Full Judgment Text
2025 INSC 1147
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No (s). 27606 of 2023)
BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA
AND GOA ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
RAJIV NARESHCHANDRA
NARULA & ORS. ….RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
SLP (CIVIL) NO (s). of 2025
( @ Diary No(s). 38238 of 2023)
SLP (CIVIL) NO (S). 1492 OF 2024
J U D G M E N T
Mehta, J.
Civil Appeal @ SLP (Civil) No (s). 27606 of 2023
1. Heard.
2. Leave granted.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SONIA BHASIN
Date: 2025.09.24
16:04:16 IST
Reason:
1
1
3. The Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa is
before us through this appeal by way of special leave
th
assailing the interim order dated 04 November,
2023, passed by the High Court of Judicature at
2
Bombay in Writ Petition (L) No.23662 of 2023,
th
staying the order dated 6 July, 2023, passed by the
appellant-BCMG in Disciplinary Case No. 27 of 2023,
which reads as below:
“Exhibit – “A”
• After hearing the Complainant and Respondent
and after going through the document available
on record, according to me, Complainant has
made out a case by invoking Jurisdiction under
Section 35 of the Advocates Act;
• There is a prima facie case made out by the
Complainant against the Respondent. Hence, I
pass the following Order.
|| ORDER ||
Complaint is referred to D.C. for further
inquiry and disposal in accordance with law.
Ashish P. Deshmukh
Judge
06.07.2023”
4. By the aforesaid order, the Judge-Advocate took
cognizance of the complaint and directed reference
3
thereof to the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar
Council for inquiry against respondent No. 1, Shri
1
Hereinafter, referred to as the “BCMG”.
2
Hereinafter, referred to as the “High Court”.
3
For short, “DC”.
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C.A. @ SLP(Civil) No(s). 27606 of 2023 with connected matters
4
Rajiv Narula for alleged professional misconduct
referred to under Section 35 of the Advocates Act,
5
1961 .
5. The complaint in question was filed by one
6
Khimji Devji Parmar against the respondent-
advocate in the year 2022, alleging inter alia that he
was an heir to one Devji Parmar, who during his
lifetime was a partner of Dara Nariman Sarkari in a
firm functioning in the name and style of M/s. Volga
Enterprises. Shri Devji Parmar expired in the year
2009, on which the complainant inherited his assets
and liabilities.
6. The complainant set up a case that one Nusli
Randelia was the owner of a piece of land bearing CTS
Nos. 433 and 438, Old Survey No. 30 Hissa No. 4 (P)
in Village Valnai, Taluka Malad which he leased out
to Dara Nariman Sarkari.
7. Nusli Randelia had also entered into a
development agreement with the firm M/s. Volga
Enterprises, in which Shri Devji Parmar was a
partner, and in that capacity, he was in possession of
4
Hereinafter, referred to as the “respondent-advocate”
5
For short, “the 1961 Act”.
6
Hereinafter, referred to as the “complainant”.
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C.A. @ SLP(Civil) No(s). 27606 of 2023 with connected matters
the property. A suit was instituted by Dara Nariman
Sarkari bearing Suit No. 1129 of 1987 in the Court of
Small Causes, Bombay, in relation to the above land
wherein an injunction was granted against Nusli
Randelia, as well as M/s. Unique Construction,
which was also asserting title to the suit property.
8. The suit was dismissed for default on account
of the fact that Dara Nariman Sarkari had already
been impleaded as a party-defendant (defendant No.
2) in another similar suit bearing No. 2541 of 1985,
instituted by M/s Unique Construction, pending
before the High Court, wherein his rights would be
adjudicated. The complainant claimed that his father
always confided in him that the suit No.2541 of 1985
was pending, wherein he had the right, title, and
interest in the capacity of a partner of M/s. Volga
Enterprises.
9. Shri Devji Parmar, the complainant’s father
passed away in 2009, upon which he made enquiries
about the stage and status of the suit, and was
shocked to find out that the same had been disposed
of as settled on Consent Terms. Thereafter, he tried
to approach Dara Nariman Sarkari, but despite best
efforts, he could not trace him at his last known
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C.A. @ SLP(Civil) No(s). 27606 of 2023 with connected matters
address. The complainant also made efforts to locate
Nusli Randelia, but without any success. Thereupon,
the complainant contacted his father’s advocate and
collected the documents pertaining to the suit in
question and on a perusal thereof, he came to know
that M/s. Unique Construction – the plaintiff therein,
and Nusli Randelia – defendant No. 1, had obtained
a consent decree without the knowledge and consent
of defendant No. 2, i.e., Dara Nariman Sarkari. The
complainant continued to search for the whereabouts
of Dara Nariman Sarkari and eventually came to
know that he had passed away.
10. As per the complainant, his father was a partner
with Dara Nariman Sarkari in M/s. Volga Enterprises
and, hence, upon the death of Dara Nariman Sarkari
in 1991, his father, Devji Parmar, became entitled to
pursue and protect all the rights of the partnership
firm as the sole surviving partner. Consequent upon
the death of Devji Parmar, the complainant, along
with other heirs of Devji Parmar, inherited such
rights.
11. The complainant further alleged that during the
pendency of the suit, there was a sudden change of
advocate representing Nusli Randelia. One Ms.
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C.A. @ SLP(Civil) No(s). 27606 of 2023 with connected matters
Sheetal D. Mishra, Advocate (respondent No. 3), filed
th
a Vakalatnama on 6 June, 2005, on behalf of Nusli
Randelia without obtaining a “no-objection” from the
erstwhile advocate. Immediately upon the
Vakalatnama being filed, Consent Terms were arrived
at between M/s. Unique Construction and Nusli
Randelia in the said suit, which act was without the
knowledge of the erstwhile advocate on record, who
was personally knowing Nusli Randelia. A consent
decree was obtained without intimating Dara Sarkari
or obtaining his signatures on the said Consent
Terms.
