1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 8996 OF 2019
CENTRAL GST DELHI - III …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
DELHI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT LTD …RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2465 OF 2020
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 4751-4753 OF 2021
J U D G M E N T
S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.
1. In all these appeals, orders of the Customs, Excise and Service Tax
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Appellate Tribunal (hereafter “CESTAT”) are impugned by the service tax
authorities (hereafter “the revenue”), who argue that user development fee
levied and collected by the airport operation, maintenance and development
| ture Not Verified<br>lly signed by<br>TA SAPRA<br>2023.05.19<br>:39 I1ST | | |
| I1S | T |
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Airport Pvt. Ltd., and the Hyderabad International Airport Pvt. Ltd., (hereafter
collectively called “the assessees”) is subjected to service tax levy, under the
provisions of the Finance Act, 1994 (hereafter “the Act”).
2. All the assessees had entered into joint venture arrangements/agreements
(hereafter “OMDA”) with the Airports Authority of India (hereafter “AAI”, a
body corporate created by the Airports Authority of India Act, 1994 [hereafter
“AAI Act”]. Under OMDA, the assesses agreed to undertake some activities
enjoined upon the AAI, by the AAI Act. The assessees were authorised,
by various notifications (dated 27th February 2009) issued by the Central
Government under Section 22A of the AAI Act to collect a “development fee”
@ Rs. 100/- for every departing domestic passenger and Rs. 600/- for every
departing international passenger at the concerned airports for a period of 48
months.
3. The Commissioner of Service Tax, through various show cause notices
demanded payment of tax on the development fee collected for various periods.
These notices were adjudicated and confirmed; the CESTAT remanded the
matter to the original authority requiring fresh adjudication after taking into
consideration the decisions of this court in Consumer Online
2
Foundation v. Union of India , Commissioner of Central Excise v. Cochin
3
International Airport Ltd. , , Acer India Ltd. and Orissa Cement Ltd. v. State
2
(2011) 5 SCC 360
3
2010 (17) STR J 79 (S.C.)
3
4
of Orissa and various instructions issued by the Central Board of Excise and
Customs (hereafter “CBEC”). The original authority disposed of all show cause
notices by confirming demands, and also levying penalties under the Act. The
adjudicating authority accorded the benefit of “cum-tax” valuation. These
orders were challenged before the CESTAT, which, by the orders impugned,
allowed the assessees’ appeals, holding that the development fee collected was
not liable to service tax levy.
II
The relevant provisions
4. Section 65 (105) (zzm) of the Finance Act, 1994, contains the definition
of “airport service” (with effect from 01.07.2010) and states that such service is:
“any service provided or to be provided by airports authority or by
any other person in any airport or a civil enclave”
Before the amendment, i.e., before 1 July 2010, the definition, of airport service
was as follows:
“to any person, by airports authority or any person authorised by it,
in an airport or a civil enclave"
Section 65 (3d) defines airport authority as:
“Airports Authority of India constituted under section 3 of the
Airports Authority of India Act, 1994 (55 of 1994) and also includes
any person having the charge of management of an airport or civil
enclave”.
4
1991 Supp (1) SCC 430
4
5. Section 68 (1) of the Finance Act provides that every person providing
taxable service to any person shall pay service tax at the rate specified in section
66. Section 67 (1) of the Finance Act, provides that where service tax is
chargeable on any taxable service with reference to its value then such value
shall be the gross amount charged by the service provider for such service
provided or to be provided by him.
6. The relevant provisions of the Airports Economic Regulatory Authority
of India Act, 2008 and the Aircraft Rules, 1937 are extracted below:
Section 13 of the Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India Act,
| 2008 sets out the functions of the authority, and | inter alia, | reads as follows: |
|---|
“13. Functions of Authority.
(1) The Authority shall perform the following functions in respect of
major airports, namely:--
(a) to determine the tariff for the aeronautical services taking into
consideration--
(b) to determine the amount of the development fees in respect of
major airports;
(c) to determine the amount of the passengers service fee levied under
rule 88 of the Aircraft Rules, 1937 made under the Aircraft Act, 1934
(22 of 1934);…”
Provisions of the Aircraft Rules, 1937:
“Rule 88. Passenger Service Fee. —The licensee is entitled to collect
fees to be called as Passenger Service Fee from the embarking
passengers at such rate as the Central Government may specify and is
also liable to pay for security component to any security agency
designated by the Central Government for providing the security
service. Provided that in respect of a major airport such rate shall be
as determined under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 13 of the
Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India Act, 2008.
