Full Judgment Text
$~9 (Regular matter)
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 26.02.2026
+ W.P.(C) 12886/2009
BABU KHAN .....Petitioner
Through: Ms. Tasneem Ahmadi and Ms.
Shubhi Khare, Advs.
versus
DDA .....Respondent
Through: Ms. Chand Chopra, Mr. Punishk
Handa, Advocate
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH
JASMEET SINGH, J ( ORAL )
1. This is a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India seeking the following prayers:-
“(i) Grant a writ of Mandamus or any other writ in the nature of
mandamus directing the respondent to hand over possession of plot
No. 164/22 & 165/22 measuring 1112 sq. yd. in Abadi Ghosla
(Jheel Kurenja) to the Petitioner, or any other plot of equivalent area
in the same locality.
(I) Grant a Writ ofMandamus or any other writ in the nature of
mandamus directing the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to hand over
possession of plot No. 164/22 & 165/22 measuring 1112 sq. yds. in
Abadi Ghosla (Jheel Kurenja) to the Petitioner, or any other plot of
equivalent area in the same locality and execute an appropriate
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Lease Deed for the same.
(ii) Grant a writ of Mandamus or any other writ in the nature of
mandamus directing the respondent to execute a fresh Lease Deed
for 20 years extendable by another 30 years for such plot as is leased
out to the Petitioner and possession handed over to the Petitioner.
(iii) Award the costs to the Petitioner. …..”
2. The case of the petitioner is that the Deputy Commissioner of Delhi
leased a plot of Nazul land admeasuring 1112 Sq. yds. bearing Khasra No.
164/22 and 165/22 Plot No. 1 and 2 situated in Block No. B of Abadi Ghosla
(Jheel Kurenja) Delhi (“ subject property ”) and executed a Lease Deed on
01.08.1915 in favour of Allah Bux, son of Maula Bux, for a term of 20 years
expiring on 31.07.1935. Later on request of Inayatullah i.e., grandfather of the
petitioner, successor in interest of Allah Bux, the Deputy Commissioner
renewed the Lease Deed for a further term of 20 years i.e., from 01.08.1935 to
31.07.1955 in favour of Inayatullah and executed another Lease Deed on
24.03.1936. The relevant clauses of the said Lease Deed read as under:-
“(12) The Lessor will at the request and cost of the Lessee at the end
of the term hereby granted and so on from time to time thereafter at
the end of each such successive further term of years as shall be
granted, a new lease of the premises demised hereby execute to the
Lessee by way of renewal for a further term as follows:
(a) At second renewal - 20 years.
(b) At third renewal-30 years.
Provided always that each such renewed term of years as shall be
granted shall not with the original term of years and anyprevious
renewals exceed in the aggregate the period of 90 years.”
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3. During partition, Inayatullah’s properties including the subject
property was treated as evacuee property and the rights to the same were
forfeited. However, later on Inayatullah’s appeal to the Assistant Custodian
(Judicial), Jamnagar House, New Delhi in respect of all his properties, vide
order dated 12.09.1961 it was held that since Inayatullah never migrated to
Pakistan, he was a non-evacuee and therefore, his properties were restored.
The operative portion of the said order reads as under:-
“In view of the above facts, I hold that petitioners title to the property
in dispute has been established and that they being non-evacuees, the
aforesaid property is restored to them and denotified as such.”
4. After the said order, possession of other property was handed over,
however, since the possession of the subject property was with Delhi
Development Authority (“ DDA ”) and DDA executed a Lease Deed for the
property on 15.11.1984 for a period of 20 years expiring on 14.11.2004 and
extendable by another 30 years. However, despite the same, DDA did not
hand over possession. The relevant clauses of the said Lease Deed read as
under:-
“12) The Lessor hereby covenants with the Lessee that at the request
and cost of the Lessee before or at the end of the said term of twenty
years the lessor will execute to the Lessee a new lease of the said of
land by way of renewal for a further term of 30 years provided that
such renewed term of years as may be granted shall not with the
original term of years any previous renewals exceed in the aggregate
the period of 90 years and that the lessor shall not be bound to grant
such renewal except the then prevailing market rate of rents for the
land in the vicinity and save as to the amount of rent to be thereby
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reserved and as to the term thereby granted such renewed lease of
the said land shall contain such of the covenants provisions and
conditions as are reserved and herein contained (excluding only this
present covenants for renewal)."
