Chinthada Anand vs State Of Andhra Pradesh

Court
Supreme Court
<div> <br /> <br /> 2026 INSC 283<br /> <b>REPORTABLE</b> <br /> <br /> <b>IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA </b><br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION </b><br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1580 OF 2026 </b><br /> <b>(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (CRIMINAL) NO. 9231/2025) </b><br /> <b>CHINTHADA ANAND </b> <b> </b> <b> …. APPELLANT(S) </b><br /> <b> </b> <b>VERSUS </b> <b> </b><br /> <b>STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH </b><br /> <b>AND OTHERS </b><br /> <b> </b> <b> …. RESPONDENT(S) </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>J U D G M E N T </b><br /> <b>PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, J. </b><br /> <b>1)</b> <b> </b> Leave granted. <br /> <b>2)</b> <b> </b> The present Appeal arises out of the impugned judgment dated <br /> 1<br /> 30.04.2025 passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati in <br /> Criminal Petition No. 7114 of 2022 filed under Section 482 of the Code of <br /> 2<br /> Criminal Procedure, 1973 , whereby, the High Court has quashed the <br /> criminal proceedings against respondent nos. 2 to 7 in Spl. SC No. 36 of 2021 <br /> arising out of FIR No. 08 of 2021 registered for offences punishable under <br /> Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes <br /> 3<br /> (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and Sections 341, 506 and 323 read with <br /> 4<br /> Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 on the file of the Special Court <br /> under the SC/ST Act, Guntur District. <br /> Signature Not Verified<br /> Digitally signed by<br /> MINI<br /> Date: 2026.03.24<br /> 15:41:16 IST<br /> Reason:<br /> <br /> 1<br /> ‘High Court’ <br /> 2<br /> ‘Cr.PC’ <br /> 3<br /> ‘SC/ST Act’ <br /> 4<br /> ‘IPC’ <br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>1</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> <b>FACTUAL MATRIX </b><br /> <b>3)</b> <b> </b> The appellant in the present proceedings is Chinthada Anand, resident <br /> of Kothapalem Village, Pittalavanipalem Mandal, Guntur District. He claims <br /> to belong to the Madiga community, a Scheduled Caste and states that for <br /> nearly ten years prior to the incident, he had been conducting Sunday prayer <br /> meetings as a Pastor at different houses in the village, including the house of <br /> one Doma Koti Reddy. <br /> <b>4)</b> <b> </b> According to the appellant, in December 2020, he began receiving <br /> abusive and intimidating telephone calls from unknown numbers, in which <br /> he was allegedly abused by caste-based slurs and was threatened with dire <br /> consequences. These calls, according to him, were on account of his religious <br /> activities and his presence in the village as a Pastor. <br /> <b>5)</b> <b> </b> The first incident is stated to have occurred on 03.01.2021. The <br /> appellant alleges that while he was conducting Sunday prayers at around <br /> noon at the house of Doma Koti Reddy, one of the accused called him outside, <br /> assaulted him by slapping and striking him, abused him by referring to his <br /> caste, and warned him against continuing the prayer meetings. The appellant <br /> states that he did not retaliate. <br /> <b>6)</b> <b> </b> The second and principal incident is stated to have occurred on <br /> 24.01.2021. It is alleged that after completing Sunday prayers and while <br /> returning home, the appellant was wrongfully restrained at the entrance of <br /> the nearby hamlet by respondent nos. 2 to 7 and twenty-five others. He alleged <br /> that his mobile phone and vehicle keys were forcibly snatched, he was <br /> dragged, beaten and abused by caste name in public view, and threatened <br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>2</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> with death. It is also alleged that threats were extended to kill his family <br /> members and kidnap his children. <br /> <b>7)</b> <b> </b> On the next day, i.e., 25.01.2021, the appellant submitted a written <br /> complaint before Chandole Police Station. On the basis of the said complaint, <br /> FIR No. 08 of 2021 came to be registered on 26.01.2021 for the offences <br /> punishable under Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act and <br /> Sections 341, 506, 323 read with Section 34 of the IPC. <br /> <b>8)</b> <b> </b> Investigation was undertaken by the Sub-Divisional Police Officer, <br /> Bapatla. During the course of investigation, statements of the appellant, his <br /> wife and several villagers were recorded. The appellant was medically <br /> examined and the injury sustained by him was certified to be simple in <br /> nature. The Tahsildar conducted verification regarding the caste status of the <br /> appellant and issued a certificate showing him as belonging to Hindu-Madiga <br /> community (Scheduled Caste), while the accused persons admittedly <br /> belonged to the Reddy community (OC category). <br /> <b>9)</b> <b> </b> Upon completion of investigation, the Police filed the charge-sheet on <br /> 30.04.2021, which was taken on file as Spl. SC No. 36 of 2021 before the <br /> Special Court under the SC/ST Act for Guntur District. All the <br /> aforementioned offences were included in the charge-sheet. <br /> <b>10)</b> <b> </b> The accused persons thereafter approached the High Court by filing a <br /> petition under Section 482 of the Cr.PC seeking quashing of the proceedings. <br /> The primary ground urged before the High Court was that the appellant had <br /> admittedly converted to Christianity and was working as a Pastor for about <br /> ten years, and therefore, in view of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, <br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>3</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 1950, he could not legally claim the status of a Scheduled Caste so as to <br /> invoke the provisions of the SC/ST Act. <br /> <b>11)</b> <b> </b> <i>Vide</i> impugned judgment dated 30.04.2025, the High Court had <br /> quashed the entire criminal proceedings in Spl. SC No. 36 of 2021 <i>qua</i> <br /> respondent nos. 2 to 7, holding <i>inter alia</i> that the appellant cannot claim <br /> protection under the SC/ST Act since he had been openly professing <br /> Christianity and working as a Pastor for about a decade. The High Court was <br /> of the view that caste system is not recognised in Christianity and that a <br /> person who has converted and continues to actively work as a Pastor and <br /> profess Christianity, cannot, in law, claim protection under the SC/ST Act. <br /> <br /> <b>12)</b> <b> </b> Further, the High Court noted that the statements of witnesses did not <br /> consistently support the appellant’s version of a large group assault, and only <br /> a limited corroboration was available for the alleged restraint and attack, the <br /> medical evidence showed only a simple injury sustained by the appellant. On <br /> an overall assessment, the High Court held that continuation of the criminal <br /> proceedings against respondent nos. 2 to 7 would amount to an abuse of the <br /> process of law. <b> </b><br /> <b>13)</b> <b> </b> Aggrieved, the appellant has preferred the present Appeal challenging <br /> the quashing of proceedings against respondent Nos. 2 to 7 in Spl. SC No. 36 <br /> of 2021 arising out of FIR No. 08 of 2021. <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>SUBMISSION OF PARTIES </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>14)</b> We have heard the learned counsels for both the parties and perused <br /> the materials on record. <b><i> </i></b><br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>4</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> <b>15)</b> <b> </b> Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the High Court <br /> wrongly quashed the criminal proceedings against respondent nos. 2 to 7 <br /> despite there being a <i>prima facie</i> case made out against them. Learned <br /> counsel highlighted that the High Court failed to appreciate that the appellant <br /> was subjected to physical assault as well as caste-based insults, was also <br /> intimidated by the accused persons. <b> </b><br /> <b>16)</b> <b> </b> Furthermore, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the High <br /> Court gravely erred in holding that the appellant was disentitled from invoking <br /> the provisions of the SC/ST Act, merely on account of his conversion to <br /> Christianity. It was argued that caste is a matter of birth and not of faith, and <br /> a change of religion does not wipe out the social identity and historical <br /> disadvantages attached to one’s caste. <b> </b><br /> <b>17)</b> <b> </b> To bolster his submission, learned counsel for the appellant placed <br /> reliance on G.O. Ms. No. 341 dated 30.08.1977, issued by the Government of <br /> Andhra Pradesh, which specifically stipulates that mere change of religion <br /> shall not operate as a bar to Scheduled Caste persons from securing the <br /> benefits to which they were otherwise entitled prior to conversion. <b> </b><br /> <b>18)</b> <b> </b> <i>Per contra, </i> learned senior counsel for respondent nos. 2 to 7 supported <br /> the impugned judgment and submitted that the High Court has rightly <br /> exercised its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.PC to quash the <br /> proceedings, as the very foundation for invoking the provisions of the SC/ST <br /> Act was absent. <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>19)</b> Learned senior counsel submitted that the appellant is admittedly a <br /> Pastor, performing Sunday prayers for more than a decade, and by his own <br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>5</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> showing professes and practises Christianity. In such a situation, he cannot <br /> claim the protection of the SC/ST Act, which is applicable only to persons <br /> who are members of the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes within the <br /> ambit of clauses (24) and (25) of Article 366 read with Articles 341 and 342 of <br /> the Constitution of India, 1950. <b> </b><br /> <b>20)</b> <b> </b> Learned senior counsel pointed out that Clause 3 of the Constitution <br /> (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 unequivocally provides that no person who <br /> professes a religion different from Hinduism, Sikhism or Buddhism shall be <br /> deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste. It was further argued that the <br /> expression “professes” has consistently been interpreted by this Court to <br /> mean open declaration or practice of a religion, and that the relevant test is <br /> the material time when the benefit is claimed. <b> </b><br /> <b>21)</b> <b> </b> Learned senior counsel for respondent nos. 2 to 7 further argued that <br /> the <i>sine qua non</i> for offences under the SC/ST Act is that the victim must be <br /> a <i>bona fide</i> SC/ST member. It was highlighted that where the appellant does <br /> not belong to an SC/ST community, the very jurisdictional requirement for <br /> applying the SC/ST Act fails. Hence, according to the learned senior counsel, <br /> the High Court rightly quashed the proceedings. <b> </b><br /> <b>22)</b> <b> </b> It has been contended by learned senior counsel for respondent nos. 2 <br /> to 7 that the appellant’s reliance on a purported caste certificate is of no <br /> assistance. It is pointed out that there is no evidence whatsoever to suggest <br /> that the appellant reconverted to Hinduism or that the community accepted <br /> him back. Therefore, mere production of a certificate cannot override the <br /> admitted fact that the appellant is a practising Christian. <b> </b><br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>6</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> <b>23)</b> <b> </b> Learned senior counsel for respondent nos. 2 to 7 submitted that <br /> reliance of the appellant on G.O.Ms. No. 341 issued by the State is wholly <br /> misplaced since an executive order cannot override the Presidential Order <br /> issued under Article 341 of the Constitution of India, and the State has no <br /> authority to enlarge, modify, or alter the Scheduled Caste list. <b> </b><br /> <b>24)</b> <b> </b> Lastly, the learned senior counsel for respondent nos. 2 to 7 submitted <br /> that the present case concerns criminal prosecution, and no person can be <br /> subjected to penal consequences under the SC/ST Act unless the appellant <br /> indisputably falls within the definition of “Scheduled Caste or Scheduled <br /> Tribe” under the Constitution of India. The High Court, therefore, according <br /> to learned senior counsel, has correctly held that, in the absence of such <br /> foundational facts, continuance of the proceedings would be an abuse of <br /> process. <b> </b><br /> <b>ANALYSIS </b><br /> <b>25)</b> <b> </b> Before considering the correctness of the High Court’s decision to quash <br /> the criminal proceedings against respondent nos. 2 to 7, it becomes necessary <br /> to first delineate the broader legal issue that arises, namely, the <b><i> </i></b> conditions <br /> under which a person, who has undergone religious conversion, may avail the <br /> statutory benefits granted to the members of the Scheduled Castes and <br /> Scheduled Tribes. The clarification of this overarching principle is essential, <br /> as the resolution of the present controversy must rest upon its proper <br /> application. <b><i> </i></b><br /> <b>26)</b> <b> </b> To address the aforesaid issue, it is appropriate to state the authorities <br /> which talk about the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Under the <br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>7</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> Constitution of India, 1950, Articles 341 and 342 enumerate about the <br /> Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The relevant Articles are reproduced <br /> hereinbelow: <br /> “341. Scheduled Castes.—(1) The President may with <br /> respect to any State or Union territory, and where it is a <br /> State, after consultation with the Governor thereof, by <br /> public notification, specify the castes, races or tribes or <br /> parts of or groups within castes, races or tribes which shall <br /> for the purposes of this Constitution be deemed to be <br /> Scheduled Castes in relation to that State8[or Union <br /> territory, as the case may be. <br /> <br /> (2) Parliament may by law include in or exclude from the <br /> list of Scheduled Castes specified in a notification issued <br /> under clause (1) any caste, race or tribe or part of or group <br /> within any caste, race or tribe, but save as aforesaid a <br /> notification issued under the said clause shall not be <br /> varied by any subsequent notification. <br /> <br /> 342. Scheduled Tribes.—(1) The President may with <br /> respect to any State or Union territory, and where it is a <br /> State, after consultation with the Governor thereof, by <br /> public notification, specify the tribes or tribal communities <br /> or parts of or groups within tribes or tribal communities <br /> which shall for the purposes of this Constitution be <br /> deemed to be Scheduled Tribes in relation to that State or <br /> Union territory, as the case may be. <br /> <br /> (2) Parliament may by law include in or exclude from the <br /> list of Scheduled Tribes specified in a notification issued <br /> under clause (1) any tribe or tribal community or part of <br /> or group within any tribe or tribal community, but save as <br /> aforesaid a notification issued under the said clause shall <br /> not be varied by any subsequent notification.” <br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>27)</b> <b> </b> The core object of the above provisions is to provide right for the purpose <br /> of affording protection to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes having <br /> regard to the backwardness they suffer. <b> </b> The question which is now required <br /> to be posed at the outset is what is a ‘tribe’? <br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>8</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> <b><i>5</i></b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>28)</b> In <b><i>State of Kerala vs. Chandramohan</i></b> , a three-Judge Bench of this <br /> Court had the opportunity to discuss the concept of ‘tribe’ and its <br /> characteristics. The relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow: <br /> “4. The object of the said provision is to provide right for <br /> the purpose of grant of protection to the Scheduled Tribes <br /> having regard to the economic and educational <br /> backwardness wherefrom they suffer. For the <br /> aforementioned purpose only the President of India has <br /> been authorised to issue the notification to parts or groups <br /> within the tribes. It is not in dispute that the Constitution <br /> (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 made in terms of the <br /> aforementioned provisions is exhaustive. The question <br /> which is required to be posed at the outset is what is a <br /> tribe? <br /> <br /> <b>“Tribe has been defined as a social group of a </b><br /> <b>simple kind, the members of which speak </b><br /> <b>common dialect, have a single government and </b><br /> <b>act together for such common purposes as </b><br /> <b>warfare. Other typical characteristics include a </b><br /> <b>common </b> <b>name, </b> <b>a </b> <b>contiguous </b> <b>territory, </b> <b>a </b><br /> <b>relatively uniform culture or way of life and a </b><br /> <b>tradition of common descent. Tribes are usually </b><br /> <b>composed of a number of local communities e.g. </b><br /> <b>bands, villages or neighbourhoods and are often </b><br /> <b>aggregated in clusters of a higher order called </b><br /> <b>nations. The term is seldom applied to societies </b><br /> <b>that </b> <b>have </b> <b>achieved </b> <b>a </b> <b>strictly </b> <b>territorial </b><br /> <b>organisation in large States but is usually </b><br /> <b>confined to groups whose unity is based primarily </b><br /> <b>upon a sense of extended kinship ties though it </b><br /> <b>is no longer used for kin groups in the strict </b><br /> <b>sense, such as clans.” </b><br /> <br /> (See Dr Gupta, Jai Prakash: The Customary Laws of <br /> the Munda &amp; the Oraon.) <br /> <br /> <b>“Tribe in the Dictionary of Anthropology is </b><br /> <b>defined as ‘a social group, usually with a definite </b><br /> <b>area, dialect, cultural homogeneity, and unifying </b><br /> <b>social organization. It may include several </b><br /> <b>subgroups, such as sibs or villages. A tribe </b><br /> <b>ordinarily has a leader and may have a common </b><br /> <b>ancestor, as well as patron deity. The families or </b><br /> <b>small communities making up the tribe are </b><br /> <b>linked </b> <b>through </b> <b>economic, </b> <b>social, </b> <b>religious, </b><br /> <b>family, or blood ties’.” </b><br /> <br /> (See Bhowmik, K.L.: Tribal India: A Profile in Indian <br /> Ethnology.)” <br /> <br /> (emphasis supplied) <br /> <br /> 5<br /> (2004) 3 SCC 429 <br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>9</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>29)</b> Under