12. As per the complainant, the respondent-
advocate suppressed the material fact from the High
Court that Dara Nariman Sarkari was a party to the
suit and that he had not affixed his signatures on the
Consent Terms. This deliberate omission on part of
the Advocate representing M/s. Unique
Construction, the plaintiff in the suit, tantamounted
to concealment of material fact whereby the legal
representatives of Dara Nariman Sarkari and Devji
Parmar were defrauded and deprived of their rightful
share in the suit property.
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13. The complainant further averred that the
Consent Terms had been prepared and filed in the
Court without recognition of the rights of Dara
Nariman Sarkari and M/s. Volga Enterprises in the
suit property. He also apprehended that the
consideration stipulated in the Consent Terms never
passed on to Nusli Randelia, who might even have
been impersonated before the Court, and his
signatures may also be forged and fabricated.
14. According to the complainant, someone other
than Nusli Randelia may have appeared before the
Court to execute the Consent Terms, or in all
probability, coercion was practiced upon Nusli
Randelia, who was induced and pressurised to sign
the Consent Terms without consideration. The
complainant also conjectured that Nusli Randelia
might have been abducted and murdered, as there
was neither any trace of him nor was any death
certificate available.
15. The complainant further alleged that the
Advocates arraigned in the complaint were complicit
to the crime as they were the direct beneficiaries of
the fraudulent transactions. Based on this
complaint, the Judge-Advocate of the BCMG
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th
proceeded to pass the order dated 6 July, 2023,
reproduced supra .
16. The respondent, Shri Rajiv Narula, filed an
affidavit-in-reply to the disciplinary complaint,
setting up a case that the complaint had been filed
by suppressing material facts. Various other
litigations filed by Nusli Randelia in respect of the
land in question had been decided against him, and
having lost in all the legal proceedings, Nusli
Randelia forged a document purporting to create
some rights in favour of Dara Sarkari so as to
frustrate the Court orders/decrees.
17. Upon coming to know of this fraud, M/s. Unique
Construction took out a Notice of Motion No. 2903 of
1987, for impounding all the documents which they
claimed had been fabricated by Nusli Randelia.
18. Consequently, the High Court directed the
impounding of all documents sought to be relied
upon by Nusli Randelia. During the pendency of the
subject suit before the High Court, negotiations
ensued, pursuant whereto the disputes were settled
and Consent Terms were drawn up, under which
Nusli Randelia confirmed that he had no right, title,
or interest in respect of the suit property.
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Accordingly, the High Court accepted the Consent
Terms, discharged the receiver appointed on the said
property, and directed that possession be handed
over to M/s. Unique Construction.
19.
Learned counsel representing the appellant-Bar
Council, vehemently and fervently contended that the
challenge laid to the cognizance order was premature
and the High Court ought not to have entertained the
writ petition filed by the respondent-advocate against
the interlocutory order of reference passed by the
Judge-Advocate of the Bar Council on the valid
complaint filed by Khimji Devji Parmar.
20. It was submitted that at the stage of taking
cognizance of a complaint, detailed reasons are not
required, and a prima facie finding in the reference
order that there are grounds to proceed against the
advocate for misconduct would be sufficient for
reference of the complaint to the DC. Furthermore,
the orders passed by the State Bar Council are
amenable to challenge before the Bar Council of
India.
21. He thus urged that the High Court committed
patent jurisdictional error in entertaining the writ
petition filed by the respondent-advocate against the
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C.A. @ SLP(Civil) No(s). 27606 of 2023 with connected matters
reference order and granting a stay on the
proceedings before the DC.
22. Per contra , learned counsel representing the
respondent-advocate fervently contended that the
complaint filed by Shri Khimji Devji Parmar is, ex
facie, mala fide and malicious.
23. The respondent had admittedly not represented
the complainant and thus, entertaining a complaint
filed against the advocate of the opposite party is
nothing short of a gross abuse of the process of law.
24.
It was submitted that till date, there is no order
recalling or rescinding the disputed consent terms
recorded in the original suit proceedings, and thus,
the complaint lacks foundation. Hence, the High
Court was justified in entertaining the writ petition
and granting a stay on further proceedings.
th
25. It was further urged that the order dated 6
July, 2023, whereby the complaint was referred to
the DC, does not refer to even the barest of allegations
set out in the complaint filed against the respondent-
advocate, and only a cryptic satisfaction has been
recorded that the complainant has made out a case
for invoking jurisdiction under Section 35 of the 1961
Act. When a regulatory body like the Bar Council
10
C.A. @ SLP(Civil) No(s). 27606 of 2023 with connected matters
intends to proceed for professional misconduct
against an enrolled advocate, then it is essential that
at least a bare minimum discussion of allegations set
out in the complaint is made before referring the
complaint to the DC.
26. On these grounds, learned counsel representing
the respondent-advocate implored the court to quash
the entire proceedings of the DC pending before the
Bar Council and to dismiss the appeal.
27. Heard the learned counsel on either side and
perused the material available on record.
28. As the present matter arises from an interim
order, under normal circumstances, rather than
entertaining this Special Leave Petition, we would
have relegated the parties to pursue the pending writ
petition before the High Court. However, upon going
through the pleadings filed by the parties, the
materials placed on record, and more particularly,
the stark and glaring facts set out in the counter-
affidavit filed by the respondent-advocate, who was
sought to be prosecuted before the BCMG, this Court
is persuaded to invoke its jurisdiction under Article
136 of the Constitution of India for quashing the
proceedings of the complaint as a whole.
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29. It is an admitted case of the parties that the
respondent-advocate never represented Nusli
Randelia, Dara Sarkari, or M/s. Volga Enterprises in
the suit before the High Court. The respondent-
advocate had simply identified the plaintiff being the
authorized representative of M/s. Unique
Construction in the Consent Terms, which stand
undisturbed to date. Thus, by mere identification of
the plaintiff, the respondent-advocate cannot be held
liable to face proceedings under Section 35 of the
1961 Act.
30. Indisputably, the Consent Terms taken on
record by the High Court continue to hold good and
have not been recalled or rescinded. The role
assigned to the respondent-advocate was of
identifying the plaintiff in these very consent terms.
