Life Insurance Corporation Of India vs. M.S.Jain

2025 INSC 1419
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPRME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE/INHERENT JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 2638 of 2023
LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION
OF INDIA & ANR. …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
VITA …RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
C.A. Nos. 2636-2637/2023
C.A. No. 5369/2015
SLP(C) No. 28081/2012
SLP(C) No. 8296/2014
SLP(C) No. 4112/2015
SLP(C) No. 6677/2015
SLP(C) No. 24905/2015
S.L.P.(C)...CC No. 6501/2016
S.L.P.(C)...CC No. 7091/2016
S.L.P.(C)...CC No. 7050/2016
Signature Not Verified
S.L.P.(C)...CC No. 7207/2016
Digitally signed by
RASHI GUPTA
Date: 2025.12.11
17:24:36 IST
Reason:
S.L.P.(C)...CC No. 7203/2016
SLP(C) No. 15938/2016
Page 1 of 58

C.A. No. 6110-6111/2017
C.A. No. 8227/2017
CONMT.PET.(C) No. 1668/2017 in C.A. No.
8227/2017
SLP(C) No. 25244-25245/2017
SLP(C) No. 23824/2018
SLP(C) No. 28119/2018
SLP(C) No. 8589/2025
J U D G M E N T
N.V. ANJARIA, J.
In view of two conflicting judgments on the
aspect of overriding applicability of the Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act,
1
1971 as against State Rent Control Legislations, a
two-Judge Bench of this Court passed order dated
17.03.2015 in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil)
No.35859 of 2014, [now Civil Appeal No.2638 of
2023] along with other Special Leave Petitions
(Civil) Nos.6677 of 2015 and 4112 of 2015,
referring the matters for adjudication by a three-
Judge Bench.
1.1 The referral order dated 17.03.2015,
aforementioned, reads as under,
1 PP Act 1971
Page 2 of 58

“In these petitions, in fact, the ratio
decided by the two-Judge Bench of this Court
in the case of Suhas H. Pophale vs.
Oriental Insurance Company Limited
2
and its Estate Officer , is contrary to the
decision of the Constitution Bench rendered
in the case of Ashoka Marketing Ltd. And
Another vs. Punjab National Bank and
3
Ors. . Therefore, these matters need to be
heard by a three-Judge Bench.”
1.2 It is accordingly that the present batch of
cases came to be posted before this Court, which
await answer to the issue referred to.
Issue Under Reference
2. The principal question that arises for
determination in this batch of matters is whether
the provisions of the PP Act 1971 would prevail over
the respective State Rent Control legislations, in
relation to premises let out prior to the
commencement of the said Act, as against the
premises let out after its enforcement but before
their acquisition or transfer to the Government or
any statutory corporation, by which the character
of such premises stood transformed into “public
premises” within the meaning of the Act.
2 2014 (4) SCC 657
3 1990 (4) SCC 406
Page 3 of 58

2.1 In other words, the issue that falls for
determination is whether, for the purposes of
application of the PP Act 1971, a valid distinction
can be made between tenants who were in
occupation of the premises prior to the
enforcement of the said Act and those who entered
into occupation subsequent thereto but before such
premises were taken over by the Government or a
Government Corporation, as the case may be; and
whether in such cases, the operation of the PP Act
1971 is intended to be only prospective in nature.
Representative Facts
3. As the Civil Appeal No.2638 of 2023 titled
as “ Life Insurance Corporation of India
Limited vs. Vita Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. ” has been
treated to be the lead matter, the basic facts
involved therein may be highlighted as
representative. In all other cases the facts are more
or less similar. The Special Leave Petition/Civil
Appeal arises from the judgment and order of the
High Court of Bombay dated 20.06.2014 in Writ
Petition (C) No.2628 of 2013 whereby the High
Court quashed the order of the City Civil Court
which had declared the order of eviction passed by
the Estate Officer under the PP Act 1971 to be
illegal, resting on the reasoning that the
Page 4 of 58

controversy was covered by the judgment of this
2
Court in Suhas H. Pophale .
3.1 The Life Insurance Corporation of India
Limited–appellant herein, which is a statutory
Corporation established under the provisions of the
Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 an entity
wholly owned by the Central Government, owns
and maintains, amongst other immovable
properties, the premises described as Flat No. G-B,
Ground Floor, Jeevan Jyot Builiding, 7 Setalwad
Road, Mumbai-400 006, and identified with Tenancy
Code 2445. The tenancy in respect of this property
was created in favour of respondent No.1-Vita
Private Limited in or around April, 1957.

3.1.1 The PP Act, 1971came into force on
23.08.1971. This Central Legislation was given
effect retrospectively from 16.09.1958, by virtue of
Section 1(3) of the Act. It appears that Respondent
No.1 addressed a letter dated 31.08.2007 asking
the appellant to send the bills and receipts at the
address as suggested in the letter. The Building
Inspector gave report dated 28.07.2008 that the
premises in question was locked for over a period
of one year and that the same was occupied by one
Smt. B.J. Malhoutra-respondent No.2 herein who
used to visit the premises occasionally. It was the
Page 5 of 58

case of the appellant that respondent No.2 was a
trespasser, and her occupation of the premises was
illegal.
3.1.2 Thereupon, a notice dated 24.03.2009
under Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882 for terminating the tenancy was sent by the
appellant to the respondents, asking the tenant to
vacate and handover the possession of the
premises, to pay the arrears of rent, as also
compensation etc. in order to avoid initiation of
proceedings for unauthorised occupancy of the
premises under the PP Act 1971. As the notice did
not yield any result, the appellant-Corporation
made an application dated 08.09.2009 under
Sections 5 and 7 of the PP Act 1971 before the
Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the Act,
seeking eviction of the respondents and any other
persons found to be in unauthorised occupation of
the public premises.
Contentions before the Estate Officer
3.2 One of the contention of the respondents
before the Estate Officer was that the respondent
no.1-Company was inducted in the premises as
tenant in the year 1957 and that in view of Section
4
33 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 , only
the Small Causes Court had jurisdiction in the
4 1999 Rent Control Act
Page 6 of 58

subject matter, although it appeared that the said
contention was not seriously pressed. It was also
the contention that it was illegal on the part of the
Estate Officer to issue show cause notice in relation
to arrears and damages.
3.2.1 The appellant Corporation asserted that
respondents were the unauthorised occupants with
effect from 01.05.2009 as the monthly tenancy of
respondent No.1 was terminated by notice dated
24.06.2009, and that respondent No.2 was a
trespasser in occupation unauthorisedly. Holding
that the premises was governed by the PP Act
1971, the Estate Officer by order dated 27.03.2012,
directed eviction of the respondents and further
mandated for payment of rent and the damages
with interest. The appeal preferred by the
respondents before the City Civil Court, Mumbai
came to be dismissed on 29.01.2013.
The aforesaid order of the City Civil Court,
Mumbai was subjected to challenge before High
Court by way of Writ Petition (C) No.2628 of 2013.
The said writ petition came to be allowed vide order
th
dated 20 June, 2014, which is assailed in this
appeal by special leave.
Page 7 of 58

