REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS……………OF 2023
(@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NOS. 2849-2854 OF 2022)
CARDINAL MAR GEORGE ALENCHERRY ...APPELLANT
Versus
STATE OF KERALA & ANR. …RESPONDENTS
WITH
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NOS. 1487-1493 OF 2022
EPARCHY OF BATHERY, REP. THROUGH
MOST REV. DR. JOSEPH MAR THOMAS ... PETITIONER
Versus
STATE Of KERALA & ORS. ETC. ... RESPONDENTS
WITH
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO(S). ……… OF 2023
ARISING OUT OF DIARY NO. 7364 OF 2022)
CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF THAMARASSERY … PETITIONER
REP. THROUGH MAR REMEGIOSE INCHANAYIL
Versus
STATE OF KERALA & ORS. ETC. …RESPONDENT(S)
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Jayant Kumar Arora
Date: 2023.03.17
16:53:30 IST
Reason:
1
J U D G M E N T
BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.
1. Leave granted in SLP (Crl.) Nos. 2849-2854 of 2022.
2. All these matters are arising out of the impugned common
judgment and order dated 12.08.2021 passed by the High Court of
Kerala at Ernakulam in Crl. MC No. 8936 of 2019, Crl. MC No. 205
of 2020, Crl. MC No. 1414 of 2020, Crl. MC No. 1409 of 2020, Crl.
MC No. 2138 of 2020, Crl. MC No. 2136 of 2020 and Crl. MC No.
9115 of 2019.
3. In the batch of six appeals arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 2849-
2854/2022, filed by the appellant Cardinal Mar George Alencherry
(original accused) the impugned common order dated 12.08.2021
in its entirety has been assailed, however, in the SLP (Crl.) No.
1487-1493/2022 filed by Eparchy of Bathery (not a party before the
High Court), and in the SLP Diary No. 7364/2022 filed by the
Catholic Diocese of Thamarassery (not a party before the High
Court), this Court vide the order dated 14.02.2022 had granted
permission to file the SLPs to the said petitioners to a limited
extent in respect of the petitioners’ grievances pertaining to
paragraphs 17 to 39 of the impugned order. Under the
2
circumstances, the facts of the appeals filed by the appellant-
Cardinal Mar George Alencherry are considered for the sake of
convenience.
4. The facts in nutshell, as discernible from the record, giving rise to
the present appeals are that: -
(i) The Syro Malabar Church, an Episcopal Institution
is headed by the Bishop of Archdiocese, i.e., the
appellant – Cardinal Mar George Alencherry
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the appellant-
Archbishop’). The said Archbishop claiming to have
an authority over all the spiritual and temporal
affairs concerning Syro Malabar Church alienated
certain immoveable properties of the Church. The
present respondent no. 2 – Mr. Joshy Varghese
(original complainant) claiming to be a member and
believer of a Roman Catholic Church has filed a
complaint under Sections 190 and 200 of Cr.P.C.
being Crl. M.P.No. 5003/2018 in the Court of
Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Kakkanad
th
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Trial Court’) on 16
July, 2018, against three accused i.e. (1) the
3
appellant-Archbishop, (2) Rev Fr. Joshy Puthuva
and (3) Saju Varghese alleging commission of the
offences punishable under Sections 120B, 406,
409, 418, 420, 423, 465, 467, 468 r/w 34 of IPC.
(ii) It has been alleged in the complaint, inter alia that
the complainant is the member of the St. Mary’s
Church, Perumbavoor, one of the churches
administered by the Archdiocese of Ernakulam-
Angamaly. The appellant took charge of the
Archdiocese as its Major Archbishop on 29.05.2011
and he was subsequently ordained as a Cardinal of
Syro Malabar Church on 06.01.2012. The said
Archdiocese has been administering various
educational institutions, orphanages, old age
homes, convents, monasteries and hospitals, in
addition to 338 churches under it. The said
Archdiocese owned assets both movable and
immovable worth crores of rupees. The bylaws of
Archdiocese which prescribed the procedures for
the administration and management of the assets of
the Archdiocese were modified on 29.07.2009.
4
(iii) It has been further alleged that the appellant-
Archbishop entered into a criminal conspiracy with
accused no. 2 – Rev Fr. Joshy Puthuva, who was
the financial officer of the said Archdiocese, during
the period from 2012 to 2017 to fraudulently dispose
of some of the immovable properties of the
Archdiocese, and in furtherance thereof, they
alienated certain properties worth crores of rupees
to the accused no. 3 - Saju Varghese, as described
in the complaint.