We are, therefore, of the firm opinion that no one can
be allowed to raise an issue questioning the Consent
Terms that were arrived at between the plaintiff and
the defendants.
31. Devji Parmar was not a party to the suit. Had
there been any semblance of a right or claim of Devji
Parmar in the suit property, Nusli Randelia would
definitely have sought his impleadment in the suit.
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Not only this, Nusli Randelia never projected that the
so-called firm M/s. Volga Enterprises had any role to
play in the dispute over the suit premises.
32. Since the respondent-advocate was not
representing the complainant or his predecessor
Devji Parmar, there was no justification behind his
arraignment in the complaint for alleged misconduct
within the meaning of Section 35 of the 1961 Act.
33. We say so for the reason that there existed no
professional relationship between the respondent-
advocate and the complainant. His prosecution, as
being the lawyer of the opposite party in the suit
before the High Court, was highly objectionable,
totally impermissible, and absolutely uncalled for.
Ordinarily, the existence of a jural relationship
between the complainant and the advocate
concerned is a precondition for the invocation of
disciplinary jurisdiction on the ground of
“professional misconduct”.
34. We are of the considered opinion that even if the
respondent-advocate had actually represented and
pleaded the case of the plaintiff-M/s. Unique
Construction in the suit and had not merely
identified the plaintiff; that act in isolation could not
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C.A. @ SLP(Civil) No(s). 27606 of 2023 with connected matters
be termed as misconduct within the meaning of
Section 35 of the 1961 Act because the acts
attributed to the advocate, taken on their face value,
cannot be regarded as misconduct, professional or
otherwise.
35. The scheme of Section 35 of the 1961 Act
exposits that where a complaint is received from the
State Bar Council, it must record its reasons to
believe that any Advocate on its roll has been guilty
of professional or other misconduct, and only
thereafter can the matter be referred for disposal to
the DC. For ready reference, Section 35 of the Act is
quoted hereinbelow: -
“35. Punishment of advocates for
misconduct. ―(1) Where, on receipt of a
complaint or otherwise, a State Bar Council has
reason to believe that any advocate on its roll
has been guilty of professional or other
misconduct, it shall refer the case for disposal to
its disciplinary committee.
[(1A) The State Bar Council may, either of its
own motion or on application made to it by any
person interested, withdraw a proceeding
pending before its disciplinary committee and
direct the inquiry to be made by any other
disciplinary committee of that State Bar
Council.]
(2) The disciplinary committee of a State Bar
Council 4 shall fix a date for the hearing of the
case and shall cause a notice thereof to be given
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to the advocate concerned and to the Advocate-
General of the State.
(3) The disciplinary committee of a State Bar
Council after giving the advocate concerned and
the Advocate-General an opportunity of being
heard, may make any of the following orders,
namely:― (a) dismiss the complaint or, where
the proceedings were initiated at the instance of
the State Bar Council, direct that the
proceedings be filed; (b) reprimand the advocate;
(c) suspend the advocate from practice for such
period as it may deem fit; (d) remove the name
of the advocate from the State roll of advocates.
(4) Where an advocate is suspended from
practice under clause (c) of sub-section (3), he
shall, during the period of suspension, be
debarred from practising in any court or before
any authority or person in India.
(5) Where any notice is issued to the Advocate-
General under sub-section (2), the Advocate-
General may appear before the disciplinary
committee of the State Bar Council either in
person or through any advocate appearing on his
behalf.
[Explanation. ―In this section, [section 37 and
section 38], the expressions “Advocate-General”
and “Advocate-General of the State” shall, in
relation to the Union territory of Delhi, mean the
Additional Solicitor General of India.]
(Emphasis supplied)
36. It would be apposite here to refer to the following
observations made by this Court in Nandlal
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7
Khodidas Barot v. Bar Council of Gujarat ,
whereby, the State Bar Council’s referral of the
complaint to the Disciplinary Committee was set
aside, for it did not contain reasons for the
satisfaction of a prima facie case: -
“It is apparent that a State Bar Council not only
receives a complaint but is required to apply
its mind to find out whether there is any
reason to believe that any advocate has been
guilty of professional or other misconduct.
The Bar Council of a State acts on that reasoned
belief....
...The Bar Council acts as the sentinel of
professional code of conduct and is vitally
interested in the rights and privileges of the
advocates as well as the purity and dignity of the
profession.
... the function of the Bar Council in
entertaining complaints against advocates is
when the Bar Council has reasonable belief
that there is a prima facie case of misconduct
that a disciplinary committee is entrusted
with such inquiry....”
(Emphasis supplied)
37. Thus, recording of reasons to believe that the
advocate has committed misconduct is a
sine qua non
before the complaint can be referred to the
disciplinary committee for inquiry.
7
1980 Supp SCC 318.
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38. In the present case, the order passed supra by
the Judge-Advocate, referring the complaint to the
DC, is absolutely cryptic and laconic for it does not
record any satisfaction to the effect that the
respondent-advocate had committed misconduct as
provided under Section 35 of the 1961 Act. The order
th
dated 6 July, 2023, does not even make a bald
reference to the gist of allegations as set out in the
complaint and hence, the same suffers from total
non-application of mind. Reference of a complaint of
the DC would have serious consequences on the
professional career of the lawyer and could tarnish
his image and standing in the profession. Hence a
cryptic order referring the complaint to the DC
without a bare minimum discussion of the
allegations contained in the complaint would not
satisfy the requirements of a valid reference order.
39. In the absence of such prima facie satisfaction,
the statutory requirement under Section 35 remains
non-complied, and the order of reference is
ex facie
in teeth of Section 35(1) of the 1961 Act. Hence, the
same cannot be sustained.
