DHEERAJ MOR vs. HONBLE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

1 (REPORTABLE) IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL/INHERENT JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1698 OF 2020 [ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) NO.14156 OF 2015] DHEERAJ MOR        … APPELLANT(S) VERSUS HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF DELHI        … RESPONDENT(S) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1699 OF 2020 [ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) No. 14676/2015] CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1700 OF 2020 [ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) No. 24219/2015 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1701 OF 2020 [ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) No. 30556/2015 W.P. (C) No. 77/2016 W.P. (C) No. 130/2016 W.P. (C) No. 405/2016 W.P. (C) No. 414/2016 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1702 OF 2020 [ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) No. 15764/2016 W.P. (C) No. 423/2016 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1707 OF 2020 [@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 4781 OF 2020] [ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C)...CC No. 15018/2016] CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1703 OF 2020 [ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) No. 23823/2016] CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1704 OF 2020 [ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) No. 24506/2016] Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by JAYANT KUMAR ARORA Date: 2020.02.19 16:39:28 IST Reason: CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1706 OF 2020 [ @ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 4778 OF 2020] [ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C)...CC No. 15304/2016] 2 W.P. (C) No. 600/2016 W.P. (C) No. 598/2016 W.P. (C) No. 601/2016 W.P. (C) No. 602/2016 W.P. (C) No. 733/2016 W.P. (C) No. 189/2017 W.P. (C) No. 222/2017 W.P. (C) No. 316/2017 W.P. (C) No. 334/2017 W.P. (C) No. 371/2017 W.P. (C) No. 96/2018 W.P. (C) No. 102/2018 W.P. (C) No. 103/2018 T.P. (C) No. 272/2018 W.P. (C) No. 108/2018 W.P. (C) No. 110/2018 W.P. (C) No. 106/2018 W.P. (C) No. 146/2018 W.P. (C) No. 123/2018 W.P. (C) No. 124/2018 W.P. (C) No. 138/2018 W.P. (C) No. 155/2018 W.P. (C) No. 145/2018 W.P. (C) No. 158/2018 W.P. (C) No. 174/2018 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1705 OF 2020 [ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) No. 8480/2018] W.P. (C) No. 291/2018 W.P. (C) No. 287/2018 W.P. (C) No. 344/2018 W.P. (C) No. 352/2018 3 W.P. (C) No. 387/2018 W.P. (C) No. 392/2018 W.P. (C) No. 396/2018 W.P. (C) No. 530/2018 W.P. (C) No. 519/2018 W.P. (C) No. 535/2018 W.P. (C) No. 581/2018 W.P. (C) No. 578/2018 W.P. (C) No. 612/2018 W.P. (C) No. 629/2018 W.P. (C) No. 596/2018 W.P. (C) No. 616/2018 W.P. (C) No. 632/2018 W.P. (C) No. 608/2018 W.P. (C) No. 628/2018 W.P. (C) No. 617/2018 W.P. (C) No. 624/2018 W.P. (C) No. 631/2018 W.P. (C) No. 635/2018 W.P. (C) No. 636/2018 W.P. (C) No. 641/2018 W.P. (C) No. 642/2018 W.P. (C) No. 639/2018 W.P. (C) No. 640/2018 W.P. (C) No. 650/2018 W.P. (C) No. 644/2018 W.P. (C) No. 658/2018 W.P. (C) No. 659/2018 4 W.P. (C) No. 680/2018 W.P. (C) No. 671/2018 W.P. (C) No. 677/2018 W.P. (C) No. 681/2018 W.P. (C) No. 686/2018 W.P. (C) No. 703/2018 W.P. (C) No. 696/2018 W.P. (C) No. 717/2018 W.P. (C) No. 728/2018 W.P. (C) No. 726/2018 W.P. (C) No. 727/2018 W.P. (C) No. 1272/2018 W.P. (C) No. 1302/2018 W.P. (C) No. 656/2019 W.P. (C) No. 744/2019 W.P. (C) No. 999/2019 W.P. (C) No. 1054/2019 W.P. (C) No. 1053/2019 W.P. (C) No. 1080/2019 W.P. (C) No. 1073/2019 W.P. (C) No. 1089/2019 W.P. (C) No. 1086/2019 W.P. (C) No. 1150/2019 CONMT.PET. (C) No. 1023/2019 in W.P.(C) No. 414/2016 W.P. (C) No. 1266/2019 5 J U D G M E N T ARUN MISHRA, J. 1. A Division Bench of this Court has referred the matters. The question involved in the matters is the interpretation of Article 233 of the   Constitution   of   India   as   to   the   eligibility   of   members   of   the subordinate   judicial   service   for   appointment   as   District   Judge   as against the quota reserved for the Bar by way of direct recruitment. The petitioners who are in judicial service, have claimed that in case before joining judicial service a candidate has completed 7 years of practice as an advocate, he/she shall be eligible to stake claim as against the direct recruitment quota from the Bar notwithstanding that on the date of application/appointment, he or she is in judicial service of the  Union or  State.  Yet  another  category  is that  of  the persons having completed only 7 years of service as judicial service. They contend that experience as a judge be treated at par with the Bar service, and they should be permitted to stake their claim. The third category is hybrid, consisting of candidates who have completed 7 years' by combining the experience serving as a judicial officer and as advocate. They claim to be eligible to stake their claim against the above quota. The central argument advanced is that Article 233(2) provides 2. two sources of recruitment; one is from judicial service, and the other 6 is from Bar. Thus, a person in judicial service with experience of 7 years practice at the Bar, before joining service (or combined with service as a judicial officer), can stake a claim under Article 233(2) as against the posts reserved for those having experience of 7 years as an advocate/pleader. Reliance has been placed on the decisions of this Court in  Rameshwar Dayal v. State of Punjab & Ors. , AIR 1961 SC 816 and in  Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. , (1967) 1 SCR 77 = AIR 1966 SC 1987 to submit that under Article 233(2) there are two sources of direct recruitment to the higher judicial service; one from the Bar and the other from service. The decisions of Constitution Bench in  Chandra Mohan  (supra) and  Rameshwar Dayal  (supra) are binding. The decision to the contrary in   Satya Narain Singh v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad & Ors.,   (1985) 1 SCC 225 taking a departure negating the right of the member of the judicial service and confining   the   direct   recruitment   from   the   Bar   through   practicing advocates   effectively   whittle   down   the   law   laid   down   in   Chandra Mohan  (supra) and  Rameshwar Dayal  (supra). It is argued that articles 233(1) and 233(2)   inter alia   deal with 3. direct   recruitment,   as   is   apparent   from   the   Constitution   Bench decision of this Court in the  High Court of Punjab & Haryana v. State , (1975) 1 SCC 843. The rules framed by various High of Haryana Courts disqualifying the members of subordinate judicial service from 7 direct recruitment to the higher judicial service are not in consonance with the law laid down in   Chandra Mohan   (supra) and   Rameshwar Dayal  (supra) and the provisions contained in Article 233.  The rules, which completely cut off one stream and provide only one stream of direct   recruitment   then   the   High   Court’s   rules   would   have   to   be declared   ultra   vires   being   violative   of   Article   233.   It   was   further submitted that the rules framed by various High Courts arbitrarily discriminate   between   advocates   and   the   members   of   the   judicial service in the matter of direct recruitment, the rules suffer from the vice of arbitrariness. It was also submitted that the decision in   All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India , (2002) 4 SCC 247 has been rendered by a Bench of three Judges.  The decision cannot overturn the two earlier Constitution Bench judgments of this Court. In   All India Judges’ Association case   (supra), the Court proceeded on the basis that there was only one source of direct  recruitment to  the higher judicial service, which is violative of the dictum laid down by a larger Bench of this Court in  Rameshwar Dayal  (supra) and  Chandra Mohan   (supra).   The   decision   in   All   India   Judges’   Association   case (supra) is inadvertent and cannot be said to be binding. The quota system from the service and the Bar would apply to those who apply within the quota. The quota system cannot override the constitutional scheme of Article 233(1) and (2).  8 4. Reliance has also been placed on behalf of the petitioners upon the decision in  Vijay Kumar Mishra & Anr. v. High Court of Judicature at Patna & Ors. , (2016) 9 SCC 313 in which it has been held that the bar prescribed under Article 233(2) prohibits only the appointment of persons   in   service   of   Central/State   Government   and   not   their participation in the recruitment process. It is the constitutional right of such persons as well to participate in the selection process. In case they are selected, they can resign and join the post. On the other hand, it was submitted on behalf of various High 5. Courts as well as on behalf of the practicing advocates that Article 233(2) contemplates direct recruitment  only from the Bar and the person   should   not   be   in   judicial   service   for   the   post   of   direct recruitment. They can only be promoted. By their volition they can join the subordinate judicial service. Having done so, they can only be promoted to the higher judicial service as provided in the rules. It was further submitted that the decisions in  Rameshwar Dayal  (supra) and Chandra Mohan   (supra) rather than espousing the submissions on behalf   of   in­service   candidates,   negate   the   same.   The   decision   in Satya Narain Singh  (supra) has also considered the aforesaid decisions and   has   opined   that   there   are   two   different   streams,   and   the candidates   from   the   judicial   service   cannot   stake   their   claim   as against the posts reserved for direct recruitment from the Bar. Similar 9 is the law laid down by this Court in the case of  Deepak Aggarwal v. Keshav Kaushik & Ors. , (2013) 5 SCC 277. It was further submitted that the decision in  All India Judges Association  (supra) has prescribed a quota for merit promotion from the in­service candidates and 25% of the quota for direct recruitment from the Bar. Also, the quota for limited competitive examinations fixed was reduced to 10% in  All India Judges'   Association   v.   Union   of   India ,   (2010)   15   SCC   170.   It   was further submitted that there is a separate quota provided under the rules framed by various High Courts, but now there is a roster system as well. Roster system has also been made applicable for fixing the seniority of the incumbents recruited from in­service candidates as well as directly from the Bar.  In this regard reference has been made to the decision of this Court in  Punjab & Haryana High Court v. State of Punjab , (2018) SCC OnLine SC 1728. 6. The   main   question   for   consideration   is   the   interpretation   of Article   233   of   the   Constitution   of   India,   and   based   upon   its interpretation, the question concerning the rules being ultra vires of the   same   has   to   be   examined.   Rules   of   various   High   Courts,   as existing preclude members of the judicial service from staking their claim as against the posts reserved for direct recruitment from the Bar. Article 233 is extracted hereunder: 10 “   (1) Appointments of 233. Appointment of district judges­­   persons   to   be,   and   the   posting   and   promotion   of,   district judges in any State shall be made by the Governor of the State in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State. (2) A person not already in the service of the Union or of the State shall only be eligible to be appointed a district judge if he has   been   for   not   less   than   seven   years   an   advocate   or   a pleader   and   is   recommended   by   the   High   Court   for appointment.” 7. The  Hindi  version of Article 233 has also been relied upon.  The same is extracted hereunder: “ अधययय 6- अधधनसथनययययलय 233. जजललनयलयलधधशशकधजनययजकक - (1) जकसधरलजयममजजललनयलयलधधश जनययककहहनवललनवयजककयशकधजनययजकककथलजजललनयलयलधधशकधपदसथलपनल औरपरहननजकउसरलजयकलरलजयपललऐसनरलजयकनसबसधममअजधकलजरकलकल परयहगकरनवललनउचचनयलयललयसनपरलमशरकरनगल। (2) वह वयजकक ,  जह सघ कध यल रलजय कध सनवल मम पहलन सन हध नहधस ह ,  जजलल नयलयलधधश जनययकक हहन कन जलए कनवल कभध पलकपर हहगल जब वह कम सन कम सलक वर कक अजधवककल यल पलधडर रहल ह और उसकध जनययजकक कन जलए उचच नयलयललय न जसफलजरश कध ह। “ It was submitted that Article 394A had been inserted by way of 8. the   Constitution   (Fifty­eighth   Amendment)   Act,   1987.     The   same provides as under: “ 394A. Authoritative text in the Hindi language .­­ (1) The President shall cause to be published under his authority,­­ (a)   the   translation   of   this   Constitution   in   the   Hindi language, signed by members of the Constituent Assembly, with such modifications as may be necessary to bring it in conformity   with   the   language,   style   and   terminology adopted in the authoritative texts of Central Acts in the Hindi   language,   and   incorporating   therein   all   the amendments   of   this   Constitution   made   before   such publication; and (b)   the   translation   in   the   Hindi   language   of   every amendment   of   this   Constitution   made   in   the   English language. (2)   The   translation   of   this   Constitution   and   of   every amendment   thereof   published   under   clause   (1)   shall   be construed to have the same meaning as the original thereof, 11 and if any difficulty arises in so construing any part of such translation, the President shall cause the same to be revised suitably. (3)   The   translation   of   this   Constitution   and   of   every amendment   thereof   published   under   this   article   shall   be deemed to be, for all purposes, the authoritative text thereof in the Hindi language.” 9. The  Hindi  translation of the Constitution signed by the members of   the   Constituent   Assembly   was   published   in   1950   under   the authority   of   the   President   of   the   Constituent   Assembly.     The translation of the Constitution shall be deemed to be the authoritative text thereof in the  Hindi  language.   10. Crawford in   The Construction of Statutes , 202 (1940) has also been referred to, especially the following observations: "In some jurisdictions statutes may be enacted in more than one   language.     Where   this   is   the   situation,   both   texts constitute   the   law   and   each   must   be   considered   in ascertaining the meaning of the legislature." Considering the version in the  language as well as in the 11. Hindi  English language, the meaning is the same, and interpretation does not change.   There is no room for  any  confusion that they are two different sources of appointment provided in Article 233.  12. Article 233(1) provides for appointments by way of posting and promotion.   It   is   apparent   from   Article   233   that   the   appointing authority the Governor has to exercise the power of appointment in consultation with the High Court. The term ‘appointment’ is broader and includes appointment by way of direct recruitment or by way of 12 promotion, and sometimes it may also include, if so provided in the rules, by way of absorption. 13. Article 233(2) starts with a negative stipulation that a person who is not already in the service of the Union or the State, shall be eligible  only   to  be appointed  as  District   Judge  if  he  has  been  an advocate or a pleader for not less than 7 years and is recommended by the High Court for appointment. The expression ‘in the service of the Union or of the State’ has been interpreted by this Court to mean the judicial service. A person from judicial service can be appointed as a District Judge. However, Article 233(2) provides that a person who is not in the service of the Union, shall be eligible only if he has been in practice, as an advocate or a pleader for 7 years; meaning thereby, persons   who   are   in   service   are   distinguished   category   from   the incumbent   who   can   be   appointed   as   District   Judge   on   7   years’ practice as an advocate or a pleader. Article 233(2) nowhere provides eligibility of in­service candidates for consideration as a District Judge concerning a post requiring 7 years’ practice as an advocate or a pleader. Requirement of 7 years' experience for advocate or pleader is qualified with a rider that he should not be in the service of the Union or the State. Article 233 provides two sources of recruitment, one from judicial service and the other from advocates or pleaders. There are two separate streams provided; one is for persons in judicial service, 13 and the other is for those not in judicial service of the Union or the State and have practiced for seven years. The expression ‘in service of the Union or the State’ has been interpreted in  Chandra Mohan  (supra) to mean judicial service, not any other service of the Union or the State. Thus, it is clear that the members of the judicial service alone are eligible for appointment as against the post of District Judge as the only mode provided for the appointment of in­service candidates is by way of promotion. They can stake their claim as per rules for promotion or merit promotion as the case may be. This Court has excluded   the   persons   from   the  Indian   Civil  Service,   the  Provincial Judicial  Service,  or other  Executive  Services, before  Independence, recruitment to the post of District Judge was provided from other services   also.   In   Chandra   Mohan   (supra),   this   Court   held   that   no person from the Executive Service can be promoted as District Judge. There   is   separation   of   the   judiciary   in   terms   of   Article   50   of   the Constitution of India.  It mandates the State to take steps to separate the judiciary from the Executive in the public services of the State. Article 50 is extracted hereunder:

