Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
OIL & NATURAL GAS COMMISSION
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
M/S MC CLELLAND ENGINEERS S.A.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 23/04/1999
BENCH:
S.Rajendra Babu, S.N.Phukan
JUDGMENT:
RAJENDRA BABU, J. :
This appeal arises out of certain arbitration
proceedings between the parties to this appeal resulting in
an award made on February 29, 1988. The Arbitrators by
their award directed that the appellant shall pay to the
respondent as follows : (i) US $ 1004.50 being interest on
US $ 40, 102.97 at 12% p.a. from 10.12.1985 to 16.4.1986.
(ii) US $ 59,583 being interest on US $ 3,12,011.00 at
12% p.a. from 3.5.1983 to 5.11.1984.
On these two items of claim the Arbitrators also
awarded interest at 12% per annum from the date of award
till realisation. The award so made by the Arbitrators was
filed into the Court. Objections filed thereto stood
dismissed and decree was passed in terms of the award.
Against that order made by the learned Single Judge in his
original jurisdiction an appeal was carried to a division
bench which also stood dismissed. Hence this appeal.
Shri B.Datta, learned senior counsel for the
appellant, contended that what was awarded by the
Arbitrators in respect of the two claims referred to earlier
in the course of this order is itself interest for different
periods. He, therefore, submitted that Arbitrators could
not have further awarded interest on the claims awarded at
12% per annum from the date of award till realisation. He
did not dispute, and very fairly and correctly, that the
Arbitrators do have the power to grant interest on the
amount claimed in the arbitration and the power of the
Arbitrators was very characteristically described by him as
before, during and after of the arbitration proceedings.
His point is that there cannot be interest upon interest
when the claim itself is one of interest and interest upon
that amount could not have been granted by the Arbitrators
and relied upon Section 3 of the Interest Act.
There cannot be any doubt that the Arbitrators have
powers to grant interest akin to Section 34 of the CPC which
is the power of the court in view of Section 29 of the
Arbitration Act, 1940. It is clear that interest is not
granted upon interest awarded but upon the claim made. The
claim made in the proceedings is under two heads - one is
the balance of amount claimed under invoices and letter
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dated February 10, 1981 and the amount certified and paid by
the appellant and the second is the interest on delayed
payment. That is how the claim for interest on delayed
payment stood crystallized by the time the claim was filed
before the Arbitrators. Therefore, the power of the
Arbitrators to grant interest on the amount of interest
which may, in other words, be termed as interest on damages
or compensation for delayed payment which would also become
part of the principal. If that is the correct position in
law, we do not think that Section 3 of the Interest Act has
any relevance in the context of the matter which we are
dealing with in the present case. Therefore, the first
contention raised by Shri Datta, though interesting,
deserves to be and is rejected.
The next contention urged by Shri Datta is that the
claim made by the appellant for interest on the alleged
delayed payments made by the respondent is barred by law of
limitation. It is pointed out that the award itself notices
that the claimants cannot lose their right to interest due
on the next delayed payment at the end of the three years
per each due date the claim would be barred and that
principle was not applied on the delayed payment for the
period May 3, 1983 to November 5, 1984. On this aspect of
the matter we may notice the pleading raised before the
Arbitrators. It is stated at para 10(a) as follows :
The present arbitration itself is barred by
limitation as the alleged claims are relating to the work
done in 1981-82
This is a very bald statement without setting out the
details as to how the claim made by the respondent before
the Arbitrators have become barred by the limitation
particularly when the stand of the respondent is that they
had running bills and payments were made from time to time
and an account has to be taken as to what amount became due
and when; the same has to be worked out. Whether all such
details have to be worked out and whether the transactions
between the appellant and the respondent did not become
complete until the payment of final amount are matters for
adjudication. Thus, it becomes very difficult to appreciate
that the plea raised before the Arbitrators was sufficient
to meet the situation to defeat the claim on the bar of
limitation. Therefore, we do not think that we can examine
the matter in the light suggested now by the learned senior
counsel for the appellant when no foundation has been laid
in the course of the proceedings before the Arbitrators
either in the pleadings or in the evidence. We are,
therefore, of the view that the High Court was justified in
dismissing the appeal against the decree passed in terms of
the award.
The appeal, therefore, stands dismissed. However, in
the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to
costs.