40. Resultantly, the Complaint No. 27 of 2023 filed
by the complainant, before BCMG and all
17
C.A. @ SLP(Civil) No(s). 27606 of 2023 with connected matters
proceedings sought to be undertaken in furtherance
thereof, are hereby quashed and set aside. The
pending writ petition before the High Court shall
stand closed.
41.
Cost of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand
only) is imposed on the appellant-BCMG for
entertaining the frivolous complaint and for dragging
the respondent-advocate Shri Rajiv Narula to this
Court. The said cost shall be deposited with the
Registry of the Bombay High Court within a period of
four weeks from today, and thereafter, be paid to the
respondent-advocate Shri Rajiv Narula.
42. The appeal is, accordingly, disposed of in the
above terms.
43. All Pending application(s), if any, shall also
stand disposed of.
SLP (CIVIL) NO (s). of 2025
(Diary No(s). 38238 of 2023)
SLP (CIVIL) NO (S). 1492 OF 2024
44. Delay condoned.
45. These matters are heard along with the above
matter, as the legal issues raised are common.
However, since the factual matrix is distinct, we
18
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proceed to note the facts of the connected case
separately.
46. Both these special leave petitions arise from the
th
Order dated 9 August, 2023, passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition (L) No.
7383 of 2023. By the impugned order, the High
Court allowed the writ petition filed by respondent
8
No.1-Ms. Geeta Ramanugrah Shastri , a practicing
advocate, and quashed the order-cum-report dated
th
20 September, 2020, and proceedings of
Disciplinary Case No. 264 of 2017 registered with the
BCMG (petitioner in SLP (C) No.1492 of 2024).
47. The pith and substance of the allegations set
out in the complaint filed by Bansidhar Annaji
9
Bhakad (petitioner in SLP (C) Diary No. 38238 of
2023) was that there was a dispute between him and
Ismail Yusuf Junior College, a State Government
Educational Institution, where he used to serve as a
Lecturer. His services were terminated by the college
st
with effect from 1 December, 1993. Thereafter, Shri
Bhakad commenced practice as an advocate.
8
Hereinafter, referred to as the “respondent-advocate”.
9
Hereinafter, referred to as the “Complainant”.
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48. He instituted suit No. 1204 of 1995 against the
college by invoking the Original Jurisdiction of the
High Court seeking damages to the tune of Rs. 43
lakhs from the college. Owing to an increase in the
pecuniary jurisdiction, the suit was transferred from
the High Court to the City Civil Court, Bombay.
49. The college thereafter filed a chamber summons
in the suit seeking amendment of its written
statement. Certain documents were annexed with the
chamber summons, which were supported by an
affidavit.
50. It is alleged that the advocate on record, Shri
N.P. Pandit certified the documents filed with the
chamber summons as true copies. As per the
complainant, the respondent-advocate identified the
deponent of the affidavit filed with the chamber
summons, and in doing so, she purportedly attested
to the correctness of the contents of that affidavit and
the chamber summons as being of her personal
knowledge. As per the complainant, the statements
set out in the affidavit were ultimately found to be
false and, therefore, the respondent-advocate, by
subscribing to the affidavit, had lent support to the
20
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false recitals and made a false deposition based on
the contents of the affidavit.
51. The gravamen of the case, as set out in the
complaint, was that the respondent-advocate could
not have identified signatures of the deponent
without assuming responsibility for the correctness
of the statements contained in the body of the
affidavit. As per the complainant, the deponent of the
affidavit made incorrect statements and filed false
documents, and thus, the advocate who identified the
deponent by appending signatures on the same
would be equally responsible for the offences of
forgery, perjury, or cheating.
52. The respondent-advocate filed the subject writ
petition before the High Court, and the High Court,
upon consideration of the material available on
record, held that the respondent-advocate at no point
of time had sworn any affidavit in the suit, motion,
interim application, or the chamber summons. The
mere act of identifying the deponent in an affidavit
filed with the chamber summons would not make the
advocate responsible for the contents of the affidavit.
Upon overall appreciation of the materials placed on
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record, the High Court found the allegations set out
in the complaint to be wholly absurd and untenable.
53. In our considered view, the said finding
recorded by the High Court is perfectly justified and
hence unassailable. An advocate, by mere attestation
of the affidavit, does not become a privy to the
contents of the affidavit. Hence, ex facie , the
complaint filed by the petitioner, Bansidhar Annaji
Bhakad, against the respondent-advocate was not
only bereft of substance but was also founded on
malicious and spiteful insinuations directed against
the advocate who merely identified the opposite party
in an affidavit.
54. The steps taken and order passed by the BCMG
in directing registration of the complaint and in
referring the same to the DC for undertaking the
inquiry were illegal on the face of the record,
bordering on perversity. It is manifestly a case of
malicious prosecution of the advocate at the behest
of the opponent litigant.
th
55. The impugned order dated 9 August, 2023,
passed by the High Court quashing the complaint in
writ jurisdiction, does not, ex facie, suffer from any
infirmity. The complainant and, thereafter, the
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BCMG, have caused immeasurable grief and
harassment to the respondent-advocate.
56. Thus, both the special leave petitions are devoid
of merit and are dismissed as such.
57.
Cost of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand
only) each is imposed on the complainant-petitioner
Bansidhar Annaji Bhakad, and the BCMG. The said
cost shall be deposited with the Registry of the
Bombay High Court within a period of four weeks
from today, from where the same shall be paid to the
respondent-advocate Ms. Geeta Ramanugrah
Shastri.
58. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
….…………………… J.
(VIKRAM NATH)
...……………………. J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 24, 2025.
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C.A. @ SLP(Civil) No(s). 27606 of 2023 with connected matters
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No (s). 27606 of 2023)
BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA
AND GOA ….APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
RAJIV NARESHCHANDRA
NARULA & ORS. ….RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
SLP (CIVIL) NO (s). of 2025
( @ Diary No(s). 38238 of 2023)
SLP (CIVIL) NO (S). 1492 OF 2024
J U D G M E N T
Mehta, J.
