to fix the price. But State advised price has to be higher than the minimum price fixed by Central Government. But the exercise of the power under section 16 of the Act of 1953 to fix State Advised Price, cannot be said to be irreconcilable with the minimum price fixation under section 3(2) (c) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and clause 3 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966. The power of fixation of State advised price under section 16 of the Act of 1953 cannot be said to be arbitrary or illegal in any manner. 64 20.4.1 In   the   case   of   U.P.   Cooperative   Cane   Unions  (supra), this Court had an occasion to consider the Federations ambit, scope and import of Section 16 of the Act.  The question involved was as to whether the State Government had the power to fix SAP for sugarcane or it was only the Central Government, which could fix the minimum price or so to say, whether the fixation of SAP was covered by the Central Legislation or was it open to the State to fix the price different than the price fixed by the Central Government and whether there was repugnancy in view of Article 254 of the Constitution. 20.4.2 From the close scrutiny of the judgment passed by this   Court   in   the   case   of   U.P.   Cooperative   Cane   Unions Federations   (supra),   it   did   appear   that   this   Court   took   into consideration the effect, scope and impact of Section 16 under the Act.  This Court considered in detail Section 16 of the Act – the provision to regulate purchase and supply of sugarcane in the   reserved   and   assigned   area,   under   which   the   State Government is vested with the power to regulate the distribution, sale or purchase of sugarcane in any reserved or assigned area 65 and   purchase   of   cane   in   any   area   other   than   a   reserved   or assigned area by issuing an order to that effect.   Thereafter, this Court has held that the power to regulate includes the power to fix the SAP.  This Court has also specifically observed and held that there was no repugnancy. 20.4.3 From the judgment of the Constitution Bench in the case of   (supra), it U.P. Cooperative Cane Unions Federations further appears that this Court took into account the relevance, importance,   purpose   and   object,   its   impact,   implication   and reasons for enacting Section 16 of the Act and after taking into account   all   the   relevant   considerations   this   Court   has specifically   held   that   the   SAP   is   a   price   higher   than   that determined   by   the   Central   Government   which   is   known   as Statutory  Minimum  Price (SMP).     Thus, in the case of   U.P. Cooperative Cane Unions Federations  (supra), this Court has specifically upheld the power of the State Government to fix the SAP under Section 16 of the Act. 20.5 Now,   so   far   as   the   fixation   of   the   SAP   by   the   State Government is concerned, from the counter affidavit before the 66 High   Court   filed   in   Writ   Petition   No.   8548   (MB)   of   2007   it appears that as per the State Government, the following factors are the relevant facts for determination of SAP. (i) The cost of cultivation of sugarcane. (ii) The cost of transport of sugarcane by cane growers from the field to purchase center or to mill gate as the case may be. (iii) A reasonable return on the aforesaid amount of his produce to cane growers. (iv) Availability of the cane area, demand of sugarcane by industries,   profitability   of   the   industries   by   selling sugar, and other bye products etc. (v) The price of sugarcane paid by sugar factories in the proceeding year. (vi) The factors necessary to avoid diversion of sugarcane from sugar industries to other consumers like Kolhu and Khandsari Units. It also appears that determination and fixation of the SAP is a Cabinet decision which has been fixed after considering several factors,   including   the   cost   of   cultivation/production   of   the 67 sugarcane etc. and after taking into consideration the relevant factors as above and including increasing of national economic growth, cost of production of sugarcane, increase in the cost of seeds, fertilizers, labour charges, irrigation etc., including the profit earned by sugar factories from the produces from bye­ products, power projects etc.  Thus it appears that that authority is guided by all relevant factors while determining such price – SAP.    20.5.1 In   the   case   of   U.P.   Cooperative   Cane   Unions Federations   (supra),   the   Constitution   Bench   has   upheld   the power and authority of the State Government to fix the SAP after precisely observing that the Act of 1953 has been enacted to regulate the SAP and purchase of sugarcane required by the sugar factories and that the word ‘regulate’ would also include the right to fix the price.  