Reasoning of the High Court
3.3 The reasons supplied by the High Court
while allowing the Writ Petition and setting aside
the judgment and order of the City Civil Court may
be looked at in their necessary details inasmuch as
they directly reflect on the issue to be addressed in
this reference.
3.3.1 The High Court relied upon the decision of
2
this Court in Suhas H. Pophale , and addressed
the question whether the rights of an occupant/
licensee/ tenant protected under the State Rent
Control Act, namely the Bombay Rents, Hotel &
5
Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 and its
successor Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999
which was applicable in the instant case, would be
superseded because of the application of the PP Act
1971.
3.3.2 The High Court stated that the principle
contention raised by the appellant was that his
occupation of the premises concerned was
protected by the 1947 Rent Control Act with effect
st
from 1 February, 1973, which was even prior to the
respondent in that case acquiring title over the
st
property from 1 January, 1974 and therefore, by
invoking provisions of the PP Act 1971, he could not
5 1947 Rent Control Act
Page 8 of 58

have been evicted treating him to be an
unauthorised occupant.
3.3.3 The High Court followed the view in Suhas
2
H. Pophale and held that the Public Premises
could not have been given retrospective effect to
take away the benefits to the petitioner-tenant
under the 1947 Rent Control Act and the rights
made available under the State enactment. The
tenant could not be evicted by giving retrospective
application to the provisions of the PP Act 1971
stated the High Court.
3.3.4 The High Court proceeded with the
reasoning, as extracted below,
“The Public Premises Act, 1971 came
rd
into force on 23 August, 1971. But Section
1(3) thereof states that it shall be deemed to
th
have come into force on 16 September,
1958 except for Section 11 (on offences and
penalty) and Sections 19 and 20 (on repeal
and validation). The respondent Corporation
came into existence on it’s creation under
Life Insurance Corporation Act of 1956. It
became entitled to resort to the provisions of
th
Public Premises Act, 1971 only on 16
September, 1958. Therefore, any tenancies
created prior to that date being protected by
Page 9 of 58

the State Rent Legislation remained beyond
the application of Public Premises Act, 1971.”
Guided By Suhas H. Pophale
3.3.5 The High Court concluded that any tenancy
created, prior to the date of coming into force of the
PP Act 1971 that is, 16.09.1958 would stand
protected under the State Rent legislation and shall
remain beyond the application of the PP Act 1971
and that the landlord-Life Insurance Corporation
was required to file eviction proceedings in the
Court of Small Causes at Bombay. This view was
2
based on what Suhas H. Pophale had held.
3.3.6 The two-Judge Bench carved out two
categories of the persons in occupation of a
premise which became public premises, for the
purpose of applying to them the provisions of the
PP Act 1971. The conclusions it summarised were
as under,
(i) For any premises to become public
premises, the relevant date will be 16-9-1958
or whichever is the later date on which the
premises concerned become the public
premises as belonging to or taken on lease by
LIC or the nationalised banks or the general
insurance companies concerned like
Page 10 of 58

Respondent i.e. The Oriental Insurance Co.
Ltd.; and that
(ii) All those persons falling within the
definition of a tenant occupying the premises
prior thereto will not come under the ambit of
the PP Act 1971 and cannot therefore, be said
to be persons in ‘unauthorised occupation’.
(iii) there are two categories of occupants
of these public corporations who get excluded
from the coverage of the PP
Act itself.
(a) Firstly, those who are in occupation
since prior to 16.09.1958, that is, prior to
the Act becoming applicable and thus, they
are clearly outside the coverage of the
Public Premises Act.
(b) Secondly, those who come in
occupation thereafter but prior to the date
of the premises concerned coming under
the ownership/control of a government
corporation or a company and are covered
under a protective provision of the State
Rent Act also gets excluded and until such
date, 1947 Rent Control Act and its
successor 1999 Rent Control Act will
continue to govern the relationship
between the occupants of such premises
Page 11 of 58

on the one hand, and such government
companies and corporations on the other.
(iv) Hence, with respect to such occupants
it would not be open to such companies or
corporations to issue notices, and to proceed
against such occupants under the PP Act
1971 and such proceedings will be void and
illegal.
Rival Submissions
4. Heard learned Attorney General for India
Mr. R. Venkataramani with learned senior advocate
Shri Ashok Panigrahi, other senior advocates and
respective assisting learned advocates in the lead
appeal as well as other appeals for the appellants,
learned senior advocate Dr. Anindita Pujari, learned
senior advocate, Mr. Vishnu Mehra assisted by other
respective learned advocates for the respondents,
at length.
4.1 Learned senior counsels and assisting
learned advocate led by learned Attorney General,
on behalf of the appellant-Life Insurance Company
and the other Insurance Companies, as the case
may be, the owners of the premises, raised
following main submissions,
Page 12 of 58

(a) There exists an ex-facie inconsistency
between the Constitution Bench judgment in
3
Ashoka Marketing and in two Judges Bench
2
decision in Suhas H. Pophale .
(b) The distinction created by Suhas H.
2
Pophale between the tenants in occupation
of the Public Premises prior to coming into
force of the PP Act 1971 and those in
occupation post-coming into force of the Act
is in clear conflict with the ratio of the five
Judges Bench decision in Ashoka
3
Marketing . The distinction so carved out is
totally artificial in nature and in essence, such
distinction does not exist.
(c) It was erroneous on the part of Suhas
2
H. Pophale to make the applicability of the
PP Act 1971 to be dependent on the date of
the entry of the tenant into the said premises.
3
(d) As held in Ashoka Marketing , the PP
Act 1971 would have an overriding effect over
the Rent Control Act. The provisions of the PP
Act 1971 have to be applied even to such
premises which were within the bounds of the
Rent Control Act and no exception could be
created on the basis of the date of coming
into force of the PP Act 1971.
Page 13 of 58

2
(e) Suhas H. Pophale drew inferences
3
from Ashoka Marketing in its own way
which were unfounded and not in consonance
3
with the ratio of Ashoka Marketing . The
High Court of Bombay seriously erred in
2
relying on Suhas H. Pophale .
4.2 On the other hand learned senior counsels
with learned advocate assisting them for the
respondents-tenants in respective matters argued
on the following lines,
(i) It was incorrect on part of the High
Court to hold that the provisions of the PP Act
1971 would apply merely for the reasons that
the 1999 Rent Control Act is not applicable
inasmuch as the petitioner-tenant is excluded
under Section 3(1)(b) of the 1999 Rent
Control Act.
(ii) In holding as above, the High Court
disregarded the following aspects:
(a) In a situation where neither the PP
Act 1971 is applicable nor the
Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 is
applicable, then in such a situation the
dispute between the parties had to be
adjudicated under Section 41 of The
Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882,
as applicable to State of Maharashtra.
Page 14 of 58