(iv) In the said complaint, a sworn statement of the
complainant was recorded in view of Section 202 of
Cr.P.C. as the appellant and the other two accused
in the said complaint were residing beyond the
jurisdiction of the Trial Court. One more witness was
also summoned and examined in support of the
complaint. The complainant also had produced few
documents in support of the said complaint.
nd
(v) The Trial Court vide the order dated 2 April, 2019
took the complaint on file and dismissed the
complaint under Section 203 of Cr.P.C. so far as the
5
offences under Sections 409, 418, 420, 465, 467
and 468 of IPC were concerned, however issued
summons against the accused for the offences
under Sections 120-B, 406, 423 read with 34 of IPC.
5. The complainant - Joshy Varghese has also filed other five similar
complaints against the appellant-Archbishop and others
(Annexures A-4 to A-9 in SLP(Civil) Nos.2849-2854 of 2022) in
which the trial court had issued the summons by passing separate
orders, the details of which are as under:
| S.<br>No. | CrMP No./ Complaint No. | Magistrate Court |
|---|
| 1. | CrMP 5005/2018 (CC. No. 1886/2019) | Summons issued to the<br>Petitioner and another on<br>05.11.2019 |
| 2. | CrMP 5013/2018 (CC. No. 51/2020) | Summons issued to the<br>Petitioner and another on<br>20.01.2020 |
| 3. | CrMP 5011/2018 (CC. No. 50/2020) | Summons issued to the<br>Petitioner and another on<br>20.01.2020 |
| 4. | CrMP 5009/2018 (CC. No. 93/2020) | Summons issued to the<br>Petitioner and another on<br>13.02.2020 |
| 5. | CrMP 5015/2018 (CC. No. 94/2020) | Summons issued to the<br>Petitioner and another on<br>13.02.2020 |
6. The appellant-Archbishop (accused no.1) and the said Saju
Varghese (accused no. 3) being aggrieved by the order dated
02.04.2019 passed by the trial court in Cr.M.P.No. 5003/2018
6
preferred Criminal Revision Application Nos. 20/2019 and 21/2019
respectively before the Sessions Court, Ernakulam Division
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the Sessions Court’). The Sessions
Court dismissed the said Criminal Revision Petitions, vide the
order dated 24.08.2019, against which the appellant-Archbishop
preferred Crl.M.C. No.8936 of 2019 and other five petitions before
the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The original accused
no. 3 - Saju Varghese also filed Crl.M.C. No.9115/2019 before the
th
High Court. The High Court vide the impugned order dated 12
August, 2021 dismissed all the seven Crl.M.Cs. The High Court
also gave certain directions to the respondent-State Government
while dismissing the said petitions. The High Court thereafter
posted the matters on 25.10.2021 for the compliance report, and
then gave further directions by passing various orders from time to
time. Being aggrieved by the same, the present sets of appeals
have been filed by the appellants as stated hereinabove.
7. The learned senior advocate Mr. Sidharth Luthra appearing for the
appellant-Archbishop submitted following chart, showing details of
the properties involved in these appeals.
DETAILS OF PROPERTY
| S.<br>No. | Case No. | CrlMC<br>No. (HC) | SLP No.<br>(SC) | Sale<br>Deed<br>Nos. | Area of<br>Land | Re.Sy. No. Place<br>Location of Land |
|---|
7
| 1. | CC. No.<br>632/19<br>P4@132 | Crl.M.C<br>No.<br>8936/19<br>P14 @<br>392/V2 | SLP No.<br>2849/22 | 3373/16 | 24.40 | Re.Sy. No. 548/4<br>Vazhakala Village<br>Opp.<br>Bharathmatha<br>College (Para 20;<br>Page 141) |
|---|
| 2. | CC. No.<br>1886/19<br>P5@148 | Crl.M.C<br>No.<br>205/20 | SLP No.<br>2850/22 | 2720/16<br>2721/16<br>2723/16 | 3.93<br>3.94<br>1.93 | Re.Sy. No. 509/4<br>Thrikkakara area<br>in Vazhakala<br>Village Near<br>Karunalayam<br>(Para 37; Page<br>173) |
| 3. | CC. No.<br>51/2020<br>P6@176 | Crl.M.C<br>No.1409/<br>20 | SLP No.<br>2851/22 | 1679/17<br>1680/17<br>1681/17 | 1.31<br>1.36<br>1.41 | Re.Sy. No. 509/4<br>Thrikkakara area<br>in Vazhakala<br>Village Near<br>Karunalayam<br>(Para 37; Page<br>198) |
| 4. | CC. No.<br>50/2020<br>P7@202 | Crl.M.C<br>No.<br>1414/20 | SLP No.<br>2852/22 | 2735/16 | 1.92 | Re.Sy. No. 509/4<br>Thrikkakara area<br>in Vazhakala<br>Village Near<br>Karunalayam<br>(Para 37; Page<br>222) |
| 5. | CC. No.<br>93/2020<br>P8@225 | Crl.M.C<br>No.<br>2136/20 | SLP No.<br>2853/22 | 2732/16<br>2733/16<br>2734/16 | 1.85<br>1.83<br>1.93 | Re.Sy. No. 509/4<br>Thrikkakara area<br>in Vazhakala<br>Village Near<br>Karunalayam<br>(Para 37; Page<br>254) |
| 6. | CC. No.<br>94/2020<br>P9@258 | Crl.M.C<br>No.<br>2138/20 | SLP No.<br>2854/22 | 2368/17<br>2369/17<br>2370/17 | 1.31<br>1.21<br>1.14 | Re.Sy. No. 509/4<br>Thrikkakara area<br>in Vazhakala<br>Village Near<br>Karunalayam<br>(Para 37; Page<br>1284) |
