Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
PALANIVELAYUTHAM PILLAI & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
RAMACHANDRAN & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/05/2000
BENCH:
U.C.Banerjee, S.B.Majumdar
JUDGMENT:
S.B.Majmudar, J.
This appeal, on grant of special leave, is moved by
Defendant nos. 1-4 in Original Suit no.341 of 1968 in the
Court of the Subordinate Judge of Madurai in the State of
Tamilnadu. The said suit was filed by Respondent nos. 2 &
3 herein as plaintiffs against number of other defendants
with which we are not concerned in this appeal. The said
suit was filed for partition and separate possession of the
plaintiffs undivided share in the suit properties scheduled
A, B & C. It was contended that the plaintiffs and
the 7th defendant were the sons of one Sivasankaran Pillai
through his second wife, while the Defendant nos. 1,5 & 6
were the sons of the said Sivasankaran Pillai through his
first wife. The 8th defendant was the second wife of
Sivasankaran Pillai. Sivasankaran Pillai died on 27th
January, 1956. According to the plaintiffs, the suit
properties were the ancestral properties of the said
Sivasankaran Pillai who inherited the same. That the said
properties remained as joint family properties and the
plaintiff and Defendant nos. 1,5 & 6 were continuing as
undivided members of the joint family even after the death
of Sivasankaran Pillai.
The contesting Defendant nos. 1, 5 & 6 resisted the
suit on various grounds. In the present proceedings, the
dispute centers around schedule C properties only. Hence
we may not dilate on other properties and the nature of
dispute between the contesting defendants qua them. So far
as schedule C properties were concerned, the contention of
the contesting defendants was that they were gifted by the
original owner one Palanivelayutham Pillai by a Gift Deed
dated 18th February, 1907 in favour of Madurai Devasthanam
Tirupparankundram Andavar Subramaniaswamy and consequently,
they were not liable to be partitioned amongst the
descendants of said settlor. It was further contended that
under the said Gift Deed the right of management of the
aforesaid endowed properties was entrusted, on the death of
the settlor, to his second wife who had to continue
charitable performances for the deity along with her heirs
and had to act as a trustee qua these properties. That the
said designated trustee, the second wife of the settlor
Pitchammal alias Avudai Ammal, after the death of the
settlor, had continued to manage the said properties as a
trustee. That she had executed a General Power of Attorney
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on 3rd August, 1922 in favour of R. Sivasankaran Pillai
whose properties were sought to be got partitioned in the
present suit. That, amongst others, the said Sivasankaran
Pillai was entrusted with the task to manage and maintain
schedule C properties and to perform the charitable
activities as per the document executed by the deceased
husband of Pitchammal. That by a Will dated 27th January,
1924, the said Pitchammal also appointed the very same
Sivasankaran Pillai and his wife Subbammal who pre-deceased
Sivasankaran Pillai, as successor trustees after her death.
He alone, therefore, remained the repository of the right of
management of schedule C properties. That the said
Pitchammal died on 24th June, 1950 and thereafter
Sivasankaran Pillai continued to manage the schedule C
properties pursuant to the Will dated 27th January, 1924.
That the said Sivasankaran Pillai, by his Will (Ex.B-487)
dated 1st July, 1955, bequeath the rights of management and
trusteeship to Defendant no.9 - K.Sethuramalingam Pillai,
his son-in-law, so far as schedule C properties were
concerned. While on the same day he executed another Will
qua his other properties in favour of Defendant nos. 1, 5 &
6. The plaintiffs contention was that the aforesaid two
Wills of Sivasankaran Pillai were unauthorised, illegal and
inoperative at law. Earlier, the present appellants
resisted the said suit and contended that the Wills were
legal and valid but subsequently by an amended written
statement Defendant nos. 1,5 & 6 parted company of
Defendant no.9 and submitted that Sivasankaran Pillais Will
(Ex.B-487) dated 1st July, 1955 in favour of Defendant no.9
entrusting the management of schedule C properties to him
after testators death was not legally proved and, in any
case, was inoperative at law as Sivasankaran Pillai could
not Will away the right of management of schedule C
properties to a stranger like Defendant no.9, who was his
son-in-law, bypassing his own sons who were his heirs.
The learned Trial Judge, after recording evidence
offered by the contesting parties, came to the conclusion
that so far as schedule C properties were concerned, they
could not be partitioned being kattalai properties i.e.
consisting of special grant for religious services in a
temple. The learned Trial Judge, however, held that the
Will of 1st July, 1955 (Ex. B-487) entrusting the
management of the aforesaid schedule C properties to his
son-in-law, Defendant no.9, bypassing his own sons was duly
proved and was perfectly legal and valid. The aforesaid
decision was rendered by the learned Trial Judge on 30th
November, 1976.
