Full Judgment Text
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1100 OF 2001
State of U.P. ... Appellant
VERSUS
Banne @ Baijnath & Ors. ... Respondents
J U D G M E N T
This appeal is directed against the judgment of the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad delivered in Criminal
Appeal No.1358 of 1980 dated 1st February, 2000 by which
the High Court had acquitted all the five accused who were
convicted and sentenced to undergo six months R.I. under
Section 147 I.P.C., three years R.I. under Section 307/149
I.P.C. three months R.I. under Section 323/149 and to
imprisonment for life under Section 302 read with Section
149 I.P.C. by the trial court.
Brief facts which are necessary to dispose of this
appeal are recapitulated as under:-
1
Members of the accused and complainant party are
close relatives. In order to properly appreciate the
relationship, the pedigree of the family is reproduced:
2
3
4
On 13.11.1977 a violent incident is alleged to have
taken place between the accused and members of the
complainant party, namely, Moti, Gharroo and his sons over
share in plot No.165/2 measuring 1.88 decimals situated in
Village Shivpurwa, P.S. Manduadih, District Varanasi. It is
admitted case of the parties that Chhakkoo and his brother
Panchu were original tenure holders of the said plot along
with some other plots.
In a suit under Section 49 of the U.P. Tenancy Act,
Moti, Gharroo and Lalloo obtained one half share in the
joint Khata while the other half share went to descendants
of Panchu, namely, Vinayak and others. Lalloo, Moti and
Gharroo have since been recorded as co-tenure holders of
the aforesaid plot along with other plots.
The dispute about the share between Lalloo on the one
hand and Gharroo and Moti on the other started in the year
5
1965. Lalloo claimed one half share while according to Moti
and Gharroo all the three daughters’ sons Lalloo, Moti and
Gharroo had equal share. Lalloo took the lead in asserting
his claim by executing a sale deed in respect of 5 decimals
of plot No.251/2 area 10 decimals in favour of Shivlal on
21.1.1965. He executed second sale deed in respect of 6
decimals of plot No.205/2 measuring 12 decimals in favour
of Nand Lal and Lalloo sons of Dhanesh on 20.12.65. Moti
deposited ten times land revenue of his one-third share in
the disputed joint Khata comprising of plots Nos.109,
165/2, 182/2, 205/2 and 251/2 and filed a suit for division
of holdings under Section 138 of the Zamindari Abolition
and Land Reforms Act for 1/3rd share on 6.1.66. The suit
was decreed ex parte on 10.1.1970 and mutation of this
order was made in Khatauni 1376 F to 1378F. The ex-parte
decree was, however, set aside on the application of Lalloo,
father of the accused persons, after setting aside the ex
parte decree on 19.2.1973. Thereafter the suit was
proceeded in the revenue court. It was dismissed in default
on 27.7.1977. The suit was ultimately restored on
6
21.2.1979 on the application of Moti and decided in his
favour on 25.2.80 against which the appeal has been filed
by the accused persons which is still pending.
After the death of Lalloo, his five sons succeeded to the
property. According to the prosecution, the disputed plot
No.165/2 is divided into two portions. One-third portion
towards north has been in possession of the accused
persons since the time of their father Lalloo while the two-
third portion towards south is in the joint cultivation of Moti
and Gharroo. There is a Merh between the portion in the
occupation of the accused and that in the possession of
Moti and Gharroo.
On 13.11.1977 at about 7.00 a.m. Tilakdhari PW.1
and his father Gharroo went to their portion of the plot in
dispute along with the bullocks to plough the land.
Immediately after they had started ploughing, all the
accused persons arrived there. Accused Banne alias
Baijnath and Binne alias Viswanath were armed with iron
7
rods while the other accused Nanhe alias Narain, Bhola and
Ramji were armed with sticks. The accused persons asked
Tilakdhari, PW1 and his father to get out of the field. They
refused to do so saying that the said portion of the field has
been in their possession for a long time and that they would
continue to plough it. Thereupon the accused Banne alias
Baijnath instigated other accused persons to assault
Tilakdhari and his father and drive them away, whereupon
Gharroo ran towards the house of Khatkhat in the
neighbourhood. Hearing the hue and cry raised on the
spot, Amardhari, Shangoo and Jagga arrived at the spot.
The accused Ramji gave a lathi blow to Amardhari who
consequently fell down because of the impact of blow.
