Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SARNAM SINGH & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/12/1999
BENCH:
S.Saghir Ahmad, D.P.Wadhwa,
JUDGMENT:
S. SAGHIR AHMAD, J.
Leave granted.
Sarnam Singh (respondent No.1), who shall hereinafter
be referred to as respondent, was compulsorily retired from
service by order dated 12.11.1997 passed by the State
Government on the recommendation of the High Court which
itself, incidentally, is the appellant before us. This
Court in All India Judges’ Association vs. Union of India,
(1992) 1 SCC 119, had issued certain directions for
improvement of the service conditions of the members of the
subordinate judiciary in the country. The Union of India
and various States thereafter filed a Review Petition which
was considered and disposed of by this Court on August 24,
1993 by Judgment since reported as All India Judges’
Association and Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors., (1993) 4
SCC 288. It may be pointed out that by the earlier Judgment
in the main case of All India Judges’ Association (supra),
one of the directions related to the enhancement of
superannuation age of all the subordinate Judicial Officers
upto 60 years. This question was also considered in the
Review Petition and while rejecting the contention of the
Union of India and other States that age of retirement
should not be enhanced to 60 years, this Court, inter alia,
observed as under:-
"30. There is, however, one aspect we should
emphasise here. To that extent the direction contained in
the main judgment under review shall stand modified. The
benefit of the increase of the retirement age to 60 years,
shall not be available automatically to all judicial
officers irrespective of their past record of service and
evidence of their continued utility to the judicial system.
The benefit will be available to those who, in the opinion
of the respective High Courts, have a potential for
continued useful service. It is not intended as a windfall
for the indolent, the infirm and those of doubtful
integrity, reputation and utility. The potential for
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continued utility shall be assessed and evaluated by
appropriate Committees of Judges of the respective High
Courts constituted and headed by the Chief Justices of the
High Courts and the evaluation shall be made on the basis of
the Judicial officer’s past record of service, character
rolls, quality of judgments and other relevant matters.
31. The High Court should undertake and complete the
exercise in case of officers about to attain the age of 58
years well within time by following the procedure for
compulsory retirement as laid down in the respective Service
Rules applicable to the judicial officers. Those who will
not be found fit and eligibile by this standard should not
be given the benefit of the higher retirement age and should
be compulsorily retired at the age of 58 by following the
said procedure for compulsory retirement. The exercise
should be undertaken before the attainment of the age of 58
years even in cases where earlier the age of superannuation
was less than 58 years. It is necessary to make it clear
that this assessment is for the purpose of finding out the
suitability of the concerned officers for the entitlement of
the benefit of the increased age of superannuation from 58
years to 60 years. It is in addition to the assessment to
be undertaken for compulsory retirement and the compulsory
retirement at the earlier stage/s under the respective
Service Rules."
Pursuant to the above directions, the High Courts, all
over the country, before allowing Officers of the
subordinate judiciary to continue in service upto the age of
60 years, scrutinised the work, conduct and performance of
all Officers who were about to attain the age of 58 years,
to determine whether they were fit to be allowed an
extension in service or were fit to be compulsorily retired.
This scrutiny was done in accordance with the procedure laid
down by the respective Service Rules relating to compulsory
retirement as applicable to the Judicial Officers.
This exercise was done in the case of respondent also
who was compulsorily retired from service principally on
account of the adverse remark given by the then Inspecting
Judge who had made a surprise inspection of the Moradabad
Judgeship on April 18, 1995, in cognito, which was followed
by the annual inspection by the Inspecting Judge (Mr.Justice
R.B. Mehrotra) from 22nd May to 28th May, 1995. A
reference to the surprise inspection as also to the regular
inspection shall be made later as we intend to consider a
more important aspect first on which the whole appeal can be
disposed of finally.
The principal contention urged by Mr. P.P. Rao,
learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the
respondent is that pursuant to the directions issued by this
Court in its Judgment in All India Judges’ Association vs.
Union of India and others, (1992) 1 SCC 119, the U.P.