14. Article 233(2) provides that if an advocate or a pleader has to be appointed, he must have completed 7 years of practice. It is coupled with the condition in the opening part that the person should not be 14 in service of the Union or State, which is the judicial service of the State. The person in judicial service is not eligible for being appointed as against the quota reserved for advocates. Once he has joined the stream of service, he ceases to be an advocate. The requirement of 7 years of minimum experience has to be considered as the practising advocate as on the cut­off date, the phrase used is a continuous state of affair from the past. The context ‘has been in practice’ in which it has been used, it is apparent that the provisions refers to a person who has been an advocate or pleader not only on the cut­off date but continues to be so at the time of appointment. 15. Reliance has been placed on   Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P. , (supra) by both the sides, facts of which reflect that Allahabad High Court called for applications for recruitment to 10 vacancies in the Uttar   Pradesh   Higher   Judicial   Service   from   Barristers,   Advocates, Vakils and pleaders of more than 7 years’ standing and from judicial officers. Six incumbents were selected ­ three advocates and three judicial   officers.   The   Selection   Committee   sent   two   lists,   one comprising the names of the three advocates and the other comprising the  names  of  three   judicial   officers  to  the  High  Court.   There  was agreement that the selection from the Bar was good. The question arose about the legality of the appointment of judicial officers. The question arose was whether the incumbents who were not members of 15 the   judicial   service   could   have   been   appointed   as   District   Judges under Rule 14. This Court while striking down the Rules interpreted Article 233 thus: “7. The first question turns upon the provisions of Art. 233 of the Constitution. Article 233(1) reads: "Appointments   of   persons   to   be,   and   the   posting   and promotion of, district judges in any State shall be made by the Governor  of the State in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State." We are assuming for the purpose of these appeals that the "Governor"   under Art.   233 shall   act   on   the   advice   of   the Ministers. So, the expression "Governor" used in the judgment means  Governor acting on  the  advice   of  the   Ministers.   The constitutional mandate is clear. The exercise of the power of appointment   by   the   Governor   is   conditioned   by   his consultation with the High Court, that is to say, he can only appoint a person to the post of district judge in consultation with the High Court. The object of consultation is apparent. The High Court is expected to know better than the Governor in regard to the suitability or otherwise of a person, belonging either to the "judicial service" or to the Bar, to be appointed as a district judge. Therefore, a duty is enjoined on the Governor to make the appointment in consultation with a body which is the appropriate authority to give advice to him. This mandate can be disobeyed by the Governor in two ways, namely, (i) by not consulting the High Court at all, and (ii) by consulting the High Court and also other persons. In one case he directly infringes the mandate of the Constitution and in the other he indirectly does so, for his mind may be influenced by other persons not entitled to advise him. That this constitutional mandate has both a negative and positive significance is made clear by the other provisions of the Constitution. Wherever the Constitution intended to provide more than one consultant, it has   said   so:   see   Arts.   124(2)   and   217(1).   Wherever   the Constitution   provided   for   consultation   of   a   single   body   or individual it said so: see Art. 222. Art. 124(2) goes further and makes a distinction between persons who shall be consulted and persons who may be consulted. These provisions indicate that the duty to consult is so integrated with the exercise of the power that the power can be exercised only in consultation with   the   person   or  persons   designated   therein.   To   state   it differently, if A is empowered to appoint B in consultation with C,   he   will   not   be   exercising   the   power   in   the   manner prescribed if he appoints B in consultation with C and D.” 16 This   Court   in     (supra)   also Chandra   Mohan   v.   State   of   U.P. observed, concerning recruitment from the Bar under Article 233(2), the Governor can appoint only advocates recommended by the High Court to the judicial service. This Court has held: 

(emphasis supplied) 16. Rule 14 of U.P. Rules which came up for consideration of this Court in  Chandra Mohan  (supra) is extracted hereunder: “Rule   14.   Direct   Recruitment.­(1)   Applications   for   direct recruitment to the service shall be called for by the Court and shall be made in the prescribed form which may be obtained from the Registrar of the Court. (2)   The   applications   by   barristers,   advocates,   vakils   or pleaders,   should   be   submitted   through   the   District   Judge concerned and must be accompanied by certificates of age, character,   nationality,   and   domicile,   standing   as   a   legal practitioner, and such other documents as may be prescribed in this behalf by the Court. Applications from Judicial Officers should be submitted in accordance with the rules referred to in clause 2(b) of rule 5 of these Rules. The District Judge or other officer through whom the application is submitted shall send to the Court, along with the application, his own estimate of the applicant's character and fitness for appointment to the service.” After having answered the question about recruitment from the 17. Bar, the further question considered in   Chandra Mohan   (supra) was whether   the   Governor   could   directly   appoint   persons   from   service other than judicial service as District Judges in consultation with the High Court. They belonged to the executive branch of the Government 17 and performed certain revenue and ministerial functions. This Court took note of the fact that in the pre­Independence era, there was a demand that the judiciary should be separated from the Executive, and   that   was   based   upon   the   assumption   that   unless   they   were separated, independence of the judiciary at the lower level would be a mockery.   Thus,   Article   50   of   Directive   Principles   of   State   Policy provides   that   States   to   take   steps   to   separate   judiciary   from   the executive   in   public   services   of   the   State.   There   shall   be   separate judicial service from the executive service. This Court considered the provisions of Articles 234, 235, 236 and 237 and observed that there are two sources of recruitment, services of the Union or State and members of the Bar. This Court observed thus: “15. With this background, if the following provisions of the Constitution   are   looked   at,   the   meaning   of   the   debated expressions therein would be made clear: We have already extracted Art. 233. Article  234.  Appointments   of   persons  other  than  district judges to the judicial service of a State shall be made by the Governor of the State in accordance with rules made by him in   that   behalf   after   consultation   with   the   State   Public Service   Commission   and   with   the   High   Court   exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State. Article   235. The   control   over   district   courts   and   courts subordinate thereto including the posting and promotion of, and the grant of leave to, persons belonging to the judicial service of a State and holding any post inferior to the post of district   Judges   shall   be   vested   in   the   High   Court;   but nothing in this Article shall be construed as taking away from any such person any right of appeal which he may have under the law regulating the conditions of his service or as authorising the High Court to deal with him otherwise than   in   accordance   with   the   conditions   of   his   service prescribed under such law. Article 236. In this Chapter­ 18 (a) the expression "district judge" includes judges of a city civil   court,   additional   district   judge,   joint   district   judge, assistant district judge, chief judge of a small cause court, chief   presidency   magistrate,   additional   chief   presidency magistrate, sessions judge, additional sessions judge and assistant sessions judge: (b)   the   expression   "judicial   service"   means   a   service consisting exclusively of persons intended to fill the post of district judge and other civil judicial posts inferior to the post of district judge. Article 237. The Governor may by public notification direct that the foregoing provisions of this Chapter and any rules made thereunder shall with effect from such date as may be fixed by him in that behalf apply in relation to any class or classes of magistrates in the State as they apply in relation to   persons   appointed   to   the   judicial   service of   the   State subject to such exceptions and modifications as may be specified in the notification. The   gist   of   the   said   provisions   may   be   stated   thus: Appointments of persons to be, and the posting and promotion of, district judges in any State shall be made by the Governor of the State. There are two sources of recruitment, namely, (i) service of the Union or of the State, and (ii) members of the Bar. The said judges from the first source are appointed in consultation with the High Court and those from the second source   are   appointed   on   the   recommendation   of   the   High Court.  But   in   the   case   of   appointments   of   persons   to   the judicial service other than as district judges they will be made by the Governor of the State in accordance with rules framed by him in consultation with the High Court and the Public Service Commission. But the High Court has control over all the district courts and courts subordinate thereto, subject to certain prescribed limitations.”                               (emphasis supplied) As to the question whether persons from other services can be appointed as District Judges, the expression service of Union or State, has been held to be construed to be judicial service in Article 233(2) thus:  “16.  So far there is no dispute. But the real conflict rests on the  question   whether   the   Governor   can   appoint   as   district judges persons from services other than the judicial service; that is to say, can he appoint a person who is in the police, excise, revenue or such other service as a district judge? The 19 acceptance of this position would take us back to the pre­ independence days and that too to the conditions prevailing in the Princely States. In the Princely States one used to come across appointments to the judicial service from police and other departments. This would also cut across the well­knit scheme of the Constitution and the principle underlying it, namely,   the   judiciary   shall   be   an   independent   service. Doubtless if Art. 233(1) stood alone, it may be argued that the Governor may appoint any person as a district judge, whether legally qualified or not, if he belongs to any service under the State. But Art. 233(l) is nothing more than a declaration of the general power of the Governor in the matter of appointment of district judges. It does not lay down the qualifications of the candidates to be appointed or denote the sources from which the   recruitment   has   to   be   made.  But   the   sources   of   recruitment are indicated in cl. (2) thereof. Under cl. (2) of   Art.   233   two sources are given, namely, (i) persons in the service of the Union or of the State, and (ii) advocate or pleader. Can it be   said   that   in   the   context   of   Ch.   VI   of   Part   VI   of   the Constitution "the service of the Union or of the State" means any service of the Union or of the State or does it mean the judicial service of the Union or of the State? The setting, viz., the   chapter   dealing   with   subordinate   courts,   in   which   the expression   "the   service"   appears   indicates   that   the   service mentioned  therein  is   the  service   pertaining  to  courts.   That apart, Art. 236(2) defines the expression "judicial service" to mean a service consisting exclusively of persons intended to fill the post of district judge and other civil judicial posts inferior to   the   post   of   district   judge.   If   this   definition,   instead   of appearing in  Art. 236 , is placed as a clause before Art. 233(2), there   cannot   be   any   dispute   that   "the   service"   in Art. 233(2) can only mean the judicial service. The circumstance that   the   definition   of   "judicial   service"   finds   a   place   in   a subsequent   Article   does   not   necessarily   lead   to   a   contrary conclusion. The fact that in Article 233(2) the expression "the service" is used whereas in Arts. 234 and 235 the expression "judicial   service"   is   found   is   not   decisive   of   the   question whether  the  expression   "the   service"   in Art.   233(2) must   be something   other   than   the   judicial   service,   for,   the   entire chapter is dealing with the judicial service.  The definition is exhaustive of the service. Two expressions in the definition bring   out   the   idea   that   the   judicial   service   consists   of hierarchy   of   judicial   officers   starting   from   the   lowest   and ending with district judges. The expressions "exclusively" and "intended" emphasise the fact that the judicial service consists only of persons intended to fill up the posts of district judges and other civil judicial posts and that is the exclusive service of judicial officers. Having defined "judicial service" in exclusive terms, having provided for appointments to that service and having entrusted the control of the said service to the care of the High Court, the makers of the Constitution would not have conferred a blanket power on the Governor to appoint any person from any service as a district judge. 20