(b) As per Section 41 the Court of
Small Causes shall have jurisdiction to
entertain and try eviction proceedings
with respect to immovable property
situated in Greater Bombay or with
respect to its Rent, irrespective of the
value of subject matter of such suits or
proceedings.
(c) The tenancy/Lease between the
parties would be governed by Section 106
of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 in as
much as after expiry of the Lease
Agreement, the Petitioner has been
continuing as tenant/Lessee in the
premises in question and has been
regularly paying rent to the appellant-
insurance company since 1965.
Respondent cannot be termed as
(d)
unauthorized occupant as it was inducted
as tenant and had paid the rent regularly.
The Corporation duly accepted the
(e)
amount of rent without protest. The law
2
laid down in Suhas H. Pophale is

correct in the context of the facts of the
case .
Page 15 of 58

(iii) Reliance was placed on Section 15A of
the 1947 Rent Control Act to contend that the
PP Act 1971 cannot be applied to the subject
premises and tenancy of the respondents.
Framework of Public Premises Act, 1971
5. Before we proceed to delve into and
consider the issue at hand, noticing the relevant
provisions of the PP Act 1971 by way of preface
would be useful.
5.1 The definition of ‘Public Premises’ is
provided under Section 2(e) of the Act. Sub clause
(ii) of sub-section (1) includes any premises
belonging to, or taken on lease, by or on behalf for
Corporation such as LIC. For ready reference,
Section 2 (e) of PP Act 1971 is reproduced herein
below: -
‘2( e ) ‘ public premises ’ means—
(1) any premises belonging to, or
taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on
behalf of, the Central Government, and
includes any such premises which have been
placed by the Government, whether before
or after the commencement of the Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised
Occupants) Amendment Act, 1980, under the
control of the Secretariat of either House of
Page 16 of 58

Parliament for providing residential
accommodation to any member of the staff
of that Secretariat;
(2) any premises belonging to, or
taken on lease by, or on behalf of,—
(i) any company as defined in Section 3
of the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013), in
which not less than fifty-one per cent of the
paid-up share capital is held by the Central
Government or any company which is a
subsidiary (within the meaning of that Act) of
the first-mentioned company,
(ii) any Corporation not being a
company as defined in Section 3 of the
Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013), or a local
authority established by or under a Central Act
and owned or controlled by the Central
Government,
(iii) any company as defined in clause
(20) of Section 2 of the Companies Act, 2013
(18 of 2013) in which not less than fifty-one per
cent of the paid-up capital is held partly by the
Central Government and partly by one or more
State Governments and includes a company
which is a subsidiary (within the meaning of
that Act) of the first mentioned company and
which carries on the business of public
transport including metro railway.
Page 17 of 58

Explanation .—For the purposes of this
item, “metro railway” shall have the same
meaning as assigned to it in clause ( i ) of sub-
section (1) of Section 2 of the Metro Railway
(Operation and Maintenance) Act, 2002 (60 of
2002);
(iii-a) any University established or
incorporated by any Central Act,
(iv) any Institute incorporated by the
Institutes of Technology Act, 1961 (59 of 1961),
(v) any Board of Trustees or any
successor company constituted under or
referred to in the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963
(38 of 1963);
(vi) the Bhakra Management Board
constituted under Section 79 of the Punjab
Reorganisation Act, 1966 (31 of 1966), and that
Board as and when renamed as the Bhakra-
Beas Management Board under sub-section (6)
of Section 80 of that Act;
(vii) any State Government or the
Government of any Union Territory situated in
the National Capital Territory of Delhi or in any
other Union Territory;
(viii) any Cantonment Board constituted
under the Cantonments Act, 1924 (2 of 1924);
and
Page 18 of 58

(3) in relation to the [National Capital
Territory of Delhi,—
(i) any premises belonging to
the Council as defined in clause (9) of Section 2
of the New Delhi Municipal Council Act, 1994
(44 of 1994) or Corporation or Corporations
notified under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of
the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (66
of 1957) of Delhi, or any municipal committee
or notified area committee,
(ii) any premises belonging to the
Delhi Development Authority, whether such
premises are in the possession of, or leased out
by, the said Authority, and
(iii) any premises belonging to, or
taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf
of any State Government or the Government of
any Union Territory;
(iv) any premises belonging to, or
taken on lease by, or on behalf of any
Government company as defined in clause (45)
of Section 2 of the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of
2013).
Explanation .— For the purposes of this
clause, the expression, “State Government”
occurring in clause (45) of the said section shall
mean the Government of the National Capital
Territory of Delhi.
Page 19 of 58

(4) any premises of the enemy
property as defined in clause ( c ) of Section 2
of the Enemy Property Act, 1968 (34 of
1968).”
5.1.1 Section 2(g) defines “unauthorised
occupation” as under:
‘2(g) “unauthorised occupation, in
relation to any public premises, means the
occupation by any person of the public
premises without authority for such
occupation, and includes the continuance in
occupation by any person of the public
premises after the authority (whether by way
of grant or any other mode of transfer) under
which he was allowed to occupy the
premises has expired or has been
determined for any reason whatsoever.”
5.1.2 Sections 4 and 5 of the Act outline the
procedure of eviction under the Act. The provision
of Section 4 stipulates that if the Estate Officer has
information or has reason to believe that any
person is in unauthorised occupation of any public
premises and that he should be evicted, the Estate
Officer shall issue a notice in writing specifying the
grounds calling upon the person concerned to show
cause why an order of eviction should not be made.
It is further provided that any delay in issuing a
Page 20 of 58

notice shall not vitiate the proceedings under this
Act. In response to the notice, the occupant(s) shall
be required to appear before the Estate Officer on
the date specified along with the evidence which
they intend to produce in support of the cause
shown, and also for personal hearing, if such
hearing is desired.
5.1.3 Section 5 deals with the eviction of
unauthorised occupants. It provides inter alia that
after considering the cause shown by any person in
pursuance of a notice issued under Section 4 and
any evidence produced by him in support of the
same and after personal hearing, if any, given
under sub-clause ( ii ) of clause ( b ) of sub-section (2)
of Section 4, the Estate Officer is satisfied that the
public premises are in unauthorised occupation, the
Estate Officer shall make an order of eviction, for
reasons to be recorded therein, directing that the
public premises shall be vacated, on such date as
may be specified in the order, but not later than
fifteen days from the date of the order, by the
person/s who may be in occupation thereof or any
part thereof.
5.1.4 It is further provided that if any person
refuses or fails to comply with the order of
eviction on or before the date specified in the said
order, the Estate Officer or any other officer duly
Page 21 of 58

authorised by the Estate Officer is entitled to take
possession of the public premises and for that
purpose, the said officer may use force as may be
necessary. The Estate Officer has power to grant
time to vacate if any compelling reason exists.
5.1.5 The PP Act 1971 thus envisages special
procedure for eviction of unauthorised occupant/s
of the public premises. The special procedure seeks
to facilitate speedy recovery of the possession of
‘public premises’ avoiding technicalities and
possibility of delay.
5.1.6 The Constitutionality of the PP Act 1971
and the summary procedure for eviction provided
thereunder came to be upheld by a five-Judge
Bench of this Court in Kaiser-i-Hind Pvt. Ltd. &
Anr. vs. National Textile Corpn. (Maharashtra
6
North) Ltd. & Ors.
Suhas H. Pophale Versus Ashoka Marketing
(a)Facts in Suhas H. Pophale
5.2 In the process of analysing as to how
2
Suhas H. Pophale stands in contradiction to
3
Ashoka Marketing , the facts involved and the
2
issue addressed in Suhas H. Pophale may be
noticed. The premises identified as Flat No. 3 in
Colaba, Mumbai belonged to the Indian Mercantile
6 (2002) 8 SCC 182
Page 22 of 58