Banne alias Baijnath gave a thrust with the iron rod in the
abdomen which punctured the abdomen of Amardhari. The
intestine of Amardhari protruded out through the wound
and he also fell down. Sahangoo was attacked by Ramji,
Bhole and Nanhe with lathis. He received lacerated wounds
on his head. He ran towards the house of Sahdeo and fell
8
down at his doorstep. Tilakdhari PW1 was also given blows
by the accused persons.
The case of the accused persons is that the members
of the complainant party tried to forcibly dispossess them
and in their right of private defence some injuries were
caused to the members of the complainant party.
Tilakdhari PW1 dictated a written report Ex. Ka. 1 to
Sitaram on the spot. He took Sahangoo, Amardhari to P.S.
Manduadih where he submitted the written report Ex. Ka.1,
in terms of which chick FIR Ex. Ka. 13 was prepared and a
case was registered in the general diary.
Sahangoo, Amardhari and Tilakdhari were escorted to
S.S.P.G. Hospital, Varanasi, where they were examined for
their injuries by Dr. A.K. Dwivedi at 8.45 A.M., 9.00 A.M.
and 12.00 noon respectively. Sahangoo succumbed to the
injuries at 5.45 P.M. on the same day in S.S.P.G. Hospital,
Varanasi and died. Inquest of the dead body was performed
9
by Ram Chandra Pandey S.I. on 14.11.1977 at 8.00 A.M.
Dr. Narsingh Sharma, Medical Officer Incharge S.V.M.V.
Government Hospital, Varanasi conducted post-mortem
examination on the dead body of Sahangoo at the mortuary
on 14.11.1977 at 2.30 P.M. He found the following ante-
mortem injuries on his dead body.
1. Lacerated wound 6½ cm x ½ bone
deep on the right side crown of head, 7 cm
above right eyebrow.
2. Contusion 10 cm x 4 cm on the back
of right forearm, 2 cm above wrist joint,
right Ulna bone fractured.
3. Abrasion 4 cm x ½ cm on the outer
aspect of upper part of right thigh.
4. Abrasion 2-½ cm x 2 cm on the right
shoulder top.
5. Lacerated wound 2 cm x ¼ cm
muscle deep on the inner aspect left
dorsum of foot, 2 cm above the root of left
big toe.
On internal examination, he found the right frontal and
temporal bones fractured and the right fronto-parietal suture
10
separated, brain was congested. Middle cranial fossa was
also fractured.
Amardhari received injuries and was hospitalised for
two and a half months. The prosecution examined 10
witnesses in support of its case.
The trial court though noted the injuries which were
received by the accused persons, but the prosecution has not
explained those injuries on the body of the accused.
It is pertinent to mention that Dr. A.K. Dwivedi PW.8
examined accused Vishwanath alias Binney and found the
following injuries on him:
1. Abrasion 1 cm x 1 cm right parietal,
12 cm from right ear.
2. Abrasion 2 cm x 2 cm back of left
knee.
Dr. A.K. Dwivedi PW.8 also examined the injuries of accused
Narain alias Nanhey and found the following injuries
11
1. Lacerated wound 4 cm x ½ cm x
bone deep on right parietal, 6 cm
above right ear.
2. Lacerated wound 2 cm x ½ x
bone right ring finger back.
The same Doctor also examined accused Ramji alias Raman
on the same day and found the following injury.:
1. Lacerated wound 4 cm x 1/2 cm
x bone on left side parietal 14 cm
from left ear.
Dr. R.K. Singh, DW.1 medically examined accused Bhola
and found the following injuries:-
1. Contusion 5 cm x 4 cm on the
dorsum of left palm with tenderness
at the base of II metacarpal bone,
skin over it bluish pink. Restricted
movement of left index finger. X-ray
of palm was advised.
2. Contusion 3 cm x 2 cm on the
left side of neck 6 cm below the left
ear, skin bluish pink.
3. Contusion 6 cm x 1- ½ cm on
the back towards right side 6 cm
below the right scapula.
12
4. Contusion 1 cm x 1 cm right
side chest over 7th rib below the right
nipple.
5. Abrasion 1 cm x 1 cm on the
back towards right side 8 cm. below
the right scapula.