(emphasis supplied) 18. In   Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P.   (supra), this Court further noted the history that the Governor­General in Council had issued a notification   in   1922   empowering   the   local   Government   to   make appointments to the said service from the members of the Provincial Civil Service (Judicial Branch) or the members of the Bar. This Court had   also   noted   that   earlier   till   India   attained   Independence,   the Governor­General made appointments of District Judges from three sources: (i) Indian Civil Service; (ii) Provincial Judicial Service; and (iii) the Bar. After India attained freedom, recruitment from Indian Civil Service was discontinued by the Government  of India, and it was decided that the members of the newly created Indian Administrative Service would not be given judicial posts. Thereafter District Judges were appointed only from either the judicial service or from the Bar. The rules framed by the Governor empowering him to recruit District Judges from the judicial officers were held to be unconstitutional. This Court has observed thus: “20. The history of the said provisions also supports the said conclusion. Originally the posts of district and sessions judges and additional sessions judges were filled by persons from the Indian Civil Service. In 1922 the Governor­General­in­Council issued a notification empowering the local government to make appointments  to  the   said  service  from  the  members   of  the Provincial Civil Service (Judicial Branch) or from the members of the Bar. In exercise of the powers conferred under S. 246(1) and S. 251 of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Secretary of State for India Framed rules styled Reserved Posts (Indian Civil Service) Rules, 1938. Under those Rules, the Governor 21 was given the power to appoint to a district post a member of the judicial service of the Province or a member of the Bar. Though S. 254(1) of the said Act was couched in general terms similar to those contained in Art. 233(1) of the Constitution, the said rules did not empower him to appoint to the reserved post of district judge a person belonging to a service other than the   judicial   service.   Till   India   attained   independence,   the position   was   that   district   judges   were   appointed   by   the Governor   from   three   sources,   namely,   (i)   the   Indian   Civil Service, (ii) the Provincial Judicial Service, and (iii) the Bar. But after India attained independence in 1947, recruitment to the Indian Civil Service was discontinued and the Government of India decided that the members of the newly created Indian Administrative   Service   would   not   be   given   judicial   posts. Thereafter district judges have been recruited only from either the judicial service or from the Bar. There was no case of a member of the executive having been promoted as a district judge.   If   that   was   the   factual   position   at   the   time   the Constitution came into force, it is unreasonable to attribute to the makers of the Constitution, who had so carefully provided for the independence of the judiciary, an intention to destroy the same by an indirect method. What can be more deleterious to the good name of the judiciary than to permit at the level of district judges, recruitment from the executive departments? Therefore,   the   history   of   the   services   also   supports   our construction   that   the   expression   "the   service"   in Art. 233(2) can only mean the judicial service. (21)  For the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the Rules framed by  the   Governor  empowering   him  to   recruit   district   judges from the "judicial officers" are unconstitutional and, therefore, for that reason also the appointment of respondents 5, 6 and 7 was bad. (23)     In   the   result,   we   hold   that   the   U.P.   Higher   Judicial Service Rules providing for the recruitment of district judges are   constitutionally   void   and,   therefore,   the   appointments made thereunder were illegal. We set aside the order of the High   Court   and   issue   a   writ   of   mandamus   to   the   1st respondent   not   to   make   any   appointment   by   direct recruitment to the U.P. Higher Judicial Service in pursuance of st the selections made under the said Rules. The 1  respondent will pay the costs of the appellant. The other respondents will bear their own costs.” (emphasis supplied) 19. It is apparent from the decision in   Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P. , (supra) that this Court has laid down that concerning District Judges recruited directly from the Bar, Governor can appoint only 22 advocates   recommended   by   the   High   Court   and   Rule   14   which provided for judicial officers to be appointed as direct recruits was struck down by this Court to be ultra vires. Thus, the decision is squarely   against   the   submission   espoused   on   behalf   of   in­service candidates. In the abovementioned para 11 of  Chandra Mohan  (supra), the position is made clear. In   (supra) the Court held Chandra Mohan that only advocates can be appointed as direct recruits, and  inter alia the Rule 14 providing for executive officers' recruitment was struck down. This Court has held that the expression ‘service of State or Union’   means   judicial   service,   it   only   refers   to   the   source   of recruitment.   Dichotomy of two sources of recruitment/appointment has been culled out in the decision. 20. Reliance has also been placed on the decision in   Rameshwar Dayal v. State of U.P. , AIR 1961 SC 816. The question which arose for consideration there was as to the eligibility of persons on the roll of advocates of East Punjab High Court before the partition of India in 1947 for appointment as a District Judge. This Court held that the period   of   practice   before   Lahore   High   Court   could   be   counted   as against the required period of 7 years for appointment as District Judge. This Court laid down that practice rendered in or before the Lahore High Court before partition was not open to objection under Article 233(2) of the Constitution. Even if the word ‘advocate’ in clause 23 (2) of Article 233 meant an advocate of a court in India, and the appointee must be such an advocate at the time of his appointment, no objection can be raised on this ground because being factually on the   roll   of     Advocates   of   the   Punjab   High   Court   at   the   time   of appointment, the candidate was admittedly an advocate in a court in India and continued as such till the date of his appointment. This Court also considered the principle applied to the East Punjab High Court. An advocate of the Lahore High Court was entitled to practice in the new High Court counted his seniority on the strength of his standing in the Lahore High Court.   It was held that a person who continued   as   advocate   at   the   time   of   his   appointment   as   District Judge fulfilled the requirement of Article 233. Emphasis was laid by this Court that such a practice was recognised under clause 6 of the High Court of Punjab Order, 1947. Earlier, the High Court used to maintain   the   rolls   of   advocates.   The   question   which   arose   for consideration   was   whether   respondent   Nos.2   to   6   fulfilled   the requirements  of  having   been   7  years   an  advocate  or   pleader.   The submission made was that practice rendered outside the territory of India cannot be counted as practice for counting 7 years. This Court interpreted Article 233 distinguishing it from Article 124 and Article 217 and held that under clause (1), the Government can appoint such a person who is already in the service of the Union or State. No special qualifications were prescribed under clause (1) of Article 233. The 24 Governor can appoint such a person as District Judge. However, as to a person not already in service, the qualification prescribed in Article 233 is that he should be an advocate or a pleader of 7 years' standing. This Court answered the question thus: “11.  This is the background against which we have to consider the argument of learned counsel for the appellant. Even if we assume without finally pronouncing on their correctness that learned counsel is right in his first two submissions viz. that the   word   “advocate”   in   clause   (2)   of   Art.   233   means   an advocate of a court in India and the appointee must be such an advocate at the time of his appointment, no objection on those grounds can be raised to the appointment of three of the respondents who were factually on the roll of Advocates of the Punjab High Court at the time of their appointment; because admittedly   they   were   advocates   in   a   court   in   India   and continued   as   such   advocates   till   the   dates   of   their appointment.   The   only   question   with   regard   to   them   is whether  they  can  count   in  the  period   of  seven  years  their period of practice in or under  the Lahore High Court.  The answer to this question is clearly furnished by clause 6(2) of the High Courts (Punjab) Order, 1947, read with S. 8(3) of the Bar Councils Act, 1926. That clause lays down that the right of   audience   in   the   High   Court   of   East   Punjab   shall   be regulated   in   accordance   with   the   principle   in   force   in   the Lahore High Court immediately before the appointed day. The relevant rule in the Lahore High Court Rules laid down that Advocates who are Barristers shall take precedence inter se according to the date of call to the Bar; Advocates who are not Barristers, according to the dates when they became entitled to practice in a High Court. The same principle applied to the East Punjab High Court, and an advocate of the Lahore High Court who was recognised as an advocate entitled to practise in the new High Court counted his seniority on the strength of his standing in the Lahore High Court. He did not lose that seniority, which was preserved by the Bar Councils Act, 1926, and we see no reasons why for the purpose of cl. (2) of Art. 233 such an advocate should not have the same standing as he has in the High Court where he is practising.  12.   Learned   counsel   for  the   appellant  has   also   drawn  our attention   to   Explanation   I   to   cl.   (3)   of   Art.   124   of   the Constitution relating to the qualifications for appointment as a Judge of the Supreme Court and to the explanation to cl. (2) of Art. 217 relating to the qualifications for appointment as a Judge of a High Court, and has submitted that where the Constitution   makers   thought   it   necessary   they   specifically provided for counting the period in a High Court which was formerly in India. Articles 124 and 217 are differently worded 25 and refer to an additional qualification of citizenship which is not a requirement of Art. 233, and we do not think that cl. (2) of  Art.   233   can  be  interpreted   in  the  light   of  explanations added to Arts. 124 and 217. Article 233 is a self contained provision regarding the appointment of District Judges. As to a person who is already in the service of the Union or of the State, no special qualifications are laid down and under cl. (1) the Governor can appoint such a person as a district judge in consultation with the relevant High Court. As to a person not already in service, a qualification is laid down in cl. (2) and all that is required is that he should be an advocate or pleader of seven   years’   standing.  The   clause   does   not   say   how   that standing must be reckoned and if an Advocate of the Punjab High Court is entitled to count the period of his practice in the Lahore High Court for determining his standing at the Bar, we see nothing in Art. 233 which must lead to the exclusion of that period for determining his eligibility for appointment as district judge.  What will be the result if the interpretation canvassed for 13. on behalf of the appellant is accepted? Then, for seven years beginning from August 15, 1947, no member of the Bar of the Punjab   High   Court   would   be   eligible   for   appointment   as district   judge   ­­   a   result   which   has   only   to   be   stated   to demonstrate   the   weakness   of   the   argument.   We   have proceeded   so   far   on   the   first   two   submissions   of   learned counsel for the appellant, and on that basis dealt with his third submission. It is perhaps necessary to add that we must not be understood to have decided that the expression ‘has been’   must   always   mean   what   learned   counsel   for   the appellant   says   it   means   according   to   the   strict   rules   of grammar.   It   may   be   seriously   questioned   if   an   organic Constitution must be so narrowly interpreted, and the learned Additional Solicitor­General has drawn our attention to other Articles of the Constitution like Art. 5( c ) where in the context the expression has a different meaning. Our attention has also been drawn to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Mubarak Mazdoor  v.   K.K. Banerji,   AIR 1958 All 323, where a different meaning was given to a similar expression occurring in the proviso to sub­sec. (3) of S. 86 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. We consider it unnecessary to pursue this   matter   further   because   the   respondents   we   are   now considering   continued   to   be   advocates   of   the   Punjab   High Court when they were appointed as district judges and they had a standing of more than seven years when so appointed. They were clearly eligible for appointment under cl. 2 of Art. 233 of the Constitution.  We now turn to the other two respondents (Harbans Singh 14.   and P.R. Sawhney) whose names were not     on the roll   factually   of Advocates at the time they were appointed as district judges. What is their position? We consider that they also fulfilled the requirements of Art. 233 of the Constitution. Harbans Singh 26 was in service of the State at the time of his appointment, and Mr Viswanantha Sastri appearing for him has submitted that cl. (2) of Art. 233 did not apply. We consider that even if we proceed on the footing that both these persons were recruited from the Bar and their appointment has to be tested by the requirements of cl.(2), we must hold that they fulfilled those requirements.  They   were   Advocates   enrolled   in   the   Lahore High  Court;   this  is  not   disputed.  Under  Cl.   6  of   the   High Courts   (Punjab)   Order,   1947,   they   were   recognised   as Advocates entitled to practise in the Punjab High Court till the Bar Councils Act, 1926, came into force.  Under S.8 (2)(     a   ) of that Act it was the duty of the High Court to prepare and maintain a roll of advocates in which their names should have been entered on the day on which S. 8 came into force, that is, on  September 28,  1948.  The proviso to sub­sec.  (2) of S.8 required them to deposit a fee of Rs 10 payable to the Bar Council. Obviously such payment could hardly be made before the Bar Council was constituted. We do not agree with learned counsel for the appellant and the interveners (B.D. Pathak and Om Dutt Sharma) that the proviso had the effect of taking away   the   right   which   these   respondents   had   to   come automatically on the roll of advocates under S. 8(2)( a ) of the Act. We consider that the combined effect of Cl. 6 of the High Courts (Punjab) Order, 1947, and S. 8(2)( a ) of the Bar Councils Act,   1926,   was   this:   from   August   15,   1947,   to   September 28,1948,   they   were   recognised   as   Advocates   entitled   to practise in the Punjab High Court and after September 28, 1948, they automatically came on the roll of advocates of the Punjab High Court but had to pay a fee of Rs 10 to the Bar Council. They did not cease to be advocates at any time or stage   after   August   15,   1947,   and   they   continued   to   be advocates of the Punjab High Court till they were appointed as District Judges. They also had the necessary standing of seven years   to   be   eligible   under   Cl.(2)   of   Art.   233   of   the Constitution.” (emphasis supplied) 21. Much was tried to be made based on the facts of Harbans Singh and   P.R.   Sawhney   in   the   decision   of   Rameshwar   Dayal   (supra). Harbans   Singh   and   P.R.   Sawhney   were   having   the   following qualifications as noted in the judgment: “5.  x x x  (2) Respondent 3 (Harbans Singh, J.) was also called to the Bar and then enrolled as an Advocate of the Lahore High Court on March 5, 1937. He worked as an Additional District and Sessions Judge, Ferozepore, from July 2, 1947, to February 27 22, 1948. He then returned to practice at Simla for a short while. On March 15, 1948, he worked as Deputy Custodian, Evacuee Property, till April 17, 1950. On April 18, 1950, he was appointed as District and Sessions Judge and on August 11, 1958, he was appointed as an Additional Judge of the Punjab High Court. (5) Respondent 6 (P.R.  Sawhney) was called  to the Bar on November 17, 1930, and was enrolled as an Advocate of the Lahore   High   Court   on   March   10,   1931.   After   partition   he shifted to Delhi and worked for sometime as Legal Adviser to the Custodian, Evacuee Property, Delhi. Then he practised for sometime   at   Delhi;   he   then   accepted   service   under   the Ministry of Rehabilitation as an Officer on Special Duty and Administrator,   Rajpura   Township.   On   March   30,   1949,   he became the Chairman, Jullundur Improvement Trust. On May 6,   1949,   he   got   his   licence   to   practise   as   an   Advocate suspended. On April 6, 1957, he was appointed as District and Sessions Judge.” Two of them were not in judicial service as on the date of their appointment; they had practised earlier for the requisite period as advocates  and  later  were  appointed  as  District   &  Sessions   Judge. Harbans Singh was working as Deputy Custodian, Evacuee Property till 1950, when he was appointed as District & Sessions Judge. In 1958, he was appointed as an Additional Judge of the Punjab High Court.   At   the   relevant   time,   when   the   appointments   were   made, recruitments   were   permissible   from   executive   services   too.   Their eligibility to be appointed as District & Sessions Judge was tested. The question which came up for consideration was not whether they could have been appointed being in service of Custodian of Evacuee Property or the Improvement Trust. What was held by this Court concerning interpretation   of   Article   233   in   the   abovementioned   para   12   of Rameshwar Dayal   (supra), by a Constitution Bench of Court, goes 28 squarely against the submissions raised on behalf of the in­service candidates.           In   (supra), a similar question arose.   The 22. Satya Narain Singh   members of Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service applied for appointment by way of direct recruitment to the Uttar Pradesh Higher Judicial Service claiming that they had completed 7 years of practice at the Bar before their appointment to the Uttar Pradesh Judicial Service.   Therefore, they were eligible to be appointed by direct recruitment to the Higher Judicial Service, i.e., to the post of District Judge.  It was submitted that it would be extremely anomalous to interpret Article 233 in a way to render judicial officers eligible for appointment as a District Judge by   direct   recruitment.     This   Court   rejected   the   submission   and observed thus:  "3. …Two points straightway project themselves when the two clauses of Article 233 are read: The first clause deals with "appointments   of   persons   to   be,   and   the   posting   and promotion of, District Judges in any State" while the second clause is confined in its application to persons "not already in the service of the Union or of the State”. We may mention here that "service of the Union or of the State" has been interpreted by this Court to mean Judicial Service. Again while the first clause makes consultation by the Governor of the State with the High Court necessary, the second clause requires that the High Court must recommend a person for appointment as a District Judge. It is only in respect of the persons covered by the second clause that there is a requirement that a person shall be eligible for appointment as District Judge if he has been an advocate or a pleader for not less than 7 years. In other words, in the case of candidates who are not members of a Judicial Service they must have been advocates or pleaders for not less than 7 years and they have to be recommended by the   High   Court   before   they   may   be   appointed   as   District Judges, while in the case of candidates who are members of a Judicial Service the 7 years' rule has no application but there 29 has to be consultation with the High Court. A clear distinction is   made   between   the   two   sources   of   recruitment   and   the dichotomy is maintained. The two streams are separate until they come together by appointment. Obviously the same ship cannot sail both the streams simultaneously." (emphasis supplied) This   Court   has   relied   upon   Rameshwar   Dayal   (supra)   and Chandra Mohan  (supra) to hold:  Posing the question whether the expression “the service of “5. the Union or of the State” meant any service of the Union or of the State or whether it meant the Judicial Service of the Union or of the State, the learned Chief Justice emphatically held that  the expression “the service” in Article 233(2) could only mean the Judicial Service. But he did not mean by the above statement that persons who are already in the service, on the recommendation   by   the   High   Court   can   be   appointed   as District Judges, overlooking the claims of all other seniors in the Subordinate Judiciary contrary to Article 14 and Article 16 of the Constitution. 6.   Thus we see that the two decisions do not support the contention advanced on behalf of the petitioners but, to the extent that they go, they certainly advance the case of the respondents. We therefore, see no reason to depart from the view already taken by us and we accordingly dismiss the writ petitions.” (emphasis supplied) The cases of  Harbans Singh and Sawhney  were considered and explained   in   the   aforesaid   decision.     This   Court   relied   upon   the decision of  (supra) to hold that as to a person not Rameshwar Dayal  already in­service, a qualification is that he should be an advocate or pleader of seven years' standing.  The same clinches the issue against in­service candidates and negates their claim therefor. 23. In  Deepak Aggarwal  (supra) a three­Judge Bench of this Court considered the provisions of Article 233(2) and held that service in Article 233 to mean judicial service and there is dichotomy of sources 30 of   recruitment,   namely,   (i)   from   judicial   service;   and   (ii)   from   the advocate/pleader or in other words from the Bar.  The meaning of the term advocate/pleader too has been considered by this Court.   The expression “advocate” or “pleader” refers to the members of the Bar practicing law.   Relying upon   Sushma Suri v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi) , (1999) 1 SCC 330, this Court further observed that members of the Bar meant classes of persons who were practicing in a court of law as pleaders or advocates.  This Court further held that in Article 233(2), "if he has been for not less than seven years," the present perfect continuous tense is used for a position which began at some time in the   past   and   is   continuing.     Therefore,   one   of   the   essential requirements is that such a person must with requisite period be continuing as an advocate on the date of application.  This Court has observed: “ 70.  