Civil Appeal @ SLP (Civil) No (s). 27606 of 2023
1. Heard.
2. Leave granted.
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SONIA BHASIN
Date: 2025.09.24
16:04:16 IST
Reason:
1
1
3. The Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa is
before us through this appeal by way of special leave
th
assailing the interim order dated 04 November,
2023, passed by the High Court of Judicature at
2
Bombay in Writ Petition (L) No.23662 of 2023,
th
staying the order dated 6 July, 2023, passed by the
appellant-BCMG in Disciplinary Case No. 27 of 2023,
which reads as below:
“Exhibit – “A”
• After hearing the Complainant and Respondent
and after going through the document available
on record, according to me, Complainant has
made out a case by invoking Jurisdiction under
Section 35 of the Advocates Act;
• There is a prima facie case made out by the
Complainant against the Respondent. Hence, I
pass the following Order.
|| ORDER ||
Complaint is referred to D.C. for further
inquiry and disposal in accordance with law.
Ashish P. Deshmukh
Judge
06.07.2023”
4. By the aforesaid order, the Judge-Advocate took
cognizance of the complaint and directed reference
3
thereof to the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar
Council for inquiry against respondent No. 1, Shri
1
Hereinafter, referred to as the “BCMG”.
2
Hereinafter, referred to as the “High Court”.
3
For short, “DC”.
2
C.A. @ SLP(Civil) No(s). 27606 of 2023 with connected matters
4
Rajiv Narula for alleged professional misconduct
referred to under Section 35 of the Advocates Act,
5
1961 .
5. The complaint in question was filed by one
6
Khimji Devji Parmar against the respondent-
advocate in the year 2022, alleging inter alia that he
was an heir to one Devji Parmar, who during his
lifetime was a partner of Dara Nariman Sarkari in a
firm functioning in the name and style of M/s. Volga
Enterprises. Shri Devji Parmar expired in the year
2009, on which the complainant inherited his assets
and liabilities.
6. The complainant set up a case that one Nusli
Randelia was the owner of a piece of land bearing CTS
Nos. 433 and 438, Old Survey No. 30 Hissa No. 4 (P)
in Village Valnai, Taluka Malad which he leased out
to Dara Nariman Sarkari.
7. Nusli Randelia had also entered into a
development agreement with the firm M/s. Volga
Enterprises, in which Shri Devji Parmar was a
partner, and in that capacity, he was in possession of
4
Hereinafter, referred to as the “respondent-advocate”
5
For short, “the 1961 Act”.
6
Hereinafter, referred to as the “complainant”.
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the property. A suit was instituted by Dara Nariman
Sarkari bearing Suit No. 1129 of 1987 in the Court of
Small Causes, Bombay, in relation to the above land
wherein an injunction was granted against Nusli
Randelia, as well as M/s. Unique Construction,
which was also asserting title to the suit property.
8. The suit was dismissed for default on account
of the fact that Dara Nariman Sarkari had already
been impleaded as a party-defendant (defendant No.
2) in another similar suit bearing No. 2541 of 1985,
instituted by M/s Unique Construction, pending
before the High Court, wherein his rights would be
adjudicated. The complainant claimed that his father
always confided in him that the suit No.2541 of 1985
was pending, wherein he had the right, title, and
interest in the capacity of a partner of M/s. Volga
Enterprises.
9. Shri Devji Parmar, the complainant’s father
passed away in 2009, upon which he made enquiries
about the stage and status of the suit, and was
shocked to find out that the same had been disposed
of as settled on Consent Terms. Thereafter, he tried
to approach Dara Nariman Sarkari, but despite best
efforts, he could not trace him at his last known
4
C.A. @ SLP(Civil) No(s). 27606 of 2023 with connected matters
address. The complainant also made efforts to locate
Nusli Randelia, but without any success. Thereupon,
the complainant contacted his father’s advocate and
collected the documents pertaining to the suit in
question and on a perusal thereof, he came to know
that M/s. Unique Construction – the plaintiff therein,
and Nusli Randelia – defendant No. 1, had obtained
a consent decree without the knowledge and consent
of defendant No. 2, i.e., Dara Nariman Sarkari. The
complainant continued to search for the whereabouts
of Dara Nariman Sarkari and eventually came to
know that he had passed away.
10. As per the complainant, his father was a partner
with Dara Nariman Sarkari in M/s. Volga Enterprises
and, hence, upon the death of Dara Nariman Sarkari
in 1991, his father, Devji Parmar, became entitled to
pursue and protect all the rights of the partnership
firm as the sole surviving partner. Consequent upon
the death of Devji Parmar, the complainant, along
with other heirs of Devji Parmar, inherited such
rights.
11. The complainant further alleged that during the
pendency of the suit, there was a sudden change of
advocate representing Nusli Randelia. One Ms.
5
C.A. @ SLP(Civil) No(s). 27606 of 2023 with connected matters
Sheetal D. Mishra, Advocate (respondent No. 3), filed
th
a Vakalatnama on 6 June, 2005, on behalf of Nusli
Randelia without obtaining a “no-objection” from the
erstwhile advocate. Immediately upon the
Vakalatnama being filed, Consent Terms were arrived
at between M/s. Unique Construction and Nusli
Randelia in the said suit, which act was without the
knowledge of the erstwhile advocate on record, who
was personally knowing Nusli Randelia. A consent
decree was obtained without intimating Dara Sarkari
or obtaining his signatures on the said Consent
Terms.
12. As per the complainant, the respondent-
advocate suppressed the material fact from the High
Court that Dara Nariman Sarkari was a party to the
suit and that he had not affixed his signatures on the
Consent Terms. This deliberate omission on part of
the Advocate representing M/s. Unique
Construction, the plaintiff in the suit, tantamounted
to concealment of material fact whereby the legal
representatives of Dara Nariman Sarkari and Devji
Parmar were defrauded and deprived of their rightful
share in the suit property.
