D B Corp Ltd vs. Asburt Gonsalves

Case Type: Writ Petition

Date of Judgment: 02-04-2026

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Full Judgment Text

2026:BHC-AS:15578
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AGK
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.1452 OF 2026
D.B. Corp. Limited (Dainik Bhaskar),
having office at 501, 5th Floor,
Naman Corporation Link, Opposite
Dena Bank, C-31, G Block, Bandra-Kurla
Complex, Bandra (East), Mumbai
through Anwar A.,
Aged 41 years, the Chief Manager,
HR of the Company
… Petitioner
ATUL
GANESH
KULKARNI
Digitally signed by
ATUL GANESH
KULKARNI
Date: 2026.04.02
12:45:03 +0530
Vs.
Asburt Gonsalves,
having address at Philips House,
Shetodi Wadi, Papdi, Vasai (West),
District Palghar 401 207
… Respondent
Mr. Prahlad Paranjape with Ms. Shweta More, Mr.
Saket Tare, Ms. Rupa Shaw i/by Mr. Atishay Jain for
the petitioner.
Mr. Vinod Sanjiv Shetty for the respondent.
CORAM : AMIT BORKAR, J.
RESERVED ON : MARCH 27, 2026.
PRONOUNCED ON : APRIL 2, 2026
JUDGMENT:
1. By the present writ petition instituted under Articles 226 and
227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has assailed the
order dated 24 September 2025 passed by the Industrial Court at
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Mumbai in Complaint (ULP) No. 42 of 2025. By the said order, the
Industrial Court has granted interim relief and stayed the
operation of the transfer order dated 26 December 2014 issued by
the petitioner.
2. The factual matrix giving rise to the present proceedings, as
set out by the petitioner, is as follows. The respondent came to be
appointed pursuant to an Appointment Letter dated 18 February
2008, which expressly stipulated in clear and unambiguous terms
that the services of the respondent were liable to be transferred to
any of the establishments or offices of the petitioner. It is the case
of the petitioner that on account of prolonged, consistent and
persistent non-performance, the services of the respondent were
terminated by an order dated 30 August 2016 with effect from 31
August 2016. Being aggrieved, the respondent raised an industrial
dispute, which came to be registered as Reference (IDA) No. 9 of
2018 before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour at Mumbai. The
petitioner entered appearance in the said proceedings and
contested the claim by filing its written statement on 14 January
2020. The Labour Court at Mumbai, by its Award dated 24 April
2023, allowed the reference and set aside the order of termination.
The petitioner was directed to reinstate the respondent in service
with continuity, along with full back wages and all consequential
benefits. Aggrieved by the said Award, the petitioner preferred
Writ Petition No. 3145 of 2024 before this Court. This Court, by its
order dated 14 March 2025, dismissed the writ petition and
upheld the Award passed by the Labour Court.
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3. Being dissatisfied with the said decision, the petitioner
carried the matter to the Supreme Court by filing Special Leave
Petition (Civil) No.13636 of 2024. The Hon’ble Supreme Court
dismissed the Special Leave Petition, thereby affirming the Award
dated 24 April 2023. In compliance with the directions contained
in the Award, the petitioner reinstated the respondent in service
and paid back wages aggregating to Rs. 16,90,802/-.
4. It is the case of the petitioner that by communication dated 8
June 2023, the respondent was informed that since he had
remained out of service for a considerable period of approximately
eight years, the petitioner had engaged other personnel to
discharge the duties of System Engineer. Consequently, at the time
of reinstatement, no vacancy was available for immediate posting,
and the respondent was assured that he would be informed as and
when a suitable vacancy arose. Thereafter, in December 2024, a
vacancy became available at the petitioner’s Bhopal office.
Accordingly, by letter dated 26 December 2024, the respondent
was informed that his services were required at the Bhopal office
and was called upon to report for duty at the said place on or
before 2 January 2025. The petitioner, by subsequent
communications dated 7 January 2025 and 19 February 2025,
reiterated its direction to the respondent to report at the Bhopal
office so as to ensure continuity and smooth functioning of
operations. Despite the aforesaid communications, the respondent
failed and neglected to comply with the transfer directions. It is
alleged that the respondent neither reported at the transferred
place of posting nor sought any leave, and remained absent from
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duties without authorization. Instead, the respondent approached
the Industrial Court at Mumbai alleging that the transfer
amounted to an unfair labour practice. The respondent accordingly
instituted proceedings under Section 28 read with Section 30(2) of
the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of
Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. The petitioner opposed the said
complaint by filing an affidavit in reply on 21 February 2025. By
the impugned order dated 24 September 2024, the Industrial
Court granted interim relief in favour of the respondent. The
Industrial Court recorded a prima facie finding that the issuance of
the transfer order by the petitioner constituted an unfair labour
practice, and directed that the transfer order be kept in abeyance
pending adjudication of the complaint. The Industrial Court
further directed the petitioner to provide work to the respondent
at its Mumbai office. Being aggrieved by the said order, the
petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court.