Government framed new Rules, namely, U.P. Judicial Officers
(Retirement on Superannuation) Rules, 1992 which were
notified on 20.10.1992 by which the age of retirement of the
Judicial Officers was raised from 58 years to 60 years. It
is contended that since the State Government itself had
framed new Rules by which the age of retirement was raised
from 58 years to 60 years, the age of retirement fixed under
Fundamental Rule 56, contained in Financial Hand Book,
Volume II, Part 2 to 4, would not be applicable to the
Judicial Officers as it is specifically provided in the new
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Rules that they shall have effect notwithstanding anything
to the contrary contained in Rule 56 of the Fundamental
Rules. Mr. P.P. Rao contends that the age of retirement
having been raised from 58 years to 60 years, the respondent
had a right to continue in service till the age of 60 years
and the rule of scrutiny envisaged by this Court in its
Judgment dated August 24, 1993 [(1993) 4 SCC 288] would not
be applicable.
Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, learned Senior Counsel, appearing
on behalf of the High Court has, on the contrary, contended
that though the State Government had made a specific Rule by
which the age of retirement of Judicial Officers was raised
from 58 years to 60 years, a scrutiny had still to be done
to find out their suitability to continue till the age of 60
years in terms of the directions issued by this Court which
had specifically provided that continuance upto the age of
60 years would not be automatic and only those Officers who
are found suitable would alone be allowed the benefit of
extension. It is further submitted that the directions
issued by this Court have to be read as supplemental to the
Rules already made by the State Government. Regarding the
overriding provision under the Rules, it is submitted by Mr.
Rakesh Dwivedi that the new Rules override all other earlier
rules relating to the age of retirement of Judicial Officers
but do not intend to override the directions issued by this
Court in All India Judges Association’s case, (1992) 1 SCC
119.
The direction relating to the age of retirement in the
All India Judges Association’s case, (1992) 1 SCC 119, was
to the following effect :
"(iii) Retirement age of judicial officers be raised
to 60 years and appropriate steps are to be taken by
December 31, 1992."
Acting upon these directions, the State Govt. framed
the U.P. Judicial Officers (Retirement on Superannuation)
Rules, 1992, under Article 309 of the Constitution. They
came into force on October 20, 1992. Rules 2 and 4 of the
aforesaid Rules which are relevant for the present case are
quoted below :
"2. Overriding effect -- The provisions of these
Rules shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the
contrary contained in Rule 56 of the U.P. Fundamental
Rules, contained in the Financial Hand Book Volume II Parts
2 to 4 or any other Rules made by the Governor under the
proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution or orders, for
the time being in force.
4. Retirement -- A Judicial Officer shall retire from
service on superannuation in the afternoon of the last day
of the month in which he attains the age of sixty years."
The above Rules indicate that the age of
superannuation of Judicial Officers was fixed at 60 years.
It was also specifically provided that these Rules would
have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in Rule 56 of the U.P. Fundamental Rules which
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provided that the age of superannuation of a Govt. servant
would be 58 years. All Judicial Officers working in the
subordinate courts are, undoubtedly, Govt. servants and
like all other Govt. servants, they retired from service on
attaining the age of 58 years in terms of Rule 56 of the
Fundamental Rules. But on account of the directions issued
by this Court in the All India Judges Association’s case
(1992) 1 SCC 119, the Govt. of Uttar Pradesh, as pointed
out earlier, framed new Rules specially for the Judicial
Officers and provided that their age of retirement would be
60 years. In order to give effect to the new Rules, it was
specifically provided that these Rules would have effect
notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in
Fundamental Rule 56. The directions issued by this Court
were thus fully implemented and the State Govt., by bringing
out new Rules, and that too with effect from October 20,
1992, acted within the time limit fixed by this Court. The
age of superannuation thus having been raised from 58 years
to 60 years, all Judicial Officers in the State would retire
on attaining the age of 60 years and not earlier.
We may now examine the contention of Mr. Rakesh
Dwivedi that before allowing them to continue in service for
another two years, that is from 58 to 60 years, there should
have been a scrutiny of their service record and only those
who were found suitable for continuance in service alone
should have been given that benefit in terms of the
directions issued by this Court in the Review Judgment
[(1993) 4 SCC 288].