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13. The complainant further averred that the
Consent Terms had been prepared and filed in the
Court without recognition of the rights of Dara
Nariman Sarkari and M/s. Volga Enterprises in the
suit property. He also apprehended that the
consideration stipulated in the Consent Terms never
passed on to Nusli Randelia, who might even have
been impersonated before the Court, and his
signatures may also be forged and fabricated.
14. According to the complainant, someone other
than Nusli Randelia may have appeared before the
Court to execute the Consent Terms, or in all
probability, coercion was practiced upon Nusli
Randelia, who was induced and pressurised to sign
the Consent Terms without consideration. The
complainant also conjectured that Nusli Randelia
might have been abducted and murdered, as there
was neither any trace of him nor was any death
certificate available.
15. The complainant further alleged that the
Advocates arraigned in the complaint were complicit
to the crime as they were the direct beneficiaries of
the fraudulent transactions. Based on this
complaint, the Judge-Advocate of the BCMG
7
C.A. @ SLP(Civil) No(s). 27606 of 2023 with connected matters
th
proceeded to pass the order dated 6 July, 2023,
reproduced supra .
16. The respondent, Shri Rajiv Narula, filed an
affidavit-in-reply to the disciplinary complaint,
setting up a case that the complaint had been filed
by suppressing material facts. Various other
litigations filed by Nusli Randelia in respect of the
land in question had been decided against him, and
having lost in all the legal proceedings, Nusli
Randelia forged a document purporting to create
some rights in favour of Dara Sarkari so as to
frustrate the Court orders/decrees.
17. Upon coming to know of this fraud, M/s. Unique
Construction took out a Notice of Motion No. 2903 of
1987, for impounding all the documents which they
claimed had been fabricated by Nusli Randelia.
18. Consequently, the High Court directed the
impounding of all documents sought to be relied
upon by Nusli Randelia. During the pendency of the
subject suit before the High Court, negotiations
ensued, pursuant whereto the disputes were settled
and Consent Terms were drawn up, under which
Nusli Randelia confirmed that he had no right, title,
or interest in respect of the suit property.
8
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Accordingly, the High Court accepted the Consent
Terms, discharged the receiver appointed on the said
property, and directed that possession be handed
over to M/s. Unique Construction.
19.
Learned counsel representing the appellant-Bar
Council, vehemently and fervently contended that the
challenge laid to the cognizance order was premature
and the High Court ought not to have entertained the
writ petition filed by the respondent-advocate against
the interlocutory order of reference passed by the
Judge-Advocate of the Bar Council on the valid
complaint filed by Khimji Devji Parmar.
20. It was submitted that at the stage of taking
cognizance of a complaint, detailed reasons are not
required, and a prima facie finding in the reference
order that there are grounds to proceed against the
advocate for misconduct would be sufficient for
reference of the complaint to the DC. Furthermore,
the orders passed by the State Bar Council are
amenable to challenge before the Bar Council of
India.
21. He thus urged that the High Court committed
patent jurisdictional error in entertaining the writ
petition filed by the respondent-advocate against the
9
C.A. @ SLP(Civil) No(s). 27606 of 2023 with connected matters
reference order and granting a stay on the
proceedings before the DC.
22. Per contra , learned counsel representing the
respondent-advocate fervently contended that the
complaint filed by Shri Khimji Devji Parmar is, ex
facie, mala fide and malicious.
23. The respondent had admittedly not represented
the complainant and thus, entertaining a complaint
filed against the advocate of the opposite party is
nothing short of a gross abuse of the process of law.
24.
It was submitted that till date, there is no order
recalling or rescinding the disputed consent terms
recorded in the original suit proceedings, and thus,
the complaint lacks foundation. Hence, the High
Court was justified in entertaining the writ petition
and granting a stay on further proceedings.
th
25. It was further urged that the order dated 6
July, 2023, whereby the complaint was referred to
the DC, does not refer to even the barest of allegations
set out in the complaint filed against the respondent-
advocate, and only a cryptic satisfaction has been
recorded that the complainant has made out a case
for invoking jurisdiction under Section 35 of the 1961
Act. When a regulatory body like the Bar Council
10
C.A. @ SLP(Civil) No(s). 27606 of 2023 with connected matters
intends to proceed for professional misconduct
against an enrolled advocate, then it is essential that
at least a bare minimum discussion of allegations set
out in the complaint is made before referring the
complaint to the DC.
26. On these grounds, learned counsel representing
the respondent-advocate implored the court to quash
the entire proceedings of the DC pending before the
Bar Council and to dismiss the appeal.
27. Heard the learned counsel on either side and
perused the material available on record.
28. As the present matter arises from an interim
order, under normal circumstances, rather than
entertaining this Special Leave Petition, we would
have relegated the parties to pursue the pending writ
petition before the High Court. However, upon going
through the pleadings filed by the parties, the
materials placed on record, and more particularly,
the stark and glaring facts set out in the counter-
affidavit filed by the respondent-advocate, who was
sought to be prosecuted before the BCMG, this Court
is persuaded to invoke its jurisdiction under Article
136 of the Constitution of India for quashing the
proceedings of the complaint as a whole.
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C.A. @ SLP(Civil) No(s). 27606 of 2023 with connected matters
29. It is an admitted case of the parties that the
respondent-advocate never represented Nusli
Randelia, Dara Sarkari, or M/s. Volga Enterprises in
the suit before the High Court. The respondent-
advocate had simply identified the plaintiff being the
authorized representative of M/s. Unique
Construction in the Consent Terms, which stand
undisturbed to date. Thus, by mere identification of
the plaintiff, the respondent-advocate cannot be held
liable to face proceedings under Section 35 of the
1961 Act.
30. Indisputably, the Consent Terms taken on
record by the High Court continue to hold good and
have not been recalled or rescinded. The role
assigned to the respondent-advocate was of
identifying the plaintiff in these very consent terms.