5. Mr. Paranjape, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner,
submitted that the respondent was appointed pursuant to an
Appointment Letter dated 18 February 2008, wherein the terms
and conditions of service expressly provided that the respondent
was liable to be transferred to any place within India. It is
submitted that the respondent accepted the said terms without
demur. During the course of his employment, the petitioner
received several complaints pertaining to the respondent’s
performance, including allegations of habitual absenteeism and
unsatisfactory discharge of duties. In view thereof, the services of
the respondent came to be terminated in accordance with the
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prescribed procedure. It is further submitted that during the period
2018–2019, the petitioner undertook a restructuring exercise
whereby its entire computer systems across various offices in India
were centralized and brought under the control of its Head Office
at Bhopal. For this purpose, a dedicated team of IT Engineers was
engaged at Bhopal. Consequently, the computer systems at the
Mumbai office are also centrally managed from Bhopal. Any
software-related issues arising in devices at Mumbai are resolved
from the Bhopal office. It is further pointed out that the Mumbai
office presently has approximately sixteen printers, which are
maintained through third-party vendors under annual
maintenance contracts. Insofar as laptops are concerned, more
than fifty percent are under warranty and are maintained by the
respective vendors, while the remaining are either serviced by
third-party contractors or through centralized support from
Bhopal. It is thus contended that there is presently only one
System Engineer at the Mumbai office, whose services are required
only in exceptional circumstances. According to the petitioner,
there is no functional requirement for a System Engineer at
Mumbai, and even the existing position is not necessitated by
operational needs.
6. Learned Advocate for the petitioner further submitted that in
the absence of any vacancy for the post of System Engineer at the
Mumbai office, the petitioner has, in compliance with the Award
dated 21 April 2023, continued to pay salary to the respondent
without allocation of any work. It is submitted that while
challenging the said Award before this Court in Writ Petition No.
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3145 of 2024, the petitioner had specifically contended that no
vacancy was available for the respondent at the Mumbai office.
7. It is further submitted that in December 2024, the petitioner
established an extension facility at its Bhopal headquarters, from
where centralized IT support is provided to all offices of the
petitioner across India. In view of the absence of any available
work or vacancy at Mumbai, the petitioner had no alternative but
to transfer the respondent to its Bhopal office. Accordingly, in
terms of service conditions, company policy, and administrative
requirements, the petitioner issued the transfer order dated 26
December 2024, relieving the respondent from Mumbai office on
the same date after office hours and directing him to report at the
Bhopal office on 3 January 2025. It is submitted that the
respondent was also informed about the admissibility of transfer-
related benefits, including joining time and travelling expenses. It
is thus contended that the transfer order cannot be termed as mala
fide or actuated by any ulterior motive, such as compelling the
respondent to resign or effecting termination indirectly. According
to the petitioner, the respondent has deliberately failed to comply
with the transfer directions and has instead instituted false and
untenable proceedings. It is urged that no prima facie case is made
out in favour of the respondent, nor does the balance of
convenience lie in his favour. It is further contended that no
irreparable injury would be caused to the respondent, as the
transfer is in accordance with the terms of employment. It is
emphasized that transfer is an incident of service and lies within
the managerial prerogative of the employer. On these grounds, it is
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prayed that the application for interim relief be rejected.
8. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned Advocate for
the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgments of the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in National Hydroelectric Power
Corporation Limited vs. Shri Bhagwan & Another , (2001) 8 SCC
574, and Rajneesh Khajuria vs. Wockhardt Limited & Another ,
(2020) 2 SCC 86.
9. Per contra, Mr. Shetty, learned Advocate appearing for the
respondent, submitted that the respondent has been subjected to
continuous victimization at the hands of the petitioner. It is
contended that the petitioner had illegally terminated the services
of the respondent by order dated 30 August 2016 without
adhering to the principles of natural justice and without any
supporting evidence. Being aggrieved, the respondent raised an
industrial dispute by filing Reference (IDA) No.9 of 2018 on 5
November 2018 before the Labour Court at Mumbai, seeking
reinstatement with back wages. The Labour Court, by its Award
dated 21 April 2023, allowed the reference, set aside the
termination order, and directed reinstatement of the respondent
with full back wages and consequential benefits with effect from 1
September 2016.