Being aggrieved by the said decision of the learned
Trial Judge, the present appellants along with Defendant
no.5 filed first Appeal no. 1058 of 1977 in the High Court
of Judicature at Madras. The appeal was confined to
schedule C properties and two contentions were canvassed
for consideration of the High Court. They are : 1) Whether
the Will (Ex. B-487) dated 1st July, 1955 said to have been
executed by Sivasankaran Pillai favouring Defendant no. 9
was legal and valid and was duly proved. 2) Whether under
the aforesaid Will Sivasankaran Pillai was authorised to
entrust trusteeship and management of schedule C
properties, i.e. kattalai properties, to a stranger like
Defendant no.9, who was his son-in-law, bypassing his own
sons. The Division Bench of the High Court, by its impugned
judgment dated 12th July, 1984, negated both these
contentions and upheld the decision of the Trial Court on
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these issues. That is how the appellants-original Defendant
nos. 1-4 have landed in this Court in the present
proceedings by obtaining special leave to appeal under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
RIVAL CONTENTIONS: Learned counsel for the appellants
Shri Sampath in support of the appeal vehemently contended
that Sivasankaran Pillai, the father of Appellant no.1 was
not having any sound disposing state of mind on the date on
which he is said to have executed the Will (Ex. B-487) i.e.
on 1st July, 1955. That he was almost invalid and was not
having enough mental poise and that the Will was clouded by
many suspicious circumstances. He further submitted that,
in any case, the Will was not legally proved as attesting
witnesses to the said Will were not examined in proof
thereof. He alternatively contended that, in any case, the
Will could not be treated as a valid legal document under
which the right of management of schedule C kattalai
properties could be entrusted to a stranger to the family
like Defendant no.9, who was his son-in-law, bypassing the
appellants, who were his straight lineal descendants. In
support of this alternative contention, it was submitted
that the original endowment of schedule C properties,
pursuant to the Gift Deed of Palanivelayutham Pillai dated
18th February, 1907, created a life interest or widows
estate in favour of his second wife Pitchammal who had to
carry on religious and charitable performances along with
her heirs after the death of the donor; and as Pitchammal
had no issues or her legal heirs, on the death of
Pitchammal, the right of management would revert to the
reversioners being the lineal descendants of original
settlor - Palanivelayutham Pillai. That Pitchammal died on
24th June, 1950. Thereafter, Sivasankaran Pillai, as a
reversioner, could continue in management of the Kattalai
properties but he, in his turn, could not have willed away
the said right of management in favour of Defendant no.9,
who was a stranger to the family. That right of management
would legally enure in favour of Sivasankaran Pillais
lineal descendants - like appellants and Defendant no.5 and
consequently the Will (Ex.B-487) of Sivasankaran Pillai was
legally inoperative even on this ground. It was also
contended by Shri Sampath that pending the suit, even
Defendant no.9 has died, and his heir - Defendant no.10 -
his widowed wife, who is the sister of Appellant no.1, was
bequeathed with the right of management of schedule C
properties by Defendant no.9 by his own Will in her favour
and that the said Will would fall through if it is held that
the Will (Ex.B-487) dated 1st July, 1955 of Sivasankaran
Pillai in favour of Defendant no.9 itself was inoperative in
law.
It was also contended that by an Order dated 13th
September, 1945 of the Board of Commissioner for Hindu
Religious Endowments, Madras, a scheme of administration was
settled under Section 57 of the Madras Hindu Religious
Endowments Act, 1926 (Madras Act II of 1927) for
administration of the kattalai known as Palani Velayudham
Pillais specific endowments for Uchikalam kamalapatram
service and feeding on Karthigai Monday for Sri
Subramaniaswamy Temple, Tirupparankundram, Madurai. That
the said order was passed at the time when Sivasankaran
Pillai was managing the properties under the General Power
of Attorney dated 3rd August, 1922 executed by Pitchammal in
his favour. Therefore, the kattalai trustee had to be
governed by the said scheme of administration and that
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Defendant no.9 who was managing the schedule C properties,
had not complied with the requirements of the said scheme.