8. According to the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Luthra, the
respondent no. 2-Joshy Varghese and others had also filed similar
complaints against the appellant and others. The details of the said
complaints submitted by Mr. Luthra are as below:-
8
(i) 03.01.2018: The respondent no. 2 Joshy Varghese,
the complainant, had filed a complaint being CMP
No. 2/2018 in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First
Class. Maradu, against the appellant and others
praying for investigation under Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C., alleging criminal conspiracy to sell the plots
of lands belonging to the Archdiocese. The Judicial
Magistrate, Maradu, Ernakulam before issuing the
process in the said complaint directed the
respondent no. 2 to examine the witnesses. The
respondent no. 2 challenged the said order before
the Kerala High Court, which dismissed his petition
vide the order dated 22.02.2018. The said complaint
was thereafter dismissed by the Magistrate vide the
order dated 30.09.2021.
(ii) 12.01.2018: One Paulachan Puthuppara, an
Advocate filed a complaint being CMP No.
179/2018 in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate,
Ernakulam against the petitioner and two others
alleging criminal conspiracy in respect of the sale of
plots of land belonging to the Archdiocese. The
9
Magistrate, Ernakulam vide the order dated
02.02.2018 dismissed the complaint observing that
if complainant was aggrieved, he could resort to an
appropriate civil action as may be available under
the law.
(iii) 15.01.2018: One Shine Varghese filed a complaint
before the P.S. Ernakulam Central, being FIR No.
719/2018, making similar allegations, in which the
police filed a closure report, however the
complainant Shine Varghese filed a Protest Petition,
which is pending under consideration before the
concerned court.
(iv) 18.03.2019: One complainant Pappachan filed a
complaint being Cr.M.P.No. 820/2019 against the
appellant-Archbishop and others in the Court of
Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Kakkanad. The said
complainant had also filed a complaint before the
Ernakulam P.S. on 12.01.2019, however no action
was taken. Ultimately FIR No. 818/2019 was
registered, however the investigating officer has
submitted a closure report in the said complaint.
10
9. Adverting to the first and foremost submission made by the
Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Luthra that the present complaint
against the appellant after the dismissal of the earlier complaint by
the Court of Maradu, on the same set of facts, filed by the
respondent no.2-complainant was not maintainable, it may be
noted that the respondent no.2 had earlier filed a complaint being
no.2/2018 on 03.01.2018 in the Court of JMFC, Maradu under
Section 156(3) and Section 200 Cr.PC, making general allegations
with regard to the fraudulent sale of the properties belonging to the
Archdiocese by the appellant Archbishop, whereas the instant
complaints six in number have been filed by the respondent no.2-
complainant in the Trial Court giving specific details about the sale
of the properties situated within the jurisdiction of Trial Court at
Kakkanad. It is not disputed that the first complaint (C.C.
No.2/2018) was dismissed on 30.09.2021 by the concerned court
at Maradu without taking cognizance of the complaint as the
counsel for the complainant did not appear, whereas in the instant
complaints, the summons have been issued by the Trial Court,
taking cognizance of the offences under Section 120B, 406, 423
read with Section 34 of IPC on 02.04.2019 and on other dates
subsequent thereto, that is prior to the dismissal of the first
complaint on 30.09.2021. The respondent no.2 in the counter filed
11
by him has specifically stated that regarding the first item of
property, the complaint was filed before the Court of Maradu
(Ernakulam), as the cause of action had arisen within the
jurisdiction of Maradu Police Station, whereas with regard to the
other properties, seven complaints have been filed before the
Court of JMFC, Kakkanad within whose jurisdiction the properties
were situated. It is pertinent to note that there was no adverse
order passed or cognizance taken by the Court at Maradu and on
the contrary the same was dismissed after the Trial Court at
Kakkanad issued summons against the appellant and others,
taking cognizance of the alleged offences under Section 120B,
406, 423 read with Section 34 of IPC.