10. Learned Advocate for the respondent further submitted that
the respondent had also lodged a complaint before the Assistant
Commissioner of Labour, Mumbai on 19 September 2016
regarding non-implementation of the Majithia Wage Board Award.
The said authority referred the dispute, being Reference No. 07 of
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2019, to the Labour Court at Mumbai for recovery of arrears of
wages. It is submitted that the respondent had informed the
petitioner about the Award passed by the Labour Court both
personally and through correspondence. However, the petitioner
failed to comply with the same and instead challenged the Award
before this Court by filing Writ Petition No.3145 of 2024,
contending that no work was available for the respondent at the
Mumbai office and seeking modification of the Award by grant of
compensation. This Court, by order dated 14 March 2024,
dismissed the writ petition. It is thus contended that the Award
dated 21 April 2023 has attained finality and is binding upon the
petitioner.
11. It is further submitted that despite the Award having
attained finality, the petitioner failed to comply with its directions.
Consequently, the respondent initiated proceedings under Section
33-C(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before the Assistant
Labour Commissioner, Mumbai for recovery of back wages
amounting to Rs.16,90,802/-. A recovery certificate dated 31
January 2024 came to be issued in favour of the respondent.
Pursuant thereto, the Collector, Mumbai directed the Tahsildar,
Andheri to recover the said amount as arrears of land revenue. The
Tahsildar, Andheri, by communication dated 13 June 2024, called
upon the concerned co-operative society to furnish details of the
petitioner’s properties and restrained the petitioner from
transferring the same. It is submitted that only thereafter the
petitioner paid the said amount to the respondent.
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12. Learned Advocate for the respondent further submitted that
despite clear directions in the Award, as confirmed by this Court,
requiring reinstatement of the respondent on his original post, the
petitioner has failed to comply with the same in its true spirit. It is
contended that the impugned transfer order dated 26 December
2024 has been issued with a view to defeat the Award and to
penalize the respondent for having initiated proceedings alleging
unfair labour practices. According to the respondent, the transfer is
a colourable exercise of power intended to victimise him and to
circumvent the binding Award of the Labour Court.
13. It is further submitted that the respondent has been serving
at the Mumbai office since 2008 and has established his residence
and family life in Mumbai. The respondent has a working spouse,
an aged mother, and a school-going child. In such circumstances, it
is contended that relocation to Bhopal is not feasible. It is urged
that the transfer order operates as a measure of victimisation and
is intended to compel the respondent to resign. It is submitted that
the complaint filed by the respondent before the Industrial Court is
pending adjudication and would take time for final disposal.
Therefore, it is contended that it is just and proper that the
transfer order be kept in abeyance pending such adjudication. It is
further urged that the respondent has made out a strong prima
facie case and that the balance of convenience lies in his favour. It
is contended that failure to grant interim relief would result in
irreparable harm, as the petitioner may initiate disciplinary
proceedings leading to termination. On these grounds, it is prayed
that interim relief be granted.
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14. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned Advocate for
the respondent has relied upon the decisions in Venkitaramanan
Potti vs. Travancore Devaswom Board , 1993 II CLR 622, and C.
Prabhakaran vs. Southern Petrochemicals Industries Corporation
Limited, New Bombay , 2001 II CLR 272.
REASONS AND ANALYSIS:
15. The present matter is not about deciding the entire dispute
finally. The Court is only concerned with a limited question at
interim stage. The Industrial Court has granted interim protection
to the respondent. Because of that order, the transfer has been
stopped and the petitioner has been directed to give work to the
respondent at Mumbai itself. The main complaint under the
M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act is still pending. That complaint will take
its own course and evidence will be led there. Therefore, this Court
is not required to record final findings on all disputed facts. Still,
the Court has to examine whether the Industrial Court was correct
in granting such strong interim relief. For that purpose, the Court
has to look into the material placed by both parties. It is necessary
to see whether a proper prima facie case was made out, whether
balance of convenience was considered, and whether any serious
prejudice would be caused. Sympathy or personal hardship alone
cannot guide such decision. The order must stand on legal
reasoning and available material.
16. Coming to the basic facts, it is clear that the respondent
entered service under an appointment letter dated 18 February
2008. That document is not denied by the respondent. In that
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letter, there is a clear clause which states that his services can be
transferred anywhere in India. It is a normal service term and it
forms part of the contract between the parties. Once such a
condition is accepted at the time of joining, the employee cannot
later object to transfer as a general rule. Of course, there are
exceptions. If the employee shows that the transfer is mala fide, or
that it is actually a punishment in disguise, or that it violates some
statutory protection, then the Court can interfere. But unless such
strong grounds are shown, the transfer condition must be
respected. In the present case, the petitioner has also pointed out
that during the service period, complaints were received about the
respondent’s work and his absenteeism. On that basis, his services
were earlier terminated. It is true that the Labour Court later set
aside that termination and directed reinstatement with back
wages. That award has also been confirmed by higher Courts.
