Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
BALRAJ KHANNA & ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
MOTI RAM
DATE OF JUDGMENT22/04/1971
BENCH:
VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.
BENCH:
VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.
RAY, A.N.
CITATION:
1971 AIR 1389 1971 SCR 447
1971 SCC (3) 399
ACT:
Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860), s. 499--Necessity of
complainant stating actual words used by accused-When
arises.
Code of Criminal Procedure (Act 5 of 1898), ss. 202 and 203-
Jurisdiction of magistrate holding preliminary enquiry-Scope
of.
Practice and Procedure-Applicability of exceptions to s. 499
to a case--If may be considered at the preliminary stage.
HEADNOTE:
The respondent filed a complaint against the appellants
under s. 500 I.P.C. alleging that they made certain
defamatory allegations against him. According to him the
appellants passed a resolution suspending him from municipal
service, that in the course of the discussion relating to
the passing of the resolution, all the appellants made wild
and baseless allegations involving moral turpitude against
the respondent, and after passing the resolution the
appellants with the ulterior motive of maligning the respon-
dent, gave publicity to the resolution in the local
newspapers with large circulation. A report containing the
allegations which was sent by the Secretary of the
Corporation to the Commissioner was given in evidence.’
The Magistrate dismissed the complaint under s. 203, Cr.
P.C. on two grounds, namely, (1) there was no evidence on
record as to which of the appellants made which allegations
against the respondents and in the absence of such an
important ingredient no prima facie case against any of the
appellants could be said to have been made out, and (2) the
resolution passed by the Standing Committee and the
discussion preceding it were covered by the exceptions to s.
499, I.P.C. The sessions Judge dismissed the revision of the
complainant summarily.
The High Court set aside the order of the Magistrate and
directed further inquiry on the grounds that: (1) it could
not be said that there was no evidence as to which member of
the Standing Committee made allegations against the
respondent, as the evidence implicated all the members of
the Standing Committee including the appellants in the
charge of making the defamatory allegations contained in the
report and (2) the appellants were not protected by the
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Exceptions to s. 499.
In appeal to this Court,
HELD: (1) While it is desirable that the actual words
stated to have ’been used by the accused which are alleged
to be defamatory should be reproduced by the complainant, in
cases where the words spoken are too many or the statements
are too long, it will be the height of technicality to
insist that the actual words and the entire statements
should-be reproduced verbatim. The object of having the
actual words before the court is to enable it to consider
whether the words are defamatory. That purpose will be
served if the complainant is able to reproduce in his
complaint or evidence, in a substantial measure, the words
of imputation alleged to have been uttered. From the point
of view of the accused also it is
448
necessary that the matters alleged to be defamatory in the
complaint must be so stated as to enable them to know the
nature of the allegations they have to meet. But a
complaint cannot be thrown out on the mere ground that the
actual words spoken had not been stated in the complaint.
It is only if the case of a complainant is that each of the
accused made different statements that it would be necessary
for the complainant to specify them actual words spoken by
each of the accused. (457B-F]
In the present case, on the averments made in the complaint
which refers to various matters referred to in the report,
the complainant had furnished in a substantial measure the
words of imputation, which, according to him were
defamatory. When the case of the complainant was that all
the appellants made the statements referred to in the
report, an& he was prepared to go to trial on that footing,
the question of the complainant stating the words alleged to
have been used by the individual accused did not arise.
[457G-H; 458B]
English decisions dealing with libel, held not applicable on
all fours.[457A-B]
Sarat Chandra Das & Anr. v. State, A.I.R. 1952 Orissa 351,
Krishnarao v. Firm Radhakisan Ramsahai & Anr., [1956] I.L.R.
Nag. 236, Emperor v. Col. Bholanath, 51 I.L.R. 1929 All.
313, K. S. Namjundaiah v. Setti Chikka Thippanna, (1952] Cr.
