Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
HANMANTA DAULAPPA NIMBAL SINCE DECEASED BY HIS HEIRS ANDLRS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
BABASAHEB DAJISAHEB LONDHE
DATE OF JUDGMENT29/08/1995
BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
BENCH:
RAMASWAMY, K.
HANSARIA B.L. (J)
CITATION:
1996 AIR 223 1995 SCC (6) 58
JT 1995 (6) 654 1995 SCALE (5)196
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
O R D E R
This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment
of the High Court at Bombay in Special Civil Application
No.277 of 1972 dated 8th September, 1977. The respondent-
landlord filed Civil Suit No.10/68 in the Court of Civil
Judge, J.D. at Akkalkot. Since the appellant raised plea of
oral tenancy for the year 1968-69, the Civil Court referred
the issue : "Does the defendant prove tenancy over the suit
land thereon?" to the Tehsildar who in his proceedings held
that in respect of Survey No.3 to the extent of 16 acres 26
Gunthas situated in Mirajgi village belongs to the
respondent and the appellant had not proved oral tenancy.
Thereon, the appellant carried the matter in appeal to the
Special Deputy Collector, Tenancy Appeals, Sholapur, who
held that oral tenancy was established. Even otherwise, the
appellant is a deemed tenant under s.4 of the Bombay Tenancy
and Agricultural Land Act, 1948 (for short, ‘Tenancy Act").
On revision, Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Pune, confirmed
the findings. A writ Petition was filed under Article 227 of
the Constitution.
The learned Single Judge of the High Court, while
holding that since the issue referred to the Tribunal under
the Tenancy Act is only the contractual tenancy for the year
1968-69, the Tribunals could not have gone into the question
of deemed tenancy under s.4. On the question of tenancy, the
High Court came to the conclusion that the oral tenancy has
not been proved on the grounds that the entries in the
revenue records for the year 1968-69 were made without
notice to the landlord. When the parties were litigating
their rights, it cannot be said that the landlord had agreed
for creating oral tenancy in favour of the appellant. Thus
on that premise, reversed the orders of the Tribunals below,
accepted the finding of the Tehsildar and referred the
matter to the Civil Court for decision according to the
finding of the Tehsildar. Thus, this appeal.
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The only question that arises for consideration is
whether the appellant is in lawful possession of the
property. Admittedly, there is no written lease granted in
favour of the appellant. He claimed that the landlord had
agreed for an oral lease for the year 1968-69. The admitted
facts are that the landlord was a minor and was prosecuting
his studies and his maternal uncle was looking after the
properties. The suit property was subject of hypothecation
and the mortgagee had inducted one Somanna who remained in
possession and cultivated the land till 1964-65. Thereafter,
the maternal uncle of the respondent claimed to have been in
possession and cultivated the land. The question whether who
cultivated the land upto year 1967-68 is not material for
the reason that the appellant is not laying any claim for
that period. In view of the admitted position that the
respondent is the owner and, being minor, his maternal uncle
must be deemed in law to be in possession.
The only material question is whether the appellant had
any tenancy rights in respect of the land in question? His
claim is that he came into possession under the oral tenancy
for 1968-69. That was denied by the maternal uncle who was
examined on behalf of the respondent-landlord. It is true
that one witness was examined on behalf of the appellant and
that evidence was believed by the Appellate Authority, and
the Revisional Authority did not disturb that finding. But
the Revisional Authority primarily proceeded on the finding
that the appellant is a deemed tenant. The question,
therefore, is whether the ingredients of s.4 of the Tenancy
Act are satisfied. Section 4 reads thus:
"A person lawfully cultivating any land
belonging to another person shall be
deemed to be a tenant if such land is
not culltivated personally by the owner
and if such person is not----"
The other criteria as enumerated in clauses (a), (b)
and (c) and the Explanation re not relevant for the purpose
of this case.
The question springing for consideration is whether the
appellant has lawfully cultivated the land for the year
1968-69? The admitted position is that the respondent filed
the suit for injunction on January 20, 1969 and ad-interim
injunction was issued on January 21, 1969. The appellant
issued notice on January 22, 1969 claiming oral tenancy. In
other words, the appellant had raised his claim for the
first time, after the landlord had filed the suit. The
appellant could have got lawful possession over the lands,
if there would have been an agreement with the landlord, and
pursuant thereto the landlord inducted the tenant in
possession for beneficial enjoyment of the demised land on
payment of premium or rent etc., or there would have been
acquiescence of the landlord, for the tenant continuing to
possess by accepting the rent. Since the claim of the
appellant that he came into possession in the year 1968-69
under oral lease was not conclusively accepted and there is
no proof that the landlord had accepted any rent, the
appellant is a trespasser on the land. The suit was filed
for injunction against the appellant. The burden is on the
appellant to establish his lawful possession. Except the
oral tenancy, no other evidence was brought on record.
Entries in the revenue records cannot establish lawful
possession, when, admittedly, no notice was given to the
respondent before making those entries. The other
circumstance is payment of land revenue to the Government
through Talatti (village servant). For the payment thereof
also, there is no notice or acquiescence by the landlord.
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If these two circumstances are excluded, then the only
fact is on the land, but the possession cannot be said to be
lawful possession. In other words, his possession is of a
trespasser, which is not protected by the Act. The question
of benefit of s.4 does not arise. Though the Tribunals below
or the High Court has not adverted to this aspect of the
matter, we feel that the order passed by the High Court
needs no interference.
The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs through
out.