Insurance Company, which subsequently merged
with the respondent Oriental Insurance Company
Limited - a government company. One Mr. Voller
was a tenant of the erstwhile Indian Mercantile
Insurance Company i.e., the predecessor-in-title of
the Oriental Insurance Company Limited.
Subsequently, Mr. Voller executed a leave and
licence agreement dated 20.12.1972 in favour of
the appellant for two years, and put him in
exclusive possession of the premises. Mr. Voller,
migrated to Canada. The appellant, a practising
physician remained in exclusive possession, and
was accepted as tenant by the Oriental Insurance
Company Limited.
5.2.1 The landlord - Oriental Insurance Company
Limited addressed a notice dated 12.7.1980 to Mr
E. Voller terminating his tenancy with respect to the
said premises, and also instituted a suit for eviction
against him as well as against the appellant Suhas
H. Pophale in the Court of Small Causes at Mumbai,
under the provisions of the 1947 Rent Control Act.
The appellant requested the Oriental Insurance
Company Limited to regularise his tenancy as a
statutory tenant. The Insurance Company served
on the appellant notices under Sections 4 and 7 of
the PP Act 1971 to show cause as to why he should
not be evicted.
Page 23 of 58

5.2.2 Ultimately, the eviction order dated
28.05.1993 was passed directing the eviction of
said Mr. Voller as well as the appellant from the
premises. The appellant’s appeal before the City
Civil Court filed under Section 9 of the PP Act 1971
was dismissed and the eviction order was upheld.
The High Court also dismissed the writ petition.
5.2.3 The principal contention raised by the
appellant-tenant before the High Court was that the
occupation of the premises in question was
protected under Section 15-A of the 1947 Rent
Control Act with effect from 01.02.1973, that is,
prior to the respondent-Insurance Company
acquiring the title over the property on 01.01.1974
from the erstwhile Indian Mercantile Insurance
Company. It was the contention of the appellant
that in view of the protection of the said provision,
he could not have been evicted by invoking the
provisions of the PP Act 1971, and by treating him
as an unauthorised occupant under that Act.
(b) View in Suhas H. Pophale
5.3 The two-Judge Bench of this Court in
2
Suhas H. Pophale proceeded to lay down that
the PP Act 1971 had only prospective effect. It was
held that the PP Act 1971 would apply to those
premises which (a) were public premises on
Page 24 of 58

16.09.1958 or (b) become public premises after
16.09.1958 i.e., from the date of vesting of the
premises in any government/public entity
mentioned in Section 2(e) of the said Act or from
the date when the owner/lesser of the premises
becomes a government/public entity under Section
2(e) of the said Act.
5.3.1 The aforesaid date 16.09.1958 described
as ‘date 1’ and post 16.09.1958 described as ‘date
2’ were the effective dates. It was also, when the
PP Act 1971 would have overriding effect over the
State Rent Act. In the process, the Court also
considered the concept as to when premise could
be said to be owned/controlled by a government/
public entity.
5.3.2 The Court adverted to the definition of
‘unauthorised occupation’ contained in Section 2( g )
of the PP Act 1971. According to Suhas H.
2
Pophale , the aforesaid definition was to be read in
two parts. The first part dealt with the persons who
are in occupation of the public premises “without
authority for such occupation” and the second part
dealt with those in occupation of the public
premises, whose authority to occupy the premises
“had expired or had been determined for any
reason whatsoever”. Taking such context, the Court
ruled that the PP Act 1971 would not apply to
Page 25 of 58

persons who entered in the occupation prior to the
‘date 1’ and ‘date 2’ mentioned above, as the case
may be, who, (according to the two-Judge Bench),
had acquired the vested right of the occupation.
The prospectivity and application of the PP Act
1971 was accordingly underlined.
5.3.3 In other words, separate categories were
carved out by the Court, stating that the premises
of LIC would become public premises within the
meaning of the PP Act 1971 from the date of
coming into force of the Life Insurance Corporation
Act, 1956, similarly, for banking companies the
relevant date would be the date of their
nationalization which took place under the
provisions of the Banking Companies Act, 1970. The
Court held that the third class namely all other
persons falling within the definition of tenant
occupying the premises would not come under the
umbrella of the PP Act 1971 and they would not be
classified as persons in ‘unauthorised occupation’.
5.3.4 It was, thus, reasoned that the premises
could be said to be belonging to the government
only when the aforesaid Acts namely the Life
Insurance Corporation Act, 1956 and the Banking
Companies Act, 1970 came into force. It was held
that the occupants of such premises were the
tenants of the erstwhile Insurance Company which
Page 26 of 58

were the private landlords and that status as
occupants of the public insurance companies had
been thrust upon later, by applying the PP Act 1971
to evict them.
(c)Facts In Ashoka Marketing Ltd.
5.4 The issue of overriding effect of the PP Act
1971, vis-à-vis State Rent Control Act was dealt
with by the five-Judge Bench of this court as back
3
as in the year 1990 in Ashoka Marketing in the
context of set of facts akin and similar to Suhas H.
2
Pophale . The Constitution bench in Ashoka
3
Marketing dealt with the tenancies prior to the
coming into force of the PP Act 1971. In first case
3
involved in Ashoka Marketing , the building
originally belonged to the Punjab National Bank-a
3
banking corporation. Ashoka Marketing and
Sahu Jain Service Ltd. were the tenants in the
premises since 10.07.1958. As a result of the
enactment of the Banking Companies (Acquisition
and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970, the
undertaking of the Punjab National Bank Ltd. came
to be transferred and stood vested in the Punjab
National Bank, which became a body corporate
constituted under the 1970 Act. The tenants of the
Punjab National Bank Ltd. became the tenants of
the Punjab National Bank. The tenancy of both the
tenants came to be terminated with effect from
Page 27 of 58

30.11.1971 by issuance of notices dated
18.05.1971 under Section 106 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882.
5.4.1 In another case, the tenant was inducted
since 1948 by the then Insurance Company. The life
insurance business was nationalized under the Life
Insurance Corporation Act, 1956, whereby the Life
Insurance Corporation was established. The tenant
became a tenant of the Life Insurance Corporation.
The Life Insurance Corporation proceeded to
determine the tenancy by giving notice under
Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
Eviction proceedings were successfully initiated
under the PP Act 1971 against the tenant Ashoka
3
Marketing .
5.4.2 The Constitution Bench in Ashoka
Marketing (supra) addressed this
question:-“whether a person who was inducted as a
tenant in premises, which are public premises for
the purpose of the PP Act 1971, and whose tenancy
has expired or has been terminated, can be evicted
from the said premises as being a person in
unauthorised occupation of the premises under the
provisions of the PP Act 1971 and whether such a
person can invoke the protection of the Delhi Rent
Control Act, 1958”. In other words, the issue before
the Court was whether the provisions of the PP Act
Page 28 of 58

1971 would override the provisions of the State
Rent Control Act in respect of the premises which
come within the purview of both the enactments.
Interpretation In Ashoka Marketing Ltd.
5.5 In dealing with the above issue, the five-
Judge Bench of this Court observed that the Rent
Control legislations fall within the ambit of Entries
6, 7 and 13 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the
Constitution. The Rent Control Act has been
enacted by Parliament in exercise of its legislative
power under Article 246(4) of the Constitution. On
the other hand, PP Act 1971 which deal with the
eviction of unauthorised occupants from the
premises belonging to or taken on lease or
requisitioned by or on behalf of the Central
Government would fall within Entry 32 of List I
being law with respect to a property of the Union.
At the same time, it was stated that in relation to
the properties belonging to the various legal
entities mentioned in clauses (2) and (3) of Section
2( e ) of the PP Act 1971 would stand covered by
Entries 6, 7 and 46 of List III.
5.5.1 Thus, both the statutes namely, the Rent
Control Act and the PP Act 1971 were enacted by
the same legislature in exercise of the legislative
powers in respect of the matters enumerated in the
Page 29 of 58