L. J. Mysore 1633 and Dhruba Charan Khandal v. Dinabandhu
Patri, A.I.R. 1966 Orissa 15, referred to.
(2) Under ss. 202 and 203 Cr. P.C. the Magistrate has to
see whether a prima facie case is made out against the
accused on the materials and’ evidence placed before him by
the complainant and not whether the evidence is sufficient
to warrant a conviction. [452G-H; 453A-B]
In the present case, the approach of the Magistrate was
fallacious in the face of the allegations by the respondent
that all the appellants made the statements referred to in
the report. [458F]
Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose, [1964] 1 S.C.R.
639, followed.
(3) It was also unnecessary for the High Court to consider
the applicability of the Exceptions to s. 499 I.P.C., at
this stage. All the defence that may be available to the
appellants will have to be gone into during, the trial of
the complaint. [459B-C]
JUDGMENT:
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 14 of
1971.
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Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated,
August 26, 1970 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal
Revision, No. 138 of 1968.
C. K. Daphtary and B. P. Moheshwari, for the appellants.
The respondent appeared in person.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Vaidialingam J--This appeal, by special leave, is directed
against the judgment and order dated August 26, 1970 of the
Delhi High Court in Criminal Revision No. 138 of 1968
dismissing under-
449
Section 203 Cr. P. C. the complaint filed by the respondent
under Section 500 I. P. C.
The respondent Moti Ram filed a complaint in the court of
the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Delhi against the seven
appellants under section 500 I. P. C. alleging that they
made certain allegations against him which were defamatory
in character and had also passed a resolution placing the
respondent under suspension.
The complaint filed by the respondent is a fairly lengthy
one and refers to various matters. But the relevant facts
which could be gathered from the same appear to be as
follows :
The respondent during December, 1964 was serving as a
Liaison Officer, Municipal Corporation, Delhi. The
appellants were among the members of the Standing Committee
of the Corporation at that time. The first appellant Balraj
Khanna was bitterly inimical towards the respondent and was
bent upon causing harm to him. He wielded considerable
influence over the members of the Standing Committee. At
his instance a requisition was given by the members of the
Standing Committee to its Chairman to summon a meeting of
the Committee to enable them to move a resolution for the
immediate suspension of the respondent from his office.
Accordingly a meeting of the Standing Committee was held on
December 10, 1964. The said meeting was attended, not only
by the Commissioner and other officers of the Corporation,
but also by the press reporters. In that meeting the appel-
lants made very serious allegations of a defamatory nature
against the respondent and passed unanimously a resolution
placing him under immediate suspension. The allegations
made against the respondent and the fact of his suspension
from office were given wide publicity, with the result that
it brought down the respondent in the estimation of his
friends causing harm to his reputation. P. W. 3, who was
the Secretary of the Corporation, and who attended the
meeting of the Standing Committee on December 10, 1964 sent
a report the next day Ex. P. W. 3 / B to the Commissioner
regarding the allegations stated to have been made against
the respondent by the appellants. The allegations referred
to in P. W. 3 1 B are as follows :
"1. Since its inception in 1958 the
Corporation has executed a very heavy
programme of works for improving the
sanitation of the Corporation and provide
other civic amenities, but no publicity was
given to these activities and the public has
remained more or less in the dark. On the
other hand the Corporation is adversely
criticised even for minor omissions and
commissions. The L.O. has, thus not performed
the duties which are required of the post he
has been holding and has been deficient in the
performance of his duties.
29-1 S.C. India 171
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450.
2. The L O. is not working in harmony with
the representatives of the Press who attend
the Corporation office to cover the meetings
of the Corporation and its Committee, so much
so that these representatives have desired
that he be not required to come to their rooms
in the Corporation office.
3. Instead of applying himself seriously to
his official work he indulges in estranging
one member from the other, one officer for the
other and one political party for the other.
He has even been trying to sow seeds of
estrangement between the Mysore and the
Commissioners.