This Court, while issuing directions for raising the
age of superannuation of Judicial Officers from 58 to 60
years had fixed a time limit within which appropriate action
was to be taken by the State Governments. It was provided
that appropriate steps in that direction may be taken by
December 31, 1992. Instead of complying with those
directions, many of the States, including the Union of India
filed Review Petitions in which various contentions were
raised for recalling the earlier direction for raising the
age of superannuation. The contentions raised by the State
Governments as also by the Union of India were not accepted
and it was provided that the age of superannuation of
Judicial Officers would be 60 years. Since all the State
Governments had not, by that time, made a statutory rule to
give effect to the directions of this Court, it was provided
that the benefit of extension in the age of superannuation
would be available to those officers only who, in the
opinion of the High Court, had meticulous service record and
were officers of integrity. This benefit, it was further
provided, was not intended to serve as a "windfall" for
officers of doubtful integrity, reputation or utility. It
was left to the High Courts to consider the work, conduct
and performance of the Judicial Officers to assess their
merit and to decide whether they were fit to continue in
service beyond 58 and upto the age of 60 years. These
directions were qualified by the following words :
"The directions issued are mere aids and incidental to
and supplemental of the main direction and intended as a
transitional measure till a comprehensive national policy is
evolved."
These observations indicate that the procedure
indicated by this Court for evaluating the work, performance
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and conduct of Judicial Officers, before allowing them to
continue in service upto the age of 60 years, was evolved as
a temporary measure and was not to be adopted as a permanent
feature. The choice was thus left to the Appointing
Authority. If the Appointing Authority itself had made
necessary Service Rules extending the age of retirement, the
above procedure was to be given up as the Officers would
continue in service in accordance with the Service Rules
made by the Appointing Authority in the respective States.
If it was not done, then the Judicial Officers were to
continue in service till the age of 60 years in accordance
with the directions of this Court in the earlier case,
provided the Officers, on a scrutiny of their service
records, in accordance with the directions issued in the
Review Petition, were found suitable for the benefit of
extended service.
As pointed out above, the State Govt., acting upon the
directions of this Court in the earlier case [(1992) 1 SCC
119], made new Rules under Article 309 of the Constitution,
and that too within the time fixed by this Court, by which
the age of retirement of all Judicial Officers was raised
from 58 to 60 years. In view of these Rules, which also had
the overriding effect over F.R. 56, the Judicial Officers
in the State of U.P. became entitled to continue in service
upto the age of 60 years. The directions of this Court for
scrutiny of their service records before allowing them to
continue in service beyond 58 years, being of a transitory
character, yielded place to the new Rules made by the State
Govt. under Article 309 of the Constitution and, therefore,
it was no longer incumbent upon the High Court to resort to
the procedure of scrutiny of the service records of all
Judicial Officers before allowing them the benefit of
extension in the age of retirement. The contention of Mr.
Rakesh Dwivedi, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf
of the High Court, that the directions of this Court about
the scrutiny of the service record should be read as
supplemental to the new Service Rules cannot be accepted as
this Court itself had indicated clearly that the directions
were intended to serve as a "transitional measure".
A Three-Judge Bench of this Court in Rajat Baran Roy &
Ors. vs. State of W.B. & Ors. (1999) 4 SCC 235, relating
to the Judicial Service of the State of West Bengal, has
taken a similar view and has held that if a Rule is made by
the State Govt. extending the age of retirement of the
Judicial Officers, the directions of this Court in the
Review Petition for scrutiny of the service record would not
be applicable as the Judicial Officers, by virtue of the new
Rule, would continue upto the age of superannuation fixed
under the new Rule.
In the instant case, the service record of the
respondent was scrutinised by the High Court at the time
when he was completing 58 years of age to decide whether he
was fit to be continued in service upto the age of 60 years.
This exercise was undertaken by the High Court in accordance
with the directions issued by this Court in the Review
Petition. The High Court overlooked the vital fact that the
new Rules already made by the State Government under Article
309 of the Constitution provided specifically that the
Judicial Officers would retire on attaining the age of 60
years. That being so, it was no longer necessary for the
High Court to have scrutinised the service record at that
stage. The respondent, in view of the new Rules, was
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entitled to continue in service upto the age of 60 years.
The order of compulsory retirement passed by the State Govt.
on the recommendation of the High Court was wholly
erroneous.
The writ petition filed by the respondent, as pointed
out earlier, has been allowed by the High Court on the
judicial side, on the ground that the order of compulsory
retirement passed on the recommendation of the High Court
was based on no material and was, therefore, erroneous. In
view of the fact that we have already found above that the
respondent had a right to continue in service upto the age
of 60 years, there does not appear to be any need to enter
into the scrutiny of the reasoning adopted by the High Court
for setting aside the order of compulsory retirement as we
are also of the view that the order of compulsory retirement
was bad, though for different reasons. But, looking to the
importance of the matter, particularly the adverse entries
recorded in the character roll of the respondent by the
Inspecting Judge, we would rather dispose of that issue as
well.