We are, therefore, of the firm opinion that no one can
be allowed to raise an issue questioning the Consent
Terms that were arrived at between the plaintiff and
the defendants.
31. Devji Parmar was not a party to the suit. Had
there been any semblance of a right or claim of Devji
Parmar in the suit property, Nusli Randelia would
definitely have sought his impleadment in the suit.
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C.A. @ SLP(Civil) No(s). 27606 of 2023 with connected matters
Not only this, Nusli Randelia never projected that the
so-called firm M/s. Volga Enterprises had any role to
play in the dispute over the suit premises.
32. Since the respondent-advocate was not
representing the complainant or his predecessor
Devji Parmar, there was no justification behind his
arraignment in the complaint for alleged misconduct
within the meaning of Section 35 of the 1961 Act.
33. We say so for the reason that there existed no
professional relationship between the respondent-
advocate and the complainant. His prosecution, as
being the lawyer of the opposite party in the suit
before the High Court, was highly objectionable,
totally impermissible, and absolutely uncalled for.
Ordinarily, the existence of a jural relationship
between the complainant and the advocate
concerned is a precondition for the invocation of
disciplinary jurisdiction on the ground of
“professional misconduct”.
34. We are of the considered opinion that even if the
respondent-advocate had actually represented and
pleaded the case of the plaintiff-M/s. Unique
Construction in the suit and had not merely
identified the plaintiff; that act in isolation could not
13
C.A. @ SLP(Civil) No(s). 27606 of 2023 with connected matters
be termed as misconduct within the meaning of
Section 35 of the 1961 Act because the acts
attributed to the advocate, taken on their face value,
cannot be regarded as misconduct, professional or
otherwise.
35. The scheme of Section 35 of the 1961 Act
exposits that where a complaint is received from the
State Bar Council, it must record its reasons to
believe that any Advocate on its roll has been guilty
of professional or other misconduct, and only
thereafter can the matter be referred for disposal to
the DC. For ready reference, Section 35 of the Act is
quoted hereinbelow: -
“35. Punishment of advocates for
misconduct. ―(1) Where, on receipt of a
complaint or otherwise, a State Bar Council has
reason to believe that any advocate on its roll
has been guilty of professional or other
misconduct, it shall refer the case for disposal to
its disciplinary committee.
[(1A) The State Bar Council may, either of its
own motion or on application made to it by any
person interested, withdraw a proceeding
pending before its disciplinary committee and
direct the inquiry to be made by any other
disciplinary committee of that State Bar
Council.]
(2) The disciplinary committee of a State Bar
Council 4 shall fix a date for the hearing of the
case and shall cause a notice thereof to be given
14
C.A. @ SLP(Civil) No(s). 27606 of 2023 with connected matters
to the advocate concerned and to the Advocate-
General of the State.
(3) The disciplinary committee of a State Bar
Council after giving the advocate concerned and
the Advocate-General an opportunity of being
heard, may make any of the following orders,
namely:― (a) dismiss the complaint or, where
the proceedings were initiated at the instance of
the State Bar Council, direct that the
proceedings be filed; (b) reprimand the advocate;
(c) suspend the advocate from practice for such
period as it may deem fit; (d) remove the name
of the advocate from the State roll of advocates.
(4) Where an advocate is suspended from
practice under clause (c) of sub-section (3), he
shall, during the period of suspension, be
debarred from practising in any court or before
any authority or person in India.
(5) Where any notice is issued to the Advocate-
General under sub-section (2), the Advocate-
General may appear before the disciplinary
committee of the State Bar Council either in
person or through any advocate appearing on his
behalf.
[Explanation. ―In this section, [section 37 and
section 38], the expressions “Advocate-General”
and “Advocate-General of the State” shall, in
relation to the Union territory of Delhi, mean the
Additional Solicitor General of India.]
(Emphasis supplied)
36. It would be apposite here to refer to the following
observations made by this Court in Nandlal
15
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7
Khodidas Barot v. Bar Council of Gujarat ,
whereby, the State Bar Council’s referral of the
complaint to the Disciplinary Committee was set
aside, for it did not contain reasons for the
satisfaction of a prima facie case: -
“It is apparent that a State Bar Council not only
receives a complaint but is required to apply
its mind to find out whether there is any
reason to believe that any advocate has been
guilty of professional or other misconduct.
The Bar Council of a State acts on that reasoned
belief....
...The Bar Council acts as the sentinel of
professional code of conduct and is vitally
interested in the rights and privileges of the
advocates as well as the purity and dignity of the
profession.
... the function of the Bar Council in
entertaining complaints against advocates is
when the Bar Council has reasonable belief
that there is a prima facie case of misconduct
that a disciplinary committee is entrusted
with such inquiry....”
(Emphasis supplied)
37. Thus, recording of reasons to believe that the
advocate has committed misconduct is a
sine qua non
before the complaint can be referred to the
disciplinary committee for inquiry.
7
1980 Supp SCC 318.
16
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38. In the present case, the order passed supra by
the Judge-Advocate, referring the complaint to the
DC, is absolutely cryptic and laconic for it does not
record any satisfaction to the effect that the
respondent-advocate had committed misconduct as
provided under Section 35 of the 1961 Act. The order
th
dated 6 July, 2023, does not even make a bald
reference to the gist of allegations as set out in the
complaint and hence, the same suffers from total
non-application of mind. Reference of a complaint of
the DC would have serious consequences on the
professional career of the lawyer and could tarnish
his image and standing in the profession. Hence a
cryptic order referring the complaint to the DC
without a bare minimum discussion of the
allegations contained in the complaint would not
satisfy the requirements of a valid reference order.
