Full Judgment Text
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PETITIONER:
INDIA CARBON LTD., ETC.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
THE STATE OF ASSAM
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/07/1997
BENCH:
S. P. BHARUCHA, M. JAGANNADHA RAO
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
[WITH CA 2168-71/93, 7735/95, 9267/95)
J U D G M E N T
S.P. BHAURCHA, J.
These appeals impugn a judgment and order of the High
Court at Guwahati. It may be immediately stated that, there
having been some difference of opinion between the two
learned Judges who first heard the writ petitions filed by
the appellants, four questions were referred to a third
learned Judge and it is the first of those four questions
which will determine these appeals.
Briefly stated for the purposes of this judgment, the
facts are these: The appellants manufacture and sell
petroleum coke, which are goods declared by Section 14 of
the Central Sales Tax Act. The appellants are registered as
dealers under the Central Act and liable to pay Central
sales tax on the petroleum coke that is the subject of
inter-State sales of petroleum coke were delayed. For the
assessment years 1974 to 1980 the appellants were required
by the respondents to pay interest at the rate of 24% per
annum thereon, in purported exercise of the provisions of
Section 35A of the Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947. The writ
petitions were filed by the appellants challenging the
imposition of such interest.
The four questions which were referred to the third
learned Judge read thus:
"1) Section 9(2) of the central
Act did not visualise any payment
of interest.
2) If interest were to be charged
by the force of Section 35A of the
Assam Sales Tax Act, 1974 which
visualises imposition of a minimum
interest at the rate of 6% per
annum, The same would violate
Section 15(a) of the Central Act
which has put a limit of 4% in so
far as the tax payable on the goods
dealt with the appellants were
concerned.
3) Charging of interest on the
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amount of tax assessed because of
what have been provided in Rule 42A
of the Assam Sales Tax Rules, 1974
was not permissible inasmuch as
Rule 42A was ultra vires Section
35A.
4) Section 35A of the said Act
was violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution.
Section 9(2) of the Central Act, as it stood at the
relevant time, read thus:
"9(2) Subject to the other
provisions of this Act and the
rules made thereunder, the
authorities for the time being
empowered to assess, re-assess,
collect and enforce payment of any
tax under the general sales tax law
of the appropriate State shall, on
behalf of the Government of India,
assess, re-assess, collect and
enforce payment of tax, including
any penalty, payable by a dealer
under this Act as if the tax or
penalty payable by such a dealer
under this Act is a tax or penalty
payable under the general sales tax
law of the State; and for this
purpose they may exercise all or
any of the powers they have under
the general sales tax law of the
State; and the provisions of such
law, including provisions relating
to returns, provisional assessment,
advance payment of tax,
registration of the transferee of
any business, imposition of the tax
liability of a person carrying on
business on the transferee of, or
successor to, such business,
transfer of liability of any firm
or Hindu undivided family to pay
tax in the event of the dissolution
of such firm or partition of such
family, recovery of tax from third
parties, appeals, reviews,
revisions, reference, refunds,
rebates, penalties charging or
payment of interest, compounding of
offences and treatment of documents
furnished by a dealer as
confidential, shall apply
accordingly."
It was contended before the learned third Judge that,
there being no mention of interest in the first part of
Section 9(2) of the Central Act, the appellants were, not
Liable to pay interest as aforestated. Reliance was placed
upon the judgment of this Court in Khemka & Company vs. Stat
of Maharashtra, 1975(3) SCR 753. The learned third Judge
noted the view taken by his two brother Judges on the first
question and found that there was unanimity on the result,
though for different reasons. He, therefore, took the same
view and held that interest was payable by the appellants on
account of delay in payment of Central sales tax even though
no specific provision had been made in the Central Act in
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this regard.
Our attention was invited to the Constitution Bench
judgment in J.K. Synthetics Ltd. vs. Commercial Taxes
Officer, 1994(4) SCC 276, where it has been held that
provision relating to the charging and levying of interest
in a statute are provisions of substantive law. The relevant
paragraph of the judgment may be extracted.
"16. It is well-known that when a
statute levies a tax it does so by
inserting a charging section by
which a liability is created or
fixed and then proceeds to provide
the machinery to make the liability
effective. It, therefore, provides
the machinery for the assessment of
the liability already fixed by the
charging section, and then provides
the mode for the recovery and
collection or tax, including penal
provisions meant to deal with
defaulters. Provisions is also made
for charging interest on delayed
payments, etc. Ordinarily the
charging section which fixes the
liability is strictly construed but
that rule of strict construction is
not extended to the machinery
provisions which are construed like
any other statute. The machinery
provisions must, no doubt, be so
construed as would effectuate the
object and purpose of the statute
and not defeat the same. (See
Whitney v. IRC, CIT v. Mahaliram
Ramjidas, India United Mills Ltd.
v. Commissioner of Excess Profits
Ta, Bombay and Gursahai Saigal v.