4. In the days when he was Chief Reporter
to the Hindustan Times. he resorted to
undesirable means to achieve, his desired
ends.
5. His association with some of the non
Official Presidents of the erstwhile Delhi
Municipal Committee has brought nothing but
slur to their good names.
6. He is known for indulging in acts of
moral turpitude and for seducing unsuspecting
girls and women."
In the complaint it is further stated that in October, 1964,
all the seven appellants entered into a conspiracy to defame
the respondent and remove him from the municipal service and
passed a resolution on December 10, 1964 placing him under
suspension. It is further stated that apart from the ’seven
appellants, three other members of the Standing Committee
were also parties to this resolution In particular, it is
alleged in the complaint that in the course of discussion
relating to the passing of the resolution-, all the seven
appellants made wild and baseless allegations involving
moral turpitude against the respondent. After passing the
resolution the appellants with the ulterior motive of
maligning the respondent and lowering him in the estimation
of the public gave publicity to the resolution in the local
newspapers with large circulation. The allegations stated
to have been made by the appellants are those referred to in
Ex. P. W. 3/B. The respondent alleged that the appellants
knowingly and maliciously made false and defamatory
allegations against him and prayed for taking action against
them.
Before the Magistrate the respondent and five other
Witnesses were examine under section 202,Cr.P.C. and after
consideration of the evidence the Magistrate dismissed the
complaint under section 203.Cr.P.C.The dismissal of the
complaint by the Magistrate is rested on two
ground,namely,(1)there is no evidence on record as to which
of the appellants made which allegation against the
respondent and in the absence of such an important
ingredient, no prima facie case against any of the
appellants
451
can be said to have been made out, and (2) the resolution
passed by the Standing Committee and the discussion
preceding it are covered by the Exceptions to Section 499 1.
P. C. and hence the appellants were well within their rights
in passing a resolution recommending suspension of the
respondent.
The Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, dismissed the revision
of the respondent summarily stating that the material on
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record was not sufficient to justify any direction being
given to the trial Magistrate, to make further inquiry into
the complaint. The Sessions Judge has further stated that
the evidence produced by the respondent is too general to
make out a case to summon any one of the appellants.
The High Court, after a reference to the material evidence
on record, as well as the allegations stated to have been
made by the appellants, has held that the approach made by
the Magistrate for dismissing the complaint was erroneous.
In the view of the High Court the evidence on record goes to
show that the case of the respondent is that all the members
of the Standing Committee including the appellants had made
the allegations against the respondent, which had been
reproduced by the Municipal Secretary in Ex. P. W. 3/B. On
this reasoning the High Court held that it cannot be said
that there is no evidence as to which member of the Standing
Committee made the allegation against the respondent.
According to the High Court the evidence as it stands
implicates all the members of the Standing Committee
including the appellants herein in the charge of making the
defamatory allegations against the respondent. The High
Court has further held that if at a later stage when
witnesses are examined, it is found that only some of the
appellants made the allegations and also what those
allegations are, it will be open to the trial Magistrate to
discharge such of the accused against whom there is no evid-
ence of having made any defamatory allegation. The High
Court is also of the view that the reasoning of the
Magistrate that the appellants are protected by the
Exceptions to Section 499 1. P. C. is also not correct.
Ultimately, the High Court set aside the order of the
Magistrate dismissing the complaint under Section 203 Cr.
P. C. and directed further inquiry to be made into the
complaint by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Delhi or by any
Magistrate subordinate to him, and to dispose of the same in
accordance with law.
Mr. C. K. Daphtary, learned counsel for the appellants, con-
tended that in cases of defermation it is essential that the
actual words used should be set out in the complaint and a
reproduction of the gist or substance of the words used is
not enough. He further contended that a general allegation
that the appellants and other members of the Standing
Committee made defamatory statements referred to in Ex. P.