10. It cannot be gainsaid that the cognizance is taken of an offence
and not of the offender. As such the phrase “taking cognizance”
has nowhere been defined in the Cr.PC, however has been
interpreted by this Court to mean “become aware of” or “to take
notice of judicially”. In S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer
1
Vs. Videocon International Ltd. and Others , this Court while
explaining the scope of the enquiry under Section 202 Cr.PC,
observed as under:-
| “19. | The expression “cognizance” has not been defined in |
|---|
| the Code. But the word (cognizance) is of indefinite import. It | |
| has no esoteric or mystic significance in criminal law. It | |
1 (2008) 2 SCC 492
12
| merely means “become aware of” and when used with | |
|---|
| reference to a court or a Judge, it connotes “to take notice of | |
| judicially”. It indicates the point when a court or a Magistrate | |
| takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating | |
| proceedings in respect of such offence said to have been | |
| committed by someone. | |
| 20. | “Taking cognizance” does not involve any formal action of | |
|---|
| any kind. It occurs as soon as a Magistrate applies his mind | | |
| to the suspected commission of an offence. Cognizance is | | |
| taken prior to commencement of criminal proceedings. | | |
| Taking of cognizance is thus a sine qua non or condition | | |
| precedent for holding a valid trial. Cognizance is taken of an | | |
| offence and not of an offender. Whether or not a Magistrate | | |
| has taken cognizance of an offence depends on the facts | | |
| and circumstances of each case and no rule of universal | | |
| application can be laid down as to when a Magistrate can be | | |
| said to have taken cognizance. | | |
| 21. Chapter XIV (Sections 190-199) of the Code deals with<br>“Conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings”. Section<br>190 empowers a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence<br>in certain circumstances. Sub-section (1) thereof is material<br>and may be quoted in extenso: | | |
| “190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates.—(1) Subject to<br>the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the First<br>Class, and any Magistrate of the Second Class specially<br>empowered in this behalf under sub-section (2), may take<br>cognizance of any offence— | | |
| (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such<br>offence; | | |
| (b) upon a police report of such facts; | | |
| (c) upon information received from any person other than a<br>police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence<br>has been committed.” | | |
| 22. | ……. | |
23. Then comes Chapter XVI (Commencement of
proceedings before Magistrates). This Chapter will apply only
after cognizance of an offence has been taken by a
Magistrate under Chapter XIV. Section 204, whereunder
process can be issued, is another material provision which
reads as under:
“204. Issue of process .—(1) If in the opinion of a Magistrate
taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground for
proceeding, and the case appears to be—
( a ) a summons case, he shall issue his summons for the
attendance of the accused, or
( b ) a warrant case, he may issue a warrant, or, if he thinks fit,
a summons, for causing the accused to be brought or to
appear at a certain time before such Magistrate or (if he has
no jurisdiction himself) some other Magistrate having
jurisdiction.
(2) No summons or warrant shall be issued against the
accused under sub-section (1) until a list of the prosecution
witnesses has been filed.
13
| (3) In a proceeding instituted upon a complaint made in<br>writing, every summons or warrant issued under sub-section<br>(1) shall be accompanied by a copy of such complaint. | |
|---|
| (4) When by any law for the time being in force any process-<br>fees or other fees are payable, no process shall be issued<br>until the fees are paid and, if such fees are not paid within a<br>reasonable time, the Magistrate may dismiss the complaint. | |
| (5) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the<br>provisions of Section 87.” | |
| 24. | From the above scheme of the Code, in our judgment, it |
| is clear that “Initiation of proceedings”, dealt with in Chapter | |
| XIV, is different from “Commencement of proceedings” | |
| covered by Chapter XVI. For commencement of | |
| proceedings, there must be initiation of proceedings. In other | |
| words, initiation of proceedings must precede | |
| commencement of proceedings. Without initiation of | |
| proceedings under Chapter XIV, there cannot be | |
| commencement of proceedings before a Magistrate under | |
| Chapter XVI. The High Court, in our considered view, was | |
| not right in equating initiation of proceedings under Chapter | |
| XIV with commencement of proceedings under Chapter XVI.” | |
2
11 . In Ramdev Food Products Private Vs. State of Gujarat while
drawing distinction between the provisions contained in Section
156(3) and Section 202(1) of Cr.PC, this Court examined the
scheme of the said sections and after discussing various earlier
decisions concluded as under:-
“38. In Devarapalli Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana
Reddy [(1976) 3 SCC 252: 1976 SCC (Cri) 380], National Bank
of Oman v. Barakara Abdul Aziz [(2013) 2 SCC 488: (2013) 2
SCC (Cri) 731], Madhao v. State of Maharashtra [(2013) 5 SCC
615: (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 141], Rameshbhai Pandurao
Hedau v. State of Gujarat [(2010) 4 SCC 185 : (2010) 2 SCC
(Cri) 801] , the scheme of Sections 156(3) and 202 has been
discussed. It was observed that power under Section 156(3) can
be invoked by the Magistrate before taking cognizance and was
in the nature of pre-emptory reminder or intimation to the police
to exercise its plenary power of investigation beginning with
Section 156 and ending with report or charge-sheet under
Section 173. On the other hand, Section 202 applies at post-
cognizance stage and the direction for investigation was for the
purpose of deciding whether there was sufficient ground to
proceed.”