Rule 89. User Development Fee —The licensee may, -
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(i) levy and collect at a major airport the User Development Fee at
such rate as may be determined under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of
section 13 of the Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India
Act, 2008;
(ii) levy and collect at any other airport the User Development Fees at
such rate as the Central Government may specify.”
The relevant provisions of the AAI Act are extracted below:
“Section 22. The Authority may,-
(i) With the previous approval of the Central Government, charge
fees, or rent-
(a) for the landing, housing or parking of aircraft or for any other
service or facility offered in connection with aircraft operations at any
airport, heliport or airstrip
Explanation. -
In this sub-clause “aircraft” does not include an aircraft belonging to
any armed force of the Union and “aircraft operations” does not
include operations of any aircraft belonging to the said force;
(b) for providing air traffic services, ground safety services,
aeronautical communications and navigational aids and
meteorological services at any airports and at any aeronautical
communication station;
(c) for the amenities given to the passengers and visitors at any
airport, civil enclave, heliport or airstrip;
(d) for the use and employment by persons of facilities and other
services provided by the authority at any airport, civil enclave heliport
or airstrip;
(ii) with due regard to the instructions that the Central Government
may give to the authority, from time to time, charge fees or rent from
persons who are given by the authority any facility for carrying on
any trade or business at any airport, heliport or airstrip.
Section 22A. The Authority may, after the previous approval of the
Central Government in this behalf, levy on, and collect from, the
embarking passengers at an airport, the development fees at the rate
as may be prescribed and such fees shall be credited to the Authority
and shall be regulated and utilized in the prescribed manner, for the
purposes of-
(a) funding or financing the costs of upgradation, expansion or
development of the airport at which the fee is collected; or
(b) establishment or development of a new airport in lieu of the
airport referred to in clause (a); or
(c) investment in the equity in respect of shares to be subscribed by
the Authority in companies engaged in establishing, owning,
developing, operating or maintaining a private airport in lieu of the
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airport referred to in clause (a) or advancement of loans to such
companies or other persons engaged in such activities.”
III
Contentions of the parties
7. Ms. Nisha Bagchi, learned counsel for the revenue, submits that assessees
function as licensees of Airports. The airports are capable of being licensed by
the AAI to operate as aerodromes. It was submitted that grant of licenses is
subject to express conditions. Rule 88 provides for collection of fees known as
“passenger services fees” from the embarking passengers; Rule 89 provides for
collection of “User Development Fee” (hereafter “UDF”) by licensees. Ms
Bagchi argued that user development fees are nothing but amounts collected for
extending or enhancing various services like providing passenger lounges,
passenger amenities, toilets, rest rooms and other facilities inside airports. Even
the agreement entered by the assessees with AAI, indicates that UDF is to
enhance passenger amenities, services and facilities. Those amounts are to be
used for development, management, maintenance and operation and expansion
of facilities at the airport.
8. It was urged that the nature of UDF indicates that such fees are amounts
collected for rendering various services. The amounts collected is nothing but
development fee, meant to be used for funding and financing specific
renovation, maintenance, development and upgradation of airports. These are
necessary due to cost escalation. These amounts are for services rendered, and
providing access by the airport. Such amounts are taxable. Learned counsel
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also relied on the circular No. 106/Commr (ST)/2009 dated 08.07.2011, which
specifically stated that service tax is paid by the various airports on passenger
services fee and UDF but no tax is paid on development fees. It was argued that
CBEC has clarified that passenger service fee, user development fee and
development fee are different and development fee is to be taxed under “airport
services” .
9. Learned counsel sought to distinguish the decision of the Kerala High
Court in the case of Cochin International Airport Ltd. because in that case, what
was in issue was user fee while in the case in hand it is UDF. Counsel reiterated
that the findings of the lower authorities are correct and submits that the
impugned orders of CESTAT call for interference.
10. Learned counsel pointed out that by Section 22A of the AAI Act, the
authority “may”, after the previous approval of the Central Government “levy
on, and collect from, the embarking passengers at, an airport, the Development
Fees”. It was contended that such levy cannot be called a tax because it is
discretionary and subject to the approval of the Central Government, meant for
funding or financing the costs of upgradation, expansion or development of the
airport at which the fee is collected; or establishment or development of a new
airport in lieu of the existing airport or towards investment in the equity in
respect of “shares to be subscribed by the authority in companies engaged in
establishing, owning, developing, operating or maintaining a private airport in
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lieu of the airport” or “advancement of loans to such companies or other
persons engaged in such activities.” It was also urged that the amounts cannot
be termed as levy, because they are not deposited with the government treasury.
11. It was submitted that from a reading of Section 22A, it is clear that it
allows for funding or financing the cost of upgradation, expansion or
development of the airport at which the fee is collected and establishment or
development of a new Airport in lieu of the airport at which the fee is collected.