Concurrent List and the Union List respectively. The
Court stated that in its opinion, the question
whether the provisions of the PP Act 1971 override
the provisions of the Rent Control Act had to be
considered in light of the principles of statutory
interpretation applicable to the laws made by same
legislature.
5.5.2 The Court proceeded to highlight such
principle of statutory interpretation observing,
“One such principle of statutory
interpretation which is applied is contained in
the latin maxim : leges posteriores priores
conterarias abrogant (later laws abrogate
earlier contrary laws). This principle is
subject to the exception embodied in the
maxim: generalia specialibus non
derogant (a general provision does not
derogate from a special one.) This means
that where the literal meaning of the general
enactment covers a situation for which
specific provision is made by another
enactment contained in the earlier Act, it is
presumed that the situation was intended to
continue to be dealt with by the specific
provision rather than the later general one
(Bennion, Statutory Interpretation pp. 433-
34).”
(Para 50)
Page 30 of 58


Domain of Two Statutes
5.6 It was observed that the Delhi Rent Control
Act is an earlier enactment, whereas the PP Act
1971 is subsequently enacted law and thus, it being
the enactment later in point of time, represents the
last will of the Parliament. The Court observed that
the PP Act 1971 should, therefore, prevail over the
Delhi Rent Control Act unless it can be said that the
PP Act 1971 is a general enactment, whereas the
Rent Control Act is a special enactment.
5.6.1 Explaining the operational status of the
Rent Control legislation and the PP Act 1971, it was
observed,
“The Rent Control Act makes a
departure from the general law regulating
the relationship of landlord and tenant
contained in the Transfer of Property Act
inasmuch as it makes provision for
determination of standard rent, it specifies
the grounds on which a landlord can seek the
eviction of a tenant, it prescribes the forum
for adjudication of disputes between
landlords and tenants and the procedure
which has to be followed in such
proceedings. The Rent Control Act can,
therefore, be said to be a special statute
Page 31 of 58

regulating the relationship of landlord and
tenant in the Union territory of Delhi.”
(para
55)
5.6.2 The PP Act 1971 intends for speedy
eviction, stated the Constitution Bench,
“The Public Premises Act, 1971 makes
provision for a speedy machinery to secure
eviction of unauthorised occupants from public
premises. As opposed to the general law which
provides for filing of a regular suit for recovery
of possession of property in a competent court
and for trial of such a suit in accordance with
the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil
Procedure, the Public Premises Act, 1971
confers the power to pass an order of eviction
of an unauthorised occupant in a public
premises on a designated officer and
prescribes the procedure to be followed by the
said officer before passing such an order.”
(para 55)
5.6.3 It was thus clearly expressed that the PP
Act 1971 is a special statute and that it will
override the Rent Control Act
“Therefore, the Public Premises Act,
1971 is also a special statute relating to
eviction of unauthorised occupants from
public premises. In other words, both the
enactments, namely, the Rent Control Act
and the Public Premises Act, 1971, are
special statutes in relation to the matters
Page 32 of 58

dealt with therein. Since, the Public Premises
Act, 1971 is a special statute and not a
general enactment the exception contained
in the principle that a subsequent general
law cannot derogate from an earlier special
law cannot be invoked and in accordance
with the principle that the later laws
abrogate earlier contrary laws, the Public
Premises Act, 1971 must prevail over the
Rent Control Act.”
(Para 55)
Policy And Purpose Would Prevail
5.7 As both the enactments are ‘special
enactments’ in their respective realms, the five-
Judge Bench observed on the basis of the principle
stated in Shri Ram Narain vs. Simla Banking
7
and Industrial Co., Limited that when each
enactment is a special Act, the ordinary principle
that a special law overrides a general law does not
afford any clear solution. In such circumstances, it
was stated, it would be desirable to determine the
overriding effect of one or the other of the relevant
provisions in these two Acts, in a given scenario, on
much broader considerations of the purpose and
policy underlying the two statues and the clear
intendment conveyed by the language of the
relevant provisions therein.
7 AIR 1956 SC 614
Page 33 of 58

5.7.1 After referring to several other decisions,
the proposition was stated thus,
“The principle which emerges from
these decisions is that in the case of
inconsistency between the provisions of two
enactments, both of which can be regarded
as special in nature, the conflict has to be
resolved by reference to the purpose and
policy underlying the two enactments and
the clear intendment conveyed by the
language of the relevant provisions therein.”
(Para 61)
5.7.2 It was stated that the consequence of
giving overriding effect to the provisions of the PP
Act 1971 over the Rent Control Act would be that
the buildings belonging to companies, corporations
and autonomous bodies referred to in Section 2( e )
of the PP Act 1971 would be excluded from the
ambit of the Rent Control Act in the same manner
as properties belonging to the Central Government.
It was further stated that the Government while
dealing with the citizens in respect of property
belonging to it would not act for its own purpose as
a private landlord but would act in public interest.
Legislative Intent Recognised
3
5.8 Ashoka Marketing considered the object
and purpose of the PP Act 1971 and the overall
Page 34 of 58

legislative intendment behind the enactment. It
was held that the object and purpose of the PP Act
1971 would give it an overriding effect over the
provisions of the Rent Control Act, even though, the
relevant sections of both the PP Act 1971 and Delhi
Rent Control Act contained a non-obstante clause.
The Court provided that the scope of the provisions
of the Pubic Premises Act cannot be whittled down
on the basis of the apprehension that the
Corporations like nationalised banks or the Life
Insurance Corporation are trading Corporations
interested in earning profit. They cannot be
precluded from buying the properties in possession
of the tenants at low price and then vacating the
tenants after terminating the tenancy and
thereafter selling the property at higher price.
5.8.1 Negating the contention that the provisions
of the PP Act 1971 if given overriding effect would
be exploited by such corporations to expand the
business with a view to earn profit, it was observed,
“The consequence of giving overriding
effect to the provisions of the Public Premises
Act, 1971 is that premises belonging to
companies and statutory bodies referred to
in clauses (2) and (3) of Section 2( e ) of the
Public Premises Act, 1971 would be
exempted from the provisions of the Rent
Page 35 of 58

Control Act. The actions of the companies
and statutory bodies mentioned in clauses
(2) and (3) of Section 2( e ) of the Public
Premises Act, 1971 while dealing with their
properties under the Public Premises Act,
1971 will, therefore, have to be judged by
the same standard”. (Para 69)
5.8.2 The Constitution Bench with above
interpretational philosophy and cogent reasons
stated further,
“we are unable to accept the
contention of the learned counsel for the
petitioners that the provisions contained in
the Public Premises Act, 1971 cannot be
applied to premises which fall within the
ambit of the Rent Control Act. In our opinion,
the provisions of the Public Premises Act,
1971, to the extent they cover premises
falling within the ambit of the Rent Control
Act, override the provisions of the Rent
Control Act and a person in unauthorised
occupation of public premises under Section
2( e ) of the Act cannot invoke the protection
of the Rent Control Act.”
(Para 70)
Law Settled Even Prior to Ashoka Marketing
5.9 Even before the decision in Ashoka
2
Marketing , a three-Judge bench of this Court in
Page 36 of 58