clause (1) of Article 342, the President of India promulgated the <br /> Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950, identifying the tribes and tribal <br /> communities recognised as “Scheduled Tribes” for different States and Union <br /> Territories. The said order is reproduced hereinbelow: <br /> “Constitution (Scheduled Tribe) Order, 1950 <br /> <br /> 1. This Order may be called the Constitution (Scheduled <br /> Tribes) Order, 1950. <br /> <br /> 2. The Tribes or tribal communities, or parts of, or <br /> groups within, tribes or tribal communities, specified in <br /> Parts I to XXII of the Schedule to this Order shall, in <br /> relation to the States to which those Parts respectively <br /> relate, be deemed to be Scheduled Tribes so far as regards <br /> members thereof residents in the localities specified in <br /> relation to them respectively in those Parts of that <br /> Schedule. <br /> <br /> 3. Any reference in this Order to State or to a district or <br /> other territorial division thereof shall be construed as a <br /> reference to the State, district or other territorial division <br /> as constituted on the 1st day of May, 1976.” <br /> <br /> <b>30)</b> <b> </b> A person can claim benefits under the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) <br /> Order, 1950 only if he/she continues to belong to that particular tribe in <br /> substance. If, due to conversion or long-term abandonment of tribal customs, <br /> his/her tribal identity is in doubt, that question becomes a factual matter to <br /> be determined at trial. In this regard, this Court in <b><i>Chandramohan </i></b> <br /> <i>(supra)</i><br /> had observed: <br /> <b>“16.</b> <b>Before a person can be brought within the </b><br /> <b>purview of the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) </b><br /> <b>Order, 1950, he must belong to a tribe. A person for </b><br /> <b>the purpose of obtaining the benefits of the </b><br /> <b>Presidential Order must fulfil the condition of being </b><br /> <b>a member of a tribe and continue to be a member of </b><br /> <b>the tribe. If by reason of conversion to a different </b><br /> <b>religion a long time back, he/his ancestors have not </b><br /> <b>been following the customs, rituals and other traits, </b><br /> <b>which are required to be followed by the members of </b><br /> <b>the tribe and even had not been following the </b><br /> <b>customary laws of succession, inheritance, marriage </b><br /> <b>etc. he may not be accepted to be a member of a </b><br /> <b>tribe.</b> In this case, it has been contended that the family <br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>10</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> of the victim had been converted about 200 years back <br /> and in fact the father of the victim married a woman <br /> belonging to a Roman Catholic, wherefrom he again <br /> became a Roman Catholic. The question, therefore, <br /> which may have to be gone into is as to whether the <br /> family continued to be a member of a Scheduled Tribe <br /> or not. Such a question can be gone into only during <br /> trial.” <br /> <br /> (emphasis supplied) <br /> <br /> <b>31)</b> <b> </b> From the above, it becomes clear, that once a person belonging to a <br /> Scheduled Tribe converts to another religion, ultimately through the passage <br /> of time, the customs, rituals and other traits of that particular tribe may fall <br /> into eclipse. If so, in such circumstance, it is proved that the person in <br /> question has completely renounced himself from the customs, rituals and <br /> other traits of his tribe, and has assimilated into the converted religion <br /> following the practices and customs of that particular religion, a reasonable <br /> inference can be drawn that such a person shall not be considered a part of <br /> the tribe. <br /> <b>32)</b> <b> </b> Let us now pivot to the legal foundations of Scheduled Castes. The <br /> initial question which is required to be posed is what is a ‘caste’? <br /> <b><i>6</i></b><br /> <b>33)</b> <b> </b> In <b><i>C.M. Arumugam vs. S Rajagopal</i></b> , a three-Judge Bench of this <br /> Court had the opportunity to discuss on the question: what is ‘caste’? The <br /> relevant observation is reproduced hereinbelow: <br /> “10. But that immediately raises the question: what is a <br /> caste? <b>When we speak of a caste, we do not mean to </b><br /> <b>refer in this context to the four primary castes, but to </b><br /> <b>the multiplicity of castes and sub-castes which </b><br /> <b>disfigure the Indian social scene. “A caste”, as pointed </b><br /> <b>out by the High Court of Madras in Coopoosami Chetty </b><br /> <b>v. Duraisami Chetty [ILR 33 Mad 67] “is a voluntary </b><br /> <b>association of persons for certain purposes”. It is a well </b><br /> <b>defined yet fluctuating group of persons governed by </b><br /> <b>their own rules and regulations for certain internal </b><br /> <b>purposes.</b> Sir H. Risley has shown in his book on People <br /> <br /> 6<br /> (1976) 1 SCC 863 <br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>11</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> of India how castes are formed based not only on <br /> community of religion, but also on community of <br /> functions. It is also pointed out by Sankaran Nair, J. in <br /> Muthusami v. Masilamani [ILR 33 Mad 342 : 20 Mad LJ <br /> 49] : <br /> <br /> “... a change in the occupation sometimes creates <br /> a new caste. A common occupation sometimes <br /> combines members of different castes into a <br /> distinct body which becomes a new caste. <br /> Migration to another place makes sometimes a <br /> new caste.” <br /> <br /> <b>A caste is more a social combination than a religious </b><br /> <b>group. But since, as pointed out by Rajamannar, C.J., </b><br /> <b>in G. Michael v. S. Venkateswaran [AIR 1952 Mad 474] </b><br /> <b>ethics provides the standard for social life and it is </b><br /> <b>founded ultimately on religious beliefs and doctrines, </b><br /> <b>religion is inevitably mixed up with social conduct and </b><br /> <b>that is why caste has become an integral feature of </b><br /> <b>Hindu society. But from that it does not necessarily </b><br /> <b>follow as an invariable rule that whenever a person </b><br /> <b>renounces Hinduism and embraces another religious </b><br /> <b>faith, he automatically ceases to be a member of the </b><br /> <b>caste in which he was born and to which he belonged </b><br /> <b>prior to his conversion. It is no doubt true, and there </b><br /> <b>we agree with the Madras High Court in G. Michael case </b><br /> <b>that the general rule is that conversion operates as an </b><br /> <b>expulsion from the caste, or, in other words, the </b><br /> <b>convert ceases to have any caste, because caste is </b><br /> <b>predominantly a feature of Hindu society and </b><br /> <b>ordinarily a person who ceases to be a Hindu would not </b><br /> <b>be regarded by the other members of the caste as </b><br /> <b>belonging to their fold. But ultimately it must depend </b><br /> <b>on the structure of the caste and its rules and </b><br /> <b>regulations whether a person would cease to belong to </b><br /> <b>the caste on his abjuring Hinduism.” </b><br /> <br /> (emphasis supplied) <br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>34)</b> <b> </b> In exercise of powers conferred under clause (1) of Article 341 of the <br /> Constitution, the President issued the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) order, <br /> 1950. This Order specifies the castes deemed to be Scheduled Castes in <br /> relation to various States and Union territories. The said Order is reproduced <br /> hereinbelow: <br /> “Constitution (Scheduled Caste) Order, 1950 <br /> <br /> 1. This Order may be called the Constitution (Scheduled <br /> Castes) Order, 1950. <br /> <br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>12</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 2. Subject to the provisions of this Order, the castes, races <br /> or tribes or parts of, or groups within, castes or tribes <br /> specified in Parts to [XXV] of the Schedule to this Order <br /> shall, in relation to the States to which those Parts <br /> respectively relate, be deemed to be Scheduled Castes so <br /> far as regards member thereof resident in the localities <br /> specified in relation to them in those Parts of that <br /> Schedule. <br /> <br /> <b>[3. Notwithstanding anything contained in paragraph </b><br /> <b>2, no person who professes a religion different from the </b><br /> <b>Hindu, the Sikh or the Buddhist] religion shall be </b><br /> <b>deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste. </b><br /> <br /> [4. Any reference in this Order to a State or to a district or <br /> other territorial division thereof shall be construed as a <br /> reference to the State, district or other territorial division <br /> as constituted on the 1st day of May, 1976.” <br /> (emphasis supplied) <br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>35)</b> <b> </b> The question as to whether a person is a member of Scheduled Caste <br /> or Scheduled Tribe remains an absolute question of fact. In the instant case, <br /> the legislative history of Clause 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) <br /> Order, 1950 is of immense significance. As originally enacted in the year 1950, <br /> <b> </b><br /> Clause 3 restricted Scheduled Caste status to persons professing the Hindu <br /> religion. It was subsequently amended in the year 1956 to include persons <br /> professing the Sikh religion. Later, in the year 1990, the