The trial court, on appraisal of evidence, came to the
findings that at the time of incident the prosecution party
was in peaceful possession of the land in question and with
the dismissal of suit the accused persons came there
forming an unlawful assembly to extend their possession
over half share and interfered in the peaceful possession of
Gharroo and Moti in the southern portion of the plot. They
first assaulted and caused injuries to the deceased and
other victims on prosecution side and injuries on the
defence side were caused during the course of incident and
according to the learned Sessions Judge, the defence
version of the incident was false and accordingly, the
learned Sessions Judge convicted and sentenced the
appellants under various counts as stated in the earlier part
of the judgment.
13
The accused-appellants, aggrieved by the judgment of
the Sessions Judge, filed an appeal before the High Court.
The High Court re-examined the entire evidence and came
to a different conclusion. The main grievance which has
been articulated by the High Court is that though the
injuries received by the accused persons were noted by the
trial court, there was no explanation by the prosecution
about those injuries. On careful examination of the injuries
caused to the accused the High Court observed that injuries
on them (accused persons) were not superficial or minor or
self-inflicted. Therefore, the absence of any explanation by
the prosecution about the injuries received by the accused
persons creates serious doubt about the credibility of the
entire prosecution version. According to the High Court, it
was the bounden duty and obligation of the prosecution to
have given explanation about the injuries of the accused
persons.
14
The High Court, on examination of the evidence on
record, came to the conclusion that it is difficult to hold that
the complainant party was in settled and peaceful
possession of 2/3 share of the plot in question on the date
of incident and there seems to be weight in the defence
argument that the accused party was in possession to the
extent of 1/2 share and in any view of the matter there was
a bona fide dispute between the parties regarding their
shares and extent of possession. This finding gives twist to
the entire prosecution version and it is not clear as to who
were in fact the aggressors and whether the injuries caused
by the accused persons to the complainant party were in
fact caused in their right of their private defence or not.
The High Court also came to the conclusion that PW.3
Sahadeo and PW.4 Narayan cannot be said to be totally
independent witnesses as the defence had filed
documentary evidence to show that Lalloo, the father of the
accused persons had lodged an FIR against these witnesses
for an offence under Section 308 IPC. These witnesses were,
15
therefore, also somewhat inimical to the accused persons
and their evidence cannot be given due weight especially
with regard to the use of Lathi and Danda by the
prosecution witnesses, particularly when such an important
fact had not been stated by them in their statements
recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and the statements
being contradictory to each other with regard to the use of
Danda by the prosecution witness. The High Court arrived
at the conclusion that the injuries of the accused persons
have not been satisfactorily explained.
The High Court in the impugned judgment arrived at a
definite finding that it is highly doubtful that the
complainant party was in exclusive possession of the
disputed land at the relevant time and witnesses Sahadeo
PW3 and Narayan PW4 cannot be considered to be
independent witnesses. A serious doubt has been cast on
the credibility of the prosecution version. The High Court
allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and
16
sentence of the appellants and they were acquitted of the
offences charged for.
The State of U.P., aggrieved by the impugned judgment
of the High Court, has filed the present appeal by way of
special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution.
The scope of interference under Article 136 is rather
limited. It is settled legal position which has been
crystallized in a number of judgments that if the view taken
by the High Court is plausible or possible, then it would not
be proper for this court to interfere with an order of
acquittal.
This court, in a recent judgment in Ghurey Lal v.
State of Uttar Pradesh (2008) 10 SCC 450 considered
earlier cases and laid down that the appellate court should,
therefore, reverse an acquittal only when it has “very
substantial and compelling reasons”.
17
In Tulsiram Kanu v. The State, AIR 1954 SC 1, this
Court explicated that the appellate court would be justified in
reversing the acquittal only when very substantial question
and compelling reasons are present. In this case, the Court
used a different phrase to describe the approach of an
appellate court against an order of acquittal. There, the
Sessions Court expressed that there was clearly reasonable
doubt in respect of the guilt of the accused on the evidence
put before it. Kania, C.J., observed that it required good and
sufficiently cogent reasons to overcome such reasonable doubt
before the appellate court came to a different conclusion.
In Lekha Yadav v. State of Bihar (1973) 2 SCC 424,
the Court following the case of Sheo Swarup (supra) again
reiterated the legal position as under:
“ The different phraseology used in the judgments of
this Court such as-
(a) substantial and compelling reasons:
(b) good and sufficiently cogent reasons;
(c) strong reasons.