Learned senior counsel for the contesting respondents
- Defendant no.9 and Defendant no.10, being the heir of
Defendant no.9 (since deceased), on the other hand,
contended that the decision rendered by the High Court on
the aforesaid points is quite justified and calls for no
interference. That the testamentary capacity of deceased
Sivasankaran Pillai has been found to be well sustained on
record. That there were no suspicious circumstances
surrounding the Will; that the Will was legally proved as
the scribe was also an attesting witness and was examined as
such. Consequently, the Will was legally proved; that mere
presence of Defendant no.9 at the time of execution of the
Will could not be treated to be a suspicious circumstance
when, on the same day, the testator executed two Wills and
got them registered. One Will (Ex. B-487) was in favour of
Defendant no.9 and another Will (Ex. B-488) was executed in
favour of contesting defendants themselves, the appellants
herein, and Defendant nos. 5 & 6 so far as his personal
properties were concerned. On the legality of the Will, it
was submitted that by the Gift Deed (Ex. B- 506) the
settlor appointed his second wife Pitchammal as manager and
trustee qua schedule C properties, entrusting her with the
duties of carrying on charitable performances indicated in
the Gift Deed and though she had to carry on these
performances along with her heirs, in the absence of her
legal heirs, she became entrusted with absolute right of
management and trusteeship and could not be treated as
having widows estate or limited interest. Hence, there was
no question of the said right of management and trusteeship
devolving on the reversioners on her death. That she had
every right to appoint her successor manager which she did
by appointing Appellant no.1’s father - Sivasankaran Pillai
by her Will dated 27th January, 1924 (Ex. B-26) which
started operating on 24th June, 1950, when Pitchammal died.
That thereafter Sivasankaran Pillai performing the duties of
management pursuant to his appointment by Pitchammal also
had equal right to appoint another manager on his demise as
per the impugned Will (Ex.B-487) dated 1st July, 1955
favouring Defendant no.9. That the settlor had not reserved
the right of management to be confined to his own lineal
descendants but had completely parted with the same in
favour of his second wife Pitchammal pursuant to the Gift
Deed (Ex. B-506) and consequently whatever Pitchammal did
was binding not only on Sivasankaran Pillai but also to his
successor manager as per his Will (Ex.B-487) dated 1st July,
1955. That there was no restriction on the right of
Sivasankaran Pillai to appoint the manager of his choice on
his demise so far as schedule C properties were concerned
and that is exactly what he had done by the impugned Will
(Ex. B-487) dated 1st July, 1955 and, therefore, the High
Court was right in upholding the said Will in favour of
Defendant no.9. Once that conclusion is reached, Defendant
no.9, as a manager of these properties, was equally
competent to entrust the said management on his demise to
Defendant no.10 as his successor manager. So far as the
Order dated 13th September, 1945 of the Board of
Commissioner for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras is
concerned, it was submitted that no reliance was placed on
the same during the trial and, therefore, the appellants
cannot raise any contention in that behalf. However,
Respondent no.8, Executive Officer appearing for the
Devasthanam - originally joined as Defendant no.11 in the
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suit, submitted that the scheme settled by the Order dated
13th September, 1945 could not be enforced earlier because
of the pendency of this litigation and the said scheme will
be given effect in the light of the decision of this Court,
whereunder the appropriate kattalai trustee will be
ascertained and the said trustee will have to act under the
supervision of the Executive Officer for the time being in
force. In the light of the aforesaid rival contentions, the
following points arise for our consideration : 1. Whether
the Will (Ex. B-487) dated 1st July, 1955 said to have been
executed by Sivasankaran Pillai in favour of Defendant no.9
was legally proved. 2. Whether the said Will was
surrounded by suspicious circumstances and was required to
be rejected. 3. Whether the aforesaid Will can be treated
to be legal and valid in so far as it tried to entrust the
management of kattalai properties in favour of a stranger to
the family, Defendant no.9, bypassing the sons of
Sivasankaran Pillai. 4. Even if the aforesaid points are
decided against the appellants and in favour of Defendant
nos. 9 & 10, whether the scheme of administration settled
as per the Order dated 13th September, 1945 of the Board of
Commissioner for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras is
required to be enforced against the kattalai trustee, now
Defendant no.10, who is the legatee of the management rights
as per the Will executed by Defendant no.9 in her favour.
We shall deal with these points seriatim. POINT NO.1: So
far as the proof of Will (Ex. B-487) dated 1st July, 1955
is concerned, a mere look at the said Will shows that apart
from two attesting witnesses S. Ramachandran and R.
Balakrishnan, T.K.Sankara Narayanan, who is the scribe of
the Will, has also witnessed the same. The description of
Sankara Narayanan mentions that it is written and witnessed
by him and when he was examined in proof of the said Will
before the Trial Court, it cannot be said that the attesting
witnesses were not examined in proof of the said Will. The
submission of learned counsel Shri Sampath appearing for the
appellants to the effect that Sankara Narayanan is shown to
be a witness in the other Will (Ex. B-488) dated 1st July,
1955 is now not shown to be a witness simpliciter so far as
the disputed Will is concerned and, therefore, he should not
be treated as an attesting witness to the latter Will,
cannot be countenanced. It is difficult to appreciate this
contention. If the Will (Ex. B-487) had shown Sankara
Narayanan only as a scribe, Shri Sampath would have been
right. But the Will shows that Sankara Narayanan ascribed
his signature apart from describing himself as a scribe. It
must, therefore, be held that the disputed Will was attested
by three attesting witnesses out of which one Sankara
Narayanan was examined in the Trial Court for proving the
said Will. The Trial Court as well as the High Court were
justified in taking the view that the Will (Ex. B-487) was
duly executed. It has also to be kept in view that on the
very same day the testator executed and got the Will
registered along with the other Will (Ex. B-488) in favour
of Defendant nos. 1,5 & 6. Point no.1 is, therefore,
answered in the affirmative in favour of the contesting
respondents and against the appellants.