Chapter III of the Rules of Court, 1952, (as amended
upto 1.8.1994) made by the Allahabad High Court, deals with
the Executive & Administrative Business of the Court. It
provides for Inspecting Judges and Administrative Committee.
The Rule relating to "Inspecting Judges" provides as under :
"Inspecting Judge
The Chief Justice shall nominate and assign one
sessions division to each Hon’ble Judge as Inspecting Judge
of that division for a period of one year. In a given
situation, however, the Chief Justice may assign more than
one sessions divisions to one Inspecting Judge and more than
one Inspecting Judges to hold the charge of one sessions
division.
(a) In case of retirement, resignation, refusal or
death of any Inspecting Judge, another Hon. Judge shall be
nominated by the Chief Justice.
(b) Inspecting Judge shall proceed for inspection in
consultation with the Chief Justice. The Inspecting Judge
will not ordinarily devote more than five working days for
annual inspections."
The Rule relating to "Administrative Committee"
provides as under :
"Administrative Committee
There shall be a committee called the Administrative
Committee composed of the Chief Justice, two seniormost
Judges and six Judges to be nominated by the Chief Justice.
(a) The two senior most Judges shall be permanent
members and six Judges shall be nominated as members by the
Chief Justice for a term of three years.
(b) The Chief Justice and in his absence the
seniormost member of the Committee shall preside over its
meetings.
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(c) In the case of retirement, resignation, refusal or
death of any member of the committee, another Judge shall be
nominated by the Chief Justice in his place.
(d) In the event of a member being temporarily absent
on leave or otherwise, it will be open to the Chief Justice
to assign his work to any other Judge.
(e) Each member of the committee shall discharge such
functions, dispose of such executive and administrative
business, as may be allocated to him by the Chief Justice."
"Matters" which are within the jurisdiction of the
Inspecting Judge are as under :
"Matters for Inspecting Judges
(1) Review of Judicial work of subordinate Courts,
tribunals, district consumer forums and all other special
courts and control of their working including inspection
thereof, to record entries in the character rolls of the
officers posted in the division assigned to the Inspecting
Judge.
(2) Perusal of returns, calendars, evaluation of
inspection reports made by the presiding officers in respect
of their own offices, audit reports received from those
courts, tribunals etc. and to make orders thereon.
(3) Any adverse remarks or strictures made by
Inspecting Judge about Judicial work, conduct or integrity
of any officer under his charge will be communicated to the
officer concerned, who may make his representations, if any,
within a month and the same shall be placed before the
Administrative Committee for consideration and decision.
(4) Grant of earned leave to officers posted in the
sessions division under the charge of the Inspecting Judge.
(5) Grant of casual leave (including special casual
leave) and permission to leave headquarters to the District
and Sessions Judge, Presiding Officers of the tribunals and
special Courts etc. howsoever designated.
(6) Disposal of appeal against orders of punishment
imposed on and representations etc. of the employees of the
subordinate Courts."
The relevant portion relating to the matters within
the jurisdiction of the "Administrative Committee" is
reproduced below :
"Matters for the Administrative Committee
1 to 15. .........
16. Decision on the reports of the Inspecting Judge
including annual confidential remarks recorded by him in
respect of an officer in his charge."
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The High Court has also prescribed "Self Assessment
Forms" which are filled up by the Judicial Officers and are
sent to the District Judges. The High Court has also issued
Circular Letters laying down the appropriate guidelines and
instructions for the District Judges to record the Annual
Character Roll entries. In Circular Letter No. C-54/71
dated 16th April, 1971, it is provided, inter alia, as under
:
"Annual remarks recorded by the District Judges should
give a correct and full picture of the work, conduct and
reputation of the officers. In case annual remarks do not
properly assess the work of the officers, administrative
lapse on the part of the District Judge concerned would be
presumed."