This is a pre-funding collection and imposed for the facility to be provided by
the assessees and to be used for funding of project cost which ultimately would
result in creation of better facilities and amenities for passengers. The assessees
entered into agreements for the purpose of its operation, management and
development of airports (OMDA). In terms of such OMDAs, assessees are
responsible for the development, design, upgradation of airport. It is for this
purpose that they have been permitted to collect UDF from the passengers.
12. It is further submitted that the assessees are authorized to collect UDF by
the Ministry of Civil Aviation which granted approval under Section 22A of the
AAI Act. Once it is clear that the purpose and object of the UDF is for funding
or financing the costs of upgradation, expansion or development of the major
Airports, only the rate of fees are determined by the Airport Economic
Regulatory Authority. The upgradation or development of an airport results in
better infrastructure and services to passengers. Collection of the DF could
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facilitate and provide better services to the passengers who would be the
recipient of the airport service. Therefore, the amount cannot be called a tax or
levy, but is actually a collection for service, and consequently liable to service
tax.
13. The revenue argues that the definition of airport service is wide and
includes any service provided or to be provided by any person in the airport. It
is a taxable service. Further, without payment of such levy, passengers cannot
enter the airport nor can have access to the plane. Thus, the UDF collected by
DIAL is covered by the definition of “airport service” and would be liable to
payment of service tax. The impugned order has failed to appreciate this
submission and hence, the same is liable to be set aside.
14. It was argued that the decision of this court in the case of Consumer
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Online Foundation v Union of India had expressed the view that DF appeared
to be in the form of tax or cess, but was not a legally collected tax. It was argued
that Section 22A provided for the “levy” of DF, but the rate at which the said
levy was to be collected had not been prescribed by framing of a separate rule
by the Airports Economic Regulatory Authority (AERA) as amended by the
2008 Act. This court held that the collection of UDF by the assessees prior to
the notification issued by AERA was considered to be levied and collected
without the authority of law. It further found that the levy and collection of
5
2011 (5) SCR 911
10
UDF by the two airport concessionaires at the rates fixed by the Central
Government (by two letters dated 9.2.2009 and 27.2.2009) respectively were
ultra vires the AAI Act, and were not saved by Section 6 of the General Clauses
Act, 1897.
15. It is submitted that in the above decision, there is no clear finding that DF
is a tax or cess and the same was held to be ultra vires the AAI Act on the
ground that the rate could not have been fixed by the Central Government, but
only by making a rule by AERA which has not been done. In the present case,
we are concerned with the levy of service tax on DF collected by the
respondents from the passengers. Also in that decision, this court was not
concerned with levy or otherwise of service tax on DF. It was argued that DF
has not been collected as tax or cess and therefore, the contention that DF is a
tax on which there cannot be any service tax is incorrect. The nature of DF is
that these are the charges collected by the respondents for development of
facilities for the use of the airport. In fact, the assesses’ contention was these are
the charges for the use of the airport services by the passengers and is not a tax.
16. Learned counsel relied on the judgment reported as Krishi Upaj Mandi
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Samiti v Commissioner of Central Excise and urged that the nature of UDF is
similar to the optional collection made by market committees who perform
services, which are not in the nature of a statutory activity or a sovereign
6
2022 (1) SCR 700
11
function, and if such services are rendered for a consideration, they are
subjected to levy.
17. Mr. Arvind Datar, Mr. Tarun Gulati and Mr. Pritesh Kapoor, learned
senior counsel appearing for the assessees, contended that the decision in
Consumer Online (supra) has concluded the nature of collections; it is a tax,
unrelated to any service provided, and has to be borne in mind that there is no
consideration. Learned counsel relied on the following observation in Consumer
Online Foundation:
“the object 8 of Parliament in inserting Section 22A in the 2004 Act
by the Amendment Act of 2003 is to authorize by law the levy and
collection of development fees from every embarking passenger de
hors the facilities that the embarking passengers get at the existing
airports. The nature of the levy under Section 22A of the 2004 Act, in
our considered opinion, is not charges C or any other consideration
for services for the facilities provided by the Airports Authority.”
18. It was argued by learned counsel that the taxable activity did not occur in
this case, as the collections were intended for future developments whereas the
‘airport’ referred to in Section 65(105) (zzm) is an existing airport. Counsel
urged that such statutory levies were in the nature of cess or tax and were not
liable to taxation. Counsel emphasized that the ruling of the Kerala High Court
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in Cochin International Airport Limited vs. Collector Central Excise has held
that UDF is collected to fulfil the funding gap for development of airports, and
8
cannot be termed as service. This ruling was upheld by this court . In these
7
2009 (16) STR 401 (Ker.)