12. So far as facts of the present case are concerned, indisputably
though the respondent-complainant had filed the first complaint in
2 (2015) 6 SCC 439
14
the court of JMFC, Maradu seeking prayer to direct investigation to
the police under Section 156(3) and 202 of Cr.PC, the said
complaint was not prosecuted further. The concerned court had
also not directed any investigation either under Section 156(3) or
Section 202 of Cr.PC and the said complaint was dismissed for not
having been prosecuted further. The Trial Court at Kakkanad,
however, before the dismissal of the previous complaint, had
already taken cognizance by issuing summons to the appellant
and others in the instant six complaint cases filed by the
respondent no. 2 - complainant.
13. Though it is true that the respondent no. 2, in the instant
complaints should have disclosed the full and correct facts more
particularly with regard to the previous complaint filed by him
against the appellant and other accused in respect of the alleged
fraudulent sale of the properties belonging to Archdiocese, mere
non-disclosure of such facts, would not be a ground to set aside
the summons issued by the Trial Court after applying its mind and
having been prima facie satisfied about the commission of the
alleged offences under Section 120B, 406 and 423 read with 34 of
IPC. From the order dated 2.04.2019 passed in Cr.M.P.
No.5003/2018, it is quite discernible that the Trial court after
meticulously examining the allegations made in the complaint and
15
the evidence of the complainant and one witness, had taken the
cognizance, with regard to the aforesaid offences only and had not
taken cognizance of the other offences alleged under Sections
409, 418, 420, 465, 467 and 468 of IPC which shows proper
application of mind by the Trial Court before issuing the summons
to the appellant and others.
14. As regards the submission made by learned Senior Counsel, Mr.
Luthra that the second complaint at the instance of the respondent
no. 2 on the same set of facts against the same accused was not
maintainable, it may be noted that the law in this regard is quite
well settled since 1962. In case of Pramatha Nath Talukdar Vs.
3
Saroj Ranjan Sarkar , it was held with regard to filing of the
second complaint that a fresh complaint could be entertained after
the dismissal of previous complaint under Section 203 of the
Criminal Procedure Code when there was manifest error or
manifest miscarriage of justice or when fresh evidence was
forthcoming. It was further held that an order of dismissal under
Section 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code is no bar to the
entertainment of a second complaint on the same facts, but it will
be entertained only in exceptional circumstances, e.g. that the
previous order was passed on an incomplete record or on a
misunderstanding of nature of complaint or it was manifestly
3 AIR 1962 SC 876
16
absurd, unjust or foolish or where new facts which could not, with
reasonable diligence, have been brought on record in the previous
proceedings have been adduced. The precise observations made
in para 48 thereof may be reproduced hereunder :
“ 48. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure the subject of
“complaints to Magistrates” is dealt with in Chapter XVI of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. The provisions relevant for the
purpose of this case are Sections 200, 202 and 203. Section 200
deals with examination of complainants and Sections 202, 203
and 204 with the powers of the Magistrate in regard to the
dismissal of complaint or the issuing of process. The scope and
extent of Sections 202 and 203 were laid down in Vadilal
Panchal v. Dattatraya Dulaji Gha Digaonkar [Vadilal Panchal v.
Dattatraya Dulaji Gha Digaonkar, AIR 1960 SC 1113 : 1960 Cri
LJ 1499] . The scope of enquiry under Section 202 is limited to
finding out the truth or otherwise of the complaint in order to
determine whether process should issue or not and Section 203
lays down what materials are to be considered for the purpose.
Under Section 203 of the Criminal Procedure Code the judgment
which the Magistrate has to form must be based on the
statements of the complainant and of his witnesses and the
result of the investigation or enquiry, if any. He must apply his
mind to the materials and form his judgment whether or not there
is sufficient ground for proceeding. Therefore if he has not
misdirected himself as to the scope of the enquiry made under
Section 202 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and has judicially
applied his mind to the material before him and then proceeds to
make his order it cannot be said that he has acted erroneously.