W. 3 / B is not a sufficient compliance
452
with the requirement of law to enable the Magistrate to take
further action. On the other hand, according to the learned
counsel.. the complainant must specifically aver which
particular allegation was made by which of the accused, in
which case alone the individual accused will have an
opportunity of effectively meeting the imputations alleged
to have been made by him. In this connection Mr. Daphtary
referred us to certain English decisions governing the law
of Libel and he also invited our attention to certain
decisions of the High Courts.
On the other hand, the respondent, who appeared in person,
has urged that at this stage the Court is concerned only
with the question whether he has prima facie made out a case
for his complaint being inquired into by the Magistrate and
not whether he will be able to obtain a conviction of all or
any of the appellants. That stage, he pointed out, will
arise only during the course of the trial. He urged that in
his complaint he has made a categorical statement that all
the appellants have made the statements referred to in Ex.
P. W. 3 /B. As to whether the statements have been properly
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recorded by the Municipal Secretary, is again a matter which
will arise only during the course of the trial. According
to him the allegation made by him in the complaint regarding
the statements said to have been made by the appellants is
sufficient for further action being taken by the Crimmnal
Court. He further contended that the statements alleged to
have been made by the appellants have been substantially
reproduced in Ex. P. W. 3 / B and it has been placed before
the Court in the complaint and that is a sufficient
compliance with the requirement of law. He pleaded that the
principles laid down by the English Courts regarding the law
of Libel are not applicable when considering a case of
defamation under the Indian Penal Code. He- has also
referred us to certain decisions in support of his
contentions.
Before we refer to the decisions cited by Mr. Daphtary and
the respondent on merits, it is necessary to clear the
ground by appreciating the nature of the jurisdiction
exercised by the Magistrate under Sections 202 and 203 Cr.
P. C. In Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose and
another (1), it has been held by this Court that the object
of the provisions of Section 202 Cr. P. C. is to enable
the, Magistrate to form an opnion as to whether process
should be issued or not. At that stage what the Magistrate
has to see is whether there is evidence in support of the-
allegations made in the complaint and not whether the
evidence is sufficient to warrant a conviction. It been
further pointed out that the, function of the Magistrate
holdiug the preliminary inquiry is only to be satisfied that
a prima facie case is made out against
(1) [1964] 1 S.C.R, 639
453
the accused on the materials placed before him by the
complainant. Where a prima facie case has been made out,
even though much can be said on both sides, the committing
Magistrate is bound to commit the accused for trial and the
accused does not come into the picture at all till the
process is issued.
The question arises whether in an action for defamation
under Section 500 I. P. C., it is necessary that the actual
statements containing the words alleged to have been used by
the accused must be before the court or whether it is enough
that the statements alleged to have been made are
substantially reproduced in the complaint. The further
question is whether the complaint in this case is defective
in the sense that the actual statements alleged to have been
made by the individual accused have not been stated in the
complaint.
We will now refer to the decisions cited by Mr. Daphtary.
He has referred us, in the first instance, to the passage in
Halsbury’s Laws of England, Third Edition, Volume 24, page
90 para 161 that for the statement complained of as being a
libel or slander to be construed or interpreted, it is
essential that the actual words and not merely their
substance should be set forth verbatim in the statement of
claim or indictment. Again he has referred us to another
passage in the same volume as follows :
"As it is necessary in actions for libel or
slander to set forth the actual words
complained of in the statement of claim with
proper innuendoes, so also it is necessary to
do so in an indictment where words are of the
essence of the offence." (Page 135 para. 249).
In Charles Bhedlaugh and Annie Besant v. The
Queer (1) the Court of Appeal was dealing with
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an indictment for publishing an obscene book.