A few decisions rendered by some of the High Courts on the point may also be noticed here. In   Sudhakar Govindrao Deshpande v. State of Maharashtra , 1986 Lab IC 710 (Bom) the issue that fell for consideration before the Bombay High Court was whether the petitioner therein who was serving as Deputy Registrar at the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court, was eligible for appointment to the post of the District Judge. The advertisement that was issued by the High Court inviting applications for five posts of District Judges, inter alia, stated   that,   “candidate   must   ordinarily   be   an   advocate   or pleader who has practised in the High Court, Bombay or court subordinate thereto for not less than seven years on 1­10­ 1980”. The Single Judge of the Bombay High Court considered Articles   233,   234   and   309   of   the   Constitution,   relevant recruitment rules and noted the judgments of this Court in Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P.,   AIR 1966 SC 1987,   Satya Narain Singh v. High Court of Judicature of Allahabad,  (1985) 1 SCC 225 and  Rameshwar Dayal v. State of Punjab , AIR 1961 SC 816.  It was observed as follows: ( Sudhakar case , Lab IC p. 715, para 16) 31 “ 16.  … the phrase ‘has been an advocate or a pleader’ must be interpreted as a person who has been immediately prior to his appointment a member of the Bar, that is to say either   an   advocate   or   a   pleader.   In   fact,   in   the   above judgment, the Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to the second   group   of   persons   eligible   for   appointment   under Article   233(2)   as   ‘members   of   the   Bar’.   Article   233(2) therefore, when it refers to a person who has been for not less than seven years an advocate or pleader refers to a member of the Bar who is of not less than seven years’ standing.” 89.  We do not think there is any doubt about the meaning of the expression “advocate or pleader” in Article 233(2) of the Constitution.   This   should   bear   the   meaning   it   had   in   law preceding   the   Constitution   and   as   the   expression   was generally   understood.   The   expression   “advocate   or   pleader” refers to legal practitioner and, thus, it means a person who has a right to act and/or plead in court on behalf of his client. There is no indication in the context to the contrary. It refers to the members of the Bar practising law. In other words, the expression “advocate or pleader” in Article 233(2) has been used for a member of the Bar who conducts cases in court or, in other words acts and/or pleads in court on behalf of his   client. In       Sushma Suri v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi)   , (1999) 1 SCC 330,   a   three­Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   construed   the expression “members of the Bar” to mean class of persons who were   actually   practising   in   courts   of   law   as   pleaders   or advocates. … 102.  As regards construction of the expression, “if he has been for not less than seven years an advocate” in Article 233(2) of the Constitution, we think Mr Prashant Bhushan was right in his submission that this expression means seven years as an advocate immediately preceding the application and not seven years any time in the past. This is clear by use of “has been”. The present perfect continuous tense is used for a position which began at sometime in the past and is still continuing. Therefore, one of the essential requirements articulated by the above expression in Article 233(2) is that such person must with requisite period be continuing as an advocate on the date of application.” (emphasis supplied) It is clear from the decision of   Deepak Aggarwal   (supra) that recruitment from the Bar is only from among practicing advocates and those   continuing   as   advocates   on   the   date   of   appointment.     The submission that the issue of eligibility of in­service candidates did not 32 come up for consideration is of no consequence as provisions of Article 233(2) came up for consideration directly before this Court. 24. The decision of   Vijay Kumar Mishra and Anr. v. High Court of Judicature at Patna and Ors. , (2016) 9 SCC 313, has also been referred in   which   judicial   officers   staked   their   claim   as   against   the   post reserved for the members of the Bar i.e., advocates/pleaders.   The High   Court   repelled   the   challenge;   hence   appeal   was   filed   in   this Court.  A two­Judge Bench of this Court observed that a person who is not in service shall be eligible to be appointed as a District Judge. After   that,   the   bench   distinguished   between   "selection"   and "appointment."   It   was   observed   that   Article   233(2)   prohibits   the appointment of a person who is already in service of the Union or the State, but not selection of such a person.   Even if a person, who is already in service, is selected, still he has an option to be a District Judge or continue with the existing employment.  The relevant portion of the observations made is extracted hereunder: “6.   Article   233(1)   stipulates   that   appointment   of   District Judges be made by the Governor of the State in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State. However, Article 233(2) declares that only a person not already in the service of either the Union or of the State shall be eligible to be appointed as District Judge. The said Article is couched   in   negative   language   creating   a   bar   for   the appointment of certain class of persons described therein. It does   not   prescribe   any   qualification.   It   only   prescribes   a disqualification.   It is well settled in service law that there is a distinction 7. between   selection   and   appointment.   Every   person   who   is successful in the selection process undertaken by the State for 33 the purpose of filling up of certain posts under the State does not acquire any right to be appointed automatically. Textually, Article 233(2) only prohibits the appointment of a person who is already in the service of the Union or the State, but not the selection   of   such   a   person.   The   right   of   such   a   person   to participate in the selection process undertaken by the State for appointment to any post in public service (subject to other rational prescriptions regarding the eligibility for participating in the selection process such as age, educational qualification, etc.) and be considered is guaranteed under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. 8.  The text of Article 233(2) only prohibits the appointment of a person as a District Judge, if such person is already in the service of either the Union or the State. It does not prohibit the consideration of the candidature of a person who is in the service  of  the  Union   or  the   State.  A  person  who   is  in   the service of either the Union or the State would still have the option, if selected, to join the service as a District Judge or continue with his existing employment. Compelling a person to resign   from   his   job   even   for   the   purpose   of   assessing   his suitability for appointment as a District Judge, in our opinion, is   not   permitted   either   by   the   text   of   Article   233(2)   nor contemplated under the scheme of the Constitution as it would not serve any constitutionally desirable purpose. 11.   It   appears   from  the  reading  of  the   judgment  in   Satya Narain Singh v. High Court of Judicature of Allahabad,  (1985) 1 SCC 225,  that the case of the petitioners was that their claims for appointment to the post of District Judges be considered under the category of members of the Bar who had completed seven years of practice ignoring the fact that they were already in   the   Judicial   Service.   The   said   fact   operates   as   a   bar undoubtedly under Article 233(2) for their  appointment  to the Higher Judicial Service. It is in this context this Court rejected their claim. The question whether at what stage the bar comes into operation was not in issue before the Court nor did this Court go into that question.” We find ourselves unable to agree with the proposition laid down in   Vijay Kumar Mishra   (supra). In our opinion, in­service candidates cannot apply as against the post reserved for the advocates/pleaders as he has to be in continuous practice in the past and at the time when he has applied and appointed.   Thus, the decision in   Vijay 34 (supra)   cannot   be   said   to   be   laying   down   the   law Kumar   Mishra   correctly.   A person in judicial service is eligible to be appointed as District 25. Judge,   but   it   is   only   by   way   of   promotion   or   by   way   of   merit promotion,   which   concept   has   been   evolved   in   All   India   Judges  (2002) 4 SCC 247, in Association and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., which recommendations of the Shetty Commission were considered by this Court as to the method of recruitment to the post of the cadre of Higher   Judicial   Service   –   District   Judges   and   Additional   District Judges.  This Court took note of the fact that at that moment, there were   two   sources   for   recruitment   to   the   Higher   Judicial   Service, namely, (i) by promotion; and (ii) by direct recruitment.   In order to strengthen the lower judiciary and to make them more efficient, the establishment   of   Judicial   Academies   was   suggested.     This   Court approved   the   recommendations   of   Shetty   Commission   that   the recruitment to the Higher Judicial Service, i.e., the District  Judge cadre   from   amongst   the   advocates   should   be   25   percent   and   the process   of   recruitment   should   be   by   a   competitive   examination including both written and viva voce tests.  75 percent should be by way of promotion and 25 percent by direct recruitment.   This Court further ordered that 50 percent of the total post in the Higher Judicial Services must be filled by promotion on the basis of principle of merit­ cum­seniority and 25 percent of the posts in the service shall be filled 35 by   promotion   strictly   on   the   basis   of   merit   through   the   limited departmental competitive examination for which the qualifying service as a Civil Judge (Senior Division) should be not less than five years. The High Courts were directed to frame rules in this regard.   This Court also held that quota in relation to the post is necessary, which is the basic principle on the basis of which the 40­point roster works, it was held, seniority should be maintained on the basis of the roster principle.   The existing seniority had to be protected, but the roster was to be evolved for the future.  This Court observed thus:   “   Another  question which falls for consideration is the 27. method  of  recruitment  to the posts  in the  cadre  of Higher Judicial   Service   i.e.   District   Judges   and   Additional   District Judges.   At   the   present   moment,   there   are   two   sources   for recruitment   to   the   Higher   Judicial   Service,   namely,   by promotion   from   amongst   the   members   of   the   Subordinate Judicial Service and by direct recruitment. The subordinate judiciary is the foundation of the edifice of the judicial system. It is, therefore, imperative, like any other foundation, that it should   become   as   strong   as   possible.   The   weight   on   the judicial system essentially rests on the subordinate judiciary. While   we  have   accepted   the  recommendation   of  the   Shetty Commission which will result in the increase in the pay scales of the subordinate judiciary, it is at the same time necessary that the judicial officers, hard­working as they are, become more   efficient.   It   is   imperative   that   they   keep   abreast   of knowledge of law and the latest pronouncements, and it is for this reason that the Shetty Commission has recommended the establishment of a Judicial Academy, which is very necessary. At the same time, we are of the opinion that there has to be certain minimum standard, objectively adjudged, for officers who  are   to  enter  the   Higher  Judicial  Service   as  Additional District Judges and District Judges. While we agree with the Shetty Commission that the recruitment to the Higher Judicial Service   i.e.   the   District   Judge   cadre   from   amongst   the advocates   should   be   25   per   cent   and   the   process   of recruitment is to be by a competitive examination, both written and viva voce, we are of the opinion that there should be an objective method of testing the suitability of the subordinate judicial officers for promotion to the Higher Judicial Service. Furthermore, there should also be an incentive amongst the relatively junior and other officers to improve and to compete 36 with each other so as to excel and get quicker promotion. In this way, we expect that the calibre of the members of the Higher   Judicial   Service   will   further   improve.   In   order   to achieve this, while the ratio of 75 per cent appointment by promotion and 25 per cent by direct recruitment to the Higher Judicial Service is maintained, we are, however, of the opinion that there should be two methods as far as appointment by promotion is concerned: 50 per cent of the total posts in the Higher Judicial Service must be filled by promotion on the basis of principle of merit­cum­seniority. For this purpose, the High   Courts   should   devise   and   evolve   a   test   in   order   to ascertain and examine the legal knowledge of those candidates and   to   assess   their   continued   efficiency   with   adequate knowledge of case­law. The remaining 25 per cent of the posts in the service shall be filled by promotion strictly on the basis of   merit   through   the   limited   departmental   competitive examination for which the qualifying service as a Civil Judge (Senior Division) should be not less than five years. The High Courts will have to frame a rule in this regard. 28.  As a result of the aforesaid, to recapitulate, we direct that recruitment to the Higher Judicial Service i.e. the cadre of District Judges will be: (1)( a )  50   per   cent   by   promotion   from   amongst   the   Civil Judges (Senior Division) on the basis of principle of merit­ cum­seniority and passing a suitability test; ( b ) 25 per cent by promotion strictly on the basis of merit through   limited   competitive   examination   of   Civil   Judges (Senior Division) having not less than five years’ qualifying service; and ( c )  25   per   cent   of   the   posts   shall   be   filled   by   direct recruitment   from   amongst   the   eligible   advocates   on   the basis   of   the   written   and   viva   voce   test   conducted   by respective High Courts. (2) Appropriate rules shall be framed as above by the High Courts as early as possible.   Experience has shown that there has been a constant 29. discontentment amongst the members of the Higher Judicial Service in regard to their seniority in service. For over three decades a large number of cases have been instituted in order to decide the relative seniority from the officers recruited from the   two   different   sources,   namely,   promotees   and   direct recruits. As a result of the decision today, there will, in a way, be three ways of recruitment to the Higher Judicial Service. The quota for promotion which we have prescribed is 50 per cent by following the principle “merit­cum­seniority”, 25 per cent   strictly   on   merit   by   limited   departmental   competitive examination and 25 per cent by direct recruitment. Experience has   also   shown   that   the   least   amount   of   litigation   in   the country, where quota system in recruitment exists, insofar as seniority is concerned, is where a roster system is followed. For 37 example, there is, as per the rules of the Central Government, a 40­point roster which has been prescribed which deals with the   quotas   for   Scheduled   Castes   and   Scheduled   Tribes. Hardly,   if   ever,   there   has   been   a   litigation   amongst   the members   of   the   service   after   their   recruitment   as   per   the quotas,   the   seniority   is   fixed   by   the   roster   points   and irrespective of the fact as to when a person is recruited. When roster system is followed, there is no question of any dispute arising. The 40­point roster has been considered and approved by this Court in   R.K. Sabharwal   v.   State of Punjab , (1995) 2 SCC 745. One of the methods of avoiding any litigation and bringing about certainty in this regard is by specifying quotas in relation to posts and not in relation to the vacancies. This is the basic principle on the basis of which the 40­point roster works.   We   direct   the   High   Courts   to   suitably   amend   and promulgate seniority rules on the basis of the roster principle as approved by this Court in  R.K. Sabharwal case  as early as possible. We hope that as a result thereof there would be no further dispute in the fixation of seniority. It is obvious that this system can only apply prospectively except where under the relevant rules seniority is to be determined on the basis of quota and rotational system. The existing relative seniority of the members of the Higher Judicial Service has to be protected but the roster has to be evolved for the future. Appropriate rules and methods will be adopted by the High Courts and approved by the States, wherever necessary by 31­3­2003.” (emphasis supplied) It is apparent from the aforesaid decision that 25 percent of the posts   in   the   cadre   of   District   Judge   have   to   be   filled   by   direct recruitment   amongst   the   advocates   based   on   a   competitive examination, both written and viva voce.  The decision is in tune with the   various   decisions   of   this  Court   such   as   Rameshwar   Dayal, Chandra Mohan, Satya Narain Singh and Deepak Aggarwal   (supra). The direction issued by this Court of 25 percent of the post to be filled by limited departmental competitive examination has been reduced to 10 percent by this Court in  All India Judges Association and Anr. v. Union of India (II),  (2010) 15 SCC 170.  38 26. Reliance has been placed on   O.P. Garg v. State of U.P.,   1991 Supp. (2) SCC 51, wherein question was of fixation of seniority.  This Court has observed that there should be equal opportunity to enter the service for all the sources of recruitment.  If recruitment rules give unwarranted preference to one source, the seniority rule is bound to become   unworkable.     Therefore,   there   should   be   equality   of opportunity to all the sources. 27. In  Punjab and Haryana High Court v. State of Punjab , 2018 SCC OnLine   SC   1728   [Civil   Appeal   Nos.5518­5523   of   2017   decided   on 3.10.2018]   the   question   which   arose   was   with   respect   to   inter   se seniority dispute between three streams of Punjab Superior Judicial Service,   i.e. , 50 percent by promotion based on merit­cum­seniority, 25   percent   by   limited   departmental   competitive   examination   and remaining 25 percent to be filled by direct recruitment from amongst eligible   advocates.     The   facts   indicate   that   the   All   India   Judges Association   (2002) decision had been implemented, and seniority is being maintained as directed. 28. It is apparent from the decision of  All India Judges Association that in order to prove the merit of in­service candidates, a limited departmental competitive examination has also been provided, so that they can take march to hold the post of District Judges on the basis of their merit.  They are not deprived of any opportunity in their pursuit once they have joined the judicial stream, they are bound to follow the 39 provisions.  It was open to them not to join the subordinate services. They could have staked a claim by continuing to be an advocate to the Higher   Judicial   Service   as   against   the   post   of   District   Judge. However, once they chose to be in service, if they had seven years' experience   at   Bar   before   joining   the   judicial   service,   they   are disentitled to lay a claim to the 25% quota exclusively earmarked for Advocates; having regard to the dichotomy of different streams and separate quota for recruitment.  Opportunities are provided not only to in­service   candidates   but   also   to   practicing   candidates   by   the Constitutional Scheme to excel and to achieve what they aspire i.e. appointment   as   District   Judge.     However,   when   someone   joins   a particular stream, i.e. a judicial service by his own volition, he cannot sail in two boats.   His chance to occupy the post of District Judge would be by a two­fold channel, either in the 50% seniority/merit quota, by promotion, or the quota for limited competitive examination. The recruitment from the Bar also has a purpose behind it.  The 29. practicing advocates are recruited not only in the higher judiciary but in the High Court and Supreme Court as well.  There is a stream (of appointment) for in­service candidates of higher judiciary in the High Court   and   another   stream   clearly   earmarked   for   the   Bar.     The members   of   the   Bar   also   become   experts   in   their   field   and   gain expertise   and   have   the   experience   of   appearing   in   various   courts. Thus,   not   only   in   the   higher   judiciary,   in­service   candidates   of 40 subordinate judiciary are given the opportunity as against 75 percent to be appointed by way of promotion as provided in  All India Judges Association   case ,   and   the   members   of   the   Bar   are   given   the opportunity as against 25 percent of the post having 7 years’ standing at Bar. 30. The   makers   of   the   Constitution   visualised   and   the   law administered in the country for the last seven decades clearly reveals that the aforesaid modes of recruitment and two separate sources, one from in­service and other from the Bar, are recognised.  We do not find even a single decision supporting the cause espoused on behalf of candidates, who are in judicial service, to stake their claim as against the posts reserved for advocates/pleaders.  In all the cases right from beginning from   Rameshwar Dayal   (supra) to date, a dichotomy has been   maintained,   and   we   find   absolutely   no   room   to   entertain submission of discrimination based on Articles 14 and 16. 31. We are not impressed by the submission that when this Court has   interpreted   the   meaning   of   service   in   Article   233(2)   to   mean judicial   service,   judicial   officers   are   eligible   as   against   the   posts reserved for the advocates/pleaders.   Article 233(2) starts with the negative "not," which disentitles the claim of judicial officers against the post reserved for the practicing advocates/pleaders.  They can be promoted to that post as per the rules; this Court has further laid down a wider horizon to in­service candidates in the  All India Judges 41 as against the 75 percent of the post by including merit Association   promotion.  The argument that merit should prevail and they should be given due opportunity under the rules to prove their merit and to excel, in our opinion, cannot prevail.   Such judicial officer cannot claim merit in violation of the provisions of rules framed under Article 234 of the Constitution.  The two classes are different.  In terms of the prevalent   rules   in­service   candidates   lack   eligibility.     They   cannot contend that they are discriminated against and their merit is ignored and overlooked.   32. Consistently, this Court in its previous judgments has taken the view which we now take.   We find absolutely no reason to take a different view, though it was urged that mistakes committed earlier should not continue.  We find the argument to be devoid of substance and based upon misapprehensions.  We have found that the aforesaid decisions are vivid and clear, and there is no room to entertain such a submission then for a moment.   Even otherwise, when the law has been administered in this country after Independence in the manner mentioned above on the principle of  stare decisis  and rules framed by various   High   Courts,   we   find   ourselves   unable   to   accept   the submission raised on behalf of in­service candidates.  The decisions in Satya Narain Singh   (supra),   Deepak Aggarwal   (supra) and  All India Judges Association case  (supra) also cannot be said to be contrary to 42 the provisions of Article 233.  