An order of dismissal under Section 203 of the Criminal
Procedure Code, is, however, no bar to the entertainment of a
second complaint on the same facts but it will be entertained
only in exceptional circumstances, e.g., where the previous order
was passed on an incomplete record or on a misunderstanding
of the nature of the complaint or it was manifestly absurd, unjust
or foolish or where new facts which could not, with reasonable
diligence, have been brought on the record in the previous
proceedings, have been adduced. It cannot be said to be in the
interests of justice that after a decision has been given against
the complainant upon a full consideration of his case, he or any
other person should be given another opportunity to have his
complaint enquired into. Allah Ditta v. Karam Bakhsh [Allah Ditta
v. Karam Bakhsh, 1930 SCC OnLine Lah 268 : AIR 1930 Lah
879] ; R.N. Choubey v. P. Jain [R.N. Choubey v. P. Jain, 1948
SCC OnLine Pat 85 : AIR 1949 Pat 256] ; Hansabai Sayaji
Payagude v. Ananda Ganuji Payagude [Hansabai Sayaji
Payagude v. Ananda Ganuji Payagude, 1949 SCC OnLine Bom
99 : AIR 1949 Bom 384] and Doraiswami Ayyar v. T. Subramania
Ayyar [Doraiswami Ayyar v. T. Subramania Ayyar, 1917 SCC
OnLine Mad 167 : AIR 1918 Mad 484] . In regard to the adducing
of new facts for the bringing of a fresh complaint the Special
Bench in the judgment under appeal did not accept the view of
the Bombay High Court [Hansabai Sayaji Payagude v. Ananda
Ganuji Payagude, 1949 SCC OnLine Bom 99 : AIR 1949 Bom
384] or the Patna High Court [R.N. Choubey v. P. Jain, 1948
17
SCC OnLine Pat 85 : AIR 1949 Pat 256] in the cases above
quoted and adopted the opinion of Maclean, C.J. in Queen
Empress v. Dolegobind Dass [Queen Empress v. Dolegobind
Dass, 1900 SCC OnLine Cal 229 : ILR (1901) 28 Cal 211]
affirmed by a Full Bench in Dwarka Nath Mondul v. Beni Madhab
Banerjee [Dwarka Nath Mondul v. Beni Madhab Banerjee, 1901
SCC OnLine Cal 242 : ILR (1901) 28 Cal 652] . It held therefore
that a fresh complaint can be entertained where there is manifest
error, or manifest miscarriage of justice in the previous order or
when fresh evidence is forthcoming.”
15. The said observations made in the Pramatha Nath Talukdar
(supra) case were reiterated in various later decisions in case of
4
Jatinder Singh and others Vs. Ranjit Kaur , in case of Ranvir
5
Singh Vs. State of Haryana and Another , in case of Poonam
6
Chand Jain and Another Vs. Fazru , as also in the latest decision
in case of Samta Naidu and Another Vs. State of Madhya
7
Pradesh and Another . Thus, having regard to the said legal
position, it could not be said that the trial court had committed any
error in entertaining the complaints filed by the respondent
complainant, when the previous complaint filed by him was
pending before the other court, and more particularly when the
said court had dismissed the said previous complaint for non-
prosecution, without taking cognizance of the alleged offences
therein.
16. It was also submitted by the learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Luthra
that similar complaints filed by other complainants against the
appellant and others making similar allegations were not found to
4 (2001) 2 SCC 570
5 (2009) 9 SCC 642
6 (2010) 2 SCC 631
7 (2020) 5 SCC 378
18
be of any substance. In the opinion of the Court, there is hardly
any substance in the said submission. Apart from the fact that the
names of the complainants and of the accused were different in
the said complaints, it is difficult to cull out whether all other
complaints pertained to the same properties for which the present
complaints have been filed. It may also be noted that in one of the
complaints filed by the other complainant Shine Varghese, though
a closure report was filed by the police, the protest petition has
been filed by the said complainant, and that the concerned trial
court has reopened the case for hearing.
17. The Sessions Court in the Revision petitions filed by the appellant
had also upheld the said orders passed by the trial court issuing
summons against the appellant and others after dealing with each
and every aspect of the matter including the ingredients of alleged
offences for which the summons were issued against the
appellant. The High Court in the impugned order has also
discussed in detail the submissions made by the counsels for the
parties in the petitions filed by the appellant under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C. and upheld the order passed by the Sessions Court. In
view of the said observations made and prima facie findings
recorded by the three courts below as regards the alleged
19
involvement of the appellant in the alleged offences, this Court is
not inclined to interfere with the same.
18. No doubt, summoning of an accused is a serious matter and
therefore the Magistrate before issuing the summons to the
accused is obliged to scrutinize carefully the allegations made in
the complaint with a view to prevent a person named therein as
accused from being called upon to face any frivolous complaint,
nonetheless one of the objects of Section 202 Cr.P.C. is also to
enable the Magistrate to prosecute a person or persons against
whom grave allegations are made. Just as it is necessary to curtail
vexatious and frivolous complaints against innocent persons, it is
equally essential to punish the guilty after conducting a fair trial. In
the instant cases, all the three courts below have discussed in
detail about the prima facie involvement of the appellant in the
alleged offences, and therefore it is not necessary for this Court to
reiterate the same. Suffice it to say that having carefully examined
the record of the complaints in question, we do not find any
illegality or infirmity in the orders passed by the trial court issuing
summons against the appellant-Archbishop for the alleged
offences.