8
in 2010 (17) S.T.R. J79 (S.C.)
12
circumstances, there is no merit in the revenue’s submission that development
fee is collected for rendering services.
19. Learned counsel relied on the impugned orders to say that to be liable to
tax, service should be rendered to a person by a specifically described service
provider in an airport. The scope of activities of the assessee vis-a-vis
passengers who bear the burden of development fee needs a closer look.
Passengers in an airport intend to travel by an airline which has the said airport
as a scheduled port of call. The contractual nature of this relationship is
enshrined in the ticket which provides access to the airport, process through
check-in and security, space for waiting and necessary amenities and provision
for boarding an aircraft. There is nothing to show that passengers have to make
payments for any of these activities. These facilities were available without any
additional charge before the imposition of ‘development fee’. Such services
continue to be available after its quashing. No additional benefit accrues to the
passenger during the period of levy of ‘development fee.’ All facilities are basic
facilities inherent in the civil aviation sector in which the appellant, a non-
public sector entity, is a recent entrant.
20. It was emphasized that moving away from state control, airports entered
the phase of regulatory control with the advent of the AAI Act. This transition
also had to factor in the larger public interest in safety and security, which
meant that some level of control, de-regulation was limited and confined to the
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financial aspects of airport management. Having created a statutory authority,
the statute should have been specific to contain the scope of functions of the
AAI. Despite granting financial autonomy, the need for dependence on the State
exchequer could not be eliminated and hence appropriate types of levies as well
as restrictions on their utilization were incorporated in the statute. It was
contended that Sections 22 and 22A of the AAI Act are in the context
of substitution of the constitutional funds of the Union of India, for deposit and
drawing with that of the accounts of AAI.
21. The assesses urge that Section 22 of the AAI Act enables AAI to charge
for the facilities it provides. However, the levy under Section 22A [of the AAI
Act] is compulsorily charged from passengers; it is placed in an escrow account
owing to the restricted purpose for which such fee collected can be used. Hence,
there is a substantive difference between a charge under Section 22 and levy
under Section 22A. The charge under Section 22, paid by any passenger, may
be a consideration for a service and subjected to service tax. However, the same
principles are not applicable to a levy under Section 22A, which is independent
of Section 22 and is not for any service rendered.
22. Counsel underlines that this court in Consumer Online Foundation
(Supra) has declared the law and has interpreted both Section 22 and Section
22A of the AAI Act. This court has held that charges collected under Section 22
are for different services and facilities provided to the third parties by the lessee
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of AAI. Collections under Section 22A of the AAI Act, this court has ruled, are
"dehors the facilities that the embarking passengers get at the existing
airports". There is also a specific finding that there is no contractual
relationship between the passengers and the AAI for the funds collected under
Section 22A of the AAI Act. Further, it was highlighted that in the same
judgment, it was held that charges under Section 22A:
“are not charges or any other consideration for services for the
facilities provided by the Airports Authority.”
The court decisively held that development fee is “really in the nature of a cess
or a tax for generating revenue for specific purpose.” And, further, that
amounts collected are accountable to the AAI, which would ensure that such
fee levied and collected are “utilized for the purposes mentioned in Section
22A (a) of the AAI Act.”
23. It was argued that in view of the declaration of law, CESTAT correctly
held that the charges collected by the assesses under Section 22A of the AAI
Act cannot be regarded as considered for services rendered.
24. Learned counsel submitted that the decision in Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti
(supra) is distinguishable. In that case, the court was concerned only with
Section 9 (2) of the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961, which
was held not to relate to a statutory function but only a discretionary charge,
i.e., renting of premises. Rent for immovable property is materially different
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from a collection under Section 22A of the AAI Act, which, according to this
court, is in the nature of cess or tax and a compulsory exaction in Consumer
Online Foundation (supra).
25. The assesses also rely on the decision of this court in Commissioner of
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Service Tax vs. Bhayana Builders (P) Ltd , where it was stated that under
Section 67 of the Finance Act, 1994, not every amount charged by the service
provider is taxable. Upon an analysis of Section 6 7, it was held that the amount
charged should be "for such service provided" to be taxable. The court
emphasized the connection between the service and the amount by stating that:
"the Act has provided for a nexus between the amount charged and
the service provided".
26. Counsel pointed out that Consumer Online Foundation (supra) has ruled
that there is no nexus between the amounts charged under Section 22A of the
AAI Act and any service provided. In the absence of a nexus between the
amount charged as DF/UDF and any service rendered, such amounts cannot be
liable to service tax.