CIT, Punjab). But it must also be
realised that provision by which
the authority is empowered to levy
and collect interest, even if
construed as forming part of the
machinery provisions, is
substantive law for the simple
reason that in the absence of
contract or usage interest can be
levied under law and it cannot be
recovered by way of damages for
wrongful detention of the amount.
(See Bengal Nagpur Railway Co. Ltd.
v. Ruttanji Ramji and Union of
India v. A.L. Rallia Ram). Our
attention was, however drawn by Mr
Sen to two cases. Even in those
cases, CIT v. M. Chandra Sekhar and
Central Provinces Manganese Ore Co.
Ltd. v. CIT, all that the Court
pointed out was that provision for
charging interest was, it seems,
introduced in order to compensate
for the loss occasioned to the
Revenue due to delay. But then
interest was charged on the
strength of a statutory provision,
may be its objective was to
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compensate the Revenue for delay in
payment of tax. But regardless of
the reason which impelled the
Legislature to provide for charging
interest, the Court must give that
meaning to it as is conveyed by the
language used and the purpose to be
achieved. Therefore, any provision
made in a statute for charging or
levying interest on delayed payment
of tax must be construed as a
substantive law and not adjectival
law. So construed and applying the
normal rule of interpretation of
statutes, we find, as pointed out
by us earlier and by Bhagwati, J.
in the Associated Cement Co. case,
that if the Revenue’s contention is
accepted it leads to conflicts and
creates certain anomalies which
could never have been intended by
the Legislature."
This proposition may be derived from the above :
interest can be levied and charged on delayed payment of tax
only if the statute that levies and charges the tax makes a
substantive provision in this behalf.
Our attention was also invited to the Constitution
Bench judgment in Khemka & Co., where the provisions of
Section 9(2) of the Central Sales Tax Act were analysed.
Ray, C.J., taking the majority view, observed:
"Section 9(2) of the Central Act
first provides that the authorities
empowered to assess, re-assess,
collect and enforce payment of any
tax under the general sales tax law
of the appropriate State shall, on
behalf of the Government of India,
assess, re-assess and enforce
payment of tax including any
penalty payable by a dealer under
the Central Act. The State Sales
Tax authorities are thus created
agents of the Government of India.
The second important part in
section 9(2) of the Central Act is
that the State authorities shall
assess, re-assess, collect and
enforce payment of tax including
any penalty payable by the dealer
under the Central Act as if the tax
or penalty payable by such a dealer
under the Central Act is a tax or
penalty payable under the general
sales tax law of the State. This
part of the section sets out the
scope of work of the State.
agencies. The words "assess, re-
assess, collect and enforce payment
of tax including any enforce
payment of tax including any
penalty payable by dealer under
this Act" mean that the tax as well
as penalty is payable only under
the Central Act."
The learned Judge said,
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"It is only tax as well as penalty
payable by a dealer under the
Central Act which can be assessed,
re-assessed, collected and enforced
in regard to payment. The words "as
if the tax or penalty payable by
such a dealer under the Central Act
is a tax or penalty payable under
the general sales tax law of the
State" have origin and root in the
words "payment of tax including any
penalty payable by dealer under the
Central Act." Just as tax under the
State Act cannot be payable and
collected and enforced, similarly
penalty under the State Act cannot
be assessed, collected and
enforced."
The words "and for this
purpose they may exercise all or
any of the powers they have under
the general sales tax law of the
State" in section 9(2) of the
Central Act are important. The
words "and for this purpose" relate
to "assess, re-assess, collect and
enforce payment of tax including
any penalty payable by dealer under
this Act." In that context, the
last limb of section 9(2) of the
Central Act viz. "and the
provisions of such
law..........shall apply
accordingly" mean that the
provisions of the State Act are
applicable for the purpose of
assessment, re-assessment,
collection and enforcement of
payment of tax including penalty
payable under the Central Act. The
words of the last part of section
9(2) viz. "shall apply accordingly"
relate clearly to the words "and
for this purpose" with the result
that the provisions of the State
Act shall apply only for the
purpose of assessment, re-
assessment, collection and
enforcement. The doctrine of
ejusdem generis shows that the
genus in section 9(2) of the
Central Act is "for this purpose".
