Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
BAKHTAWAR SINGH & ANR.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
SADA KAUR & ANR.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/08/1996
BENCH:
FAIZAN UDDIN (J)
BENCH:
FAIZAN UDDIN (J)
SINGH N.P. (J)
CITATION:
1996 SCALE (6)222
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
Faizan Uddin, J.
1. this is an appeal by the unsuccessful plaintiffs whose
suit far deolaration to the effect that they are in
possession as owners of 2/3 share in the estate of the
husband of respondent No. 1 was dismissed by the Sub-Judge.
1st Class, Muktsar as barred by limitation by his judgment
and dagree dated May 17, 1902 which has been affirmed by the
First appellate Court and the High Court.
2. The land in suit is the anoestral land originally
belonging to Gulab Singh who died leaving behind him his
five sons. namely. Sampuran Singh, Jeet Singh, Dalip Singh,
and Bakhtawar Singh, The defendant respondent herein was to
Dalip Singh. Dalip Singh died in the year 1932 whereafter
the respondent Sada Kaur contracted ‘Karewa’ marriage with
Chand Singh the younger brother of her deceased husband
Dalip Singh.
3. The plaintiffa appellants who are two sons of late
Gulab Singh filed a declaratory suit on 19.1.1992 by
contending that they were in possession as owners of 2/3
share in the estate of Dalip Singh, the late husband of
defendant/ respondent No. 1 had forefeited her tight in the
estate of her deceased husband on acoount of marriage, by
virtue of the prevalent oustom amongst them and the
plaintiffs being the reversionaries were entitled to inherit
the same. The said suit of the plaintiffs was diamissed on
June 1989 on the findings that the defendant respondent No.
1 did not forefait her right on her remarriage with the
younger brother of her late husband. But the appeal filed by
plaintiffs against the said judgment and decree was allowed
on August 7, 1993 reversing the judgment and decree passed
by the Trial court.
4. Thereafter the plaintiffs filed another suit against
the defendant respondent No. 1 being civil suit No, 884 of
1984 to got back the possession of the suit land as
according to them, in the mean-while the defendant had taken
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forolble possession of the suit land.
5. The defendant respondent No. 1 filed second appeal in
the High Court against the reversing judgment of the
appeallate court dated August 7, 1963 but High Court
maintained the judgment and decree and dismissed the second
appeal. The High Court, however, granted Certificate and
leave to appeal to Suprame Court on the point whether a
widow forefelts her rights or not by ‘Karewa’ marriage with
her brother-in law.
6. Subesquently, on May 20, 1971 the plaintiffs withdrew
their civil suit No. 881 of 1984 form the Court of sub-judge
with liberty to file a fresh suit for possession of land.
7. On July 24 1990 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal
filed by the respondent Bada Kaur upholding the judgment of
the civil courts and the high Court holding that the
respondent No. 1 had lost her rights in the estate of her
deceased husband Dalip Singh when she contracted ’Karewa’
merriage with her brother-in-law, Chand Singh. Thereafter on
November 20, 1990 the plaintiffs appellants again filed a
fresh shit Civil Suit No, 661 of 1994. The Sub-Judge took
the view that the plaintiffs suit was barred by limitation
and the defendant respondent No. 1 had perfected her title
by adverse possession. The Additional District Judge,
Faridkot by his judgment dated August 27, 1985 as well as
the High Court by the impugned judgment dated September 4,
1986 upheld the findings recorded by the Trial Court and
dismissed the plaintiffs appeal against which this appeal
has been directed.
8. The contention of the learned counsel for the
appellants is that since the plaintiffs has withdrawn their
earlier suit (Civil Suit No. 661 of 1984) with pepmission to
file a fresh suit on the same cause of action in accordance
with the provisions coontained in lause (3) of rules 1 of
Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter the
Code) and , therefore, the plaintiffa were entitled to
exolude the time spent in prosecuting the said earlier suit
as provided under Section 14 of the Limitation
Act,(hereinafter the Act), The question, therefore, that
aries for our consideration is where the plaintiffs
appallents were permitted to withdraw the suit in a
accordance with the provisions contained in clause (3) of
Order XXIII, rile 1 of the Code and whether in the facts and
circumstance of the present case the plaintiffa appellants
are entitled for exclusion of the time under Section 11 of
the Act, Clause (3) of Order XXIII rule 1 of the Code
conmtemplates that where the Court is satisfied fail that a
suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or (b) that
there are sufficient ground for allowing the plaintiff to
institute a fresh suit for the subject matter of the suit or
part of a claim, it may on such terms as it thinks fit,
grant the polaintiff permission to withdraw from such suit
or such part of claim with liberty to institute a fresh suit
in respect of subject matter of case all the courts below
including the High Court concurrently found that the
plaintifs/appellants failed to withdraw the suit was given
on the ground that the suit was bound to fail by reason of
some formal the defect or plaintiffs to institute a fresh
suit n respect of the same subject matter, Not only this the
plaintiffs had not even produced the application which is
said to have been filed for withdrawal of the earlier suit
with permission to file a fresh suit on the same cause of
action to show as what was the formal defect in the earlier
suit by reason of which it was sought to be withdrawn.
However the order dated May 20,1971 passed by the civil
court was on record which did not indicate as to what was
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the formal defect in the suit by reason of which the
permission to withdraw the same was accorded. In these facts
and circumstances no case for action and for the same relief
after the withdrawal of the earliar suit was made out by the
plaintiffs/appellants in accordance with the provisions of
clause (2) of Order XXIII rule 1 of the Code.
9. As regards the exclusion of time under Section 14 of
the Limitation Act it was essential for its application to
show that the proceedings related to the same matter in
issue and the plaintiff prosecuted the suit in good faith in
a court which, from dafact of jurisdiction or other cause of
like nature is unable to entertain it. As discussed above
the plaintiffs appellants have miserably failed to show as
to what was the defect of jurisdiction or any other cause of
like nature by reason of which the earlier suit was not
entertainable or competent. That being so, the benefit of
the provisions of 14 cannot be legitimately extended to the
plaintiffs, In these facts and circmatanpes the plaintiffs
suit has rightly been dismissed as barred by limitation.
10. For the reasons stated above the appeal fails and is
hereby dismissed. We make no order no as to costs.