Bramwell, I,. J., observes as follows :
"In some instances, words are the subject-
matter of an indictment; and it follows from
this principle, which I have mentioned that
wherever the offence consists of words written
or spoken, those words must be stated in the
indictment; if they are not, it will be
defective upon demurrer, in arrest of judgment
or upon writ of error. In like manner, there
can be no doubt that in an indictment for
defamatory libel it was necessary to set out
the words complained of, so that the Court
might judge whether they were or could amount
to a libel it is manifest that where words
constitute the offence, they must be stated
in- the, indictment.
(1) 3 Q.B.D. 607
454
In The Capital and Counties Bank Limited v.
George Henty and sons (1) Lord Blackburn in
dealing with an action for libel states as
follows :
"The words themselves must have been set out
in the declaration or indictment, in order
that the Court might be able to judge whether
they_-were a libel or not. And this still
remains the law."
In Collins v. Jones (2), Lord Denning quoted
with approval the observations of Lord
Coleridge. C. J. in Harris v. Waree as
follows :
"In libel and slander everything may turn on
the form of words, and in olden days
plaintiffs constantly failed from small and
even unimportant variance between the words of
the libel or slander set out in the declara-
tion and the proof of them....... In libel and
slander the very words complained of are the
facts on which the action is grounded. It is
not the fact of the defendant having used
defamatory expressions, but the fact of his
having used those defamatory expressions
alleged, which is the fact on which the case
depends."
It is clear by a reference to the above English Law that is
an action for libel it is essential that the words
themselves must be set out in the indictment and that
requirement is insisted to enable the Court to judge whether
those words published in writing amount to libel or not.
Mr. Daphtary referred us to certain decisions dealing with
the nature of proof required in a prosecution for sedition
under Section 124A I. P. C. But we do, not think it
necessary to refer to those decisions as we are not at this
stage concerned with the proof of the statements attributed
to the appellants and which, according to the respondent,
are defamatory.
Mr. Daphtary also referred us to the decisions in Sarat
Chandra Das and another v. The State(1) and Krishnarao v.
Firm Radhakisan Ramshai and another In the Orissa High Court
decision two accused were being tried for an offence under
Section 500 I.P.C. It is no doubt stated in the said
decision that in a trial for defamation it is essential that
the words alleged
(1)7 Appeal Cases 741 (2) [1955].2 All England Reports 145
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(3) [1879] 4 C.P.D. 125 (4) A.I.R. 1952 Orissa 351
(5) 1956 I.L.R. Nagpur 236
455
to be defamatory in character should be precisely set out
and the accused should be individually given notice of what
he is charged with, as thewords so set out will
constitute the foundation for defamation. It is further
laid down that it is also essential that the words in
question should be proved. A perusal of this decision will
show that two accused were being prosecuted for defamation.
In the complaint in that case it was stated that both the
accused were alleged to have made certain statements. How
ever, in the swornstatement the complainant had given a
slightly different version. In his evidence before the
court the complainant attributedto the different accused
different statements. It was, under those circumstances,
that the court laid down the proposition referred to
earlier. Understood in that context, it is clear that
according to the High Court when different statements are
attributed to different accused, the statements alleged to
have been made by each of the accused must be set out as the
individual accused must have noticed as to what is
specifically alleged against him.
In the second case, the Nagpur High Court
dealing with a claim for damages for
defamation observed as follows
"We may point out that in a suit for damages
for defamation the law requires that the
plaint ought to allege the publication of the
dafamtory statement, set out the actual words
used and also state that they were published
or spoken to some named individuals and
specify the time and place when and where they
were published."
On the other hand, the respondent has invited
our attention to the decisions reported in
Emperor v. Col. Bholanath (1), K. S.
Namjundaiah v. Setti Chikka Tippanna (2) and
Dhruba Charan Khandal v. Dinabandhu Patri (3).
In the first decision of the Allahabad High
Court, Mukherji, J. observed :
"While I am not prepared to lay down, as a
universal proposition, that in no case where
the actual words used have not been proved a
conviction for defamation by word of mouth
cannot be maintained, it must be conceded that
in the majority of cases it should be so.