18
are not intended to curtail the undoubted power of
an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal to
review the entire evidence and to come to its own
conclusion, but in doing so it should not only
consider every matter on record having a bearing on
the questions of fact and the reasons given by the
court below in support of its order of acquittal but
should express the reasons in its judgment which
led it to hold that the acquittal was not justified. ”
In Bishan Singh & Others v. The State of Punjab
(1974) 3 SCC 288, Justice Khanna speaking for the Court
provided the legal position:
“22. It is well settled that the High Court in appeal
under Section 417 of the CrPC has full power to
review at large the evidence on which the order of
acquittal was founded and to reach the conclusion
that upon the evidence the order of acquittal should
be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon
that power unless is be found expressly stated be in
the Code, but in exercising the power conferred by
the Code and before reaching its conclusion upon
fact the High Court should give proper weight and
consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the
trial judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2)
the presumption of innocence in favour of the
accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by
the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3)
the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt;
& (4) the slowness of an appellate court in
disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a judge
who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.”
19
In Umedbhai Jadavbhai v. The State of Gujarat
(1978) 1 SCC 228, the Court observed thus:
“In an appeal against acquittal, the High Court
would not ordinarily interfere with the Trial Court’s
conclusion unless there are compelling reasons to
do so inter alia on account of manifest errors of law
or of fact resulting in miscarriage of justice.”
In B.N. Mutto & Another v. Dr. T.K. Nandi (1979) 1
SCC 361, the Court observed thus:
“It stems out of the fundamental principle of our
criminal jurisprudence that the accused is entitled
to the benefit of any reasonable doubt. If two
reasonably probable and evenly balanced views of
the evidence are possible, one must necessarily
concede the existence of a reasonable doubt. But,
fanciful and remote possibilities must be left out of
account. To entitle an accused person to the benefit
of a doubt arising from the possibility of a duality of
views, the possible view in favour of the accused
must be as nearly reasonably probable as that
against him. If the preponderance of probability is
all one way, a bare possibility of another view will
not entitle the accused to claim the benefit of any
doubt. It is, therefore, essential that any view of the
evidence in favour of the accused must be
reasonable even as any doubt, the benefit of which
an accused person may claim, must be reasonable.
"A reasonable doubt", it has been remarked, "does
not mean some light, airy, insubstantial doubt that
may flit through the minds of any of us about
almost anything at some time or other, it does not
mean a doubt begotten by sympathy out of
20
reluctance to convict; it means a real doubt, a
doubt founded upon reasons. [Salmond J. in his
charge to the jury in R.V. Fantle reported in
1959 Criminal Law Review 584.] "
{emphasis supplied}
In Tota Singh & Another v. State of Punjab (1987) 2
SCC 529, the Court reiterated the same principle in the
following words:
“This Court has repeatedly pointed out that
the mere fact that the appellate court is inclined
on a re-appreciation of the evidence to reach a
conclusion which is at variance with the one
recorded in the order of acquittal passed by the
court below will not constitute a valid and
sufficient ground for setting aside the acquittal.
The jurisdiction of the appellate court in dealing
with an appeal against an order of acquittal is
circumscribed by the limitation that no
interference is to be made with the order of
acquittal unless the approach made by the lower
court to the consideration of the evidence in the
case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the
conclusion recorded by the court below is such
which could not have been possibly arrived at by
any court acting reasonably and judiciously and
is, therefore, liable to be characterised as perverse.
Where two views are possible on an appraisal of
the evidence adduced in the case and the court
below has taken a view which is a plausible one,
the appellate court cannot legally interfere with an
order of acquittal even if it is of the opinion that
the view taken by the court below on its
consideration of the evidence is erroneous.”
(emphasis supplied)
21
This Court time and again has provided direction as to
when the High Courts should interfere with an acquittal. In
Madan Lal v. State of J&K, (1997) 7 SCC 677, the Court
observed as under:
“8. …….. that there must be “sufficient and
compelling reasons” or “good and sufficiently cogent
reasons” for the appellate court to alter an order of
acquittal to one of conviction……..”
In Sambasivan & Others v. State of Kerala (1998) 5
SCC 412, while relying on the case of Ramesh Babulal Doshi
(Supra), the Court observed thus:
7. The principles with regard to the scope of
the powers of the appellate court in an appeal
against acquittal, are well settled. The powers of the
appellate court in an appeal against acquittal are no
less than in an appeal against conviction. But
where on the basis of evidence on record two views
are reasonably possible the appellate court cannot
substitute its view in the place of that of the trial
court. It is only when the approach of the trial court
in acquitting an accused is found to be clearly
erroneous in its consideration of evidence on record
and in deducing conclusions therefrom that the
appellate court can interfere with the order of
acquittal.”