M/s. Jain Ink Manufacturing Company vs. Life
8
Insurance Corporation of India & Anr. had an
occasion to deal with an identical issue interpreting
Section 2(g) and Section 5 of the PP Act 1971. The
Court held that the factum of occupation at the
material time is sufficient for the purpose of
eviction under Section 5 of the PP Act 1971.
7
5.9.1 In M/s. Jain Ink , the LIC purchased the
premises in which the appellant was the tenant
who was inducted by the original owner of the
premises. The LIC issued notice to the appellant-
tenant under Section 106 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 asking the appellant to vacate
the premises, but the appellant failed to do so,
which led the LIC to file an application with the
Estate Officer under the PP Act 1971. The
contention was that the appellant could not be
treated to be an unauthorised occupant since he
had entered into possession of the premises long
before the premises were purchased by the LIC,
i.e., the subsequent owner.
5.9.2 This Court explained and interpreted the
concept of ‘unauthorised occupant’ under Section
2(g) of the PP Act 1971, to conclude that Section
2(g) is an inclusive definition which consists of two
separate limbs. First, is where a person is in
8 (1980) 4 SCC 435
Page 37 of 58

occupation in relation to any public premises
without authority for such occupation, and second,
when the possession or occupation of the tenant
continues after the lease is determined.
5.9.3 It was pointedly observed that the
definition of ‘unauthorised occupation’ of the public
premises does not use the word “possession” or the
words “entry into possession” at any point of time
at all. What is contemplated, observed the Court, in
the said Section is the occupation of any public
premises. It was stated that the entry into
possession connotes one single terminus, when a
person enters into possession or occupies the
property whereas occupation is a continuous
process which starts right from the point of time
when the person enters into possession or occupies
the premises and continues until he leaves the
premises.
5.9.4 The Court was unequivocal in stating that
‘what is germane for the purpose of interpretation
of Section 2( g ) is whether or not the person
concerned was in occupation of the public premises
when the PP Act 1971 was passed’. It was recorded
7
in M/s. Jain Ink , that the appellant continued to
occupy the property even after the PP Act 1971
came into force and in fact accepted the LIC as his
landlord. Since the lease was determined by the LIC
Page 38 of 58

by issuing a notice under Section 106 of the
Transfer of Property Act, the appellant-tenant fell
‘within the ambit of definition of Section 2(g) of the
PP Act 1971 to become an ‘unauthorised occupant’
liable to be evicted in accordance with the
procedure envisaged, and was not entitled to claim
the applicability and protection of the Rent Control
Act.
7
5.9.5 It was held in M/s. Jain Ink ,
(a) The mere fact that by virtue of a fiction
the Public Premises Act, 1971 was given
retrospective effect from 1958 will not alter the
date when the Public Premises Act, 1971 was
actually passed, that is to say August 23, 1971.
(b) In these circumstances, the Public
Premises Act, 1971 being subsequent to the
Rent Control Act would naturally prevail over
and override the provisions of the Rent Control
Act.
(c) Although in both the Public Premises
Act, 1971 and the Delhi Rent Control Act there
are non obstante clauses but the question to be
determined is whether the non obstante clauses
operate in the same field or have two different
spheres though there may be some amount of
overlapping. In such cases the conflict should
Page 39 of 58

be resolved by reference to the object and
purposes of the laws in consideration.
Ashoka Wholly Misread
6. In rendering the decision, the two-Judge
2
Bench in Suhas H. Pophale contradicted and
disregarded what was laid down in the earlier
decisions of the Bench of larger strength. Suhas H.
2
Pophale adverted to split-reading of definition in
Section 2(g). Reading the same disjunctively, a view
was taken that the first part of the definition deals
with the persons who are in occupation of the
‘Public Premises’ ‘without authority of such
occupation’ and the second part deals with those in
occupation of the ‘Pubic Premises’ whose authority
to occupy the premises ‘has expired or has been
determined for any reason whatsoever’.
2
6.1 Taking such context, Suhas H. Pophale
ruled that the PP Act 1971 would not apply to
persons who entered into occupation prior to the
‘date 1’ and ‘date 2’ mentioned above, as the case
may be, and that such persons had acquired the
vested right of occupation. In other words, Suhas
2
H. Pophale underscored that the PP Act 1971 has
only prospective application. This was completely in
conflict with the ratio laid down in Ashoka
3
Marketing .
Page 40 of 58

2
6.2 According to Suhas H. Pophale , the
eviction of unauthorised occupants under the PP
Act 1971 would come into play from 16.09.1958, or
from the later date when the premises concerned
became ‘Public Premises’ by virtue of the same
vesting into a Government company or a
Corporation like LIC or the Nationalized Banks or
the General Insurance Company. According to the
decision, the occupants-tenants of categories who
were in occupation prior to 16.09.1958, that is,
before coming into force of the PP Act 1971, would
be beyond the purview of the Act.
6.3 It was further observed in para 64 that in
respect of such occupants, it would not be open for
the Government bodies, Corporations or Companies
to proceed against them under the PP Act 1971 and
that any such proceedings initiated would be void
and illegal. Further view was taken that this class of
occupants can seek declaration of the status and
for their other rights such as transmission of the
tenancies to the legal heirs etc, under the 1947
Rent Control Act or its successor 1999 Rent Control
Act to seek the protective relief in the nature of
injunction, etc. and that the forums provided under
the State Rent Control Act will alone have the
jurisdiction to entertain such proceedings.
Page 41 of 58

Contrary Propositions
7. The following propositions set out in Suhas H.
2
Pophale are contrary to and in direct conflict with
what was laid down earlier by the Benches of larger
strength,
“For any premises to become public
premises, the relevant date will be 16-9-1958
or whichever is the later date on which the
premises concerned become the public
premises as belonging to or taken on lease
by LIC or the nationalised banks or the
general insurance companies concerned like
the first respondent. All those persons falling
within the definition of a tenant occupying
the premises prior thereto will not come
under the ambit of the Public Premises Act,
1971 and cannot therefore, be said to be
persons in “unauthorised occupation”.
(para 59)
7.1 The error was further exacerbated by the
following observation,
“Whatever rights such prior tenants,
members of their families or heirs of such
tenants or deemed tenants or all of those
who fall within the definition of a tenant
under the Bombay Rent Act have, are
Page 42 of 58

continued under the Maharashtra Rent
Control Act, 1999. If possession of their
premises is required, that will have to be
resorted to by taking steps under the
Bombay Rent Control Act, 1947 or the
Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999. If the
person concerned has come in occupation
subsequent to such date, then of course
the Public Premises Act, 1971 will apply.’
(para 59)
2
7.2 Suhas H. Pophale again charted different
course ignoring the binding law, by observing,
‘The Public Premises Act, 1971 will
apply only to those who come in such
occupation after such date. Thus, there is no
occasion to have a dual procedure which is
ruled out in para 66 of Ashoka Mktg. [ Ashoka
Mktg. Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank , (1990) 4
SCC 406] We must remember that the
occupants of these properties were earlier
tenants of the erstwhile insurance companies
which were the private landlords. They have
not chosen to be the tenants of the
government companies. Their status as
occupants of the public insurance companies
has been thrust upon them by the Public
Premises Act, 1971.’ (para
60)
Page 43 of 58