POINT NO.2: So far as this point is concerned, it has
to be kept in view that both the Trial Court as well as the
High Court have concurrently held on facts that the deceased
testator was in a sound disposing state of mind and was
capable of executing the Will and that there were no
suspicious circumstances surrounding the Will. Merely
because Defendant no.9 was present at the time of execution
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of both the wills, it could not be said that it was a
suspicious circumstance. It has also to be kept in view
that on the very same day i.e on 1st July, 1955 the testator
Sivasankaran Pillai executed two Wills, one - the disputed
Will (Ex. B-487) in favour of Defendant no.9 so far as
schedule C kattalai properties and their management were
concerned. But simultaneously at the same sitting on the
same day, he executed another Will (Ex. B-488) in favour of
the appellants & Defendant nos. 5 & 6, his own sons so far
as his personal properties were concerned. Both the Wills
were got registered simultaneously. It is easy to visualise
that if the Will in favour of appellants and Defendant nos.
5 & 6 executed by the testator on the very same day can be
found to be legal and valid though held by the Trial Court
to have not been acted upon, it cannot be held by any
stretch of imagination that the same testator, who was in
sound disposing state of mind, while executing a valid Will
(Ex. B-488) in favour of Appellants and Defendant nos. 5 &
6 would loose his testamentary capacity while executing on
the same day at the same time another disputed Will (Ex. B-
487) in favour of Defendant no.9. The appellants cannot be
permitted to blow hot and cold at the same time. Of course,
Shri Sampath, learned counsel for the appellants, submitted
that he does not rely upon the Will (Ex. B-488) as it is
not acted upon but that is neither here nor there. Even if
the Will in favour of the appellants might not have been
acted upon for reasons best known to them after the demise
of the testator, that would not affect due execution of the
said Will by the testator nor would it affect his
testamentary capacity qua the disputed Will executed on the
same day and got registered by the testator simultaneously
with the Will (Ex. B-488) in favour of the appellants and
Defendant nos. 5 & 6. Even though an attempt was made to
show that the testator was unwell and confined to bed and
the plaintiffs went to the extreme and submitted that
testator was a lunatic, the evidence on record shows to the
contrary. He might be old and suffering from illness but
his testamentary capacity is not shown to be affected
adversely in any manner when on the same day he executed two
Wills and got them registered. The findings reached about
testamentary capacity of the testator by the Trial Court and
confirmed by the High Court are well sustained on evidence
and cannot be said to be suffering from any patent error of
law or being perverse which would call for our interference
in appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
Reliance tried to be placed by learned counsel Shri Sampath
for the appellants on the three decisions of this Court in
Bhagwan Kaur w/o Bachan Singh v. Kartar Kaur w/o Bachan
Singh & Ors., (1994) 5 SCC 135, H. Venkatachala Iyengar v.
B.N.Thimmajamma & Ors., AIR (46) 1959 SC 443 and Ramchandra
Rambux v. Champabai & Ors., AIR (52) 1965 SC 354 also
cannot be of any assistance to him as the fact situations
which fell for consideration in the aforesaid decisions were
entirely different and suspicious circumstances considered
in these decisions are found to be totally absent, so far as
the facts of the present case is concerned.
Mr. Sampath tried to highlight certain circumstances,
which according to him, were highly suspicious. We may
briefly refer to them. He submitted that under normal
circumstances any reasonable person like the testator, would
not disinherit his own children, i.e the appellant no.1 and
his brothers nor would he prefer a total stranger as a sole
legatee of schedule C properties. This contention is
totally devoid of force. The reason is obvious. So far as
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schedule C properties were concerned, they were not
personal properties of Sivashankaran Pillai. They were
endowed properties belonging to the temple. Mere right of
management was given to him by earlier manager Pitchammal
and it is this right of management which was being entrusted
by him to Defendant no.9, who was found to be a capable
manager. So far as the personal properties are concerned,
the testator executed another Will (Ex.B-488) on the same
day in favour of his own children, including the appellants.
He had, therefore, not disinherited them qua his own
personal properties. The second suspicious circumstance
highlighted by Shri Sampath was to the effect that Defendant
no.9, being beneficiary of the Will, had actively
participated in its execution. That is neither here nor
there. Even despite his active participation, Defendant
no.9 saw to it that the testator bequeathed his personal
properties in favour of his own sons, namely, the appellants
and Defendant nos. 5 & 6.