provision was further <br /> extended to include persons professing the Buddhist religion. It is important <br /> to note that Christianity has not been included under this Order by any of <br /> these amendments. <b> </b><br /> <b>36)</b> <b> </b> A careful perusal of Clause 3 of Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, <br /> 1950 <b> </b> reveals that the term “professes” is of crucial significance. The clause <br /> excludes any person who professes a religion different from Hindu, Sikh or <br /> Buddhist from being deemed a member of a Scheduled Caste. It is, therefore, <br /> necessary to examine what constitutes to professing a religion. <b> </b><br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>13</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> <b>37)</b> <b> </b> The interpretation of the term “profess” as used in Clause 3 of the <br /> Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 came up for consideration <br /> <b><i>7</i></b><br /> before this Court in <b><i>Punjabrao vs. D.P. Meshram</i></b> <b>, </b> wherein it was observed <br /> thus: <b> </b><br /></div><table><thead><tr><th>“13. What clause (3) of the Constitution (Scheduled</th><th></th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Castes) Order, 1950 contemplates is that for a person</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>to be treated as one belonging to a Scheduled Caste</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>within the meaning of that Order, he must be one who</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>professes either Hindu or Sikh religion. The High</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Court, following its earlier decision</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>in Karwadi v. Shambharkar [AIR 1958 Bom 296] has</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>said that the meaning of the phrase “professes a</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>religion” in the aforementioned provision is “to enter</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>publicly into a religions state” and that for this</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>purpose a mere declaration by a person that he has</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>ceased to belong to a particular religion and embraced</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>another religion would not be sufficient. The meanings</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>of the word “profess” have been given thus</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>in Webster&#x27;s New World Dictionary:“to avow publicly;</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>to make an open declaration of … to declare one&#x27;s</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>belief in : as, to profess Christ. To accept into a</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>religious order”. The meanings given in the Shorter</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Oxford Dictionary are more or less the same. It seems</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>to us that the meaning “to declare one&#x27;s belief in : as</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>to profess Christ” is one which we have to bear in mind</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>while construing the aforesaid order because it is this</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>which bears upon religious belief and consequently</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>also upon a change in religious belief. It would thus</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>follow that a declaration of one&#x27;s belief must</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>necessarily mean a declaration in such a way that it</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>would be known to those whom it may interest.</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Therefore, if a public declaration is made by a person</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>that he has ceased to belong to his old religion and has</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>accepted another religion he will be taken as</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>professing the other religion. In the face of such an</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>open declaration it would be idle to enquire further as</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>to whether the conversion to another religion was</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>efficacious. The word “profess” in the Presidential</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Order appears to have been used in the sense of an</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>open declaration or practice by a person of the Hindu</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>(or the Sikh) religion. Where, therefore, a person says,</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>on the contrary, that he has ceased to be a Hindu he</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>cannot derive any benefit from that Order.”</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table><div><br /> (emphasis supplied) <br /> <br /> <br /> 7<br /> 1964 SCC OnLine SC 76 <br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>14</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> <b>38)</b> <b> </b> It is clear from the aforesaid interpretation that the term “profess” <b><i> </i></b><br /> connotes to publicly declare or practice a religion. The essence of the word <br /> lies in the open avowal of one’s religious beliefs in a manner discernible to the <br /> public at large. It is not merely a question of personal belief or private <br /> conviction, but requires an outward manifestation of one’s faith. <b> </b><br /> <b>39)</b> <b> </b> It may be observed that Christianity, by its very theological foundation, <br /> does not recognize or incorporate the institution of caste. The foundational <br /> Christian scripture, The New Testament states: <i>There is neither Jew nor </i><br /> <i>Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female, for you are all one </i><br /> <i>8</i><br /> <i>in Christ Jesus.</i> Christianity in India exists in several denominational forms: <br /> Roman Catholics (who adhere to liturgical traditions of the Latin Church), <br /> various Protestant denominations (including the Church of South India, <br /> Baptist, Lutheran, and Pentecostal churches), and the ancient Syrian <br /> Christian communities. <b><i> </i></b><br /> <b>40)</b> <b> </b> The aforesaid denominational distinctions arise from differences in <br /> theological interpretation, liturgical practice (the form of worship) and <br /> ecclesiastical governance (the organizational framework within the church). <br /> They do not represent any caste-based hierarchal stratifications. <b><i> </i></b><br /> <b>41)</b> <b> </b> In the present case, the facts are unequivocal. The appellant has been <br /> serving as a Pastor for the past ten years. The appellant is also the treasurer <br /> of the Pastors fellowship in Pittalavanipalem. The evidence further reveals that <br /> the appellant conducted prayer meetings on Sundays at the residence of one <br /> Doma Koti Reddy in Kohapalem Village, and regularly performed pastoral <br /> <br /> <b>8</b><br /> <b> </b> Galatians 3:28 ( NIV) Galatians 3:28 NIV - There is neither Jew nor Gentile, - Bible Gateway <br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>15</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> duties including preaching and conducting religious services for the Christian <br /> congregation. <b> </b><br /> <b>42)</b> <b> </b> A pastor occupies a position of religious leadership within the Christian <br /> faith, entrusted with the responsibility of preaching the gospel and conducting <br /> religious services in accordance with the Christian doctrine. The appellant’s <br /> occupation and conduct over this extended period constitute an open and <br /> public declaration of his Christian faith. Viewing through the lens of <br /> <b><i>Punjabrao </i></b> <i>(supra), </i> the appellant indubitably professes Christianity within <br /> the meaning of Clause 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Caste) Order, 1950. <b> </b><br /> <b>43)</b> <b> </b> It is an admitted fact that the appellant previously belonged to the <br /> Madiga community, which is specified <br /> <i>at Serial No. 32 in Part I (Andhra </i><br /> <i>Pradesh)</i> of the Schedule to the Constitution (Scheduled Caste) Order, 1950, <br /> and is recognized as a Scheduled Caste. Had the appellant continued to <br /> profess Hinduism, his status as a member of the Scheduled Caste would have <br /> been beyond question. However, the appellant now professes Christianity. <b> </b><br /> <b>44)</b> <b> </b> Clause 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 is <br /> categorical and unambiguous in its terms. It provides that notwithstanding <br /> anything contained in Clause 2, no person who professes a religion different <br /> from Hindu, Sikh, or Buddhist shall be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled <br /> Caste. The appellant professes Christianity, which is not among the three <br /> religions specified in Clause 3. Irrespective of the appellant’s caste of origin, <br /> he cannot be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste. However, the <br /> learned counsel for the appellant has sought to challenge this position by <br /> placing reliance on certain State Government