5. Alimuddin i.e., father of the petitioner, was informed that since there
was an illegal encroachment on the property, the DDA was awaiting eviction
through legal proceedings. Later, the petitioner continued to follow up the
status of the possession with the DDA and was also given the same answer.
Later, the petitioner was informed that there was no Lease in his favour or his
father and that after partition, vide Delhi Improvement Trust resolution No.
L27(36) - 50 the area on which the subject property is situate had been allotted
to one Jheel Kurenja Milk producers Society. Consequently, the petitioner
addressed letters to DDA, the Minority Commission and the Lt. Governor.
6. The other Legal Representatives executed Relinquishment Deeds dated
in respect of their rights to the subject property in favour of the petitioner.
7. Hence, the present petition.
8. Ms. Ahmadi, learned counsel for the petitioner, states that in the
present case, the petitioner pursuant to the Lease Deed dated 15.11.1984
possession of the subject property has not been handed over and hence, the
present petition is maintainable. She states that even assuming that the period
of 20 years covered in the lease of 15.11.1984 has expired, the petitioner is
entitled to another renewal of 30 years which will make the present petition
within limitation.
9. In order to justify the delay and laches, she draws my attention to
paragraph Nos. 7 and 8 of the amended writ petition, which reads as under:-
“7. It is submitted that inspite of the execution of lease deed dated
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15.11.1984, in favour of the ancestors of the Petitioner, the DDA did
not hand over possession of the same to the lessees.
8. That during his lifetime, Alimuddin (father of the Petitioner) ran
from pillar to post to get possession of the land from the DDA but
was informed that since there was an illegal encroachment on the
property, the DDA was awaiting eviction through legal proceedings.
Not being a very literate man, he trusted the version of the DDA and
kept visiting the DDA on a regular basis and was always told that the
legal proceedings were still on for eviction of the encroachers.
Considering the fact that the Lease Deed was executed after 21 long
years from the order of the Assistant Custodian, the said Alimuddin
believed that it was normal for the DDA to take so much time and
that the possession would be given eventually by the DDA. The
Petitioner took over the follow up from his father Alimuddin in the
last years of his life as he was not keeping well.”
10. She also relies on the judgment of Tasnemul Haq v. Union of India,
2007 SCC OnLine Del 448 and on the judgment of the Division Bench of this
Court in Union of India v. Qayyum Khan, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 839 , and
more particularly paragraph No. 16, which reads as under:-
“16. We are in agreement with the finding of the learned Single
Judge that the issuance of two orders in 1966 and 1971 expressly
recognized the right, title and interest of the Chand Khan's
properties including the suit property. Chand Khan's properties
were declared to be evcuee properties on a mistaken premise that he
had been killed in riots or migrated to Pakistan. That mistaken
premise is also not disputed. Both Section 16 of the Act and Rule 37
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of the Rules embody the restitutionary principle. In fact, the Assistant
Custodian proceeded to issue orders for restoration of the properties
of Chand Khan on the basis of his power under Section 16. The issue
of delay and laches has to be examined on this factual background.