IV
Analysis and Conclusions
27. In the decision of this court, in Consumer Online Foundation (Supra), the
context was the validity of the levy of development fees and their collection
from embarking passengers by lessees of airports, under OMDAs, including the
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2018 (1) SCR 1128
16
DIAL in this case. The court examined the history of airport regulation in India,
including the legislation concerning it, and, after analysing the provisions of the
AAI Act, including the amendment to it, in 2003, held that:
“12. The functions of the Airports Authority under clause (aa) of sub-
section (3) of Section 12 also inserted by the Amendment Act of 2003
to establish airports, or assist in the establishment of private airports
by rendering such technical, financial or other assistance which the
Central Government may consider necessary for such purposes
cannot be assigned to the lessee under Section 12A Section 12A of the
1994 Act. The Amendment Act of 2003 which also inserted Section
12A therefore provides in sub-section (1) of Section 12A that the
Airports Authority can make a lease of the premises of an airport
(including buildings and structures thereon and appertaining thereto)
to carry out "some" of its functions under Section 12 as the Airports
Authority may, in the public interest or in the interest of better
management of airports, deem fit. Obviously, "a lease of premises of
an airport" as contemplated in sub-section (1) of Section 12A cannot
include establishing an airport or assisting in establishment of private
airports as contemplated in clause (aa) of sub-section (3) of Section
12 of the Act.
13. To enable the Airports Authority to perform its statutory function
of establishing a new airport or to assist in the establishment of
private airports, the legislature has thought it fit to empower the
Airports Authority to levy and collect development fees as will be
clear from clauses (b) and (c) of Section 22A of the 1994 Act. Such
development fees levied and collected under Section 22A can also be
utilized for funding or financing the costs of up-gradation, expansion
and development of an existing airport at which the fees is collected
as provided in clause (a) of Section 22A of the Act and in case the
lease of the premises of an existing airport (including buildings and
structures thereon and appertaining thereto) has been made to a
lessee under Section 12A of the Act, the Airports Authority may meet
the costs of up-gradation, expansion and development of such leased
out airport to a lessee, but this can be done only if the rules provide
for such payment to the lessee of an airport because Section
22A says that the development fees are to be regulated and utilized in
the manner prescribed by the Rules. Since the lessee of an airport
cannot be assigned the function of the Airports Authority to establish
airports or assist in establishing private airports in lieu of the existing
airports at which the development fees is being collected, the lessee
cannot under sub-section (4) of Section 12A have the power of the
Airports Authority under Section 22A of the 1994 Act to levy and
collect development fees. This is because sub-section (4) of Section
12A provides that the lessee can have all those powers of the Airports
Authority which are necessary for performance of such functions as
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assigned to it under sub-section (1) of Section 12A in terms of the
lease. Moreover, since we have held that the function of establishment
and development of a new airport in lieu of an existing airport and the
function of establishing a private airport are exclusive functions of the
Airports Authority under the 2004 Act, and these statutory functions
cannot be assigned by the Airports Authority under lease to a lessee
under Section 12A of the Act, the lease agreements, namely, the
OMDA and the State Support agreement could not make a provision
conferring the right on the lessee to levy and collect development fees
for the purpose of discharging these statutory functions of the Airports
Authority. We, therefore, do not think it necessary to refer to the
clauses of the OMDA and the State Support Agreements executed in
favour of the two lessees to find out whether the right of levying and
collecting the development fees has been assigned to the lessees or
not.”
28. This court further held as follows:
“It will be clear from a bare reading of Sections 22 and 22A that there
is a distinction between the charges, fees and rent collected
under Section 22 and the development fees levied and collected
under Section 22A of the 1994 Act. The charges, fees and rent
collected by the Airports Authority under Section 22 are for the
services and facilities provided by the Airports Authority to the
airlines, passengers, visitors and traders doing business at the airport.
Therefore, when the Airports Authority makes a lease of the premises
of an airport (including buildings and structures thereon and
appertaining thereto) in favour of a lessee to carry out some of its
functions under Section 12, the lessee, who has been assigned such
functions, will have the powers of the Airports Authority under Section
22 of the Act to collect charges, fees or rent from the third parties for
the different facilities and services provided to them in terms of the
lease agreement. The legal basis of such charges, fees or rent
enumerated in Section 22 of the 2008 Act is the contract between the
Airports Authority or the lessee to whom the airport has been leased
out and the third party, such as the airlines, passengers, visitors and
traders doing business at the airport. But there can be no such
contractual relationship between the passengers embarking at an
airport and the Airports Authority with regard to the upgradation,
expansion or development of the airport which is to be funded or
financed by development fees as provided in clause (a) of Section 22A.