22
In Bhagwan Singh & Others v. State of M.P. (2002) 4
SCC 85, the Court repeated one of the fundamental principles
of criminal jurisprudence that if two views are possible on the
evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the
accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is
favourable to the accused should be adopted. The Court
observed as under:-
“7. The golden thread which runs through
the web of administration of justice in criminal
case is that if two views are possible on the
evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the
guilt of the accused and the other to his
innocence, the view which is favourable to the
accused should be adopted. Such is not a
jurisdiction limitation on the appellate court but a
Judge made guidelines for circumspection. The
paramount consideration of the court is to ensure
that miscarriage of justice is avoided.”
In Harijana Thirupala & Others v. Public Prosecutor,
High Court of A.P., Hyderabad (2002) 6 SCC 470, this Court
again had an occasion to deal with the settled principles of law
restated by several decisions of this Court. Despite a number
of judgments, High Courts continue to fail to keep them in
mind before reaching a conclusion. The Court observed thus:
23
“10. The principles to be kept in mind in our
system of administration of criminal justice are
stated and restated in several decisions of this
Court. Yet, sometimes High Courts fail to keep them
in mind before reaching a conclusion as to the guilt
or otherwise of the accused in a given case. The
case on hand is one such case. Hence it is felt
necessary to remind about the well-settled
principles again. It is desirable and useful to
remind and keep in mind these principles in
deciding a case.
11. In our administration of criminal justice
an accused is presumed to be innocent unless such
a presumption is rebutted by the prosecution by
producing the evidence to show him to be guilty of
the offence with which he is charged. Further if two
views are possible on the evidence produced in the
case, one indicating to the guilt of the accused and
the other to his innocence, the view favourable to
the accused is to be accepted. In cases where the
court entertains reasonable doubt regarding the
guilt of the accused the benefit of such doubt
should go in favour of the accused. At the same
time, the court must not reject the evidence of the
prosecution taking it as false, untrustworthy or
unreliable on fanciful grounds or on the basis of
conjectures and surmises. The case of the
prosecution must be judged as a whole having
regard to the totality of the evidence. In
appreciating the evidence the approach of the court
must be integrated not truncated or isolated. In
other words, the impact of the evidence in totality
on the prosecution case or innocence of the accused
has to be kept in mind in coming to the conclusion
as to the guilt or otherwise of the accused. In
reaching a conclusion about the guilt of the
accused, the court has to appreciate, analyse and
assess the evidence placed before it by the yardstick
24
of probabilities, its intrinsic value and the animus
of witnesses. It must be added that ultimately and
finally the decision in every case depends upon the
facts of each case.
12. Doubtless the High Court in appeal
either against an order of acquittal or conviction
as a court of first appeal has full power to review
the evidence to reach its own independent
conclusion. However, it will not interfere with an
order of acquittal lightly or merely because one
other view is possible, because with the passing of
an order of acquittal presumption of innocence in
favour of the accused gets reinforced and
strengthened. The High Court would not be
justified to interfere with the order of acquittal
merely because it feels that sitting as a trial court
it would have proceeded to record a conviction; a
duty is cast on the High Court while reversing an
order of acquittal to examine and discuss the
reasons given by the trial court to acquit the
accused and then to dispel those reasons. If the
High Court fails to make such an exercise the
judgment will suffer from serious infirmity.”
In C. Antony v. K.G. Raghavan Nair, (2003) 1 SCC 1
had to reiterate the legal position in cases where there has
been acquittal by the trial courts. This Court observed thus:
“6. This Court in a number of cases has held
that though the appellate court has full power to
review the evidence upon which the order of
acquittal is founded, still while exercising such an
appellate power in a case of acquittal, the appellate
court, should not only consider every matter on
25
record having a bearing on the question of fact and
the reasons given by the courts below in support of
its order of acquittal, it must express its reasons in
the judgment which led it to hold that the acquittal
is not justified. In those line of cases this Court has
also held that the appellate court must also bear in
mind the fact that the trial court had the benefit of
seeing the witnesses in the witness box and the
presumption of innocence is not weakened by the
order of acquittal, and in such cases if two
reasonable conclusions can be reached on the basis
of the evidence on record, the appellate court
should not disturb the finding of the trial court.”
