Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Special Leave Petition (civil) 26241-42 of 2005
PETITIONER:
KASAM ALI MOMIN
RESPONDENT:
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER BOMBAY & ORS
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/01/2008
BENCH:
G.P. MATHUR & D.K. JAIN
JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
O R D E R
D.K. JAIN, J.:
1. These petitions under Article 136 of the Constitution, are
directed against the judgment, dated 14th September, 2005,
rendered by the High Court of Judicature, at Bombay in First
Appeal No.580 of 2005 and order dated 28th October, 2005,
passed in the review petition, whereby the appeal as well as
the review application preferred by the petitioner against the
judgment of the Bombay City Civil Court, dismissing his suit
have been dismissed.
2. In order to appreciate the controversy involved, a few
relevant facts may be stated.
3. The petitioner is the original plaintiff. He filed a suit for
declaration and permanent injunction against the Bombay
Municipal Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the
\021Corporation\022), restraining them from carrying out demolition
of the property bearing Shed No.80, Bombay Talkies
Compound, Malad (West) Bombay. The case of the petitioner
is that since 1969 he is the tenant in respect of an open piece
of land admeasuring 1118 sq. feet, owned by a Trust, namely,
Ram Kumar Jalan Public Charitable Trust, respondent No.2
herein. This land was given to him with a right to put up
construction thereon as per the rent receipt dated 13th May,
1969. He carried out further construction on the plot prior to
1981 and constructed ground plus two upper floors.
According to the petitioner, a fire broke out in the suit
premises and the adjoining premises on 25th August, 1999,
affecting the second floor along with the loft therein. On being
informed, an officer of the Corporation inspected the site,
prepared the inspection report and observed that no major
damage was caused to the structure.
4. On 1st September, 1999, a notice under Section 354-A of
the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act (for short \021the Act\022) was
issued to the petitioner, alleging unauthorised reconstruction
of the structure by him, to which he responded vide his reply
dated 5th September, 1999. On 6th October, 1999, the
Corporation issued yet another notice under Section 351 of
the Act, requiring the petitioner to show cause as to why the
notice structure be not pulled down or unauthorised change
be not restored to its sanctioned user. He was called upon to
produce documentary evidence to show that the building or
work or change of user was not unauthorised. The petitioner
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furnished explanation to the said notice vide letter dated 11th
October, 1999, refuting the allegation of unauthorised
construction. In the same letter the petitioner issued a notice
to the Corporation, purporting to be a notice under Section
527 of the Act, threatening a legal action against the said show
cause notice.
5. The explanation so furnished by the petitioner came to be
rejected by the Corporation vide their letter dated 3rd
December, 1999, inter alia, on the ground that the petitioner
had failed to produce documentary evidence to show that the
structure was in existence prior to datum line of 1st April,
1962. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the suit challenging the
said notice and order passed by the Corporation, seeking a
declaration to the effect that the order and notice were illegal.
Relief of injunction, restraining the Corporation from
demolishing the structure which was referred to as Shed
bearing No.180, was prayed for.
6. Initially, the suit was filed only against the Corporation.
However, subsequently the said owner of the property, namely,
the Trust was also impleaded. The Corporation did not file its
written statement. However, the suit was contested by the
Trust, by filing written statement. The stand of the Trust was
that the petitioner was never given an open piece land on lease
but a built up Shed (No.180), on the ground floor only, was
given to him on rent. However, the petitioner carried out
unauthorised construction under the guise of repairs to the
portions of the Shed which was partially damaged in the fire,
which broke out in the year 1999. It was also the stand of the
Trust that the Shed was initially admeasuring 450 sq. feet
only but the petitioner constructed ground plus two upper
floors illegally without permission, consent and approval of the
Trust and without getting the plan sanctioned from the
Corporation.
7. On the basis of the pleadings, the Trial Court framed six
issues. The petitioner and the Trust led evidence and the
Corporation was permitted to cross examine the witnesses.