It has also declared that the SAP fixed by the State Government has to be higher than the minimum price fixed by the Central Government.  In a given case, the SAP price may be an agreed price.   68 20.6 At this stage, is required to be noted that in the case of U.P. Cooperative Cane Unions Federations  (supra), this Court specifically   negatived   the   submission   on   behalf   of   the   sugar factories that they cannot be compelled to enter into agreements with the cane growers and cane­growers’ cooperative society in forms B and C, wherein the State­advised price is mentioned. This Court also negatived the submission on behalf of the sugar factories that as the consent cannot be said to be a voluntary consent and as the consent was obtained under compulsion or duress and, therefore, the sugar factories cannot be compelled to pay   such   State­advised   price   even   though   it   may   have   been mentioned   in   the   forms   or   in   the   purchase   and   therefore   it cannot   be   said   to   be   a   sale.     Negativating   the   aforesaid submission and after considering the entire scheme, this Court in paragraph 33 observed and held as under:

69

It further lays down the proposition that having regard to the advantages derived from the sugar factories, they are fully bound by   the   agreement,   wherein   the   State­advised   price   may   be mentioned and it is not open to them to assail the clause relating to price of the sugar cane on the ground that their consent was not voluntary or was obtained under some kind of duress. 20.7 As observed herein above, in the 1966 Order the word “the price” has been deleted and Clause 3 of 1966 Order provides that 70 the  Central   Government   may   fix  “the  minimum   price”  of  the sugarcane   to   be   paid   by   the   producer   of   sugar.   As   rightly submitted by the learned Counsel on behalf of the State, there is a difference between “the price” and “the minimum price”. The aforesaid   shall  be  apparent   from   the   relevant  Clauses  of  the 1966 Order.  20.7.1 The provision of State advised price has been made to protect the interests of the sugarcane growers who are not in a position to negotiate. In Sukhnandan Saran Dinesh Kumar & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1982) 2 SCC 150, this Court opined: “2 2. The statutory prescription of quantum of rebate for binding material has been prescribed for the benefit of sugarcane growers. Producers of sugar and khandsari sugar constitute a powerful trade lobby, the fact of which one can take judicial notice. Sugar being an essential commodity occasionally kept in short supply and being a commodity needed for consumption by almost the entire population, the powerful industry magnates in this field are in a position to dominate both the growers of sugarcane as also the consumers of the essential commodity. Number of regulations have been enacted almost since the dawn of independence to regulate this powerful combination of manufacturers of sugar and khandsari sugar all over the country for the ultimate benefit of consumers on the one hand and on the other hand the farmers and the growers of sugarcane with their small holdings and raising a perishable food crop. The marginal farmers are unable to 71 stand up against the organised industry. It does not require long argument in this predominantly agricultural society that the farmers having small holdings need protection for selling at fair price their meagre agricultural produce. As far back as 1953, the U.P. Legislature enacted U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953, for rational distribution of sugarcane to factories, for its development on the organised scientific line, to protect the interest of cane growers and of the industry, etc. Constitutionality of this Act was challenged on various grounds including one under Article 19(1)(g). In Ch. Tika Ramji v. State of U.P. this Court repelled the challenge under Article 19(1)(g) holding that the restriction which is imposed upon the cane growers in regard to sale of their sugarcane to the occupiers of factories in areas where the membership of the cane growers’ cooperative society is not less than 75 per cent of the total cane growers within the area, is a reasonable restriction in the public interest designed for safeguarding the interest of the large majority of growers of sugarcane in the area and works for the greatest good of the greatest number. The proposition is now beyond the pale of