3
7.3 The law in Ashoka Marketing was
literally brushed aside: -
“It is true that Section 15 of the Public
Premises Act, 1971 creates a bar of
jurisdiction to entertain suits or proceedings
in respect of eviction of any person in an
unauthorised occupation. However, as far as
the relationship between Respondent 1, the
other general insurance companies, LIC,
nationalised banks and such other
government companies or corporations, on
the one hand and their
occupants/licensees/tenants on the other
hand is concerned, such persons who are in
occupation prior to the premises belonging
to or taken on lease by such entities, will
continue to be governed by the State Rent
Control Act for all purposes.”
Guise of Clarifying
8. It is evident that the view taken and the
interpretation sought to be provided by the two-
2
Judge Bench in Suhas H. Pophale is in direct
3
conflict with Ashoka Marketing . Not only that,
there was a misdirected attempt on part of the two-
2
Judge Bench in Suhas H. Pophale to try and
explain, that the view taken by it, was justified in
the facts of the case.
Page 44 of 58

8.1 A flimsy distinction was sought to be
drawn,
“ In Ashoka Mktg. [Ashoka Mktg.
Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank, (1990) 4
SCC 406] , this Court was concerned with the
premises of two nationalised banks and Life
Insurance Corporation. As far as Life
Insurance Corporation is concerned, the life
insurance business was nationalised under
the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956.
Therefore, as far as the premises of LIC are
concerned, they will come under the ambit of
the Public Premises Act, 1971 from 16-9-
1958 i.e the date from which the Act is
brought into force. As far as the nationalised
banks are concerned, their nationalisation is
governed by the Banking Companies
(Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings)
Act, 1970, and therefore, the application of
the Public Premises Act, 1971 to the
premises of the nationalised banks will be
from the particular date in the year 1970 or
thereafter.”
(Para 59)
8.2 Not following the law laid down by larger
Bench under the cloak of a purported exercise of
clarification, cannot be countenanced. Such
2
approach was evident when Suhas H. Pophale
observed,
Page 45 of 58

“We have not for a moment taken any
position different from the propositions
in Ashoka Mktg. [ Ashoka Mktg. Ltd. v. Punjab
National Bank , (1990) 4 SCC 406]. The only
issue is with effect from which date. That
aspect was not canvassed at all before the
Constitution Bench, and that is the only
aspect which is being clarified by this
judgment. (para
66)
8.3 Claiming to be in agreement with Ashoka
2
Marketing , following was said by Suhas H.
2
Pophale with clear departure,
“We are only clarifying that the
application of the Public Premises Act, 1971
will be only from 16-9-1958, or from such
later date when premises concerned become
public premises on the landlord concerned
becoming a government company or public
corporation. When the law laid down by the
different Benches of this Court including by
the Constitution Benches on retrospectivity is
so clear, and so are the provisions of the
Public Premises Act, 1971, there is no
occasion for this Court to take any other
view. When this judgment is only clarifying
and advancing the proposition laid down
in Ashoka Marketing (supra) .
(para 66)
Page 46 of 58

8.4 According to the two-Judge Bench in
2
Suhas H. Pophale , the issue about the
retrospective application of the PP Act 1971,
tenancies existing before 16.09.1958, or before the
property in question becoming public premises,
was neither canvassed before nor considered by
3
the Bench in Ashoka Marketing , therefore, the
said decision would not prevent the Bench of two-
Judges in any way from clarifying the judgment on
the said issue. It took the view, as observed in
paragraph 67 that the judgment in Ashoka
3
Marketing was an authority for what is deduced
and not what can be logically reduced therefrom.
2
According to Suhas H. Pophale , what was
decided was only something which could be
3
logically deduced from Ashoka Marketing ,
therefore, on that score, the said decision was not a
binding authority.
Page 47 of 58

Turned Blind Eye
9. Conspicuously, the two-Judge Bench of this
2
Court in Suhas H. Pophale , in what it decided
and in the propositions it laid down, overlooked,
ignored and disregarded the ratio decidendi of the
3
Constitution Bench in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. as
also the very ratio laid down by three-Judge Bench
7
in M/s. Jain Ink . The mandate of law of precedent
was completely disregarded by the two-Judge
2
Bench in Suhas H. Pophale . It could be viewed as
judicial indiscipline, if not judicial impropriety.
Discipline of Law of Precedent
10. The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the
foundational principle that precedents must be
observed with institutional fidelity, not merely by
the High Courts or subordinate courts, but by this
Court as well. It enjoins that a Bench of lesser or co-
equal strength must follow the law declared by a
larger Bench, in recognition of the binding authority
of such pronouncements. This adherence to
precedent is not a matter of mere formality, but of
judicial discipline and constitutional propriety. The
underlying purpose for respecting and following the
decisions of the Bench consisting of greater number
of Judges and even of the Bench of co-equal
strength, is part of judicial discipline. It ensures
Page 48 of 58

certainty, predictability and dependability in the
operation and application of law.
10.1 It is immaterial that the decision of the
larger Bench is rendered prior in point of time or at
subsequent stage. The precedential value is
determined by virtue of the hierarchical position or
the number of Judges delivering the judgment.
Given these well settled principles in the realm of
law of precedent, the two-Judge Bench in Suhas H.
2
Pophale could not have taken a view contrary to
the decisions of the Benches of larger strength of
this Court.
Binding Nature
9
11. In Mattulal vs. Radhe Lal , this Court
was beset with the situation similar to one obtained
here in terms of abiding by the law of precedent,
and observed,
‘The argument that the learned Judges of the
High Court exceeded their jurisdiction under
Section 39(2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act,
when they reversed the finding of bona fide
requirement of the appellant, has no
substance. Whether on the facts proved the
requirement of the landlord is bona fide within
the meaning of Section 14(1)( e ) is a finding on
a mixed question of law and fact. An inference
9 (1974) 2 SCC 365
Page 49 of 58

that the requirement of the appellant in the
present case was bona fide could not be
regarded as conclusive.’
(para 11)
11.1 The Court further observed,
‘Now there can be no doubt that these
observations made in Kamla Soni's case [ S.A.
No. 2150 of 1956, dec. on 26th September,
1969] are plainly in contradiction of what was
said by this Court earlier in Sarvate T.B.'s
case [1965 MPLJ 26] . It is obvious that the
decision in Sarvate T.B.'s case' was not brought
to the notice of this Court while deciding Smt
Kamla Soni's case , [ S.A. No. 2150 of 1956,
dec. on 26th September, 1969] or else this
Court would not have landed itself in such
patent contradiction. But whatever be the
reason, it cannot be gainsaid that it is not
possible to reconcile the observations in these
two decisions. That being so, we must prefer to
follow the decision in Sarvate T.B.'s case [1965
MPLJ 26] as against the decision in Smt Kamla
Soni's case [ S.A. No. 2150 of 1956, dec. on
26th September, 1969] as the former is a
decision of a larger Bench than the latter.
(para 11)
11.2 A similar situation of violating/breaching
the doctrine of stare decisis was dealt with by this
Court in General Manager, Telecom vs. A.
Page 50 of 58