On consideration of the evidence, so adduced, the trial court
came to the conclusion that the petitioner had failed to prove
that the first floor was in existence in the year 1969, when he
had taken possession of the suit premises or that construction
above the first floor was in existence before the datum line.
Accordingly, the suit was dismissed.
8. Being aggrieved, the petitioner filed First Appeal to the
High Court. The main point urged before the High Court was
that the datum line for construction in the Bombay Talkies
Compound being 1981 and since the structure of the
petitioner was put up prior thereto, it was not liable to be
demolished. The stand of the petitioner did not find favour
with the High Court. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.
Against the said judgment, the petitioner unsuccessfully
preferred Review Application. Both these orders are
questioned in the present Special Leave Petitions.
9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. It was
vehemently contended by Mr. U.U. Lalit, learned senior
counsel on behalf of the petitioner that the trial court as well
as the High Court have failed to return a clear finding on the
question of datum line, though it was specifically pleaded.
Learned counsel submitted that in view of this fallacy in the
order of the High Court, the matter deserves to be remitted
back to the High Court for fresh consideration on this vital
question.
10. We are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with
learned counsel for the petitioner.
11. Indubitably, in the plaint as well as in his affidavit it was
the specific case of the petitioner that the datum line for
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industrial units at the Bombay Talkies Compound was 3rd
March, 1981 as according to the petitioner this fact had been
recognised by virtue of various orders issued by the officers of
the Corporation as well as by the Government and the order
passed by the High Court in the writ petition filed by the
association of the unit holders. In support of his stand the
petitioner produced several documents; examined himself and
deposed on the lines of the averments in the plaint. The
Corporation led no evidence, necessitating the petitioner to
summon some official records. His application seeking leave to
lead secondary evidence was also allowed. The Corporation
was called upon to produce certain documents. As noted
above, though the Corporation had not filed its written
statement yet they were allowed to cross examine the
petitioner. By giving certain suggestions, the Corporation set
up a specific case that the datum line was never changed from
1st April, 1964, as applicable to all industrial sheds existing all
over the city of Bombay, to 3rd March, 1981 as pleaded by the
petitioner. Therefore, the onus was on the petitioner to prove
that the Corporation had extended the datum line to 3rd
March, 1981. It is manifest that no specific issue was framed,
as claimed by the petitioner, with regard to the datum line.
Nevertheless, while collectively dealing with the issues No.2, 3
and 4, relating to the question whether the notice structure
was unauthorised and/or tolerated, the trial court examined
threadbare the entire documentary and ocular evidence,
referred to various orders passed by the High Court, brought
on record by the petitioner and returned the findings that : (i)
in none of the orders passed by the High Court, there was
direction regarding regularisation and there was no mention of
any datum line or policy statement on behalf of the
Corporation much less 3rd March, 1981; (ii) the
communication between the Corporation and the State
Government was only draft guidelines sent for approval, inter
alia, suggesting that because of litigation started by the
occupants of the sheds, 3rd March, 1981 may be treated as a
cut off date but there was no material on record to show that
the proposal, sent as far back as in 1988, was accepted by the
Government, (iii) admissions in the plaint as well as in the
statement of the petitioner showed that he did not have any
documentary evidence to show that the suit structure was in
existence prior to 1st April, 1962 (iv) the petitioner had failed to
prove the existence of the first floor and, in any case, the
existence of the first floor when gala No.80 was taken into
possession by him and (v) the petitioner had failed to prove
that the first floor was in existence on or before the datum
line.
12. In the light of the aforenoted findings returned by the
trial court and affirmed by the High Court, which are primarily
findings of fact, we do not find any reason to entertain the plea
sought to be raised by learned counsel for the petitioner that
the matter may be remanded back for determination of the
datum line. It needs little reiteration that in exercise of its
extraordinary power under Article 136 of the Constitution,
ordinarily this Court does not interfere on questions of fact,
except in exceptional cases when the finding is such that it
shocks the conscience of this Court. In our opinion, the
present case does not fall in the latter category.
13. In the conspectus of the circumstances aforesaid, the
petition is devoid of any merit. We decline to grant leave.
Dismissed.