It has also to be kept in view that Defendant no.9 was
brother-in-law of Appellant no.1 and a trusted worldly wise
person on whom the testator, his father-in-law, had full
trust. He was not shown to be inimical to the appellants
when the disputed Will was executed. In fact, he was
looking after the interest of the entire family. Thus his
presence proved to be beneficial not only to him but also to
the appellants. The next circumstance pressed in service
was that the testator was residing with Defendant no.9 in
his house. This, to say the least, is not a suspicious
circumstance but a relevant circumstance which would
persuade the testator to entrust the management of the
kattalai properties to Defendant no.9. The next
circumstance tried to be highlighted by Shri Sampath was
that the testator was seriously ill and had undergone
abdominal operation and was unconscious and had no capacity
to understand things. It is difficult to appreciate this
contention. Even though the testator might be ill and might
have undergone abdominal operation, he could not be said to
be unconscious when he himself got the Will registered
before the authorities when the registering officer remained
present in the house of Defendant no.9 between 8 9 in the
morning and ascertained the willingness and capacity of the
testator in getting the Will executed and registered by the
authority. Shri Sampath tried to submit that the scribe got
the Will executed by the testator by exercising undue
influence and coercion. This contention, to say the least,
is not at all borne out from the evidence when the very same
scribe became an attesting witness to the Will (Ex. B-488)
in favour of appellants themselves and Defendant nos. 5 &
6. If he was out to pressurise the testator to disinherit
the appellants and Defendant nos. 5 & 6, he would never
have stood as an attesting witness to the Will (Ex. B-488)
in favour of Defendant nos. 1, 5 & 6 on the very same day
on which it was executed by the testator along with the
disputed Will. Resultantly, point no. 2 is also answered
against the appellants and in favour of the contesting
respondents.
POINT NO.3: So far as this point is concerned, we
have to trace the genesis and the nature of the management
entrusted to Sivasankaran Pillai by the deceased Pitchammal.
The first document, in chronology, is the Gift Deed
(Ex.B-506) dated 18th February, 1907. It recites that the
donor Palani Velayutham Pillai was donating the properties
in favour of Madurai Devasthanam Tirupparankumdram Andavar
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Subramania swamy. These properties were gifted to the
temple for the purpose of performing poojas and Archanas to
the deity daily at noon, for performing lotus archana in
every karthigai month and for Bhojanas to Brahmins and
others. The Gift Deed also recited that excluding the
payment of government taxes the remaining income derived out
from the under-mentioned properties had to be utilised for
the aforesaid purpose by the management of the trustee and
in case of death of the donor prior to the death of his
second wife, she will continue the said charitable
performances along with her heirs and after the amount spent
for the said purpose, an amount of Rs.2/- per month had to
be detained by them and she had to act as a trustee. In the
event of any fault on the part of performing the said
charitable performances, the Devasthanam was entitled to
question the same. He also consented for transferring the
patta as a trustee of the properties in the name of the
deity. These recitals clearly indicate that the donor
wanted the right of mangement of the donated properties to
be entrusted to his second wife along with her heirs after
the lifetime of the donor. It is obvious that the
properties belong to the temple. A mere right of managing
the properties, as a trustee, by collecting income therefrom
and for utilising the same for performing the religious
ceremonies and charitable performances as laid down in the
Gift Deed was entrusted to his second wife along with her
heirs. It is pertinent to note that this mere right of
management as a trustee did not confer any proprietary right
in the property donated to the temple. The only proprietary
right was to collect an amount of Rs.2/- per month as
remuneration for performing the duties of a trustee
entrusted to his second wife along with her heirs. It is
also necessary to note that this mere right of management as
a trustee charged with the duty to perform religious and
charitable performances was the kattalai grant to donors
second wife along with her heirs. It is pertinent to note
that the donor, who is the settlor, had not entrusted the
right of management as successor trustees to any of his
heirs or lineal descendants. He, on the contrary, chose to
select his own second wife and her heirs for discharging
this obligation. It is, therefore, not possible to agree
with the contention of Shri Sampath, learned counsel for the
appellants, that the aforesaid recitals in the Gift Deed
conferred any life interest or widows estate to the donors
second wife, after his demise. On the contrary, the right
of management and to act as trustee for the same without any
proprietary interest in the donated properties was only
conferred on his second wife along with her heirs.
In this connection, we may usefully refer to the
observations of learned author B.K.Mukherjea on The Hindu
Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts - Fifth Edition by
A.C. Sen, Eastern Law House in connection with Kattalai
grants in South India. The learned speaker in one of his
lectures reproduced in the aforesaid book at pages 198-200
observed as under:
XIV. KATTALAI GRANTS IN SOUTH INDIA 4.55. Kattalai
or special grant.- Before I close this chapter one thing
requires to be noticed and that is a special grant for
religious services in a temple which is in vogue in Southern
India and is known by the name of Kattalai. As Muttusami
Aiyyar, J. explained in Vythilinga v. Somasundara, in
ordinary parlance, the term Kattalai as applied to temple
means endowments and signifies a special endowment for
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certain specific service or religious charity in the temple.