10
Srinivasa Rao & Ors. , holding that the bench of
lesser strength cannot take a view contrary to, or
bypass, that has been taken by a larger Bench. The
issue was with regard to concept and definition of
‘industry’ within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. A two-Judge Bench in
Sub-Divisional Inspector of Post vs. Theyyam
11
Joseph held that the functions of the Postal
Department, since part of the sovereign functions
of the State, the Department would not be an
‘industry’. This view was taken and the decision
was rendered without reference to the seven-Judge
Bench decision in Bangalore Water Supply and
12
Sewerage Board vs. A. Rajappa . It was noticed
that in the later decision in Bombay Telephone
13
Canteen Employees' Assn. vs. Union of India ,
a Bench having strength of two-Judges followed the
decision of Theyyam Joseph (supra) to hold that
the Telephone Nigam was not an ‘industry’. In
Bombay Telephone Canteen Employees' Assn.
(supra) , the Court although had referred to the
Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board
(supra) , the two-Judge Bench proceeded to
distinguish Bangalore Water Supply and
Sewerage Board (supra) to observe that if the
law laid down in Bangalore Water Supply and
10 (1997) 8 SCC 767
11 (1996) 8 SCC 489
12 (1978) 2 SCC 213
13 (1997) 6 SCC 723
Page 51 of 58

8
Sewerage Board is followed, then catastrophic
consequences would ensue.
11.3 This Court observed in General Manager,
Telecom (supra) that the view taken by the two-
Judge Bench that the application of law laid down in
8
Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board
would cause catastrophic consequences will have
no impact on the role of stare decisis and the two-
Judge Bench was bound to follow the law laid down
by the seven-Judge Bench in Bangalore Water
8
Supply and Sewerage Board .
11.4 Following pertinent observations were
made.
‘It is needless to add that it is not
permissible for us, or for that matter any
Bench of lesser strength, to take a view
contrary to that in Bangalore Water Supply or
to bypass that decision so long as it holds
the field. Moreover, that decision was
rendered long back—nearly two decades
earlier and we find no reason to think
otherwise. Judicial discipline requires us to
follow the decision in Bangalore Water
Supply case . We must, therefore, add that
the decisions in Theyyam
Joseph and Bombay Telephone Canteen
Employees' Assn. cannot be treated as laying
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down the correct law.’
(Para 7)
Conclusions
12. In view of the foregoing discussion, reasons
and analysis, the following positions of law
emerges,
(a) In view of the law laid down by the
3
Constitution Bench in Ashoka Marketing
and the three-Judge Bench decision in M/s.
7
Jain Ink , the view taken in Suhas H.
2
Pophale which is a two-Judge Bench
decision, is palpably incorrect and unjustified.
2
Suhas H. Pophale cannot and does not hold
the field.
(b) Since, the propositions laid down in
2
Suhas H. Pophale runs contrary to the
decisions laid down by the Benches of larger
3
strength in Ashoka Marketing and M/s.
7
Jain Ink , the same is bad in law.
(c) The ratio decidendi by the Bench of
larger strength is binding on the Bench of the
smaller strength, irrespective of the fact
whether the judgment by the Bench of the
larger strength is apriori or posterior , in point
of time.
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(d) A Bench of the smaller strength cannot
mark a departure from the decision of the
Bench of larger strength, so as to vary the
ratio of the Bench of larger strength, in guise
of explaining the decision of the larger Bench.
(e) It was not permissible for the two-
2
Judge Bench in Suhas H. Pophale to
interpret the statutes and lay down
propositions in conflict with what was laid
down by the Constitution Bench in Ashoka
3
Marketing and by a three-Judge Bench in
7
M/s. Jain Ink , when the set of material facts
in the background of the controversy dealt
with, were similar.
(f) In laying down the propositions
incongruent to and contrary to the law laid
3
down in Ashoka Marketing , the Bench in
2
Suhas H. Pophale disregarded the principle
of stare decisis and violated the well settled
law of precedent.
Answers
13. As a sequitur, this Court reiterates the
3
propositions of law laid in Ashoka Marketing
(i) Both categories of statutes namely, the
PP Act 1971 on one hand, and the Bombay
Rent Control Act, 1947, Maharashtra Rent
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Control Act, 1999, Delhi Rent Control Act,
1958 and similar Rent Control Legislations, on
the other hand, are special laws. Therefore, in
order to determine as to which Act will apply
in case of conflict, reference has to be made
to the purpose and policy underlying the two
enactments and the clear intendment
conveyed by the language of the relevant
provisions therein. Keeping in view the object
and purpose underlying both the enactments,
that is, the PP Act 1971 and the Rent Control
Acts, the provisions of the PP Act 1971 shall
override the provisions in the Rent Control
Legislations.
(ii) The PP Act 1971 and the State Rent
Control Acts are special enactments in
themselves. Rule generalia specialibus non
derogant will not apply. Having regard to the
purpose, policy and legislative intent of the PP
Act 1971, the same would prevail over the
State Rent Control Acts in respect of eviction
of ‘unauthorised occupants’ of ‘public
premises’ as defined in Section 2(g) of the
Act.
(iii) The provisions of PP Act 1971, to the
extent they cover the premises falling within
the ambit of Rent Control Act, override the
provisions of the Rent Control Act.
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(iv) A person in unauthorised occupation of
‘Public Premises’ under Section 2(e) of the Act
cannot invoke the protection of the Rent
Control Act.
(v) In cases where the tenanted premises
are claimed to be governed by the State Rent
Control Act and the same have also become
‘Public Premises’ within the meaning in
Section 2(e) of the PP Act 1971, for their
unauthorised occupation, the PP Act 1971 will
have the application.
(vi) The statutory machinery envisaged
under the PP Act 1971, could be activated for
recovery of possession of public premises by
any Government or public entity mentioned in
the definition.
(vii) The PP Act 1971 will apply to the
tenancies which may have been created and
in existence either before coming into force of
the Act or which may have been created
subsequent to coming into the force of the
Act.
(viii) Two conditions must be satisfied for the
applicability as above. Firstly, the tenanted
premises must fall within the purview of
definition under Section 2(e) of the PP Act
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1971. Secondly, the premises should have
been in unauthorised occupation.
(ix) Termination of tenancy of ‘Pubic
Premises’ by issuing notice under Section 106
of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is one of
the modes which would render the occupation
of the tenant unauthorised, post the date
specified in such notice. This would hold true
in respect of tenancies created before or after
coming into force of the PP Act 1971.
(x) Invocation and applicability of the
provisions of the PP Act 1971 is not
dependent upon the aspect of possession.
What is material is the occupation of the
premises which has become unauthorised
occupation. The occupation is a continuous
concept.
(xi) The propositions enunciated in Suhas
2
H. Pophale , as noticed in paragraph 3.3.6 of
this judgment, do not, in our considered view,
state the correct position of law. The
observations made therein, with great
respect, are not in consonance with the
settled legal principles and runs contrary to
the principle of stare decisis and stand
overruled to that extent.
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14. The Reference is answered accordingly.
…………………………………..…,J.
(VIKRAM NATH)
…………………………………..…, J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
…………………………………..…, J.
(N.V. ANJARIA)
NEW DELHI
DECEMBER 11, 2025.
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