controversy that the State can impose a restriction in the interest of general public on the right of a party to contract where in the opinion of the Government the contracting parties are unable to negotiate on the footing of equality. Constitutional validity of statutes prescribing minimum wages has been founded on this proposition. The principle can be effectively extended to the powerful sugar industry and the cane growers because the cane growers admittedly are at a comparative disadvantage to the producers of sugar and khandsari sugar who were described in the course of arguments as sugar barons. It does not require an elaborate discussion to reach an affirmative conclusion that sugarcane growers who are farmers cannot negotiate on the footing of the equality with the producers of sugar and khandsari sugar. The State action for the protection of the weaker sections is not only justified but absolutely necessary unless the restriction imposed is excessive.” 20.7.2 Clause 3(1) empowers the Central Government to fix 72 the minimum price of sugarcane to be paid by the producers of sugar   or   their   agents   for   the   sugarcane   purchased   by   them. Clause 3(2) provides that no person shall sell or agree to sell sugarcane to a producer of sugar or his agent, and no such producer   or   agent   shall   purchase   or   agree   to   purchase sugarcane, at a price  lower  than that fixed under sub­clause (1). As per Clause 3(3), where a producer of sugar purchases any sugarcane from a grower  of sugarcane or from a Sugarcane­ grower's Co­operative Society, the producer shall,   unless there is   an   agreement   in   writing   to   the   contrary   between   the parties , pay within fourteen days from the date of delivery of the sugarcane to the seller or tender to him the price of the cane sold at   the   rate   agreed   to   between   the   producer   and   the sugarcane­   grower   or   Sugarcane­   growers'   Co­operative , as the case may be. Society or that fixed under sub­clause (1) Clause (3­A) provides that a producer of sugar or his agent shall pay,   for   the   sugarcane   purchased   by   him,   to   the   sugarcane grower or the sugarcane growers’ coopearative society,   either the minimum price of sugarcane fixed under Clause 3, or the 73 price agreed to between the producer or his agent and the sugarcane   grower   or   the   sugarcane   growers’   cooperative society, as the case may be (agreed price).  Agreed Price to be paid   under   the   Agreement   may   be   even   SAP   fixed   and/or determined by the State Government.  Clause (5­A) provides that where   a   producer   of   sugar   purchases   sugarcane,   from   a sugarcane­grower during each sugar year, he shall be liable to pay,  in addition to the minimum sugarcane price fixed under Clause 3, an additional price . Sub­clause (2) of Clause 5­A authorizes the appropriate authority to determine the additional price. Sub­clause (5) further provides that no additional price determined under sub­clause (2) or sub­clause (3) is required to be paid by a producer of sugar who pays a price higher than the minimum price fixed under Clause 3 to the sugarcane­grower, provided that,   “the price so paid is not less than the total price comprising the minimum sugarcane price fixed under Clause   3   and   the   additional   price   determined   under   sub­ clause (2) or sub­clause (3).”  74 21. As held by this Court in the case of  U.P. Cooperative Cane Unions Federations   (supra), the State has the competence to determine and fix the State Advised Price fixed under section 16 and therefore fixation of SAP by the State Government cannot be said to be beyond the purview of legislative competence. Once the   fixation   of   State   Advised   Price   has   been   done,   the   Cane Commissioner can direct the parties to follow the same as held in U.P. Cooperative Cane Growers Federation (supra). It cannot be   said   that   fixation   of   price   under   the   regulatory   measure provided in section 16 suffers from arbitrariness, nor can it be termed to be uncanalised power. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that the decision in Tika Ramji (supra) is not in conflict with the decision in U.P. Cooperative Cane Unions Federations (supra) and the decision in the latter case is not required to be revisited by a larger Bench of seven Judges.  