We unhesitatingly reject the submission to the contrary. 33. It   was   submitted   that   promotion   is   no   substitute   for   direct recruitment, as against the post reserved for direct recruitment, an incumbent   can   apply   throughout   India,   whereas   an   in­service candidate can be promoted within the State, and there is no definite period   for   coming   into   the   zone   of   consideration   for   promotion   in Higher Judicial Service.  Thus, it was urged that direct recruitment is altogether different from promotion and having practiced for 7 years, they have basic eligibility to stake their claim for the post reserved for advocates/pleaders, and they have additional experience of acting as a judge also.   We find no room to accept the submissions.   Once the Constitution envisages separate sources of recruitment, no case can be made out of deprivation of the opportunity.  Once service is joined, one   has   to   go   by   the   service   rules,   and   it   was   open   to   such   an incumbent   to   practice   and   stake   claim   in   various   States   while remaining in practice.   It is a  matter  of two  different  streams for recruitment   which   is   permissible,   such   an   argument   cannot   be accepted. 34. In  P. Ramakrishnam Raju v. Union of India and Ors.,  (2014) 12 SCC 1, this Court has observed that experience and knowledge gained by a successful lawyer at the Bar can never be considered to be less important from any point of view vis­à­vis the experience gained by a 43 judicial officer.  If service of a judicial officer is counted for fixation of pension, there is no valid reason as to why the experience at the Bar cannot be treated as equivalent for the same purpose.  In  Government of NCT of Delhi and Ors. v. All India Young Lawyers’ Association and Anr.,  (2009) 14 SCC 49, this Court has directed that a certain number of years as an advocate to be added to the judicial service for pension. Thus, in our opinion, experience as an advocate is also important, and they cannot be deprived of their quota, which is kept at 25 percent only in the Higher Judicial Service. 35. It was submitted that ultimately the appointment of the Bar member is also made under Article 233(1).  In  The State of Assam and Anr.  v.   Kuseswar  Saikia  and  Ors.,   AIR  1970 SC  1616,  this  Court observed that both appointment and promotion are included in Article 233(1).  Following observations have been made: “5.   The   reading   of   the   article   by   the   High   Court   is,   with respect,   contrary   to   the   grammar   and   punctuation   of   the article.   The   learned   Chief   Justice   seems   to   think   that   the expression “promotion of” governs “District Judges” ignoring the comma that follows the word “of”. The article, if suitably expanded, reads as under: “Appointments   of   persons   to   be,   and   the   posting   and promotion of (persons to be), District Judges etc.” It means that appointment as well as promotion of  persons to   be   District   Judges   is   a   matter   for   the   Governor   in consultation with the High Court and the expression "District Judge" includes an additional District Judge and an Additional Sessions Judge. It must be remembered that District Judges may   be   directly   appointed   or   may   be   promoted   from   the subordinate ranks of the judiciary. The article is intended to take care of both. It concerns initial appointment and initial promotion of persons to be either District Judges or any of the categories included in it. …." 44 The decision is of no avail as the question in the present case is different.  Though the appointment is made under Article 233(1), but the source and the channel for judicial officers is the promotion, and for the members of the Bar is by direct recruitment. th 36. The   116   Report   of   Law   Commission   on   All   India   Judicial Services published in November 1986 has been referred to, which observed that chances of promotion of the subordinate ranks will be proportionately reduced to the extent direct recruitment is made.  The Law Commission was not considering the provisions of Article 233 but had made certain observations, and there is no formation of the All India Judicial Service so far what would be the provisions when it is constituted,  will   have  to  be  considered  when  they  are  formulated. Thus, no benefit can be derived on the basis of certain observations and suggestions made by the Law Commission as to what may happen in case All India Judicial Service is formed.  37. Certain recommendations of the Shetty Commission have been referred   to,   but   after   their   consideration   in   the   All   India   Judges’ Association  case, there is no scope for considering the provisions of the Constitution to provide eligibility for in­service candidates for direct recruitment for the post of District Judge. The existing provisions are 45 not restrictive but provide wider choice to improve and strengthen the judicial system and in tune with Articles 14 and 16. 38. Reference has been made to the decision in   All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India and Ors.,   (1992) 1 SCC 119, in which following observations have been made: “9.   We shall first deal with the plea for setting up of an All India Judicial Service. The Law Commission of India in its Fourteenth Report in the year 1958 said: “If we are to improve the personnel of the subordinate judiciary, we must first take measures to extend or widen our field of selection so that we can draw from it really capable persons. A radical measure suggested to us was to recruit the judicial service entirely by a competitive test or examination.   It   was   suggested   that   the   higher   judiciary could be drawn from such competitive tests at the all­India level and the lower judiciary can be recruited by similar tests held at State level. Those eligible for these tests would be   graduates   who   have   taken   a   law   degree   and   the requirement of practice at the bar should be done away with. Such a scheme, it was urged, would result in bringing into the subordinate judiciary capable young men who now prefer to obtain immediate remunerative employment in the executive branch of government and in private commercial firms. The scheme, it was pointed out, would bring to the higher subordinate judiciary the best talent available in the country as a whole, whereas the lower subordinate judiciary would be drawn from the best talent available in the State.  ….”  A further recommendation was made for the formation of the All India Judicial Service.  The suggestion was made that practice at Bar for induction at the lower level should be done away with.  Be that as it may.  The   prescription of the practice period of 3 years, has been changed time to time, but the facts remain that when it comes to the eligibility and recruitment from the Bar to the post of District Judge, practicing advocates from the Bar can be inducted by way of direct 46 recruitment   as   against   the   quota   fixed   for   them.     The   question involved in the matter is not whether the practice is necessary to join the subordinate judiciary. In   All India Judges' Association and Ors. v. Union of India and 39. Ors.,   (1998) 8 SCC 771, this Court has considered the question of permitting the Legal Assistants working in different institutions other than the courts for the purpose of appointments in the judiciary.  This Court   observed   that   Legal   Assistants   do   not   get   experience   and exposure,   which   is   important   for   manning   judicial   posts.     The observations made are extracted hereunder:  “ 1.  The question of permitting the Legal Assistants working in different institutions other than the courts for the purpose of appointments on the ground that they should be treated as having experience at the Bar cannot be entertained. The Legal Assistants working in different institutions and bodies do not get the experience and exposure which is important for the purpose of manning judicial posts, and it is not possible to lay down guidelines on the basis of a few appearances but what is important   is   not   mere   appearance   but   actual   intimate knowledge   and   association   with   the   system   itself.   We, therefore, reject the applications.” 40. The decision in  A. Pandurangam Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. , AIR 1975 SC 1922, has been referred to, in which question arose as to the appointment of District Judges by direct recruitment from the Bar.  The Court held that a candidate for direct recruitment from the Bar does not become eligible for the appointment of District Judges in any State without the recommendation of the High Court. The final authority is the Government in the matter of appointment. 47 There is no dispute with the aforesaid proposition, the decision also indicates   that   direct  recruitment   is   from   the   Bar.     Obviously,   the appointment has to be made by the Government.  The decision rather than supporting defeats the cause espoused on behalf of in­service candidates. 41. The decision in  Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P. and Ors. (II),  AIR 1976 SC 1482, has also been referred to in which question arose of seniority only.  This Court has taken note that Rules 8, 13, 14, 15, 17, and 19 of the U.P. Higher Judicial Service Rules (1953) were held to be unconstitutional   as   offending   Article   233.     The   question   arose   of determining seniority in accordance with Rule 20.  The decision is not an authority on the question of interpretation of Article 233 but was rather a fallout of  Chandra Mohan­I  (supra). It was also submitted that practice as an advocate and service as 42. a judicial officer for 10 years is to be treated at par as per  explanation added   to   Articles   124   and   217   of   the   Constitution   of   India.     In (supra), this question has been considered, and Rameshwar Dayal   this Court held that Article 233(2) could not be interpreted in view of the   explanations   added to Articles 124 and 217.   In   Satya Narain (supra)   the   aforesaid   decision   has   been   considered,   and Singh   following observations have been made: “ 3 .   …Again   dealing   with   the   cases   of   Harbans   Singh   and Sawhney it was observed: 48 “We consider that even if we proceed on the footing that both these persons were recruited from the Bar and their appointment has to be tested by the requirements of clause (2), we must hold that they fulfilled those requirements.” Clearly, the Court was expressing the view that it was in the case   of   recruitment   from   the   Bar,   as   distinguished   from Judicial Service, that the requirements of Clause (2) had to be fulfilled. We may also add here earlier the Court also expressed the view: “… we do not think that Clause (2) of Article 233 can be interpreted in the light of Explanations added to Articles 124 and 217”.” Reliance   placed   on   Prof.   Chandra   Prakash   Aggarwal   v. Chaturbhuj Das Parikh and Ors.,  (1970) 1 SCC 182, dealing with the interpretation of Article 217, is of no avail. 43. The argument has been raised with respect to the violation of basic human rights.   The findings of the Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity in the U.K. in 2010 have been referred to as under: “22.   Equal   opportunities.   All   properly   qualified   people should have an equal opportunity of applying and of being selected   for   judicial   office.   Well­qualified   candidates   for judicial office should be selected on their merits and should not be discriminated against, either directly or indirectly. 23.   Inherent   in   the   concept   of   human   equality   is   the principle that talent is randomly and widely distributed in society, and not concentrated in particular racial or other groups.   It   therefore   follows   that   the   more   widely   one searches   for   talent,   the   more   likely   it   is   that   the   best candidates will be identified. “You should not be looking for unusual talent, but looking for talent in unusual places”. 24.   The   current   under­representation   of   certain   well­ qualified groups within the judiciary suggests that factors other than pure talent may be influencing either people’s willingness to apply or the selection process, or both.” We find that there is no violation of equal opportunity.  There is a wide search for talent for inducting in the judicial service as well as 49 in direct recruitment from Bar, and the best candidates are identified and   recruited.     Persons   from   unusual   places   are   also   given   the opportunity to stake their claim in pursuit of their choice.  In  State of Bihar and Ors. v. Bal Mukund Sah and Ors.,  (2000) 4 SCC 640, this Court has observed that onerous duty is cast on the High Court under the Constitutional Scheme.  It has been given a prime and paramount position in the matter with the necessity of choosing the best available talent for manning the subordinate judiciary.  Thus, we find that there is no violation of any principle of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.   44. Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has also been relied upon, which provides thus: “ Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour,   sex,   language,   religion,   political   or   other   opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” The aim of our Constitution is also the same, and there is no violation of any of human rights.  The submission is far­fetched.  In service   jurisprudence,   it   is   always   permissible   to   provide   different sources of recruitment and quotas along with a qualification.  Equal opportunity is given, and seniority and competence are criteria for promotion, and in merit promotion, seniority is not to be considered.   50 45. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the opinion that for direct recruitment as District Judge as against the quota fixed for the advocates/pleaders,   incumbent   has   to   be   practicing   advocate   and must   be   in   practice   as   on   the   cut­off   date   and   at   the   time   of appointment he must not be in judicial service or other services of the Union or  State.  For constituting experience of 7 years of practice as advocate,   experience   obtained   in   judicial   service   cannot   be equated/combined and advocate/pleader should be in practice in the immediate past for 7 years and must be in practice while applying on the cut­off date fixed under the rules and should be in practice as an advocate on the date of appointment.   The purpose is recruitment from bar of a practicing advocate having minimum 7 years’ experience. 46. In view of the aforesaid interpretation of Article 233, we find that rules debarring judicial officers from staking their claim as against the posts reserved for direct recruitment from bar are not   ultra vires   as rules are subservient to the provisions of the Constitution.   47. We answer the reference as under :­ (i) The   members   in   the   judicial   service   of   the   State   can   be appointed   as   District   Judges   by   way   of   promotion   or   limited competitive examination.  51 (ii) The   Governor   of   a   State   is   the   authority   for   the   purpose   of appointment,   promotion,   posting   and   transfer,   the   eligibility   is governed by the Rules framed under Articles 234 and 235. (iii) Under Article 232(2), an Advocate or a pleader with 7 years of practice   can   be   appointed   as   District   Judge   by   way   of   direct recruitment in case he is not already in the judicial service of the Union or a State. (iv) For   the   purpose   of   Article   233(2),   an   Advocate   has   to   be continuing in practice for not less than 7 years as on the cut­off date and at the time of appointment as District Judge. Members of judicial service having 7 years’ experience of practice before they have joined the service or having combined experience of 7 years as lawyer and member of judiciary, are not eligible to apply for direct recruitment as a District Judge. (v)   The rules framed by the High Court prohibiting judicial service officers from staking claim to the post of District Judge against the posts reserved for Advocates by way of direct recruitment, cannot be said to be ultra vires and are in conformity with Articles 14, 16 and 233 of the Constitution of India. (vi) The decision in  Vijay Kumar Mishra  (supra) providing eligibility, of judicial officer to compete as against the post of District Judge by way 52 of   direct   recruitment,   cannot   be   said   to   be   laying   down   the   law correctly. The same is hereby overruled. 48. In the case of  Dheeraj Mor  and others cases, time to time interim orders have been passed by this Court, and incumbents in judicial service were permitted to appear in the examination.  Though later on, this   Court   vacated   the   said   interim   orders,   by   that   time   certain appointments had been made in some of the States and in some of the States   results   have   been   withheld   by   the   High   Court   owing   to complication which has arisen due to participation of the ineligible in­ service   candidates   as   against   the   post   reserved   for   the   practising advocates.  In the cases where such in­service incumbents have been appointed by way of direct recruitment from bar as we find no merit in the petitions and due to dismissal of the writ petitions filed by the judicial officers, as sequel no fruits can be ripened on the basis of selection without eligibility, they cannot continue as District Judges. They have to be reverted to their original post.  In case their right in channel for promotion had already been ripened, and their juniors have been promoted, the High Court has to consider their promotion in accordance with prevailing rules. However, they cannot claim any right on the basis of such an appointment obtained under interim order, which was subject to the outcome of the writ petition and they have to be reverted. 53 49. The civil appeals, writ petitions, Transfer Petition and contempt petition are, accordingly, disposed of.  No order as to costs.   ……………………………….J.   (Arun Mishra) ……………………………….J.       (Vineet Saran) New Delhi;                       February 19, 2020. 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL/INHERENT JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1698 OF 2020 (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (C) No. 14156 OF 2015 ) DHEERAJ MOR ...APPELLANT(S) VERSUS THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF DELHI ...RESPONDENT(S) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1699 OF 2020 (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P (C) NO. 14676/2015) CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1700 OF 2020 (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P (C) NO. 24219/2015) CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1701 OF 2020 (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P (C) NO. 30556/2015) (W.P. (C) NO. 77/2016, W.P. (C) NO. 130/2016, W.P. (C) NO. 405/2016, W.P. (C) NO. 414/2016) CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1702 OF 2020 (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P (C) NO. 15764/2016) W.P. (C) NO. 423/2016 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1707 OF 2020 [@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 4781 OF 2020] (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P (C) NO.....CC NO. 15018/2016) CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1703 OF 2020 (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P (C) NO. 23823/2016) CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1704 OF 2020 (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P (C) NO. 24506/2016) CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1706 OF 2020 [@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 4778 OF 2020] (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P (C) NO. ..... CC NO. 15304/2016) 2 (W.P. (C) NO. 600/2016, W.P. (C) NO. 598/2016, W.P. (C) NO. 601/2016, W.P. (C) NO. 602/2016, W.P. (C) NO. 733/2016, W.P. (C) NO. 189/2017, W.P (C) NO. 222/2017, W.P. (C) NO. 316/2017, W.P. (C) NO. 334/2017, W.P. (C) NO. 371/2017, W.P. (C) NO. 96/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 102/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 103/2018) T.P. (C) NO. 272/2018 (W.P. (C) NO. 108/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 110/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 106/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 146/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 123/2018,W.P. (C) NO. 124/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 138/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 155/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 145/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 158/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 174/2018) CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1705 OF 2020 (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P (C) NO. 8480/2018) (W.P. (C) NO. 291/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 287/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 344/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 352/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 387/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 392/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 396/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 530/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 519/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 535/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 581/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 578/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 612/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 629/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 596/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 616/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 632/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 608/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 628/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 617/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 624/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 631/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 635/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 636/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 641/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 642/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 639/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 640/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 650/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 644/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 658/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 659/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 680/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 671/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 677/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 681/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 686/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 703/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 696/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 717/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 728/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 726/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 727/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 1272/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 1302/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 656/2018, W.P. (C) NO. 744/2019, W.P. (C) NO. 999/2019, W.P. (C) NO. 1054/2019, W.P. (C) NO. 1053/2019, W.P. (C) NO. 1080/2019, W.P. (C) NO. 1073/2019, W.P. (C) NO. 1089/2019, W.P. (C) NO. 1086/2019, W.P. (C) NO. 1150/2019) CONMT. PET. (C) NO. 1023/2019 IN W.P. (C) NO. 414/2016 W.P. (C) NO. 1266/2019 3 JUDGMENT