19. So far as SLP (Crl.) 1487-1493 of 2022 filed by Eparchy of
Bathery and the Diary No. 7364 of 2022 filed by Catholic Diocese
of Thamarassery (hereinafter referred to as the ‘petitioners’) are
20
concerned, as stated earlier the said petitioners have challenged
the observations recorded by the High Court in para 17 to 39 of the
impugned judgement, on the ground that the said observations
were made behind the back of the petitioners and other Diocese,
and that such observations had wide ramifications throughout the
state. According to the said petitioners such general observations
made in the impugned judgement amounted to nullifying the
concluded transactions involving the properties of Catholic
Churches including Syro Malabar Catholic Church.
20. In this regard, the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Chander Uday
Singh had submitted that the petitioners had nothing to do with the
appellant-accused Archbishop, however, the High Court in the
proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed by him has defined,
decided and declared the spiritual, ecclesiastical and temporal
powers of the Catholic Church without affording any opportunity of
hearing to the affected parties, which is not legally permissible. Mr.
Chander Uday Singh has relied upon observations made by this
Court in Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) 4567 of 2019
(Anu Kumar Vs. State (UT Administration) and another) to
substantiate his submission that High Court could not have
ventured to enter into an area which would adversely affect the
interest of the third party to the proceedings.
21
21. It appears to us after having gone through the impugned order
passed by the High Court, more particularly the observations made
in para 17 to 39 thereof that the said prima facie observations were
made in response to the submissions made by the learned
counsels for the parties relying upon various decisions of this
Court as regards the powers and authority of the Archbishop of
Archdiocese with regard to the temporal and spiritual affairs of the
Churches. Of course, certain observations are omnibus and
general in nature but the same being only prima facie observations
made in the impugned order in the petitions filed by the Appellant-
Archbishop under Section 482 of Cr.PC, no finality could be
attached to the said observations. Hence, without stretching the
matter any further and without expressing any opinion on the said
prima facie observations made in para 17 to 39 of the impugned
order, we deem it appropriate to direct, and accordingly direct the
Trial Court to decide the complaints in question filed by the
respondent no. 2 against the appellant-Archbishop and others in
accordance with law without being influenced by the said
observations made by the High Court in the impugned order and
that it would be open to the said petitioners to take recourse to the
remedies as may be legally permissible, in case the said
22
observations cause any complications in the transactions already
concluded by the Churches to whom the said petitioners represent.
22. In absence of any other and further material on record to support
the grievances of the said petitioners, we are not inclined to
entertain the said SLPs filed by the petitioners Eparchy of Bathery
and Catholic Diocese of Thamarassery, in exercise of our limited
jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, more
particularly when the said petitioners have failed to make out any
case of grave injustice being suffered to them. As stated earlier,
the said observations have been made by the High Court in
response to the submissions made by the counsels for the parties
in the light of the various decisions of this Court, and the said
observations being prima facie in nature, no finality could be
attached to them.
23. Having said that, we are constrained to say something on the
subsequent orders passed by the High Court after passing of the
impugned order dismissing the petitions filed under Section 482
Cr.PC by the appellant. The High Court after recording its findings
in the impugned order about the Criminal Conspiracy allegedly
hatched by the appellant and the other accused for fraudulently
selling the properties belonging to Archdiocese, further enlarged
the scope of the petitions by raising doubts as regards the
settlement deed executed by the appellant and others in respect of
23
the properties as to whether the said settlement deed was with
respect to any government land or poramboke land. The High
Court while dismissing the petitions filed by the appellant-
Archbishop under Section 482 of Cr.PC, further directed the State
Government as under:-
“Hence, it is ordered that the government shall conduct the
investigation into the matter through its investigating agencies so
as to satisfy itself whether the settlement deed of the year 2007
was executed with respect to any government land or
Poramboke Land, and whether it was a government land or a
Poramboke land at any point of time and also the non-action/in
action on part of the concerned officials who are bound by the
provisions of law including Land Conservancy Act, for which, a
team of officers possessing adequate knowledge in the civil and
criminal laws has to be selected.”
24. The High Court did not stop at giving the aforesaid directions but
kept on passing the subsequent orders even after the roster was
changed. From the application being I.A. No.106695/2022 filed in
the present appeals on behalf of the appellant, it appears that the
concerned Judge in the High Court retained the case with him for
reporting the compliance of the directions given by him in the
impugned order, and thereafter vide the order dated 08.02.2022
directed the registry to implead the Union of India as an additional
party to the main case-Crl.M.C. No.8936/2019 by observing as
under:-
“6. Since there is no comprehensive law addressing the legal
status of unincorporated organization acting under the guise of
either religion or charity, it is necessary to hear the Central
Government on that issue.