39. In the absence of such prima facie satisfaction,
the statutory requirement under Section 35 remains
non-complied, and the order of reference is
ex facie
in teeth of Section 35(1) of the 1961 Act. Hence, the
same cannot be sustained.
40. Resultantly, the Complaint No. 27 of 2023 filed
by the complainant, before BCMG and all
17
C.A. @ SLP(Civil) No(s). 27606 of 2023 with connected matters
proceedings sought to be undertaken in furtherance
thereof, are hereby quashed and set aside. The
pending writ petition before the High Court shall
stand closed.
41.
Cost of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand
only) is imposed on the appellant-BCMG for
entertaining the frivolous complaint and for dragging
the respondent-advocate Shri Rajiv Narula to this
Court. The said cost shall be deposited with the
Registry of the Bombay High Court within a period of
four weeks from today, and thereafter, be paid to the
respondent-advocate Shri Rajiv Narula.
42. The appeal is, accordingly, disposed of in the
above terms.
43. All Pending application(s), if any, shall also
stand disposed of.
SLP (CIVIL) NO (s). of 2025
(Diary No(s). 38238 of 2023)
SLP (CIVIL) NO (S). 1492 OF 2024
44. Delay condoned.
45. These matters are heard along with the above
matter, as the legal issues raised are common.
However, since the factual matrix is distinct, we
18
C.A. @ SLP(Civil) No(s). 27606 of 2023 with connected matters
proceed to note the facts of the connected case
separately.
46. Both these special leave petitions arise from the
th
Order dated 9 August, 2023, passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition (L) No.
7383 of 2023. By the impugned order, the High
Court allowed the writ petition filed by respondent
8
No.1-Ms. Geeta Ramanugrah Shastri , a practicing
advocate, and quashed the order-cum-report dated
th
20 September, 2020, and proceedings of
Disciplinary Case No. 264 of 2017 registered with the
BCMG (petitioner in SLP (C) No.1492 of 2024).
47. The pith and substance of the allegations set
out in the complaint filed by Bansidhar Annaji
9
Bhakad (petitioner in SLP (C) Diary No. 38238 of
2023) was that there was a dispute between him and
Ismail Yusuf Junior College, a State Government
Educational Institution, where he used to serve as a
Lecturer. His services were terminated by the college
st
with effect from 1 December, 1993. Thereafter, Shri
Bhakad commenced practice as an advocate.
8
Hereinafter, referred to as the “respondent-advocate”.
9
Hereinafter, referred to as the “Complainant”.
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48. He instituted suit No. 1204 of 1995 against the
college by invoking the Original Jurisdiction of the
High Court seeking damages to the tune of Rs. 43
lakhs from the college. Owing to an increase in the
pecuniary jurisdiction, the suit was transferred from
the High Court to the City Civil Court, Bombay.
49. The college thereafter filed a chamber summons
in the suit seeking amendment of its written
statement. Certain documents were annexed with the
chamber summons, which were supported by an
affidavit.
50. It is alleged that the advocate on record, Shri
N.P. Pandit certified the documents filed with the
chamber summons as true copies. As per the
complainant, the respondent-advocate identified the
deponent of the affidavit filed with the chamber
summons, and in doing so, she purportedly attested
to the correctness of the contents of that affidavit and
the chamber summons as being of her personal
knowledge. As per the complainant, the statements
set out in the affidavit were ultimately found to be
false and, therefore, the respondent-advocate, by
subscribing to the affidavit, had lent support to the
20
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false recitals and made a false deposition based on
the contents of the affidavit.
51. The gravamen of the case, as set out in the
complaint, was that the respondent-advocate could
not have identified signatures of the deponent
without assuming responsibility for the correctness
of the statements contained in the body of the
affidavit. As per the complainant, the deponent of the
affidavit made incorrect statements and filed false
documents, and thus, the advocate who identified the
deponent by appending signatures on the same
would be equally responsible for the offences of
forgery, perjury, or cheating.
52. The respondent-advocate filed the subject writ
petition before the High Court, and the High Court,
upon consideration of the material available on
record, held that the respondent-advocate at no point
of time had sworn any affidavit in the suit, motion,
interim application, or the chamber summons. The
mere act of identifying the deponent in an affidavit
filed with the chamber summons would not make the
advocate responsible for the contents of the affidavit.
Upon overall appreciation of the materials placed on
21
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record, the High Court found the allegations set out
in the complaint to be wholly absurd and untenable.
53. In our considered view, the said finding
recorded by the High Court is perfectly justified and
hence unassailable. An advocate, by mere attestation
of the affidavit, does not become a privy to the
contents of the affidavit. Hence, ex facie , the
complaint filed by the petitioner, Bansidhar Annaji
Bhakad, against the respondent-advocate was not
only bereft of substance but was also founded on
malicious and spiteful insinuations directed against
the advocate who merely identified the opposite party
in an affidavit.
54. The steps taken and order passed by the BCMG
in directing registration of the complaint and in
referring the same to the DC for undertaking the
inquiry were illegal on the face of the record,
bordering on perversity. It is manifestly a case of
malicious prosecution of the advocate at the behest
of the opponent litigant.
th
55. The impugned order dated 9 August, 2023,
passed by the High Court quashing the complaint in
writ jurisdiction, does not, ex facie, suffer from any
infirmity. The complainant and, thereafter, the
22
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BCMG, have caused immeasurable grief and
harassment to the respondent-advocate.
56. Thus, both the special leave petitions are devoid
of merit and are dismissed as such.
57.
Cost of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand
only) each is imposed on the complainant-petitioner
Bansidhar Annaji Bhakad, and the BCMG. The said
cost shall be deposited with the Registry of the
Bombay High Court within a period of four weeks
from today, from where the same shall be paid to the
respondent-advocate Ms. Geeta Ramanugrah
Shastri.
58. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
….…………………… J.
(VIKRAM NATH)
...……………………. J.
(SANDEEP MEHTA)
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 24, 2025.
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