1 Order dated 23-01-2018 in SLP (C) 14156/2015, Dheeraj More v High Court of Delhi 4 Court (in answer to the alternative argument that two candidates were ineligible, as they were serving in the Government), and Mahesh Chandra Gupta v. Union of India and Ors. (2009) 8 SCC 273. Reliance is also placed on Chandra Mohan (supra) . It is submitted that in Chandra Mohan (supra), this Court categorically held that the disqualification attached to persons in the service of the Union or a State [under Article 233(1)], expressly excludes those in the employment of the State, holding executive posts and discharging purely executive function, but does not prevent those in judicial service. It was pointed out that the rule considered in Chandra Mohan (supra) – clearly entitled judicial officers (along with advocates) with seven years’ experience at the Bar, to compete in the recruitment process. 5. Counsel for the petitioners in the second category (i.e. those with less than seven years’ experience at the Bar, and who have been working as judicial officers) submit that neither Article 233(1) nor Article 233(2) bar the participation of such candidates (as long as they have an overall combined experience of seven years – at the Bar and in judicial service) in the recruitment process along with members of the Bar, for appointment to the cadre of District Judges. 6. The argument of some of the petitioners is that Articles 233 (1) and 233 (2) operate in two different fields. Article 233 (1), the argument goes, confers power upon the Governor to make appointments, subject to consultation with the High Court of the State. It is urged that this is an independent source of power; in exercise of this provision, the Governor can make appointment of persons in the judicial service. Another argument, in the context of power under Article 233 (2) is that the experience of seven years’ at the bar, applies only to those in practise at the bar. It cannot apply to those already in the judicial service of the State. The decision in Rameshwar Dayal (supra) is relied upon. The petitioners also urge that Chandra Mohan (supra) decided that it is only members of the judicial services of any State, who can be considered for appointment, as District Judges [in addition to Advocates with seven years’ practise at the Bar, per Article 233 (2)] and not members of the executive branch of the States or the Union. It is emphasized that in fact, the rule which this court had to consider, 5