Therefore, the petitioner was bound to take him back in service.
However, reinstatement only means restoration of employment. It
does not mean that all other service conditions come to an end.
The employer still retains the right to decide posting, place of work
and distribution of duties, so long as it acts within the terms of
service. Therefore, merely because the respondent has been
reinstated, he cannot insist that he must be continued only at
Mumbai, when the original contract itself allows transfer anywhere
in India.
17. The petitioner has then tried to explain the reason behind
the transfer to Bhopal. According to the petitioner, around the
years 2018 to 2019, the company changed its system of
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functioning. It centralized all its computer and IT related work at
its Head Office at Bhopal. A full team of IT engineers has been
placed there. The Mumbai office is no longer handling such work.
Even for small issues, such as software problems in laptops used in
Mumbai support is taken from Bhopal. The petitioner has also
given details about printers and laptops. Printers are maintained
by outside agencies under contracts. Many laptops are still under
warranty and are handled by the supplier companies. The
remaining devices are also managed either by contractors or by the
central team at Bhopal. It is further stated that only one System
Engineer is kept at Mumbai and even his work is very limited and
required only in rare situations. When these facts are read
together, they give an impression that the requirement of a System
Engineer at Mumbai has almost reduced to nil. At least on a prima
facie view this explanation appears to be consistent. It shows that
the transfer is connected with restructuring of work. If the work
itself has shifted to Bhopal then asking the respondent to work
there cannot be said to be without reason. This is not a situation
where an employee is transferred to a place where no work exists.
The petitioner has shown that the main IT activity is now
concentrated at Bhopal.
18. On the other side, the respondent has argued that this
transfer is not genuine. According to him, it is only a second
attempt by the petitioner to remove him from service indirectly.
This argument cannot be rejected at once because the history
between the parties shows that there was earlier litigation
regarding termination. The respondent had to approach the
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Labour Court. He also says that the petitioner did not immediately
comply with the award and that he had to take steps for recovery
of back wages. He therefore feels that the employer is acting with
some ill intention. He points out that the transfer order has come
soon after the award has become final. According to him, this
timing itself shows that it is a retaliatory step. This submission
needs careful consideration. It is true that sometimes employers
use transfer as a method to put pressure on an employee who has
succeeded in litigation. Courts have repeatedly said that such
colourable exercise of power is not permissible. If a transfer is
passed only to harass, or to force resignation, or to punish the
employee for asserting his rights, then the Court can certainly
interfere even at an interim stage.
19. However, the Court cannot proceed only on doubt or
assumption. There must be some material which indicates mala
fide intention. In the present case, the petitioner has placed on
record the service condition, the restructuring of IT work, the
absence of work at Mumbai, and the existence of work at Bhopal.
These are all relevant factors. The respondent has not placed any
document to show that the transfer decision was taken only
because he filed complaints or litigation. The timing alone though
suspicious in appearance is not sufficient by itself to prove mala
fide. There must be something more concrete. The respondent has
also relied on his personal difficulties. He has stated that he is
settled in Mumbai since long, his spouse is working here, his
mother is aged, and his child is studying. These are genuine
concerns. The Court is not insensitive to such realities. But in law
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personal hardship cannot by itself invalidate a transfer which is
otherwise within service rules. Every transfer causes some
difficulty. If such hardship is treated as a ground to stop transfer in
all cases, then the very concept of transfer in service law will fail.
The correct test is whether the employer has acted within the
contract and for a legitimate administrative reason. In the present
case when the material of the petitioner is seen it indicates that
there is some genuine operational reason for posting the
respondent at Bhopal. Therefore, at least at this stage the case of
the petitioner appears to be stronger.
20. The respondent has placed strong reliance on the earlier
award of the Labour Court and has argued that once the
termination was set aside, he must be taken back on the same post
at Mumbai itself. At first look this submission appears reasonable.
But when examined more closely it does not fully answer the legal
position. The award directed reinstatement with continuity of
service and back wages. This means the respondent was to be
restored to service as if the termination had not taken place.
However, the award does not say that the respondent must forever
remain posted at the same place. It does not take away the normal
service conditions which were already accepted by him at the time
of appointment. One of those conditions clearly allowed transfer
anywhere in India. That part of the contract still continues.