Those passengers who embark at the airport after the airport is
upgraded, expanded or developed will only avail the facilities and
services of the upgraded, expanded and developed airport. Similarly,
there can be no contractual relationship between the Airports
Authority and passengers embarking at an airport for establishment of
a new airport in lieu of the existing airport or establishment of a
private airport in lieu of the existing airport as mentioned in Clauses
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(b) and (c) of Section 22A of the 1994 Act. In the absence of such
contractual relationship, the liability of the embarking passengers to
pay development fees has to be based on a statutory provision and for
this reason Section 22A has been enacted empowering the Airports
Authority to levy and collect from the embarking passengers the
development fees for the purposes mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and
(c) of Section 22A of the Act. In other words, the object of Parliament
in inserting Section 22A in the 2004 Act by the Amendment Act of
2003 is to authorize by law the levy and collection of development fees
from every embarking passenger de hors the facilities that the
embarking passengers get at the existing airports. The nature of the
levy under Section 22A of the 2004 Act, in our considered opinion, is
not charges or any other consideration for services for the facilities
provided by the Airports Authority. This Court has held in
Vijayalakshmi Rice Mills & Ors v Commercial Tax Officers, Palakot
& Ors (supra) that a cess is a tax which generates revenue which is
utilized for a specific purpose. The levy under Section 22A though
described as fees is really in the nature of a cess or a tax for
generating revenue for the specific purposes mentioned in clauses (a),
(b) and (c) of Section 22A.
15. Once we hold that the development fees levied under Section
22A is really a cess or a tax for a special purpose, Article 265 of the
Constitution which provides that no tax can be levied or collected
except by authority of law gets attracted and the decisions of this
Court starting from The Trustees of the Port of Madras v M/s
Aminchand Pyarelal (supra), cited on behalf of the Union of India and
DIAL and MIAL on the charges or tariff levied by a service or facility
provided are of no assistance in interpreting Section 22A. It is a
settled principle of statutory interpretation that any compulsory
exaction of money by the Government such as a tax or a cess has to be
strictly in accordance with law and for these reasons a taxing statute
has to be strictly construed. As observed by this Court in Ahmedabad
Urban Development Authority v Sharadkumar Jayantikumar
Pasawalla & Ors. (supra), it has been consistently held by this Court
that whenever there is compulsory exaction of money, there should be
specific provision for the same and there is no room for intendment
and nothing is to be read or nothing is to be implied and one should
look fairly to the language used. Looking strictly at the plain language
of Section 22A of 1994 Act before its amendment by the 2008 Act, the
development fees were to be levied on and collected from the
embarking passengers "at the rate as may be prescribed".
29. The observations and findings extracted above are decisive about the
nature of development fee, collected under Section 22A; they are statutory
exactions and not fees or tariffs, as was contended by the Union of India. In
19
fact, the court even underlined that the “ nature of the levy under Section 22A of
the 2004 Act, in our considered opinion, is not charges or any other
consideration for services for the facilities provided by the Airports Authority.”
30. By virtue of Section 67 of the Finance Act, the basis of charge is the
value of taxable service. Section 67 as it stood, before amendment w.e.f. April
18, 2006, read as follows:
“67. Valuation of taxable services for charging service tax. - For the
purposes of this Chapter, the value of any taxable service shall be the
gross amount charged by the service provider for such service
provided or to be provided by him.
Explanation 3.-For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that
the gross amount charged for the taxable service shall include any
amount received towards the taxable service before, during or after
provision of such service.”
(i) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration in
money, be the gross amount charged by the service provider for such
service provided or to be provided by him;
(ii) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration not
wholly or partly consisting of money, be such amount in money as,
with the addition of service tax charged, is equivalent to the
consideration;
(iii) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration
which is not ascertainable, bet he amount as may be determined in the
prescribed manner.
After Section 67 (4), the following explanation to the entire section
read as follows:
“Explanation.- For the purposes of this section.
(a) “consideration” includes any amount that is payable for the
taxable services provided or to be provided;
(b) “money” includes any currency, cheque, promissory note, letter of
credit, draft, pay order, travellers cheque, money order, postal
remittance and other similar instruments but does not include
currency that is held for its numismatic value.”
31. After the amendment, Section 67 of the Act read as follows:
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“Section 67. Valuation of taxable services for charging service tax (1)
Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, service tax chargeable on
any taxable service with reference to its value shall-
(i) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration in
money, be the gross amount charged by the service provider for such
service provided or to be provided by him;
(ii) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration not
wholly or partly consisting of money, be such amount in money, with
the addition of service tax charged, is equivalent to the consideration;
(iii) in a case where the provision of service is for a consideration
which is not ascertainable, be the amount as may be determined in the
prescribed manner.”