6

7

8

9 and removes Judicial Officers. The control vested in the High Court is complete control subject to the power of the Governor in the matter of appointment including dismissal, removal, reduction in rank and the initial posting and of the initial promotion to District Judges. It was also held that nothing in Article 235 restricts the control of the High Court in respect of Judges other than District Judges in any manner. This position was endorsed by a four-judge bench of this court in State of Haryana vs. Inder Prakash Anand H.C.S. & Ors. 1976 (2) SCR 977. 12. In the decision reported as State of Assam and Ors. vs. S.N. Sen & Ors 1972 (2) SCR 251, a Constitution Bench of this court underlined the unique nature of the power of the High Courts, while interpreting Articles 233-235 of the Constitution of India: “13. Under the provisions of the Constitution itself the power of promotion of persons holding posts inferior to that of the district judge is in the High Court. It stands to reason that the power to confirm such promotions should also be in the High Court. 14. This Court has on several occasions expressed its views on Article 235 of the Constitution. In The State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi (1968) I LLJ 270 (SC), it was pointed out: “In the case of the judicial service subordinate to the district judge the appointment has to be made by the Governor in accordance with the rules to be framed after consultation with the State Public Service Commission and the High Court but the power of posting, promotion and grant of leave and the control of the courts are vested in the High Court.” 15. A year later, in State of Assam v. Ratiga Mohammed and Ors. (1968) I LLJ 282 SC this Court against observed as follows: “The High Court is in the day to day control of courts and knows the capacity for work of individuals and the requirements of a particular station or Court. The High Court is better suited to make transfers than a Minister. For however well-meaning & Minister may be he can never possess the same intimate knowledge of the working of the judiciary as a whole and of individual judges, as the High Court. He must depend on his department for information. The Chief Justice and his colleagues know these matters and deal with them personally. There is less chance of being 10

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16 advocate who has been solely or, in any case, predominantly employed to act and/or plead on behalf of his client in courts of law. If a person has been engaged to act and/or plead in court of law as an advocate although by way of employment on terms of salary and other service conditions, such employment is not what is covered by Rule 49 as he continues to practice law but, on the other hand, if he is employed not mainly to act and/or plead in a court of law, but to do other kinds of legal work, the prohibition in Rule 49 immediately comes into play and then he becomes a mere employee and ceases to be an advocate. The bar contained in Rule 49 applies to an employment for work other than conduct of cases in courts as an advocate. In this view of the matter, the deletion of second and third para by the Resolution dated 22.6.2001 has not materially altered the position insofar as advocates who have been employed by the State Government or the Central Government to conduct civil and criminal cases on their behalf in the courts are concerned. 85. What we have said above gets fortified by Rule 43 of the BCI Rules. Rule 43 provides that an advocate, who has taken a full- time service or part-time service inconsistent with his practising as an advocate, shall send a declaration to that effect to the respective State Bar Council within time specified therein and any default in that regard may entail suspension of the right to practice. In other words, if full-time service or part-time service taken by an advocate is consistent with his practising as an advocate, no such declaration is necessary. The factum of employment is not material but the key aspect is whether such employment is consistent with his practising as an advocate or, in other words, whether pursuant to such employment, he continues to act and/or plead in the courts. If the answer is yes, then despite employment he continues to be an advocate. On the other hand, if the answer is in negative, he ceases to be an advocate. 86. An advocate has a two-fold duty: (1) to protect the interest of his client and pursue the case briefed to him with the best of his ability, and (2) as an officer of the Court. Whether full-time employment creates any conflict of duty or interest for a Public Prosecutor/Assistant Public Prosecutor? We do not think so. As noticed above, and that has been consistently stated by this Court, a Public Prosecutor is not a mouth- piece of the investigating agency. In our opinion, even though Public Prosecutor/Assistant Public Prosecutor is in full-time employ with the government and is subject to disciplinary control of the employer, but once he appears in the court for conduct of a case or prosecution, he is 17