In other words, the genus is
assessment, re-assessment,
collection and enforcement of
payment. The genus is from whom to
collect and against whom to
enforce. It is apparent that the
extent of liability for tax as well
as penalty is not attracted by the
doctrine of ejusdem generis in the
application of the provisions of
the State Act in regard to
assessment, re-assessment,
collection and enforcement of
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payment of tax including any
penalty payable under the Central
Act."
Ray, C.J. concluded by holding that the provision in
the State sales tax Act imposing penalty for non-payment of
sales tax within the prescribed time period was not
attracted to impose penalty on dealers under the Central
sales tax Act in respect of tax and penalty payable under
the Central Act. A penalty was a statutory liability. The
Central Act contained specific provisions in respect of
penalty. Those were the only provisions available against
dealers under the Central Act. Each State sales tax Act
contained provisions for penalties. These provisions in some
cases were also for failure to submit a return or failure to
register. These provisions could not apply to dealers under
the Central Act because the Central Act made no similar
provisions. The learned Judge added, "The Central Act is a
self contained code which by charging section creates
liability for penalty and impose penalty. Section 9(2) of
the Central Act creates the State authorities as agencies to
carry out the assessment, re-assessment, collection and
enforcement of tax and penalty payable by a dealer under the
Act."
Beg, J., concurring with the majority view, found that
provisions relating to penalties were special and specific
provisions in the Central and State Acts. "They are", he
said, "not part of the general sales tax law of either the
State or of Union. If the provisions relating to penalties,
such as those found in the Central Act and the State Acts,
are really special provisions which can be invoked in the
special circumstances given in each statute, we must
interpret the reference to penalties in the concluding
portion of Section 9(2) to relate only to the special
provisions relating to penalties provided for specifically
in the Central Act". The learned Judge added that the
legislative intent was to confine penalties mentioned in the
concluding part of Section 9(2) to only those penalties as
were mentioned specifically in the Central Act.
The words "charging or payment of interest" in sub-
section (2) and sub-section (2A) of the Section 9, were
introduced with retrospective effect in 1976. Section 9(2A)
reads thus:
"All the provisions relating to
offences and penalties (including
provisions relating to penalties in
lieu of prosecution for an offence
or in addition to the penalties or
punishment for an offence but
excluding the provisions relating
to matters provided for in Section
10 and 10A) of the general sales
tax law of each State shall, with
necessary modifications, apply in
relation to the assessment, re-
assessment, collection and the
enforcement of payment of any tax
required to be collected under this
Act in such State or in relation to
any process connected with such
assessment, re-assessment,
collection or enforcement of
payment as if the tax under this
Act were a tax under such sales tax
law."
Section 9(2A) makes applicable to the assessment, re-
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assessment, collection and enforcement of Central sales tax
the provisions relating to offences and penalties contained
in the State Acts as if the Central sales tax was a State
sales tax. But Section 9(2A) makes no reference to interest.
There is no substantive provision in the Central Act
requiring the payment of interest on Central sales tax.
There is, therefore, no substantive provision in the Central
Act which obliges the assessee to pay interest on delayed
payments of Central sales tax.
Now, the words "charging or payment or interest" in
Section 9(2) occur in what may be called the letter part
thereof. Section 9(2) authorises the sales tax authorities
of a State to assess, reassess, collect and enforce payment
of the Central sales tax payable by a dealer as if it was
payable under the State Act; this is the first part of
Section 9(2). By the second part thereof, these authorities
are empowered to exercise the powers they have under the
State Act and the provisions of the State Act, including
provisions relating to charging and payment of interest,
apply accordingly. Having regard to what has been said in
the case of Khemka & Co., it must be held that the
substantive law that the States’ sales tax authorities must
apply is the Central Act. In such application, for
procedural purposes alone, the provisions of the State Act
are available. The provision relating to interest in the
latter part of Section 9(2) can be employed by the States’
sales tax authorities only if the Central Act makes a
substantive provision for the levy and charge of interest on
Central sales tax and only to that extent. There being no
substantive provision in the Central Act requiring the
payment of interest on Central sales tax the States’ sales
tax authorities cannot, for the purpose of collecting and
enforcing payment of Central sales tax, charge interest
thereon.
The requirement of the 1st respondent’s sales tax
authorities that the appellants should pay interest at the
rate of 24% p.a. on delayed payments of Central sales tax
under the provisions of Section 35(A) of the State Act must,
therefore, be held to be bad in law.
The appeals are allowed. The judgment and order under
appeal is set aside. The demands for payment of interest as
aforestated are quashed.
No order as to costs.
Civil Appeal Nos. 2168-71/93:
Following the above judgment, these appeals are allowed
and the judgment and order under appeal is set aside. The
demands made upon the appellants for payment of interest on
delayed payments of Central sales tax are quashed.
No order as to costs.