Defamation is defined as follows:---"Whoever
by words...... makes or publishes any
imputation concerning any person intended to
harm, or knowing or having reason to
(1) 51 I.L.R. 1929. All. 313 (2) 1952
Criminal Law Journal Mysore 1633
(3) A.I.R. 1966 Orissa 15.
456.
believe that such imputation will harm, the
reputation..... is said......... to defame
that person". When the question arises as to
whether the words used were intended to harm
or had the effect of harming the reputation,
the court must be put in possession not only
of the words used, but also of the context in
which they were used..." King J., the other
learned Judge of the bench observes :
"I may here remark that in my opinion it is
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unnecessary to prove the exact words used by
the accused, for the purpose of supporting a
conviction for oral defamation. It is
sufficient to prove the purport or substance
of the defamatory imputations. No honest
witness would profess to remember the exact
words used by a person who has been speaking
for even 15 minutes. At the most he may
remember some striking phrase or expression.
But a witnesse’s failure to recall the exact
words used or the exact context in which they
were spoken is immaterial, provided that he
can give a sufficiently clear account of the
purport of the defamatory remarks. Although
the learned counsel for the appellant argued
that no conviction could be sustained unless
the exact words were proved, he was unable to
quote any authority for his proposition, and I
am not prepared to accept it. English rulings
on the English Law of libel seem beside the
point when the task before us is to apply the
provisions of section 499 of the Indian Penal
Code to a case of alleged defamation by spoken
words."
In the second case the Mysore High Court has laid down that
it is sufficient for the purpose of Sections 499 and 500 I.
P. C. that if witnesses are agreed in a substantial measure
on the words of imputation uttered as it is hardly possible
or necessary to reproduce every word or expression used.
In the last decision, the Orissa High Court has laid down
that for the purpose of an offence under Section 500 I.P.C.
it is enough if the witnesses are agreed in a substantial
measure on the words of imputation uttered, for it is not
possible even for a most honest witness to reproduce every
such word or expression. This decision has also
distinguished the earlier decision in Sarat Chandra Das and
another v. The State (1) on the ground that the observations
contained in that judgment that the precise words uttered
against the complainant should find a place in the charge
were made in the context of the court dealing with two
accused, each of whom was alleged to have made different
statements.
(1) A. I. R. 1952 Orissa 351
457.
After a consideration of the various decisions referred to
above, we are of the opinion that the propositions laid down
in English decisions dealing with libel that the actual
words alleged to be used must be stated in the indictment
cannot be applied on all fours when dealing with the cases
of defamation by spoken words under Section 499 I. P. C. it
will be highly desirable no doubt if the actual words stated
to have been used by an accused and which are alleged to be
defamatory are reproduced by the complainant. The actual
words used or the statements made may be reproduced verbatim
by the complainant if the words are few and the statement is
very brief. But in cases where the words spoken are too
many or the statements made are too long, in our opinion, it
will be the height of technicality to insist that the actual
words and the entire statements should be reproduced
verbatim. The object of having, if possible, the actual
words or the statements before the court is to enable it to
consider whether those words or the statements are
defamatory in nature. That purpose or object will be served
if the complainant is able to reproduce in his complaint or
evidence in a substantial measure the words of imputation
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alleged to have been uttered. If the statements or the
words placed before the court by the complainant are held to
be not defamatory, it will mean that the complainant will
have to lose. Therefore it is to his interest to get a
proper adjudication from, the court that as far as possible
the words spoken or the statements actually made and which
he alleges to be defamatory are before the court. But a
complaint cannot be thrown out on the mere ground that the
actual words spoken or the statements made have not been
stated in the complaint. From the point of view of accused
also it is necessary that the matters alleged to be
defamatory in the complaint must be so stated as to enable
them to know the nature of the allegations that they have to
meet.