In Circular Letter No. 17/78 dated 2nd February,
1978, it is indicated as under :
"In evaluating the judicial work of an officer, the
number of his judgments, orders reversed or modified in
appeal or revision will not be taken into account. The
assessment of judicial work of an officer will be asked on
the quality of his judgments or orders and not on the result
of the appeals or revisions. Henceforth, the work of an
officer will be assessed on the basis of quality of his
judgments or orders and not on the basis of the number of
judgments or orders reversed or modified in appeal or
revision."
Vide Circular Letter Nos. C-10/85 and C-14/89 dated
22nd March, 1985 and 10th March, 1989, respectively, it was
emphasised that :
"The District Judge shall ensure that the following
instructions as contained in various Circular Letters issued
by the Court from time to time are followed strictly in
recording the annual remarks in respect of the judicial
officers:
(a) The annual remarks should be recorded in respect
of all the officers whose work and conduct was seen for
three months or more during the year.
(b) Even if an officer has worked at the station for
period of less than three months during the year, the
District Judge should send the figures of his disposal for
that part of the year, so that his full figures of disposal
during the whole year may be worked out."
The Inspecting Judges, as set out in the Rules, are
nominated by the Chief Justice and a particular sessions
division is assigned to them. The Rules also provide that
the Chief Justice may assign more than one sessions
divisions to one Inspecting Judge or for one sessions
division, he may nominate more than one Inspecting Judges.
The Rules visualise that the Inspecting Judge will be
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appointed by the Chief Justice strictly in the interest of
administration of justice and the Chief Justice, while
appointing an Inspecting Judge for a particular sessions
division or assigning more than one sessions divisions to
one Inspecting Judge or, for that matter, appointing two
Inspecting Judges for one sessions division, will be guided
by relevant factors pertaining to the proper and smooth
running of the administration so that the High Court may
effectively exercise its power of control over the
subordinate judiciary as contemplated by Article 235 of the
Constitution. Personal liking for a particular sessions
division or convenience of the Judge will not be a relevant
factor for his appointment as an Inspecting Judge.
The Inspecting Judge, according to Rules of Court,
1952, will proceed to inspect the sessions division assigned
to him only in consultation with the Chief Justice and will
not ordinarily devote more than five working days for annual
inspection. The time limit has been fixed purposely so that
the judicial work in the High Court, which is of prime
importance, may not suffer. This philosophy leads to the
conclusion that the Inspecting Judge would not normally
sacrifice the working days in the High Court at the cost of
their visit to the Districts. The Rules set out the matters
which are within the jurisdiction of the Inspecting Judge
and those which are within the jurisdiction of the
Administrative Committee. According to the scheme set out
in the Rules as also various circular letters issued by the
High Court from time to time, it appears that annual remarks
would be recorded by the District Judges who would give a
correct and full picture of the work, conduct and reputation
of the Officers. The guidelines on the basis of which
annual remark would be given have also been laid down by the
High Court in the circular letters issued from time to time.
The High Court, thereafter, records the Character Roll
entry.
Mr. Justice R.B. Mehrotra, who has since retired,
was the Inspecting Judge of the Moradabad Judgeship at the
relevant time. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of
the appellant in the writ petition while it was pending in
the High Court, regarding which it is erroneously mentioned
by the Division Bench that it was not filed, it has been
stated, inter alia, as under :
"7. That the then Inspecting Judge, Moradabad, Hon.
Mr. Justice R.B. Mehrotra, sent a D.O. Letter dated
20.4.95 addressed to Hon’ble the Chief Justice stating
therein that His Lordship made a surprise visit to District
Judgeship of Moradabad on 18.4.1995. His lordship went
around Civil Court compound in cognito, made queries from
litigants and met several Advocates without disclosing his
lordship’s identity. The enquiries made by his lordship
from litigants and Advocates without knowing lordship’s
identity revealed that petitioner and four other Judicial
Officers whose names mentioned in the D.O. letter
dt.20.4.1995 of Hon’ble Mr. Justice R.B. Mehrotra command
stinking reputation of being corrupt. Thereafter, Hon’ble
the Inspecting Judge made queries from District Judge
regarding stinking reputation of being corrupt in respect of
the officer. The District Judge has confirmed that all the
officers whose names mentioned in the instant D.O. Letter
of Hon’ble the Inspecting Judge are having a very bad
reputation of being corrupt Judicial Officers. The District
Judge has expressed his regrets for not having brought to
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the aforesaid facts to the knowledge of the Hon’ble Court.