7. The misuse of government properties/public properties,
puramboke lands has become a matter of concern and when it is
done by religious bodies or congregational institutions, there will
24
not be any person to challenge the same before a competent
court, especially when such bodies constitute a deciding factor in
the election of members to the Assembly and Parliament. This
might be the reason why there is massive and large scale
encroachment over the government land, public property and
puramboke land at the instance of religious and charitable
unincorporated bodies. It is also a matter that can be taken note
of judicially by this court. I am afraid such misuse and
encroachment of puramboke lands are not being properly dealt
with. Necessarily, there should be a separate government
agency at the central level akin to other central agencies dealing
with public matters, investigation etc. to initiate action against
encroachment over government and public properties.
8. The Registry is directed to implead the Union of India,
represented by Additional Solicitor General of India as an
additional party to the main case-Crl.M.C.No.8936/2019 so as to
express their view on the issue and to enact a comprehensive
law dealing with the abovesaid issue, besides the formation of a
central agency.
9. The Officer, who conducted the enquiry shall submit a detailed
report addressing all the issues raised and directed by this Court
on or before 02/03/2022. Call on 03/03/2022”
25. Thereafter on 03.03.2022, following order was passed by the High
Court:
“Assistant Solicitor General of India appeared and wanted time
to file reply. No second report or additional report was submitted
by the State in spite of the direction issued by this Court.
Hence, there will be a direction to the concerned official to
appear in person and to show cause why the order of this Court
is flouted. Under such circumstances, it is necessary to implead
the Central Bureau of Investigation as an additional respondent
in the main case. The Registry is directed to implead the
Central Bureau of Investigation represented by its Director, New
Delhi as additional respondent. There will also be a direction to
the Registry to send a copy of the judgment dated 12.08.2021
along with the order dated 08.02.2022 to the Assistant Solicitor
General of India for information. Call on 21.03.2022.”
26. Again on 10.06.2022, following order was passed by the High
Court -
“Several postings have been given to the Central Government
and the Assistant Solicitor General of India to take instructions.
So far there is no positive response on the part of Assistant
Solicitor General and as such, there will be a direction to file an
affidavit as to whether they are actually interested in the matter
or not.
25
There will be a direction to the State Government to address the
issue in reference to Article 296 of the Constitution of India and
submit a detailed report. As last chance, post on 23-06-2022.”
27. From the afore-stated orders, it clearly transpires that the High
Court after the dismissal of the petitions filed by the appellant –
Archbishop under Article 482 of Cr.P.C., invoked its Suo motu
jurisdiction directing the State Government to make detailed
inquiry with regard to the execution of sale deed and settlement
deed in respect of some of the properties sold out by the appellant,
and find out whether the said properties belonged to the
Government or were Poramboke land, and whether the said
settlement deed was created with the aim to manipulate a
document of title over Government land. Thereafter, also the
concerned judge retained the matters with him even after the
change of roster, and continued to pass the orders one after the
other on the issues which were neither the subject matter of the
main petitions under Section 482 nor were argued by the
concerned advocates for the parties. The concerned judge also
assumed his plenary-advisory role by calling upon and advising
the State Government to legislate a comprehensive law
addressing the issues pertaining to the legal status of
unincorporated organisation acting under the guise of religion or
26
charity. On non-submission of the second report by the State, the
High Court directed the concerned officer to appear in person, and
directed the Registry to implead CBI as an additional respondent
in the main case, though the same was already disposed of.
28. The High Court in its overzealous approach had travelled not only
beyond the scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C and of Article
226 of the Constitution of India, but had crossed all the boundaries
of judicial activism and judicial restraint by passing such orders
under the guise of doing real and substantial justice.
29. In our opinion, the jurisprudential enthusiasm and wisdom for
doing the substantial justice has to be applied by the courts within
the permissible limits. The belief of self-righteousness or
smugness of the High Court in exercise of its powers of judicial
review should not overawe the other authorities discharging their
statutory functions. We may not have to remind the High Courts
that judicial restraint is a virtue, and the predilections of individual
judges, howsoever well intentioned, cannot be permitted to be
operated in utter disregard of the well-recognized judicial principles
governing uniform application of law. Unwarranted judicial activism
may cause uncertainty or confusion not only in the mind of the
authorities but also in the mind of the litigants.
30. In that view of the matter, all the subsequent orders passed by the
High Court after the passing of the impugned order dated
27
12.08.2021, being unwarranted deserve to be quashed and set
aside, and are accordingly quashed and set aside.
31. In the aforesaid premises and subject to the afore-stated
observations/directions, the Criminal Appeal filed by the Appellant-
Archbishop, and all the SLPs filed by Eparchy of Bathery and
Catholic Diocese of Thamarassery are dismissed.
…....…..…………………J.
(DINESH MAHESHWARI)
…..…………………J.
(BELA M. TRIVEDI)
NEW DELHI
17.03.2023
28