In this case we have already referred to Ex. P. W. 3 /B.
which, according to the complainant, contains the statements
made by the appellants during the discussion of the
resolution leading to his suspension on December 11, 1964.
The High Court, in this connection, has averted to the
evidence of P. Ws. 1, 3 and 4 on this aspect. As to how far
the evidence of those witnesses is to be accepted, is a
matter which will arise only during the trial of the
complaint. From the averments made in the complaint, which
refers to various matters referred to in Ex. P.W., 3 / B,
we are of the opinion, that the complainant has. furnished
in a substantial measure the words of imputation, which,
according to him, are defamatory. Therefore, the contention
of Mr. Daphtary that the complaint is defective inasmuch as
it does not contain the actual words alleged to have been
spoken by the appellants has to be rejected.
458
The further question is whether the complaint is defective
for the reason that the actual statements alleged to have
been made by the individual accused have not been stated
therein. So far as this aspect is concerned, if the case of
the complainant is that, each of the appellants made
different statements or spoke different words, which are
defamatory, then it is absolutely necessary that the
complaint must specify the words spoken or the statements
made by each of the appellants. But that is not the
allegation in the complaint. We have already referred to
the fact that it is specifically stated in the complaint
that during the course of the discussion of the resolution,
all the seven appellants made a wild and baseless allegation
against the complainant involving moral turpitude.
According to him those statements are contained in Ex. P. W.
3/B. The evidentiary value of Ex. P.- W. 3 / B does not
arise for consideration at this stage. The further
question. whether the complainant will be able to prove his
allegation that all the seven appellants made all or any of
the statements contained in Ex. P. W. 3 / B, is again a
matter which does not arise for consideration at this stage.
We are only concerned to find out what are the allegations
made by the respondent in his complaint against the
appellants. When the case of the complainant is that the
seven appellants made the statements referred to in Ex. P.
W. 3 / B and he is prepared to go to trial on that footing,
the question of the complainant being made to state the
statements alleged to have been made by the individual
accused does not at all arise. Such a situation will arise
only when the case of the complainant is that different
statements were made by different accused, who are before
the court.
The Magistrate dismissed the complaint on the ground that
there is no evidence on record as to which of the appellant
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made which allegation against the respondent and in the
absence of such an important ingredient, no prima facie case
against any of the appellants can be said to have been made
out. This, in our opinion, is a fallacious approach made by
the Magistrate in the face of the allegation made by the
respondent that all the seven appellants made the statements
referred to in Ex. P. W. 3/B. In our opinion, the High
Court has made a correct approach when it held that the
evidence, as it stands implicates all the members of the
Standing Committee, including the appellants in the charge
of making the statements alleged to be defamatory and
contained in Ex. PI W. 3 / B. We are in, entire agreement
with the reasoning of the High Court on this aspect.
Before concluding, the discussion, it is, to be stated that
the trial Magistrate has given an additional reason for
dismissing the complaint That, reason is that the resolution
passed by the Standing Committee an December 11. 1964 and
the discussion preceding it by the members of the Standing
Committee including the,-
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appellants is covered by the Exceptions to Section 499 I. P.
C. Unfortunately, the High Court also has touched upon this
aspect and made certain observations. In our opinion, the
question of, the application of the Exceptions to Section
499 I. P. C. does not arise at this stage. Rejection of the
complaint by the Magistrate on the second ground mentioned
above cannot be sustained. It was also unnecessary for the
High Court to have considered this aspect and differed from
the trial Magistrate. It is needless to state that the
question of applicability of the Exceptions to Section 499
I. P. C. as well as all other defences that may be available
to the appellants will have to be gone into during the trial
of the complaint.
To conclude we are satisfied that the High Court’s order
setting aside the order of the Magistrate dismissing the
complaint under Section 203 Cr. P. C. and directing further
inquiry to be made in the complaint of the respondent is
correct.
The appeal fails and is dismissed.
V.P.S. Appeal dismissed.
460