In fact, it is the authorities, who slept over the application of the
Chand Khan for more than 12 years. Although the first order came to
be passed in 1966. When it was realized that erroneous reference
was made to Section 20-A of the Act, which was declared to be
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, a fresh order came to be
passed only in 1971. The Assistant Custodian thereafter issued
notices to the occupants of the other properties but then the
jurisdiction and authority of the Assistant Custodian to issue the said
notice questioned in this Court by filing a writ petition. The writ
petition filed by the occupants came to be disposed of only on 29th
November, 1982 whereby the notices were quashed and parties were
asked to resort to the remedies as permissible by law. Pursuant to
this order, the first respondent also filed a civil suit for declaration
and injunction but he could not get temporary injunction. In the
meantime, the Assistant Custodian vide his letter dated 6th April,
1997 reiterated that the properties stood restored to Chand Khan
under Section 16 of the Act and the first respondent was directed to
deal directly with the occupants of the properties. The first
respondent then approached the DDA for mutating his name in the
property register but that request was also declined on the ground
that the property has been already transferred to subsequent
purchasers and he was asked to approach the Court of Law. Under
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these circumstances, it is not possible to accept the contention of the
appellant that the writ petition was belated. It is no doubt true that if
there is undue delay in filing the writ petition and there is no
plausible explanation for the same, the Court can refuse to entertain
it on the ground of laches but the factual situation is entirely different
in the present case. The question of any delay or laches does not
arise in the present case. It is also pertinent to note that throughout
this period, the authorities never disputed the title of Chand Khan
and his son and it is by a letter dated 1st December, 1992 they asked
the first respondent to approach the Court of law.”
11. Ms. Chopra, learned panel counsel for the respondent/ DDA, opposes
the petition on delay and laches and states that the Court need not go into any
further issue and only once the petitioner crosses the threshold and explains
the reasons why the petitioner had been sleeping over his rights, the Court
should examine the merits of the controversy.
12. I have heard learned counsels for the parties.
13. The law of delay and laches has been crystalised. The Hon’ble
Supreme Court in Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley, (2024) 15 SCC 215, on
the said issue categorically held as under:-
“9. ….An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other
words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes
up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary
relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that
delay defeats equity. Delay or laches is one of the factors which
should be borne in mind by the High Court while exercising
discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
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In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its
extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert
his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts
are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action.
10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If
the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is
explained which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such
circumstances it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for
all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be
myriad circumstances which gives rise to the invoking of the
extraordinary jurisdiction and it all depends on facts and
circumstances of each case, same cannot be described in a
straitjacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate
discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts
that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled.
11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period
of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary
jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to
whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even
submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or
resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such
circumstances on the ground of delay and laches alone, the appeal
ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited.If it is
found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches, the High
Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself,
inasmuch as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such
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indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that
there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising
discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will
have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and laches on
the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court.”
(Emphasis added)
14. The law on power of this Court to dismiss a writ petition on ground of
delay and laches alone is well settled. When any individual belatedly
approaches the writ Court after sleeping over his/her rights for a long time,
such person has no right to the extraordinary relief of writ. Definitely, there is
no fixed period of limitation prescribed for filing of a writ petition and hence,
such discretion must be exercised would utmost caution and should be used as
per peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. However, it does not mean
that the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court can be used to revive or
resurrect a dead cause of action and if the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and
laches, this Court has the discretion and power to dismiss the petition on that
sole ground itself.
15. In my considered opinion, the present case is such case. Admittedly,
the Lease Deed is executed in favour of the petitioner is dated 15.11.1984. As
per the petitioner even after execution of the Lease Deed, the possession of
the subject property was not handed over to the petitioner.
16. Except the fact that the petitioner has been communicating with the
respondent/DDA and the fact that the petitioner was an illiterate person, no
reason has been given as to why the petitioner did not initiate any legal
proceeding for a period more than 25 years i.e., from 15.11.1984 till the date
of filing petition in the year 2009.
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17. This period of almost 25 years from execution to Lease Deed to filing
of this writ petition is inexcusable and unexplained and definitely, does not
fall under exceptional situation which gives rise to the invoking of the
extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution
of India. The cause of action for filing the present petition in 2009 was dead
and long gone.
18. Further, the judgement of Qayyum Khan (supra) relied upon by Ms.
Ahmadi, learned counsel for the petitioner, is not relevant as there the
Division Bench of this Court observed that it was the authorities who slept
over the application for restoration for about 12 years. Even the other
judgment of Tasnemul Haq (supra) is also differentiable as the question of
delay and laches was not an issue in the said case.
19. Hence, I am of the view that the present petition is hopelessly barred by
limitation and no justifiable reason has been given by the petitioner for the
inordinate delay.
20. In view of the aforesaid, the present petition is dismissed.
JASMEET SINGH, J
FEBRUARY 26, 2026/DM
(Corrected and released on 03.03.2026)
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