32. This court, in Bhayana Builders (supra), ruled that to attract service tax
levy, a taxable service has to be provided to a recipient, by a service provider,
for a consideration and in the absence of any nexus to any service rendered, an
amount charged, or value of service or goods provided without a consideration,
would not be a taxing incident. The court held that:
“Section 67 clearly indicates that the gross amount charged by the
service provider has to be for the service provided. Therefore, it is not
any amount charged which can become the basis of value on which
service tax becomes payable but the amount charged has to be
necessarily a consideration for the service provided which is taxable
under the Act. By using the words "for such service provided" the Act
has provided for a nexus between the amount charged and the service
provided.
Therefore, any amount charged which has no nexus with the taxable
service and is not a consideration for the service provided does not
become part of the value which is taxable under Section 67.”
33 . On 02.08.2011, the Airports Authority of India (Major Airports)
Development Fees Rules 2011 (hereafter “the 2011 Rules”) came into force.
They, by Rule 3, authorized the collection of development fees; by Rule 4 (1),
an Escrow account had to be opened in respect of each airport into which the
development fee collections were to be deposited; by Rule 4 (2), AAI is
21
empowered to monitor and regulate the receipts and utilization of fees; by Rule
4 (3), various sub accounts were to be opened [(a) Development Fees Receipt
Account; (b) Development Fees Statutory Dues Account; (c) Development Fees
Disbursement Account; (d) Development Fees Surplus Account]. By Rule 4 (4),
the money collected as development fees is to be deposited in the Development
Fees Receipt Account.
34. Besides the rules, the assessee, in the case of DIAL, has placed on the
record, a letter issued to it, by AAI which imposes controls on the utilization of
amounts collected as development fee; apart from the fact that the amounts are
deposited in an escrow, any plan for utilization has to be approved. Unlike fees,
rent, charges etc., provided under Section 22 of AAI Act, assessee companies
are authorized on behalf of the AAI to levy and collect 'development fee' under
Section 22A of the AAI Act on behalf of the AAI and was applied for
generating revenue for utilization of the same for the specific purpose provided
under sub- clause (a), (b) and (c) of section 22(A) of the AAI Act. The UDF
collected by the assessee is to bridge the funding gap of project cost for the
development of future establishment at the airports. There is nothing on record
to show that any additional benefit has accrued to passengers, visitors, traders,
airlines etc ., upon levy of UDF during the period in question in the present case.
35. There is a distinction between the charges, fee and rent etc. collected
under Section 22 of the AAI Act and the UDF levied and collected under
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Section 22A of the AAI Act. It is that the UDF is in the form of 'tax or cess'
collected for financing the cost of future projects and there was no consideration
for services provided by the assessee to the customer, visitors, passengers,
vendors etc. The aggregate of collections in the bank accounts do not form part
of profit and loss account.
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36. It is also useful to notice that by a circular issued by the CBEC , on
18.12.2006, it was clarified that collection of amounts, by way of taxes,
sovereign or statutory dues, would not be subjected to service tax levy:
“Subject: Applicability of service tax on fee collected by Public
Authorities while performing statutory functions /duties under the
provisions of a law – regarding
A number of sovereign/public authorities (i.e. an agency
constituted/set up by government) perform certain functions/ duties,
which are statutory in nature. These functions are performed in terms
of specific responsibility assigned to them under the law in force. For
example, the Regional Reference Standards Laboratories (RRSL)
undertake verification, approval and calibration of weighing and
measuring instruments; the Regional Transport Officer (RTO) issues
fitness certificate to the vehicles; the Directorate of Boilers inspects
and issues certificate for boilers; or Explosive Department inspects
and issues certificate for petroleum storage tank, LPG/CNG tank in
terms of provisions of the relevant laws. Fee as prescribed is charged
and the same is ultimately deposited into the Government Treasury. A
doubt has arisen whether such activities provided by a
sovereign/public authority required to be provided under a statute can
be considered as ‘provision of service’ for the purpose of levy of
service tax.
2. The issue has been examined. The Board is of the view that the
activities performed by the sovereign/public authorities under the
provision of law are in the nature of statutory obligations which are to
be fulfilled in accordance with law. The fee collected by them for
performing such activities is in the nature of compulsory levy as per
the provisions of the relevant statute, and it is deposited into the
Government treasury. Such activity is purely in public interest and it
is undertaken as mandatory and statutory function. These are not in
the nature of service to any particular individual for any
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Circular No. 89/7/2006- ST dated 18.12.2006
23
consideration. Therefore, such an activity performed by a
sovereign/public authority under the provisions of law does not
constitute provision of taxable service to a person and, therefore, no
service tax is leviable on such activities.