His Lordship was strongly of the opinion that all the
officers whose name mentioned in the D.O. letter of
Inspecting Judge, Moradabad, who had stinking reputation
should be transferred and he be given punishment posting to
far-fetched stations.
After dictation of the aforesaid report by Hon’ble the
Inspecting Judge, Moradabad Session, a Confidential report
from District Judge, Moradabad was received by his lordship
and the same were also sent to Hon’ble the Chief Justice for
his lordship’s kind perusal and orders. The District Judge
in his D.O. letter dated 20.4.95 has informed the Hon’ble
the Inspecting Judge in respect of the petitioner that
though there is no complaint against Sri Sarnam Singh
(petitioner), Special Judge (Essential Commodities),
Moradabad, he also has connections with the said a cocous of
lawyers and public-men. His reputation is also very bad.
The District Judge had also requested to his lordship
to transfer the officer whose names mentioned in his report
(including petitioner) from this Judgeship immediately so
that pubic confidence in judiciary may be restored and
judicial discipline be maintained in the Judgeship.
Under orders of Hon’ble the Chief Justice these
officers including the petitioner have been transferred.
The petitioner was transferred from Moradabad to Aligarh
vide Court’s notification No. C-304/DR(S)/1995 dated
29.5.1995."
It was further stated as under :
"8. That thereafter Hon’ble Mr. Justice R.B.
Mehrotra, the Inspecting Judge, Moradabad, made annual
Inspection of this judgeship and submitted his report to the
Court on 16.10.1995. It is apparent from Inspection Note
that the then Hon’ble Inspecting Judge also inspected the
court of Special Judge (ECA) Moradabad and at that time the
petitioner was the Presiding Officer of that Court. In his
Inspection Note Hon’ble the Inspecting Judge had made the
assessment of Judicial performance of the petitioner.
Hon’ble the Inspecting Judge had made observation that he
had seen the file of 13 Sessions Trials and 6 bail
Applications decided by him in the month of August, 1994.
In all these Sessions Trials the accused had been acquitted.
In the six Sessions Trials the accused had been acquitted on
the ground that prosecution witnesses turned hostile. In
Sessions Trial No. 119/89 the accused had been acquitted
u/s 399/402 IPC and section 25 Arms Act. The Hon’ble the
Inspecting Judge after perusal of judgment in the instant
case has observed that judgment is sketchy and no proper
reason had been recorded discarding the prosecution
witnesses.
In Bail Application No. 1980/94 bail had been granted
in case of fire arm injury u/s 302 IPC on the ground that 2
persons fired whereas injury found on person of the deceased
was only one. Even assuming that bullet fired by the other
person did not hit the deceased admittedly the allegation is
that both accused had fired with the intention to kill the
deceased who was actually killed. Hon’ble the Inspecting
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Judge observed that there was absolutely no justification of
granting bail on the aforesaid ground.
In Bail Application No. 187/95, bail had been granted
by referring that there was a Judgment of Justice Palok.
Hon’ble the Inspecting Judge observed that there was no way
of quoting precedent. The reference of judgment should have
been mentioned if the Judge wanted to rely on decision of
this Court. Mr. Justice Palok Basu delivered many
judgments and on which judgment petitioner relied should
have also been indicated in the order.
Hon’ble the Inspecting Judge likewise in Bail
Application No. 3241/94 has also observed that bail had
been granted on the basis of parity. No reference has been
mentioned in the order that who was co-accused, who had been
granted bail, what was the role assigned to him and what was
the role assigned to the applicant. Hon’ble the Inspecting
Judge on persual of orders passed in the aforesaid bail
applications has observed that they are also sketchy. The
judicial performance of the petitioner is assessed to be
poor and unsatisfactory.
9. That the Hon’ble Inspecting Judge (Hon’ble Mr.
Justice R.B. Mehrotra) while giving annual remarks to the
petitioner for 1994-95 had recorded that the officer enjoyed
a stinkingly bad reputation as revealed in his lordship’s
Surprise Inspection in cognito dated 18th April, 1995. The
assessment of judicial performance of the petitioner was
adjudged as poor and unsatisfactory. The petitioner made
representation dated 26.08.1996 to the Court against the
aforesaid adverse remarks and same was duly considered and
rejected by the Court. The petitioner was informed
accordingly through the District Judge, Aligarh, vide
Court’s D.O. No. C-189/CF(A)/97, dated 6.3.1997.