22. Thus,   considering   the   entire   scheme   of   1966   Order,   it provides for “the minimum price” and “the additional price” or “the advised price”. Considering the aforesaid provisions under 1966 Order, there cannot be any sugarcane price (advised price) 75 below “the minimum price”. As per the agreement entered into the   “advised   price”   necessarily   had   to   be   higher   than   the “minimum price”. Thus, there is a difference between “the price” and the “the minimum price”. As per Clause 3 of 1966 Order, it empowers the Central Government to fix the “minimum price” and the State Government is authorized to fix the Advised Price which   as   observed   hereinabove   is   always   higher   than   the “minimum price” fixed by the Central Government. Therefore, as rightly observed by this Court in the case of U.P. Coop. Cane Unions Federations, there is no conflict in exercise of powers by the Central Government in fixing the “minimum price” and in fixing   the   “advised   price”   by   the   State   Government   which   is higher   than   the   “minimum   price”   fixed   by   the   Central Government. Therefore, as rightly observed by this Court in the case   of   U.P.   Coop.   Cane   Unions   Federations,   there   is   no inconsistency   or   repugnancy   in   fixing   the   “advised   price”   or “remunerative   price”   by   the   State   Government   and   the “minimum price” fixed by the Central Government. As rightly held, if the price fixed by the State Government is higher than that fixed by the Central Government, there will be no occasion 76 for any inconsistency or repugnancy as it is possible for both the orders to operate simultaneously and to comply with both of them.  23. Thus, it is held that the view taken by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the subsequent decision in the case of  is the correct law. U.P. Coop. Cane Unions Federations (supra) There is no conflict between the two decisions of this Court in the case of     and in the case of   Tika Ramji U.P. Coop. Cane  and therefore, there is no necessity to refer Unions Federations the   matter   to   the   larger   Bench   consisting   of   seven   Judges. Therefore, our final conclusions are as under:  a. By  virtue of Entries 33 and 34 List  III  of seventh Schedule, both the Central Government as well as the State Government have the power to fix the price of sugarcane. The Central Government having exercised the power and fixed the “minimum price”, the State Government   cannot   fix   the   “minimum   price”   of sugarcane. However, at the same time, it is always open  for  the State  Government  to  fix  the “advised price”   which   is   always   higher   than   the   “minimum 77 price”,   in   view   of   the   relevant   provisions   of   the Sugarcane   (Control)   Order,   1966,   which   has   been issued in exercise of powers under Section 16 of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953; b. The Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 which has been issued   under   Section   16   of   the   U.P.   Sugarcane (Regulation   of   Supply   and   Purchase)   Act,   1953 confers power upon the State Government to fix the remunerative/advised price at which sugarcane can be bought or sold which shall always be higher than the minimum price fixed by the Central Government; c. Section   16   of   the   U.P.   Sugarcane   (Regulation   of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953 is not repugnant to Section   3(2)(c)   of   the   Essential   Commodities   Act, 1955 and Clause 3 of the Sugarcane (Control) Order, 1966 as, as observed hereinabove, the price which is fixed by the Central Government is the “minimum price”   and   the   price   which   is   fixed   by   the   State Government is the “advised price” which is always higher than the “minimum price” fixed by the Central Government and therefore, there is no conflict. It is only in a case where the “advised price” fixed by the State Government is lower than the “minimum price” fixed by the Central Government, the provisions of 78 the   Central   enactments   will   prevail   and   the “minimum   price”   fixed   by   the   Central   Government would prevail. So long as the “advised price” fixed by the State Government is higher than the “minimum price”   fixed   by   the   Central   Government,   the   same cannot be said to be   void   under Article 254 of the Constitution of India.  d. The   view   taken   by   the   Constitution   Bench   of   this Court in the case of  U.P. Cooperative Cane Unions Federations vs. West U.P. Sugar Mills Association and Others is the correct law.  24. The Reference is answered accordingly.  Now the Registry to   notify   all   these   matters   before   the   Court   taking   up   such matters forthwith, for disposal. ………..………………….J. (ARUN MISHRA)  ………………………….J. (INDIRA BANERJEE) ………………………….J. 79 (VINEET SARAN) ………………………….J. (M.R. SHAH) ………………………….J. (ANIRUDDHA BOSE) New Delhi, April 22, 2020