21. Reinstatement cannot be understood in a inflexible manner.
It only puts the employee back into employment. It does not
restrict the employer in such a way that no administrative decision
can be taken thereafter. The employer is still entitled to organize
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its work decide where an employee is needed and post him
accordingly so long as it is done in a fair manner. In the present
case the petitioner has shown that the IT work has been
centralized at Bhopal and that there is no real requirement at
Mumbai. If that position is correct even prima facie, then sending
the respondent to Bhopal cannot be called disobedience of the
award. The award has been complied with by taking him back in
service and paying back wages. What remains is only a matter of
posting. That falls within the administrative domain of the
employer.
22. When the order of the Industrial Court is seen in this
background, it appears that the Court has treated the transfer itself
as if it is an unfair labour practice at the very beginning. This
approach is not correct at the stage of interim relief. At that stage,
the Court is required to act with caution. It must first see whether
there is a strong prima facie case. Then it must examine where the
balance of convenience lies. It must also consider whether any
irreparable loss will be caused if relief is not granted. All these
factors have to be weighed together. Here the finding of unfair
labour practice has been assumed at the interim stage without
sufficient material. The allegation of mala fide made by the
respondent is serious, but it is not backed by clear evidence at this
stage. On the other hand, the petitioner has given a business
related reason for the transfer. When such explanation is available
the Court must give it due weight. Further, the balance of
convenience also does not favour the respondent. If the petitioner
has in fact shifted its IT operations to Bhopal, then keeping the
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respondent at Mumbai without any substantial work would not
serve any purpose. It will only continue a situation where salary is
paid without corresponding work.
23. The respondent has pointed out difficulty in shifting to
Bhopal. That is understandable. But in law inconvenience is not
equal to irreparable injury. Irreparable injury means a harm which
cannot be compensated. Here the respondent’s service is
continuing. His salary is not stopped. His seniority is not taken
away. His other service benefits are also not shown to be affected.
Only the place of work is changed. Therefore, it cannot be said
that he will suffer such damage which cannot be compensated
later. If ultimately he succeeds in the complaint appropriate orders
can always be passed. At this stage such injury is not made out.
24. There is one more aspect which also deserves mention. The
conduct of the petitioner does not appear to be abrupt. The
transfer order was issued openly. Thereafter, further letters were
sent asking the respondent to join at Bhopal. The petitioner also
informed him about transfer related benefits like joining time and
travelling expenses. These are normal features of a genuine
transfer. If the intention was only to trouble the respondent or to
force him out such formalities may not have been followed in this
manner. Of course intention cannot be decided only from such
factors. But conduct gives some indication. In the present case, the
conduct of the petitioner appears to be in line with a regular
administrative decision.
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25. The judgments cited by both sides only restate settled legal
principles. It is well accepted that transfer is an incident of service.
Courts normally do not interfere with transfer orders unless there
is clear mala fide, violation of statutory provision, or proof that the
order is passed for an improper purpose. At the same time, the
Court is also aware that transfer power should not be misused. If it
is used as a tool of punishment or harassment, the Court can step
in. Therefore, each case must be examined on its own facts. In the
present case the respondent has not been able to cross the required
level to show that the transfer is illegal or colourable. The
petitioner has placed a more convincing explanation.
26. Taking an overall view of the matter, this Court finds that the
respondent has not established a strong prima facie case for
staying the transfer. The balance of convenience is also not in his
favour. No irreparable loss, in the strict sense of law, is shown. The
Industrial Court has granted a relief which goes beyond the
requirement at the interim stage. By staying the transfer and
directing posting at Mumbai, it has practically taken away the
employer’s right to decide posting without sufficient material. Such
an approach cannot be sustained. Therefore, the impugned order
is liable to be set aside.
27. In view of the foregoing discussion and reasons recorded
hereinabove, the following order is passed:
(i) The writ petition is allowed;
(ii) The impugned order dated 24 September 2025 passed
by the Industrial Court, Mumbai in Complaint (ULP) No.42
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of 2025, granting interim relief in favour of the respondent,
is quashed and set aside;
(iii) The interim application filed by the respondent before
the Industrial Court stands rejected;
(iv) It is clarified that the observations made in this
judgment are prima facie in nature and confined only to the
adjudication of the issue of interim relief. The Industrial
Court shall decide the main complaint on its own merits, in
accordance with law, without being influenced by any
observations made herein;
(v) The respondent is directed to comply with the transfer
order dated 26 December 2024 and report at the transferred
place of posting within a period of four weeks from today;
(vi) Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms. No order
as to costs.
(AMIT BORKAR, J.)
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