10. That during his surprise Inspection, Hon’ble
Inspecting Judge also contacted various sections of lawyers,
a good number of lawyers were opposed to strike and were
appearing in Court but due to strike the work by and large
remained paralysed for one and half months and only urgent
bail applications were being attended by District Judge and
other officers to whom bail applications were transferred.
His lordship tried to persuade the Lawyers to withdraw the
strike so that their grievances if any may be looked in it.
His lordship was given to understand by section of lawyers
supporting the strike that strike would be called of."
The original service record of the respondent was
placed before us which reveals that respondent, at no time,
was given any adverse remarks during the entire tenure of
his service. The High Court had itself, while disposing of
the writ petition, scrutinised the
service record of the respondent and observed as under
:
"It appears that petitioner joined, as already stated,
U.P. Higher Judicial Service on 23.4.1984. He was posted
as Additional District Judge Moradabad from June, 1992 under
Sri Tej Shankar, the then District Judge, Moradabad, who was
later on elevated to the Bench. He was also posted under
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Sri Bhagwandin, the then Distt. Judge Moradabad who also
was elevated to the Bench later on. It may be stated that
the petitioner was posted with (three) Distt. Judges who
were later on elevated to the Bench namely, Sri N.S.Gupta,
Sri Bhagwandin and Sri Tej Shankar, and according to
petitioner there was no complaint to all those 3 (three) the
then District Judges against his work and conduct."
It was further observed by the High Court as under :
"It may be mentioned that in the year 1984-85 the then
Administrative Judge Hon’ble Mr.Justice N.N. Mithal gave
remark that petitioners relations with members of the Bar
are reported to be good, the District Judge rated the
officer as good and the officer was transferred on
administrative grounds from Etawah. In the year 1985-86 the
same Administrative Judge has certified integrity of the
petitioner and has given remark that the officer took pains
to dispose of old Sessions Trials and Special cases under
the Dacoity Affected Areas Act and his judgments are
properly written and expressed in good language.
In the year 1986-87 there is no adverse entry against
the petitioner. There is remark that he has taken interest
in disposal of old cases both Civil and Criminal. His
judgments on facts and law are sound, well reasoned and
expressed in good language. The officer has good control
over his office and possesses administrative capacity and
tact. Relations with the members of the Bar are cordial.
On overall assessment Sri P.K. Jain the then District Judge
(subsequently elevated to the Bench) had rated the
petitioner to be good officer. In the year 1987-88 more or
less the entry is similar, to that of 1986-87.
In the year 1988-89 the entry of the petitioner is
recorded by Sri N.S. Gupta, the then District Judge
(subsequently elevated to the Bench). He has given remark
to the petitioner that the integrity of the officer is
beyond doubt, judgments on facts and law are sound, well
reasoned and expressed in good language and on over all
assessment the officer has been rated as good.
In the year 1988-89 good entry has been given to
petitioner by the then District Judge Sri P.P. Gupta and in
the year 1990-91 also the petitioner has been given good
entries, and his integrity has been certified. More or less
similar entry is awarded to petitioner in the year 1991-92.
In the year 1992-93 Sri Tej Shankar the then District Judge
Moradabad (subsequently elevated to the Bench) has given
good entry to the petitioner and his integrity is stated to
be beyond doubt. Similar entry has been given by Sri
Bhagwan Din the then District Judge (subsequently elevated
to the Bench) in the year 1993-94. Similarly in the year
1994-95 Sri Bhagwan Din the then District Judge Moradabad
has stated that the integrity of the officer was beyond
doubt and on overall assessment the officer was rated as
good, before the visit of Hon’ble the then Inspecting Judge.
We have perused the entire service record of the
petitioner and there is nothing adverse against him."
The High Court, thereafter, proceeded to consider
various aspects of the matter, including the fact that at
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the time when Mr. Justice R.B. Mehrotra made a surprise
Inspection of the Moradabad Judgeship, the lawyers were on
strike, and ultimately recorded a finding that the impugned
adverse entry was unjustified, arbitrary and based on non-
existent facts and was, therefore, liable to quashed. We
uphold the findings of the High Court, but we do not
subscribe to the view that before an adverse entry was
recorded in the Character Roll, an opportunity of hearing
was, by any principle, required to be given to the
respondent. [See: Major General I.P.S. Dewan vs. Union
of India & Ors. (1995) 3 SCC 383, in which R.L. Butail vs.