Orders. <b> </b><br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>16</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> <b>45)</b> <b> </b> The learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon G.O. Ms <br /> No.341, Social Welfare Department, Government of Andhra Pradesh, dated <br /> 30.08.1977, which extends certain concessions granted to Scheduled Castes <br /> (Hindus) by the State Government to Scheduled Caste converts to Christianity <br /> and Buddhism. It is contended that in view of this Government Order, the <br /> appellant ought to be recognized as a member of the Scheduled Caste for the <br /> purposes of invoking the provisions of the SC/ST Act. For proper appreciation <br /> of this contention, it is necessary to reproduce the relevant portions of <br /> G.O.Ms. No.341 dated 30.08.1977: <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> “Government of Andhra Pradesh Abstract <br /> <br /> Social Welfare (PR) Department <br /> <br /> Dated: 30.08.1977 <br /> <br /> Social Welfare-Scheduled Caste Converts to Christianity <br /> and Buddhism-Non-Statutory Concession available for <br /> Scheduled Castes-Extension to Converts for Scheduled <br /> Castes to Christianity and to Buddhism-Orders Issued. <br /> <br /> G.O.Ms.No.341 <br /> <br /> Order: <br /> <br /> Representations have been received by Government from <br /> time to time requesting for the extension of the <br /> concessions granted to Scheduled Castes (Hindus) to <br /> Scheduled Castes Converted to Christianity and <br /> Buddhism on the ground that the scheduled castes <br /> converts also suffer from all the social disabilities as <br /> Scheduled Castes, irrespective of their conversion. At the <br /> state Harijan Conference held in April 1976 also, it was <br /> recommended that mere change of religion should not <br /> become a bar to Scheduled Castes persons from securing <br /> the benefits that they would have been eligible as <br /> Scheduled Castes, before conversion and, therefore, the <br /> Scheduled Castes converts should be given all the benefits <br /> they would have enjoyed before conversion to any other <br /> religion. <br /> <br /> 2. Government have carefully examined the matter in the <br /> light of the recommendations made by the State Harijan <br /> Conference and other relevant considerations. <br /> <b>Government have decided to extended all the non-</b><br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>17</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> <b>statutory concessions now available to Scheduled </b><br /> <b>Castes (Hindus) to Scheduled Caste converts to </b><br /> <b>Christianity </b> <b>and </b> <b>to </b> <b>Buddhism. </b> Accordingly in <br /> suprecession of the orders issued in this behalf, <br /> Government direct that all non -statutory concessions <br /> granted to Scheduled Castes (Hindus) by the State <br /> Government including economic support schemes <br /> sanctioned by Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Castes <br /> Cooperative Finance Corporation be extended to <br /> Scheduled Castes converts to Christianity and to <br /> Buddhism. <br /> <br /> 3. <b>However, </b> <b>the </b> <b>statutory </b> <b>concessions </b> <b>i.e., </b><br /> <b>reservations </b> <b>in </b> <b>educational </b> <b>institutions </b> <b>and </b><br /> <b>reservation in public services for scheduled castes are </b><br /> <b>applicable only to scheduled castes with reference to </b><br /> <b>the constitution (Scheduled Castes) order 1950. The </b><br /> <b>Scheduled </b> <b>Castes </b> <b>converts </b> <b>to </b> <b>Christianity </b> <b>and </b><br /> <b>Buddhism will not therefore be eligible for these </b><br /> <b>facilities. The existing orders in this respect will </b><br /> <b>continue. </b><br /> <br /> (BY ORDER AND IN THE NAME OF THE GOVERNOR OF <br /> ANDHRA PRADESH) <br /> <br /> S.R.Sankaran. Secretary to Government.” <br /> <br /> (emphasis supplied) <br /> <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>46)</b> A careful perusal of the aforesaid State Government Order reveals that <br /> it is of no avail to the appellant. The Government Order itself draws a clear <br /> and categorical distinction between statutory and non-statutory benefits. <br /> Clause 2 of the Government Order states that only “non-statutory <br /> concessions’’ are being extended to Scheduled Caste converts to Christianity <br /> and Buddhism. These non-statutory concessions include economic support <br /> and similar welfare schemes which do not flow from statutory mandate. <b> </b><br /> <b>47)</b> <b> </b> More significantly, Clause 3 of the State Government Order is <br /> unambiguous and unequivocal. It states that statutory concessions, including <br /> reservations in educational institutions and public services, are applicable <br /> only to Scheduled Castes with reference to the Constitution (Scheduled <br /> Castes) Order, 1950. The clause categorically states that Scheduled Caste <br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>18</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> converts to Christianity and Buddhism “will not therefore be eligible for these <br /> facilities”. <b> </b> The Government Order thus explicitly recognizes and reaffirms the <br /> position embodied in Clause 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, <br /> 1950, which restricts Scheduled Caste status to persons professing Hindu, <br /> Sikh, or Buddhist religion. <br /> <b>48)</b> <b> </b> The SC/ST Act is a statutory enactment of the Parliament of India. The <br /> Act serves as a crucial legal framework to protect the rights and dignity of <br /> Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in India, ensuring stringent <br /> measures against offences of atrocities and promoting their welfare and <br /> security. The inapplicability of G.O.Ms No. 341 issued by the State to such <br /> central enactments has been authoritatively clarified by the Central <br /> Government itself. <b> </b><br /> rd<br /> <b>49)</b> <b> </b> In a written reply to the Lok Sabha on 3 August, 2021, the Minister of <br /> State for Social Justice and Empowerment, Shri A. Narayanaswamy, <br /> addressed this precise issue. The Press Information Bureau issued a press <br /> 9<br /> release titled “Benefit of Centrally Sponsored Schemes to Converted <br /> Christians” recording this parliamentary reply, which reads as follows: <b> </b><br /> “Ministry of Social Justice &amp; Empowerment <br /> Benefit of Centrally Sponsored Schemes to Converted <br /> Christians <br /> प्रविवि विवि : 03 AUG 2021 5:25PM by PIB Delhi <br /> <br /> No person who professes a religion different from the <br /> Hindu, the Sikh or the Buddhist religion shall be deemed <br /> to be a member of a Scheduled Caste. The benefits of <br /> Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS) meant for the welfare <br /> and development of Scheduled Castes can not be extended <br /> to Converted Christians from Scheduled Castes. <br /> <br /> <br /> 9<br /> Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, “Benefit of Centrally Sponsored Schemes to <br /> rd<br /> Converted Christians (PIB Press Release, 03 August, 2021) <br /> https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1741930&amp;reg=3&amp;lang=2 <br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>19</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> <b>Government of Andhra Pradesh vide their letter dated </b><br /> <b>30.07.2021 has informed that they have issued orders </b><br /> <b>vide GO.Ms. No. 341, Social Welfare Dept., dated </b><br /> <b>13.08.1977 that non-statutory concessions granted to </b><br /> <b>the Scheduled Castes (Hindus)</b> by the State Government <br /> be extended to Scheduled Caste converts to Christian and <br /> to Buddhism. <br /> <br /> <b>Since this will not apply to the benefits under </b><br /> <b>Centrally Sponsored Schemes or any other statutory </b><br /> <b>benefits, no further action is contemplated from the </b><br /> <b>Ministry</b> . This information was given by The Minister of <br /> State for Social Justice and Empowerment Shri A. <br /> Narayanaswamy in the Loksabha in a written reply today. <br /> <br /> <b><i></i></b> <br /> <br /> MG/IA <br /> <br /> <br /> रिलीज़ आईडी आगंिुक पटल<br /> ( : 1741930) : 2758” <br /> (emphasis supplied) <br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>50)</b> <b> </b> The aforesaid Press Release by the Ministry of Social Justice and <br /> Empowerment clarifies that G.O.Ms. No. 341 does not apply to the benefits <br /> under centrally sponsored schemes or any other statutory benefits. Hence, <br /> the reliance placed by the appellant on the Government Order is wholly <br /> misconceived. <b> </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>51)</b> To further appreciate our discussion on the issue raised, it is necessary <br /> to refer to some of the decisions of this Court which had addressed the same <br /> questions. In <b><i>C.M. Arumugam </i></b> <i>(supra)</i> , a three-Judge Bench of this Court had <br /> observed as follows: <b> </b><br /> “17. ….It is the orthodox Hindu society still dominated to <br /> a large extent, particularly in rural areas, by medievalistic <br /> outlook and status-oriented approach which attaches <br /> social and economic disabilities to a person belonging to a <br /> scheduled caste and that is why certain favoured <br /> treatment is given to him by the Constitution. <b>Once such </b><br /> <b>a person ceases to be a Hindu and becomes a Christian, </b><br /> <b>the social and economic disabilities arising because of </b><br /> <b>Hindu religion cease and hence it is no longer </b><br /> <b>necessary to give him protection and for this reason </b><br /> <b>he