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21 (b) While so appointing the Governor is bound to consult the High Court (Article 233 [1]: Chandra Mohan (supra) and Chandramouleshwar Prasad v 2 Patna High Court 1970 (2) SCR 666 ); (c) Article 233 (1) cannot be construed as a source of appointment; it merely delineates as to who is the appointing authority; (d) In matters relating to initial posting, initial appointment, and promotion of District Judges, the Governor has the authority to issue the order; thereafter it is up to the High Court, by virtue of Article 235, to exercise control and superintendence over the conditions of service of such District Judges. (See State 3 of Assam v Ranga Mahammad 1967 (1) SCR 454 ); 2 The court in Chandramouleshwar Prasad held that

3 This court held as follows: “By the first of these articles the question of appointment is considered separately but by the second of these articles posting and promotion of persons belonging to the judicial service of the State and holding any post inferior to the post of a district Judge is also vested in the High Court. The word 'post' used twice in the article clearly means the position or job and not the station or place and 'posting' must obviously mean the assignment to a position or job and not placing in-charge of a station or Court. The association of words in Art 235 is much clearer but as the word 'posting' in the earlier article deals with the same subject matter, it was most certainly used in the same sense and . this conclusion is thus quite apparent. This is, of course, as it should be. The High Court is in the day to day control of courts and knows the capacity for work of individuals and the requirements of a particular station or Court. The High Court is better suited to make transfers than a Minister. For however well-meaning a Minister may be he can never possess the same intimate knowledge of the working of the judiciary as a whole and of individual Judges, as the High Court. He must depend on his department for information. The Chief Justice and his colleagues know these matters and deal with them personally. There is less chance of being influenced by secretaries who may withhold some vital information if they are interested themselves. It is also well-known that all stations are not similar in climate and education, medical and other facilities. Some are good stations and some are not so good. There is less chance of success for a person seeking advantage for himself if the Chief Justice and his colleagues, with personal information, deal with the matter, than when a Minister deals with it on notes and information supplied by a secretary. The reason of the rule and the sense of the matter combine to suggest the narrow meaning accepted by us. The policy displayed by the Constitution has been in this direction as has been explained in earlier cases of this Court. The High Court was thus right in its conclusion that the powers of the Governor cease after he has appointed or promoted a person to be a district Judge and assigned him to a post in cadre. Thereafter, transfer of incumbents is a matter within the control of District Courts including the control of persons presiding there as explained in the cited case. As the High Court is the authority to make transfers, there was no question of a consultation on this account. The State Government was not the authority to order the transfers. There was, however, need for consultation before D. N. Deka was promoted and posted as a District Judge. That such a consultation is mandatory has been laid down quite definitely in the recent decision of this Court in Chandra Mohan v UP On 22

this part of the case it is sufficient to say that there was consultation.” 23 prescribe any eligibility condition. Does this mean that any judicial officer, with any length of service as a member of the judicial service, is entitled to consideration under Article 233 (2)? The answer is clearly in the negative. This is because the negative phraseology through which eligibility of holders of civil posts, or those in civil service (of the State or the Union) and advocates with seven years’ service is couched. However, the eligibility conditions are not spelt out in respect of those who are in the judicial service. 26. The omission, - in regard to spelling out the eligibility conditions vis-à-vis judicial officers, to the post of District Judge, in the opinion of this court, is clearly by design. This subject matter is covered by three provisions: Article 233 (1) – which refers to promotions to the post of District Judge; Article 234, which, like Article 233 (1) constitutes the Governor as the appointing authority in respect of judicial posts or services, (other than District Judges), and like Article 233 (1), subject to recommendation of the High Court concerned. This position is most definitely brought home by the fact that Article 235 vests in the High Courts the power of supervision and control of the judicial service, “including the posting and promotion of, and the grant of leave to, persons belonging to the judicial service of a State and holding any post inferior to the post of district judge.” The corollary to this is that the Governor is appointing authority for the post of District Judge, and other judicial posts; both are to be filled after prior consultation with the High Court, and crucially, the promotion of judicial officers, to the post of District Judge, is regulated by conditions (read rules) framed by the High Court. 27. The upshot of the above discussion is that the Constitution makers clearly wished to draw a distinction between the two sources of appointment to the post of District Judge. For one, i.e. Advocates, eligibility was spelt out in negative phraseology, i.e. not less than seven years’ practice; for judicial officers, no eligibility condition was stipulated in Article 233 (2): this clearly meant that they were not eligible to be appointed (by direct recruitment) as they did not and could not be considered advocates with seven years’ practise, once they entered the judicial service. The only channel for their appointment, was in accordance with rules framed by the High court, for 24 promotion (as District Judges) of officers in the judicial service (defined as those holding posts other than District Judges, per Article 236 [b]). 28. In view of the above discussion clearly, the decision in Satya Naraian Singh (supra) correctly appreciated the relevant provisions and held that the dichotomy between the two streams meant that those in one stream (read judicial service) could not compete for vacancies falling in the quota earmarked for advocates. 29. The petitioners had urged that the court should endeavour and interpret the provisions of the Constitution in a broad manner, rather than placing a narrow interpretation and that rendering ineligible those with seven years’ practise as advocates, but who were appointed to judicial posts, would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It was emphasized in this regard, that there is no distinction between those who continue to practice and those, who had practiced for seven years, later joined the judicial service and continued in it, as on the date of reckoning eligibility. It was urged that those in judicial service are in fact better qualified, because they would be experienced in discharging functions relating to a judicial office, whereas those who continue to practice, and remain advocates, would not have such benefit. As between the two, therefore, those holding judicial office, would be better suited. It was therefore urged, that if they are permitted to compete for the post of District Judge, without insisting that they should resign, society would have a greater pool of merit to pick up from. The last argument was since both categories fulfilled the basic condition of seven years’ practise, excluding those in judicial service, does not sub-serve the object of recruitment, i.e. selecting the best candidates. 30. In the opinion of this court, there is an inherent flaw in the argument of the petitioners. The classification or distinction made- between advocates and judicial officers, per se is a constitutionally sanctioned one. This is clear from a plain reading of Article 233 itself. Firstly, Article 233 (1) talks of both appointments and promotions. Secondly, the classification is evident from the description of the two categories in Article 233 (2): one “not already in the service of the Union or of the State” and the other “if he has been for not less than seven years as an advocate or a pleader”. Both 25 categories are to be “recommended by the High Court for appointment.” The intent here was that in both cases, there were clear exclusions, i.e. advocates with less than seven years’ practice (which meant, conversely that those with more than seven years’ practice were eligible) and those holding civil posts under the State or the Union. The omission of judicial officers only meant that such of them, who were recommended for promotion, could be so appointed by the Governor. The conditions for their promotion were left exclusively to be framed by the High Courts. 31. In view of the above analysis, since the Constitution itself makes a distinction between advocates on the one hand, and judicial officers, on the other, the argument of discrimination is insubstantial. If one examines the scheme of appointment from both channels closely- as Justice Mishra has done- it is evident that a lions’ share of posts are to be filled by those in the judicial service. For the past two decades, only a fourth (25%) of the posts in the cadre of District Judges (in every State) are earmarked for advocates; the balance 75% to be filled exclusively from amongst judicial officers. 50%, (out of 75%) is to be filled on the basis of seniority cum merit, whereas 25% (of the 75%) is to be filled by departmental examination. This examination is confined to members of the judicial service of the concerned State. The decision of this court in All India Judges' Association & Ors v Union of India & Ors 2010 (15) SCC 170, reduced the limited departmental examination quota (out of turn promotion quota) from 25% to 10% which took effect from 01.01.2011. Thus, cumulatively, even today, judicial officers are entitled to be considered for appointment, by promotion, as District Judges, to the extent of 75% of the cadre relating to that post, in every State. It is therefore, held that the exclusion- by the rules, from consideration of judicial officers, to the post of District Judges, in the quota earmarked for Advocates with the requisite standing, or practice, conforms to the mandate of Articles 233-235, and the rules are valid. 32. This court is also of the opinion that if rules of any State permit judicial officers to compete in the quota for appointment as District Judges, they are susceptible to challenge. The reason for this conclusion is that where a dichotomy is maintained, and two distinct sources for appointment are envisaged, like the present, enabling only 26 judicial officers to compete in the quota earmarked for advocates would potentially result in no one from the stream of advocates with seven or more years’ practice, being selected. This would be contrary to the text and mandate of Article 233 (2), which visualized that such category of candidates would always be eligible and occupy the post of District Judge. Clear quotas for both sources have been earmarked by High Courts. If one those in one stream, or source- i.e. judicial officers- are permitted to compete in the quota earmarked for the other (i.e. advocates) without the converse situation (i.e. advocates competing in the quota earmarked for judicial officers- an impossibility) the result would be rank discrimination. 33. Another strong reason drives us to this conclusion. The Constitution makers were aware that the judicial branch had to be independent, and at the same time, reflect a measure of diversity of thought, and approach. This is borne out by eligibility conditions spelt out clearly in regard to appointments at every level of both the lower and higher judiciary: the District court, the High Courts and the Supreme Court. In regard to judicial positions in each of these institutions, the Constitution enables appointments, from amongst members of the Bar, as its framers were acutely conscious that practising advocates reflect independence and are likely offer a useful attribute, i.e. ability to think differently and have novel approaches to interpretation of the laws and the Constitution, so essential for robustness of the judiciary, as well as society as a whole. 34. This view is fortified by Article 217 (2), which spells out two sources from which appointments can be resorted to for the position of judge of a High Court: firstly, member of a judicial service of a State [Article 217 (a)] and an advocate with ten years’ experience [Article 217 (b)]. For the Supreme Court, Article 124 (3) (a) enables consideration of a person with five years’ experience as a High Court judge; Article 124(3)(b) enables consideration of an advocate with ten years’ experience at the bar in any High Court; Article 124(3)(c) enables consideration of a distinguished jurist. Significantly, advocates with stipulated experience at the bar are entitled, by express provisions of the Constitution [Articles 233 (2), Article 217 (b) and Article 124 (3) (b)] 27 to be considered for appointment to the District Courts, High Courts and the Supreme Court, respectively. However, members of the judicial service can be considered only for appointment (by promotion) as District Judges, and as High Court judges, respectively. Members of the judicial service cannot be considered for appointment to the Supreme Court. Likewise, academics or distinguished jurists, with neither practise at the Bar, nor any experience in the judicial service, can be considered for appointment as District Judge, or as High Court judge. 35. The Constitution makers, in the opinion of this court, consciously wished that members of the Bar, should be considered for appointment at all three levels, i.e. as District judges, High Courts and this court. This was because counsel practising in the law courts have a direct link with the people who need their services; their views about the functioning of the courts, is a constant dynamic. Similarly, their views, based on the experience gained at the Bar, injects the judicial branch with fresh perspectives; uniquely positioned as a professional, an advocate has a tripartite relationship: one with the public, the second with the court, and the third, with her or his client. A counsel, learned in the law, has an obligation, as an officer of the court, to advance the cause of his client, in a fair manner, and assist the court. Being members of the legal profession, advocates are also considered thought leaders. Therefore, the Constitution makers envisaged that at every rung of the judicial system, a component of direct appointment from members of the Bar should be resorted to. For all these reasons, it is held that members of the judicial service of any State cannot claim to be appointed for vacancies in the cadre of District Judge, in the quota earmarked for appointment from amongst eligible Advocates, under Article 233.

far as it makes a distinction between consideration, of a candidate’s eligibility, at the stage of selection, and eligibility reckonable at the time of appointment, is incorrect. There is clear authority to the proposition that eligibility of any candidate is to be reckoned, not from the date of his or her selection, but in terms of the rules, or the 28

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30 District Judge; her or his chance to occupy that post would be through promotion, in accordance with Rules framed under Article 234 and proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. ........................................J. [S. RAVINDRA BHAT] New Delhi, February 19, 2020.