Ardajama Kattalai or endowment for midnight service is an
instance of the former and Annadan Kattalai or an endowment
for distributing food to the poor is an example of the
latter. In this sense the word Kattalai is used in
contradistinction to the endowment designed generally for
the upkeep and maintenance of the temple. Persons who endow
properties for kattalais are entitled to appoint special
trustees to administer them, and the general trustees of the
institution have no right to dispossess them. And if under
the terms of the grant, the special trustee has to utilise
the income for specified services in the temple, the general
trustee has the right, as the person in charge generally of
the temple, to require the special trustee to hand over the
income to him. But the special trustee is, in respect of
the management of the kattalai properties, under the same
obligations as a trustee, and an alienation by him of those
properties would be void, unless it is for necessity or
benefit. In the case of some important temples, the sources
of the income are classified into distinct endowments
according to their importance. Each endowment is placed
under a separate trustee and specific items of expenditure
are assigned to it as legitimate charges to be paid
therefrom. Each of such endowments is called also a
Kattalai and the trustee who administers it is called the
Kattlaigar or stanik of the particular Kattalai. The
import of this expression was discussed in detail by
Sesagiri Aiyyar, J. in Ambala Vana v Sree Minakshy.
According to him, this expression is used with reference to
three different kinds of endowments. Properties may be
endowed- (a) for the performance of pujas in the temple,
or (b) for the performance of certain festivals in the
temple, or (c) for the performance of Archanas to the deity
in the name of the donors. (a) Ordinarily, the puja is not
performed in the name of the donor, and consequently,
supplementary grants are made by pious persons in order that
the service should be more efficiently performed. Instances
of this type of grant are to be found in the famous temple
at Chidambaram, where almost all the necessary daily
services are conducted by means of Kattalais endowed by
pious donors. (b) It also happens that where lands for
funds in respect of particular service or festival at
temples are not sufficient for conducting them on the
original scale, new donors come forward to supplement these
funds. (c) For Archana, however, no supplementary grant by
other donors is possible. It is intended solely for the
spiritual benefit of the grantor and it is not the concern
of third parties to help in his performance if the funds are
for any reason not found sufficient. Whatever the exact
nature of Kattalais may be-and that must depend upon the
usages of particular temples-one fact ought to be remembered
in this connection, and that is that when the grant is to
the deity and the income of particular funds is earmarked
for special services which are entrusted to special
trustees, if there is a surplus which cannot be spent on
these services, it would be a case for the application of
the cy pres doctrine and the special trustee can, on no
account, claim the surplus. This has been held by the
Judicial Committee in an appeal from the Madras High Court.
These observations clearly indicate that the grantee
of such special endowment derives his or her right of
management from the appointment by the settlor and could not
be treated to be having independent proprietary right in the
subject matter of the grant.
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Once this conclusion is reached, it becomes obvious
that the right of management as a trustee which inhered in
donors second wife - Pitchammal after his death could be
independently exercised by her along with her heirs. Now it
is not in dispute that she had no issues or lineal
descendants. Therefore, the phrase along with her heirs
on that score became redundant and she had every right to
mange on her own the donated properties as a trustee. Even
alternatively, as submitted by learned senior counsel for
the contesting respondents, it could be held that her heirs
may even include her testamentary heirs. In either way
Pitchammal, the second wife of the settlor, had every right
to select successor trustee in her place by her Will. That
is precisely what she did by executing her Will (Ex.B-26)
dated 27th January, 1924 in favour of Sivasankaran Pillai,
father of appellant no.1. It is not in dispute that even
prior to the said Will, the said Sivasankaran Pillai under
the General Power of Attorney dated 3rd August, 1922 from
Pitchammal, was managing the trust properties as her agent.
But on the death of Pitchammal on 24th June, 1950 the Will
(Ex.B-26) became operative in his favour and he became the
successor trustee and manager of these properties charged
with the obligation to carry out the religious and
charitable performances as directed in the Gift Deed of the
settlor. It has also to be kept in view that the said
entrustment of trusteeship rights by Pitchammal in favour of
Sivasankaran Pillai by her Will (Ex.B-26) dated 27th
January, 1924 is not in dispute between the parties.
However, Shri Sampath, learned counsel for the appellants,
tried to put a gloss over this will by submitting that even
otherwise Sivasankaran Pillai, the legatee under
Pitchammals Will, was himself the lineal descendant of
settlor Palanivelayutham Pillai and can be said to be the
heir of Pitchammal. It is difficult to appreciate this
contention. The Gift Deed of 18th February, 1907 nowhere
mentioned, as noted earlier, that the donor wanted
trusteeship and management of properties to go to his lineal
heirs. That Sivasankaran Pillai got the right of management
and trusteeship only because of the Will of Pitchammal who
had every right to will away the said trusteeship in favour
of anyone she liked unfettered by any restrictions found in
the original Gift Deed conferring right of management to her
for the first time.