is deemed not to belong to a scheduled caste….” </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> (emphasis supplied) <br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>20</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> <b><i>10</i></b><br /> <b>52)</b> <b> </b> Thereafter, in <b><i>Guntur Medical College vs. Y Mohan Rao</i></b> <b><i>, </i></b> a <br /> Constitution Bench of this Court had discussed in detail the Constitution <br /> (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950. The observations made by the Court are as <br /> follows: <b> </b><br /> “The President in exercise of the power conferred upon him <br /> under Article 341 has issued the Constitution (Scheduled <br /> Castes) Order, 1950. Paras (2) and (3) of this Order are <br /> material and they read as follows: <br /> <br /> “2. Subject to the provisions of this Order, the castes, <br /> races or tribes or parts of or groups within caste or <br /> tribes specified in Part I to XIII of the Schedule to this <br /> Order shall, in relation to the States to which these <br /> parts respectively relate, be deemed to be scheduled <br /> castes so far as regards members thereof resident in <br /> the localities specified in relation to them in those <br /> Parts of that Schedule. <br /> <br /> 3. Notwithstanding anything contained in para 2, no <br /> person who professes a religion different from the <br /> Hindu or the Sikh religion shall be deemed to be a <br /> member of a Scheduled Caste.” <br /> <br /> <b>The schedule to this order in Part I sets out the castes, </b><br /> <b>races or tribes or parts of or groups within castes or </b><br /> <b>tribes which shall in the different areas of the State of </b><br /> <b>Andhra Pradesh be deemed to be scheduled castes. One </b><br /> <b>of the castes specified there is Madiga caste and that </b><br /> <b>caste must, therefore, be deemed to be a scheduled </b><br /> <b>caste. But by reason of clause (3), a person belonging </b><br /> <b>to Madiga caste would not be deemed to be a member </b><br /> <b>of a scheduled caste unless he professes Hindu or Sikh </b><br /> <b>religion at the relevant time. It is not necessary that </b><br /> <b>he should have been born a Hindu or a Sikh. The only </b><br /> <b>thing required is that he should at a material time be </b><br /> <b>professing Hindu or Sikh religion.” </b><br /> <br /> (emphasis supplied) <br /> <br /> <b>53)</b> <b> </b> Following the <i>dictum</i> in <b><i>Y Mohan Rao </i></b> <i>(supra)</i> , a Division Bench of this <br /> <b><i>11</i></b><br /> Court in <b><i>M. Chandra vs. M. Thangamuthu and Another</i></b> , observed as <br /> follows: <b> </b><br /> “28. <b>Under </b> <b>these </b> <b>provisions, </b> <b>the </b> <b>Constitution </b><br /> <b>(Scheduled Castes) Order was issued in 1950. It sets </b><br /> <b>out the castes, races and tribes in each State of India </b><br /> <br /> 10<br /> (1976) 3 SCC 411 <br /> 11<br /> (2010) 9 SCC 712 <br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>21</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> <b>and provides under Para 2, that a person belonging to </b><br /> <b>any of the castes specified therein be deemed to be a </b><br /> <b>Scheduled Caste for the purpose of the Constitution. </b><br /> <b>Para 3 contains a proviso to the effect that </b><br /> <b>notwithstanding anything contained in Para 2, no </b><br /> <b>person who professes a religion different from the </b><br /> <b>Hindu, Sikh or Buddhist religion shall be deemed to be </b><br /> <b>a member of a Scheduled Caste. Reading Paras 2 and 3 </b><br /> <b>of the Presidential Order would show that if a person </b><br /> <b>belongs to a caste which is notified in the Schedule to </b><br /> <b>the Presidential Order he/she would have the status of </b><br /> <b>a </b> <b>Scheduled </b> <b>Caste, </b> <b>provided </b> <b>he/she </b> <b>professes </b><br /> <b>Hinduism or one of the other religions specified in Para </b><br /> <b>3 of the Order. </b><br /> <br /> (emphasis supplied) <br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>54)</b> <b> </b> Before we further deal with this aspect, it would be apposite to refer to <br /> a recent decision of this Court in <b><i>C. Selvarani vs. The Special Secretary-</i></b><br /> <b><i>12</i></b><br /> <b><i>cum-District Collector and Others</i></b> , wherein a Division Bench was <br /> adjudicating the claim of a person seeking reservation benefits, available to <br /> Scheduled Castes, after conversion to Christianity. The relevant portion of the <br /> said decision is as follows: <b> </b><br /> “38. At this juncture, we may observe that India is a <br /> secular country. Every citizen has a right to practise and <br /> profess a religion of their choice as guaranteed under <br /> Article 25 of the Constitution. One converts to a different <br /> religion, when he/she is genuinely inspired by its <br /> principles, tenets and spiritual thoughts. However, if the <br /> purpose of conversion is largely to derive the benefits of <br /> reservation but not with any actual belief on the other <br /> religion, the same cannot be permitted, as the extension of <br /> benefits of reservation to people with such ulterior motive <br /> will only defeat the social ethos of the policy of reservation. <br /> <br /> <b>39. In the instant case, the evidence presented clearly </b><br /> <b>demonstrates that the appellant professes Christianity </b><br /> <b>and actively practices the faith by attending church </b><br /> <b>regularly. Despite the same, she claims to be a Hindu </b><br /> <b>and seeks for Scheduled Caste community certificate </b><br /> <b>for the purpose of employment. Such a dual claim </b><br /> <b>made by her is untenable and she cannot continue to </b><br /> <b>identify herself as a Hindu after baptism. Therefore, </b><br /> <b>the conferment of Scheduled Caste communal status </b><br /> <b>to the appellant, who is a Christian by religion, but </b><br /> <b>claims to be still embracing Hinduism only for the </b><br /> <b>purpose of availing reservation in employment, would </b><br /> <br /> 12<br /> 2024 INSC 900 <br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>22</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> <b>go against the very object of reservation and would </b><br /> <b>amount to fraud on the Constitution.” </b><br /> <br /> (emphasis supplied) <br /> <br /> <b>POSTULATES </b><br /> <b>55)</b> <b> </b> Upon a cumulative reading of the aforesaid discussion and in the light <br /> of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 and Constitution <br /> (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950, the following principles emerge for <br /> determining the entitlement of a person to be recognised as a member of a <br /> Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe: <b> </b><br /> a) The claimant must demonstrably belong to a caste or tribe which is <br /> specifically notified and recognised under Clause 2 of the Constitution <br /> (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 and Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) <br /> Order, 1950, and such status must be established by clear, cogent, and <br /> unimpeachable evidence. <br /> b) No person who professes a religion other than Hindu, Sikh or Buddhist <br /> shall be deemed to be a member of a Scheduled Caste. This bar under <br /> Clause 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 is <br /> categorical and absolute. Conversion to any religion not specified in <br /> Clause 3 results in immediate and complete loss of Scheduled Caste <br /> status from the moment of conversion regardless of birth. <br /> c) No statutory benefit, protection, reservation, or entitlement under the <br /> Constitution or under any enactment of Parliament or State Legislature <br /> that is predicated upon the membership of a Scheduled Caste can be <br /> claimed by or extended to any person who, by operation of Clause 3 of <br /> the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, is not deemed to be a <br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>23</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> member of a Scheduled Caste. This bar is absolute and admits no <br /> exception. <br /> d) A person cannot simultaneously profess and practice a religion other <br /> than the ones specified in Clause 3 of Constitution (Scheduled Castes) <br /> Order, 1950 and claim membership of a Scheduled Caste at the same <br /> time. A person who professes and practices such religion for personal, <br /> social and spiritual purposes cannot in law, assert membership of a <br /> Scheduled Caste for the purpose of securing statutory benefits. The two <br /> positions are mutually exclusive and contrary to the Constitutional <br /> scheme. <br /> e) In cases where a person claims to have reconverted from a religion not <br /> specified in Clause 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, <br /> 1950 back to Hindu, Sikh or Buddhist religion, the following three <br /> conditions must be cumulatively and conclusively established: <br /> i. There must be a clear proof that the person originally belonged <br /> to a caste notified under the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) <br /> Order, 1950. <br /> ii. There must be credible and unimpeachable evidence of <i>bona fide</i> <br /> reconversion to the original religion, accompanied by complete <br /> and unequivocal renunciation of the religion to which conversion <br /> had taken place, total dissociation therefrom, and actual <br /> adoption and observance of the customs, usages, practices, <br /> rituals, and religious obligations of the original