3. However, if such authority performs a service, which is not in the
nature of statutory activity and the same is undertaken for a
consideration not in the nature of statutory fee/levy, then in such
cases, service tax would be leviable, if the activity undertaken falls
within the ambit of a taxable service.”
37. This circular was interpreted in Krishi Upaj Samiti (supra). The court
held that the fee collected in that case could not be said to be a statutory
exaction or levy, but was for consideration:
“10. The aforesaid submission seems to be attractive but has no
substance. Section 9(2) is an enabling provision and the words used is
“market committee may”. It is to be noted that insofar as sub-section
(1) of Section 9 is concerned, the word used is “shall”. Therefore,
wherever the legislature intended that the particular activity is a
mandatory statutory, the legislature has used the word “shall”.
Therefore, when under sub-section (2) of Section 9, the word used is
“may”, the activities mentioned in Section 9(2)(xvii) cannot be said to
be mandatory statutory duty and/or activity. Under Section 9(2), it is
not a mandatory statutory duty cast upon the Market Committees to
allot/lease/rent the shop/platform/land/space to the traders. Hence,
such an activity cannot be said to be a mandatory statutory activity as
contended on behalf of the appellants. Even the fees which is collected
is not deposited into the Government treasury. It will go to the market
committee fund and will be used by the market committee(s). In the
facts of the case on hand, such a fee collected cannot have the
characteristics of the statutory levy/statutory fee. Thus, under the
1961 Act, it cannot be said to be a mandatory statutory obligation of
the Market Committees to provide shop/land/platform on rent/lease. If
the statute mandates that the Market Committees have to provide the
land/shop/platform/space on rent/lease then and then only it can be
said to be a mandatory statutory obligation otherwise it is only a
discretionary function under the statute. If it is discretionary function,
then, it cannot be said to be a mandatory statutory
obligation/statutory activity. Hence, no exemption to pay service tax
can be claimed.”
| 38. | | The principal holding, so to say, was that the discretionary fee could be |
|---|
| levied, and that there was no | “duty cast upon the Market Committees to |
|---|
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| allot/lease/rent the shop/platform/land/space to the traders”. | The second reason |
|---|
was that the amounts were credited to a market fund, which was later deposited
in the government treasury, even after which it remained a market committee
fund.
| 39. | | In the present case, undoubtedly, neither is there any compulsion to levy |
|---|
development fee nor is the collection conditional upon its deposit in the
government treasury. However, the absence of these features in this court’s
opinion, does not render UDF any less a statutory levy. Firstly, the ruling in
| Consumer Online Foundation | (Supra) | | is conclusive that UDF is a statutory |
|---|
levy. Secondly, the collection is not premised on rendering of any service.
| Thirdly, the amounts collected are deposited in an escrow account, | not within |
|---|
| the control of the assesses. | Fourthly, the utilization of funds, is monitored and |
|---|
regulated by law. In this regard, the fact that the amount is not deposited in a
| government treasury, | per se, | does not make it any less a statutory levy or |
|---|
compulsory exaction. Nor does its discretionary nature, (in the sense that it may
not be necessarily levied always) render it any less a statutory levy. Airport
management has evolved; it is no longer the monopoly of the government;
private participation is recognized. This sector is now regulated through a new
regulator, i.e., the Airports Economic Regulatory Authority of India. As part of
the Union’s economic policies, the upgradation and renovation of airports are
funded through UDF, which is a statutory levy. Instead of the conventional
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practise of ensuring that amounts collected are deposited with the Government,
an entirely new regulatory regime has been envisioned, under the 2011 Rules,
read with specific conditions imposed by the AAI on each assessee, which
includes monitoring of amounts, nature of expenditure, submission of plans for
expansion, renovation, their sanctioning etc. These rules and controls are in the
public interest, and evidently intended to further efficiency in funding and swift
taking up and completion of works, rather than funding through Finance Rules,
which might entail delay, and cost overruns. However, the public nature of
these funds does not in any manner get undermined, merely because they are
kept in an escrow account, and their utilization is monitored separately.
| 40. | | In view of the foregoing reasons, this court is of opinion that the |
|---|
impugned orders cannot be faulted. The revenue’s appeals therefore fail and are
dismissed; in the circumstances, without order on costs.
…………………………………. J.
[S. RAVINDRA BHAT]
.…………………………………J.
[DIPANKAR DATTA]
NEW DELHI;
MAY 19, 2023.
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