In State of Karnataka v. K. Gopalkrishna, (2005) 9
SCC 291, while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the
Court observed:
“In such an appeal the Appellate Court does
not lightly disturb the findings of fact recorded by
the Court below. If on the basis of the same
evidence, two views are reasonably possible, and
the view favouring the accused is accepted by the
Court below, that is sufficient for upholding the
order of acquittal. However, if the Appellate Court
comes to the conclusion that the findings of the
Court below are wholly unreasonable or perverse
and not based on the evidence on record, or suffers
from serious illegality including ignorance or
misreading of evidence on record, the Appellate
Court will be justified in setting aside such an order
of acquittal.”
26
In The State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran, (2007) 3 SCC
755, this Court relied on the judgment in State of Rajasthan
v. Raja Ram (2003) 8 SCC 180 and observed as under:
“ 15 . Generally, the order of acquittal shall not be
interfered with because the presumption of
innocence of the accused is further strengthened
by acquittal. The golden thread which runs
through the web of administration of justice in
criminal cases is that if two views are possible on
the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to
the guilt of the accused and the other to his
innocence, the view which is favourable to the
accused should be adopted. … The principle to be
followed by appellate court considering the appeal
against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere
only when there are compelling and substantial
reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is
clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for
interference.”
The Court further held as follows:
“16. it is apparent that while exercising the powers
in appeal against the order of acquittal the court of
appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order
of acquittal unless the approach of the lower court
is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the
conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any
reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to
be characterized as perverse. Merely because two
views are possible, the court of appeal would not
take the view which would upset the judgment
delivered by the court below.”
27
In Chandrappa & Others v. State of Karnataka
(2007) 4 SCC 415, this Court held:
“( 1 ) An appellate court has full power to
review, reappreciate and reconsider the
evidence upon which the order of acquittal is
founded.
( 2 ) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts
no limitation, restriction or condition on
exercise of such power and an appellate court
on the evidence before it may reach its own
conclusion, both on questions of fact and of
law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial
and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient
grounds”, “very strong circumstances”,
“distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”,
etc. are not intended to curtail extensive
powers of an appellate court in an appeal
against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more
in the nature of “flourishes of language” to
emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court
to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the
power of the court to review the evidence and
to come to its own conclusion.
( 4 ) An appellate court, however, must bear in
mind that in case of acquittal, there is double
presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly ,
the presumption of innocence is available to
him under the fundamental principle of
criminal jurisprudence that every person shall
be presumed to be innocent unless he is
proved guilty by a competent court of law.
Secondly , the accused having secured his
acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is
28
further reinforced, reaffirmed and
strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are
possible on the basis of the evidence on
record, the appellate court should not disturb
the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial
court.”
The following principles emerge from the aforementioned
cases.
1. The appellate court may review the evidence in
appeals against acquittal under sections 378 and 386
of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. Its power of
reviewing evidence is wide and the appellate court can
reappreciate the entire evidence on record. It can
review the trial court’s conclusion with respect to both
facts and law.
2. The accused is presumed to be innocent until proved
guilty. The accused possessed this presumption when
he was before the trial court. The High court’s
acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent.
29
3. There must also be substantial and compelling
reasons for reversing an order of acquittal.
This court would be justified in interfering with the
judgment of acquittal of the High Court only when there
are very substantial and compelling reasons to discard
the High Court decision.
Following are some of the circumstances in which
perhaps this court would be justified in interfering with
the judgment of the High Court, but these are illustrative
not exhaustive.
i) The High court’s decision is based on totally
erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal
position;
ii) The High court’s conclusions are contrary to
evidence and documents on record.
30
iii) The entire approach of the High court in dealing
with the evidence was patently illegal leading to
grave miscarriage of justice;
iv) The High court’s judgment is manifestly unjust and
unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the
record of the case;
v] This Court must always give proper weight and
consideration to the findings of the High Court.
vi) This court would be extremely reluctant in interfering
with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High
Court have recorded an order of acquittal.
When we apply the above mentioned parameters laid
down by a number of cases decided by this court to the facts of
this case, then conclusions become irresistible and no
interference is warranted by this court. Consequently, the
appeal filed by the State of UP being devoid of any merits, is
accordingly dismissed.
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….....…… ....................J.
(Dalveer Bhandari)
..………....................
J.
(Harjit Singh Bedi)
New Delhi;
February 10, 2009
32