caste. <br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>24</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> iii. There must be satisfactory and credible evidence establishing <br /> acceptance and assimilation by the members of the original caste <br /> and the concerned community. Mere self-proclamation is <br /> insufficient i.e., the community must recognize and accept the <br /> person as one of their own. <b> </b><br /> All the above three conditions are mandatory and cumulative. <br /> The burden of proving reconversion lies entirely on the claimant, <br /> to be proven through unimpeachable evidence. Failure to <br /> establish even one condition renders the claim unsustainable. <b> </b><br /> f) Where a person ceases to be a member of a Scheduled Caste by virtue <br /> of Clause 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, the loss <br /> of such status carries with it the automatic and immediate termination <br /> of all eligibility for statutory benefits, protections, reservations, <br /> preferences and entitlements that are predicated upon or flow from <br /> such membership. <b> </b><br /> g) With respect to Scheduled Tribes, this Court clarifies that unlike the <br /> Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, the Constitution <br /> (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950 does not prescribe religion-based <br /> exclusion. The determination of Scheduled Tribe status, therefore, <br /> cannot rest on conversion alone, but must turn on whether the <br /> claimant continues to possess and is recognised for the essential <br /> attributes of tribal identity, including customary practices, social <br /> organisation, community life, and acceptance by the concerned tribal <br /> community. Where conversion or subsequent conduct results in a <br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>25</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> complete severance from the tribal way of life and loss of community <br /> recognition, the foundational basis for Scheduled Tribes status will <br /> stand eroded. Conversely, where such attributes demonstrably subsist <br /> or are genuinely re-established and accepted by the tribal community, <br /> the claim cannot be rejected mechanically. The assessment in such <br /> cases is necessarily fact-specific and is left to the competent authority <br /> to decide in accordance with Constitutional principles. <br /> <b>56)</b> <b> </b> Reverting to the facts of the present case, it is not in dispute that the <br /> appellant was originally born into the Madiga community of Scheduled Caste. <br /> It is equally undisputed that he subsequently embraced Christianity. The <br /> submission advanced on behalf of the appellant that he continues to retain <br /> his Scheduled Caste status by birth notwithstanding such conversion cannot <br /> be accepted. When the postulates enunciated hereinabove are applied to the <br /> facts at hand, it becomes manifest that for a person to be recognised as a <br /> member of a Scheduled Caste, he must be professing the Hindu religion or <br /> such other religions as are expressly recognised under the Constitution <br /> (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950. Once the appellant converted to Christianity, <br /> the caste status, which he earlier enjoyed as a member of the Madiga <br /> community, stood eclipsed in the eyes of law. <b> </b><br /> <b>57)</b> <b> </b> In the present case, it is not the case of the appellant that at any stage, <br /> he had reconverted from Christianity to his original religion or has been <br /> accepted back into the fold of the Madiga community. On the contrary, the <br /> evidence on record unmistakably establishes that the appellant continues to <br /> profess Christianity and has been functioning as a Pastor for more than a <br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>26</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> decade, conducting regular Sunday prayer meetings in different houses of the <br /> village. It is also an admitted position that at the time of the alleged incident, <br /> the appellant was conducting prayer meeting as a Pastor at the house of one <br /> Doma Koti Reddy. These concurrent facts leave no room for doubt that the <br /> appellant continues to remain a Christian on the date of the occurrence. <br /> <b>58)</b> <b> </b> As far as the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant placing <br /> reliance on the caste certificate is concerned, we are of the view that mere <br /> possession of the certificate will not be of any benefit to the appellant. The <br /> said caste certificate is mandatorily required to be in consonance with the <br /> Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950. In this regard, we place reliance <br /> on the decision of this Court in <b><i>K.P. Manu vs. Scrutiny Committee for </i></b><br /> <b>13</b><br /> <b><i>Verification of Community Certificate</i></b> , wherein a Division Bench had laid <br /> out three mandatory tests to be established by a person who claims to be a <br /> beneficiary of a caste certificate: <b> </b><br /> “38. In our considered opinion, <b>three things that need to </b><br /> <b>be established by a person who claims to be a </b><br /> <b>beneficiary of the caste certificate are : (i) there must </b><br /> <b>be absolutely clear-cut proof that he belongs to the </b><br /> <b>caste that has been recognised by the Constitution </b><br /> <b>(Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950; (ii) there has been </b><br /> <b>reconversion to the original religion to which the </b><br /> <b>parents and earlier generations had belonged; and (iii) </b><br /> <b>there has to be evidence establishing the acceptance </b><br /> <b>by the community. Each aspect according to us is very </b><br /> <b>significant, and if one is not substantiated, the </b><br /> <b>recognition would not be possible.</b> ” <br /> <br /> (emphasis supplied) <br /> <b>59)</b> <b> </b> From the above, it is clear that the administrative action of the State in <br /> providing the caste certificate to the appellant cannot be in disharmony with <br /> the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950. In the present case, we <br /> <br /> 13<br /> (2015) 4 SCC 1 <br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>27</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> have no hesitation in holding that the appellant, having ceased to be a <br /> member of the Madiga community upon his conversion to Christianity and <br /> having failed to establish any subsequent reconversion, does not satisfy the <br /> mandatory Constitutional requirement for claiming the status of Scheduled <br /> Caste. <br /> <b>WHETHER THE HIGH COURT WAS RIGHT IN QUASHING PROCEEDINGS </b><br /> <b>AGAINST RESPONDENT NOS. 2 TO 7? </b><br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>A.</b> <b> </b> <b>Offences alleged under the SC/ST Act </b> <br /> <b>60)</b> <b> </b> At the very outset, it must be unequivocally stated that the offences <br /> registered under the SC/ST Act against respondent nos. 2 to 7 at the instance <br /> of the appellant cannot be sustained. Having already held that the appellant <br /> ceased to be a member of the Scheduled Caste community upon his <br /> conversion to Christianity, he cannot subsequently invoke the provisions of <br /> the SC/ST Act. The said statute is a special legislation enacted with the <br /> avowed object of preventing atrocities against the members of the Scheduled <br /> Castes and Scheduled Tribes and once the foundational requirement of caste <br /> status stands extinguished, the statutory protection thereunder is no longer <br /> available. <br /> <b>61)</b> <b> </b> Therefore, we are of the view that the High Court was right in holding <br /> that the appellant has ceased to be a member of the Scheduled Caste on his <br /> conversion to Christianity. Accordingly, the appellant cannot be a person <br /> aggrieved under the SC/ST Act. <br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>B.</b> <b>Offences alleged under the IPC</b> <br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>62)</b> Before we discuss on the alleged offences under Sections 341, 506 and <br /> 323 read with Section 34 of the IPC against respondent nos. 2 to 7, it is <br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>28</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> apposite to refer to the decision of this Court in <b><i>State of Haryana vs. Bhajan </i></b><br /> <b><i>14</i></b><br /> <b><i>Lal</i></b> , wherein a Division Bench of this Court had deliberated on the list of <br /> cases, wherein power under Section 482 of the Cr.PC should be exercised by <br /> the High Court for quashing proceedings: <br /> “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various <br /> relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and <br /> of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a <br /> series of decisions relating to the exercise of the <br /> extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent <br /> powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have <br /> extracted and reproduced above, we have given the <br /> following categories of cases by way of illustration <br /> wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent <br /> abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure <br /> the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay <br /> down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently <br /> channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae <br /> and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases <br /> wherein such power should be exercised. <br /> <br /> (1) <b>Where the allegations made in the first </b><br /> <b>information report or the complaint, even if they are </b><br /> <b>taken at their face value and accepted in their </b><br /> <b>entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or </b><br /> <b>make out a case against the accused.