In view of the aforesaid finding of ours, it is
equally not possible for us to accept the contention of Shri
Sampath that when Sivasankaran Pillai wanted to make Will in
connection with the right of management of the temple
properties, he ought to have and should have preferred only
his own sons and not a stranger like Defendant no.9. In
fact, that was the main contention of learned counsel for
the appellants. He submitted that the Will (Ex.B-487) of
Sivasankaran Pillai, favouring Defendant no.9 dated 1st
July, 1955 was, in any case, unauthorised and illegal as the
testator Sivasankaran Pillai could not have willed away the
right of management of temple properties to Defendant no.9
who was not his lineal descendant but was a stranger to the
family being, his son-in- law. This submission is totally
devoid of any force. Sivasankaran Pillai, by his impugned
Will (Ex.B-487) dated 1st July, 1955 in his turn selected an
appropriate manager for the trust properties charged with
the obligation of trusteeship to carry on the charitable
performances. The said Will itself shows that he was acting
as per the directions and demands of Pitchammal and because
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of his bad health he was unable to continue the said
charitable performances and, therefore, he was bequeathing
the said right in favour of Defendant no.9, his son in law.
It has to be kept in view that it was a mere right of
management and not a proprietary right which inhered in the
testator Sivasankaran Pillai pursuant to the earlier Will of
Pitchammal in his favour. He, as a successor trustee and
manager, had to select the best available person of his
choice to act after his demise as trustee and manager of the
temple properties with a view to continue the charitable
performances as originally entrusted by donor in favour of
his second wife Pitchammal and under whose directions he was
acting during her lifetime and had to act under her Will
after her demise. To recapitulate, as the original settlor
had not reserved the right of management and trusteeship of
these properties donated by him to the temple for his lineal
descendants and, on the contrary, had handed over that right
to his second wife and had further left the said management
to her, along with her heir, such absolute right being
conferred on her by the settlor could be well utilised by
her in selecting a successor of her choice. That is
precisely what was done by her by her Will of 3rd August,
1922 and in exercise of the same right conferred on
Sivasankaran Pillai, he in his turn as her representative
validly executed the impugned Will in favour of Defendant
no.9. It cannot, therefore, be held that the Will
(Ex.B-487) of 1st July, 1955 was in any way unauthorised or
illegal. It has to be kept in view that Pitchammal herself
was not appointed by her husband as a shebait of the
properties. She had a mere right to manage the properties
on which she had every right to bequeath to any person of
her choice unfettered by any other restrictions in this
connection. It is the very same unfettered right which got
transmitted from her to Sivasankaran Pillai by her Will
dated 27th January, 1924 and which further got transmitted
by him in favour of Defendant no.9 by the impugned Will
(Ex.B-487) dated 1st July, 1955. It is, therefore, not
possible to agree with the contention of Shri Sampath,
learned counsel for the appellants, that Sivasankaram Pillai
was bound to entrust the management and trusteeship qua the
temple properties to any of his sons and could not have
selected a stranger like Defendant no.9. It has to be kept
in view that mere right of management of trusteeship
unfettered by any direction of the original settlor could be
entrusted by Sivasankaran Pillai in his turn to any
competent person of his choice, only for the limited purpose
of management not backed up by any proprietary right in
connection with the trust properties which, admittedly,
belong to the deity.
Reliance placed by Shri Sampath, learned counsel for
the appellants, in the case of Kalipada Chakraborti & Anr.
v. Sm. Palani Bala Devi and Ors. AIR (40) 1953 SC 125
cannot be of any assistance to him. In that case,
B.K.Mukherjea, J. speaking for the three-Judge Bench
observed in this connection about Shebaitship as under:
(b) Hindu Law Religious endowments Shebaitship.
Whatever might be said about the office of a trustee, which
carries no beneficial interest with it, a shebaitship,
combines in it both the elements of office and property. As
the shebaiti interest is heritable and follows the line of
inheritance from the founder, obviously, when the heir is a
female, she must be deemed to have, what is known, as
widows estate in the shebaiti interest. It is quite true
that regarding the powers of alienation a female shebait is
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restricted in the same manner as the male shebait, but that
is because there are certain limitations and restrictions
attached to and inherent in the shebaiti right itself which
exist irrespective of the fact whether the shebaitship vests
in a male or a female heir.