Union of India (1970) 2 SCC 876 = (1971) 2 SCR 55 has been
followed.] The decision of this Court in Sukhdeo vs.
Commissioner, Amravati Division, Amravati & Anr. relied
upon by the respondent regarding Adverse Remarks in the
service record cannot be pressed into aid as in that case it
was held that Adverse Remarks suffered from inconsistency
and lack of bona fides. We may also point out that the High
Court in its judgment was wrong in observing that no
counter-affidavit on behalf of the appellant was filed as
counter-affidavits both on behalf of the State Govt. as
also on behalf of the appellant were filed at the stage of
writ petition, copies whereof have been placed before us.
The role of Inspecting Judges and the manner in which
they are to assess the work of the Judicial Officers were
considered by this Court in High Court of Punjab & Haryana
through R.G. vs. Ishwar Chand Jain and Another JT 1999 (3)
SC 266, in which one of us (Brother Wadhwa, J.), speaking
for the Court, said :
"Since late this Court is watching the spectre of
either judicial officers or the High Courts coming to this
Court when there is an order pre-maturely retiring a
judicial officer. Under Article 235 of the Constitution
High Court exercises complete control over subordinate
courts which include District Courts. Inspection of the
subordinate courts is one of the most important functions
which High Court performs for control over the subordinate
courts. Object of such inspection is for the purpose of
assessment of the work performed by the subordinate judge,
his capability, integrity and competency. Since judges are
human beings and also prone to all the human failings,
inspection provides an opportunity for pointing out mistakes
so that they are avoided in future and deficiencies, if any,
in the working of the subordinate court, remedied.
Inspection should act as a catalyst in inspiring subordinate
judges to give best results. They should feel a sense of
achievement. They need encouragement. They work under
great stress and man the courts while working under great
discomfort and hardships. A satisfactory judicial system
depends largely on the satisfactory functioning of courts at
grass root level. Remarks recorded by the inspecting judge
are normally endorsed by the Full Court and become part of
the Annual Confidential Reports and are foundations on which
the career of a judicial officer is made or marred.
Inspection of subordinate court is thus of vital importance.
It has to be both effective and productive. It can be so
only if it is well regulated and is workman like.
Inspection of subordinate courts is not a one day or an hour
or few minutes affair. It has to go on all the year round
by monitoring the work of the court by the inspecting judge.
The casual inspection can hardly be beneficial to a judicial
system. It does more harms than good. As noticed in the
case of R. Rajiah (JT 1988 (2) SC 567) there could be ill
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conceived or motivated complaints. Rumour mongering is to
be avoided at all costs as it seriously jeopardizes the
efficient working of the subordinate courts."
These are extremely important observations and
constitute important guidelines for assessing the work of a
Judicial Officer. These observations also indicate the
attitude with which the Inspecting Judge should objectively
consider the work and conduct of the Judicial Officers who
sometimes have to work under difficult and trying
circumstances. The same views were earlier expressed in
State Bank of India & Ors. vs. Kashi Nath Kher & Ors.
(1996) 8 SCC 762 = AIR 1996 SC 1328. [See also : Union of
India vs. N.R. Banerjee (1997) 9 SCC 287; State of Uttar
Pradesh vs. Yamuna Shanker Mishra (1997) 4 SCC 7 as also
Swatantra Singh vs. State of Haryana (1997) 4 SCC 14 = AIR
1997 SC 2105 on the question as to what precisely is the
object and purpose of writing Annual Confidential Report.]
We would conclude the discussion by referring to the
observations of this Court in M.S.Bindra vs. Union of
India, JT 1998 (6) SC 34 = (1998) 7 SCC 310, which are as
under :
"To dunk an officer into the puddle of "doubtful
integrity" it is not enough that the doubt fringes on a mere
hunch. That doubt should be of such a nature as would
reasonably and consciously be entertainable by a reasonable
man on the given material. Mere possibility is hardly
sufficient to assume that it would have happened. There
must be preponderance of probability for the reasonable man
to entertain doubt regarding that possibility. Only then
there is justification to ram an officer with the label
"doubtful integrity".
For the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit
in this appeal which is dismissed, but without any order as
to costs.