</b> <br /> <br /> (2) Where the allegations in the first information report <br /> and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do <br /> not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an <br /> investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of <br /> the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within <br /> the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. <br /> <br /> ( <b>3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in </b><br /> <b>the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in </b><br /> <b>support of the same do not disclose the commission </b><br /> <b>of any offence and make out a case against the </b><br /> <b>accused. </b><br /> <br /> (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a <br /> cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable <br /> offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer <br /> without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under <br /> Section 155(2) of the Code. <br /> <br /> <b>(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or </b><br /> <b>complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable </b><br /> <b>on the basis of which no prudent person can ever </b><br /> <b>reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient </b><br /> <b>ground for proceeding against the accused. </b><br /> <br /> 14<br /> 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 <br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>29</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> <br /> (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any <br /> of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under <br /> which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the <br /> institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or <br /> where there is a specific provision in the Code or the <br /> concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the <br /> grievance of the aggrieved party. <br /> <br /> (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended <br /> with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is <br /> maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for <br /> wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to <br /> spite him due to private and personal grudge.” <br /> <br /> (emphasis supplied) <br /> <br /> <b>63)</b> <b> </b> In light of the aforesaid legal parameters, we now proceed to examine <br /> the allegations levelled against respondent nos. 2 to 7 in relation to the <br /> offences punishable under Sections 341, 506 and 323 read with Section 34 <br /> of the IPC, as alleged to have been committed against the appellant. <br /> <b>64)</b> <b> </b> The case of the appellant, as emerging from the complaint, is that on <br /> the date of the incident, after offering Sunday prayers and while returning to <br /> his residence, he was allegedly wrongfully restrained at the entrance of a <br /> nearby hamlet by respondent nos. 2 to 7, along with approximately twenty-<br /> five other persons. It is further alleged that his mobile phone and vehicle keys <br /> were forcibly taken away, that he was dragged and assaulted with hands and <br /> legs, and that threats to his life were extended. <br /> <b>65)</b> <b> </b> The charge-sheet filed in the matter cites sixteen witnesses, including <br /> the appellant himself. Upon consideration of the material placed on record, <br /> the High Court, by the impugned judgment, proceeded to quash the criminal <br /> proceedings initiated at the instance of the appellant against respondent nos. <br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>30</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> 2 to 7. In this context, we consider it appropriate to extract the relevant <br /> reasoning of the High Court pertaining to the offences alleged under the IPC: <br /> “38. In so far as the allegations of commission of offences <br /> under Sections 341, 506 and 323 read with 34 of IPC is <br /> concerned except for the statement of LW.1 there is no <br /> other corroborating statement of any of the witnesses. On <br /> the contrary LW.2 the wife of LW.1 would state that she <br /> came to know about the alleged altercation and that by the <br /> time she went there LW.1 had already started in a car with <br /> one Pothurlanka Srinivasa Rao-LW.4 in the car belonging <br /> to LW.3 - Addepalii Anii Kumar. She also stated that Anil <br /> Kumar and Pothurlanka Srinivasa Rao had dropped LW.1 <br /> at her house. Both LWs.3 and 4 state that there was an <br /> altercation and that about 30 people were questioning <br /> LW.1 about his activities in the village and that LWs.3 and <br /> 4 intervened and pacified the situation and thereafter <br /> dropped LW.1. LWs.3 and 4 state that about 30 people <br /> have assembled and questioned LW.1; however, LW.5 to <br /> LW.9 do not state so in their statement. <br /> <br /> <b></b>* <br /> <br /> 41. Similarly, except for the listed witness Nos.1 and 3 no <br /> other witness speak about the altercation involving 30 <br /> people. Even the charge sheet does not state that 30 people <br /> had participated in the altercation. The only person <br /> accompanying LW.1 at the time of the alleged altercation <br /> was LW.9, she does not state about the alleged presence of <br /> the 30 people. All that she says in her statement recorded <br /> on 27.01.2021 i.e., one day after the date of filing of <br /> complaint. LW.9 stated that, she was the pillion rider of <br /> the two wheeler which was driven by LW.1, when LW.1 and <br /> LW.9 reached cross roads of Kothapalem Village some <br /> people came and stopped the two wheeler stating that they <br /> wanted to talk with the Pastor and that LW.9 was dropped <br /> off at her house on another bike. It is also stated by LW.9 <br /> she after reaching her home, she overheard people <br /> shouting. Later she came to know that Reddy&#x27;s of <br /> Kothapalem village have threatened LW.1 not to perform <br /> Sunday Prayers in the village. With these allegations, the <br /> requirements under Sections 341, 506, 323 read with 34 <br /> of IPC cannot be made out even after full fledged trial. This <br /> Court is of the considered view that a false complaint is <br /> filed and no purpose would be served if the petitioners are <br /> relegated to the trial Court and to undergo the rigmarole <br /> of trial.” <br /> <br /> <b> </b><br /> <b>66)</b> The allegations of wrongful restraint, hurt and criminal intimidation <br /> rest solely on the statement of the appellant, with no independent witness <br /> attributing any specific overt act to respondent nos. 2 to 7. LW-2 was <br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>31</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> admittedly not present at the scene, while LW-3 and LW-4, though referring <br /> to an altercation, stated that the situation was pacified and the appellant was <br /> escorted away. Their version does not support any allegation of restraint, <br /> assault or threat. The claim regarding the presence of a large unlawful <br /> assembly is unsupported by the chargesheet or other witnesses, thereby <br /> weakening the case of a concerted act under Section 34 of the IPC. LW-9, who <br /> accompanied the appellant, also does not allege any assault, restraint or <br /> intimidation; her subsequent statements are hearsay in nature. Moreover, <br /> absence of consistent ocular testimony identifying the assailants or manner <br /> of occurrence, does not advance the prosecution’s case. <br /> <b>67)</b> <b> </b> Thus, we are of the view that the basic foundation in respect of <br /> allegations of wrongful restraint, causing hurt and criminal intimidation are <br /> not present in the material collected during investigation. <br /> <b>68)</b> <b> </b> In <b><i>Bhajan Lal </i></b> <i>(supra) </i> and recently in <b><i>Neeharika Infrastructure </i></b><br /> <b><i>15</i></b><br /> <b><i>Private Limited vs. State of Maharashtra</i></b> , this Court has clearly held <br /> that where the uncontroverted allegations and the evidence collected during <br /> investigation do not disclose the commission of any offence, continuation of <br /> criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law. <br /> <b>69)</b> <b> </b> We are of the view that the High Court, upon a careful and correct <br /> appreciation of the material on record, arrived at the conclusion that the <br /> allegations under Sections 341, 506 and 323 read with Section 34 of the IPC <br /> are not borne out even if the prosecution’s case is taken at its face value. <br /> <br /> 15<br /> (2021) 19 SCC 401 (Para 33) <br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>32</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> <br /><br /> <br /> <br /> <b>70)</b> <b> </b> In view of the above analysis, we find no substance in the Appeal which <br /> fails and is hereby dismissed. <br /> <br /> <b>…………………..........................J.</b> <br /> <b> </b> <b> </b> <b> </b> <b> </b> <b> (PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA) </b><br /> <br /> <br /> <b>.………………............................J.</b> <br /> <b> </b> <b> </b> <b> </b> <b> </b> <b> (MANMOHAN) </b> <br /> <b> </b> <b> </b> <br /> <b>NEW DELHI;</b> <br /> <b>MARCH 24, 2026.</b> <br /> <b>CRIMINAL APPEAL @ SLP (CRL.) NO. 9231/2025</b> Page <b>33</b> of <b>33 </b><br /> </div>