It must be kept in view that in the light of the
recitals in the Gift Deed of 18th February, 1907, as noted
by us earlier, it cannot be said that the settlor had given
any shebaitship rights to his second wife nor had he laid
down any line of inheritance qua such shebaitship in his
Gift Deed. It was a mere right of membership entrusted to
his second wife with a further right given to her to execute
the office of trusteeship along with her heirs and without
any reference to the settlor or his heirs. The aforesaid
decision, therefore, on the facts of the present case, does
not get attracted. On the contrary, in an earlier judgment
of this Court in the case of Ram Gopal v. Nand Lal & Ors.
AIR (38) 1951 SC 139, the same learned Judge B.K.Mukherjea,
J., speaking for the Court, while dealing with the right of
hindu widow in connection with the gift of property, made
the following pertinent observations: The mere fact that
the gift of property is made for the support and maintenance
of a female relation cannot be taken to be a prima facie
indication of the intention of the donor, that the donee was
to enjoy the property only during her lifetime. The extent
of interest, which the donee is to take, depends upon the
intention of the donor as expressed by the language used,
and if the dispositive words employed in the document are
clear and unambiguous and import absolute ownership, the
purpose of the grant would not, by itself, restrict or cut
down the interest. The desire to provide maintenance or
residence for the donee would only show the motive which
prompted the donor to make the gift, but it could not be
read as a measure of the extent of the gift.
It is, of course, true that the aforesaid observations
were in connection with the absolute gift of properties in
favour of a hindu widow. But the principle laid down
therein can squarely get attracted while interpreting and
giving effect to the recitals in the Gift Deed of 18th
February, 1907. The settlors intention is very clear that
he wanted to entrust right of trusteeship and management to
his second wife along with her heirs without any fetter or
restriction on her power to appoint successor manager after
her demise. For all these reasons above, the third point
for determination, therefore, also is answered in the
affirmative in favour of the contesting respondents and
against the appellants. That takes us to the consideration
of the last point.
POINT NO.4: Learned senior counsel for the
respondents was right when he contended that the scheme of
administration settled by the Board of Commissioner for
Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras on 13th September, 1945
was not highlighted or relied upon before the Trial Court or
even before the High Court. However, it cannot be forgotten
that such an Order of the Commissioner is already on the
record of the case and that Order was rendered during the
lifetime of Pitchammal when Sivasankaran Pillai was also
very much in the management of the endowed properties as a
General Power of Attorney holder of Pitchammal. A mere look
at the Order shows that for this very endowment of kattalai,
a scheme of administration was settled under Section 57 of
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the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926 (Madras Act
II of 1927). It would be binding on Sivasankaran Pillai as
General Power of Attorney holder of Pitchammal and after her
death also, as the legatee and manager of the kattalai
properties, Sivasankaran Pillai would be bound by the said
scheme and similarly, whoever is the successor trustee
appointed by him under the Will (Ex.B-487) of 1st July, 1955
would also be bound by the said scheme and similarly any
further trustee appointed for management of the kattalai
properties would also be bound by the said scheme so long as
the scheme is not altered by the competent authorities. It
cannot be disputed that Defendant no.9 would be bound by the
said scheme as legatee of the right of management under Will
(Ex.B-487) of Sivasankaran Pillai dated 1st July, 1955.
Similarly any further entrustment of the said right of
management by Defendant no.9 in favour of Defendant no.10 by
his Will will also be subject to the binding settled scheme
of 1945 and she will have to act under the directions of the
Executive Officer as per the scheme settled for this very
kattalai endowment as per the Order of 13th September, 1945.
Even the Executive Officer of the Devasthanam, who is
governed by the said Order, is a party to the proceedings
being Defendant no.11. Learned counsel for Defendant no.11
submitted before us that relevant provisions of the scheme
were not effectively implemented till now because the
authorities were awaiting the decision of this Court as to
who will be the kattalai manager. Once that dispute is
resolved and proper kattalai trustee is indicated all the
provisions of the scheme as per Order dated 13th September,
1945 will be enforced. In this connection, we may usefully
refer to what the High Court has to say in the impugned
judgment. In para-31 of the judgment, the High Court
observed as under:
31. We wish to add one thing. The performance of
the charities ordained in Ex.B.506 shall be carried out by
the defendants who are obliged to do so, under the
supervision of the 11th defendant.
The said direction is well sustained. We only want to
make it clear that the aforesaid directions of the High
Court to 11th defendant for supervising the working of the
charities ordained in Ex. B-506 will also have to be
carried out in the light of the Order of the Board of
Commissioner for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras dated
13th September, 1945. Defendant no.10, who is now the
legatee of the management rights as per the will executed by
Defendant no.9 in her favour, will also be bound by these
directions. Point no.4, therefore, is answered in the
affirmative in favour of the appellants and against
Defendant no.10.
As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the appeal
fails and is dismissed subject to the further directions
contained in our decision on point no.4. In the facts and
circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to
costs.