Full Judgment Text
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.108 OF 2012
GUNA MAHTO ...APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF JHARKHAND ...RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
SANJAY KAROL, J.
1. The present criminal appeal is filed by appellant Guna Mahto,
found guilty of murdering his wife Smt. Deomatiya Devi under
Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 by the Ld. Trial
Court, Daltonganj in Sessions Trial Case No. 50 of 1989 titled as
State vs. Guna Mahto vide judgement dated 10.05.2001. The Ld.
Trial Court sentenced the appellant to a term of life
Signature Not Verified
imprisonment under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and
Digitally signed by
Narendra Prasad
Date: 2023.03.17
16:15:18 IST
Reason:
two years rigorous imprisonment in relation to the offence
punishable under Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code.
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2. On appeal, in the impugned judgment delivered by the High
Court of Jharkhand in Criminal Appeal No. 214 of 2001 dated
23.07.2004 titled as Guna Mahto v. State of Jharkhand and
findings in respect to the conviction and sentencing arrived at by
the Ld. Trial Court were affirmed, despite observing that the
Investigation Officer was not examined by the prosecution. Be
that as it may, the High Court solely relied upon the ocular
evidence of Banaudhi Mahto (PW-2), Samodhi Yadav (PW-9) and
Nandish Yadav (PW-10).
3. Hence the present appeal filed by the appellant Guna Mahto.
4.
It is the case of the prosecution that the accused had committed
the murder of his wife and thereafter dumped her dead body in
the well of the village with an intent to cause disappearance of
the evidence related to the crime. Later, the accused approached
the Police with unclean hands by fabricating a false story,
wherein he reported his wife to be ‘missing’.
5. On 13.8.1988, the dead body of the deceased was found in the
well of the village pursuant to which the matter was brought to
the notice of the police and P.S. Case No. 35/1988 (Ex.P-3)
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registered at Manika Police Station, Jharkhand. Accordingly, the
investigation was conducted and challan presented before the
Court for Trial. The prosecution examined ten witnesses out of
whom, testimonies of Murari Ram (PW-1), Mithu Pd. Sahu (PW-
4), Musafir Yadav (PW-5), Munni Mistry (PW-6), Chitranjan
Pandey (PW-8) and Sukhru Mahto (PW-7) are merely formal in
nature. We find their testimonies, when considered
independently or even collectively, not to point anything towards
the guilt of the accused.
6.
Before we deal with the merits of the case, we deem it
appropriate, at this stage, to state the facts that are not in
dispute: (a) the identity of the deceased, (b) the body of the
deceased recovered from the well of the village, (c) the Post
Mortem Report prepared by Dr. Narendra Kumar Misar (PW-3)
stating the cause of the death being haemorrhage and shock
with injuries on the neck of the deceased.
7. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that in a case
revolving around circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and the
circumstances relied upon must point out only towards one
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hypothesis, that is, the guilt of the accused alone and none else.
On various occasions, this Court has stated essential conditions
that must be fulfilled before conviction of an accused can take
place based on circumstantial evidence. In the landmark case of
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Mahrashtra, (1984) 4
SCC 116 it has been held as under:
153.
“ A close analysis of this decision would show that
the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case
against an accused can be said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt
is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the
circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may
be” established. There is not only a grammatical but a
legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be
or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji
Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC
793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the
observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri)
p. 1047]
“Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must
be and not merely may be guilty before a court can
convict and the mental distance between ‘may be’ and
‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure
conclusions.”
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with
the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say,
they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis
except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature
and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except
the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not
to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the accused and must
show that in all human probability the act must have
been done by the accused.”
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8.
In the instant case, as we have noted earlier, the Investigation
Officer was not examined. We find that there is no evidence,
ocular or documentary, relating to the factum of the accused
having caused the disappearance of evidence by giving
information to the police in order to prevent himself from being
prosecuted in relation to the murder of his own wife.
9.
When we examine the testimony of Banaudhi Mahto (PW-2),
father of the deceased, we notice him not to have stated anything
against the accused in relation to the crime. He states that two
days prior to the recovery of the dead body, father of the accused
had informed him that the deceased had eloped with someone.
But with whom? He does not mention. He admits that the
deceased and the accused were living together and when he
discovered that his daughter had not returned home, he lodged
the report with the Police.
10. Samodhi Yadav (PW-9), uncle of the deceased, residing in village
Maran, only states that Ram Brijesh Yadav (co-villager) informed
him that his daughter-in-law (the deceased) had eloped with
someone residing in village i.e. Maran. Since he doubted such
statement, he went to village Janho, the place of the matrimonial
house of the deceased and was informed that since previous
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evening, none had seen the deceased. The body of the deceased
was found only on the date of recovery from the well of the
village. He expressed his doubt, “…that accused had killed his
wife and had thereafter thrown her into the well”. This being the
only statement that he made against the accused. But what is
his source of such information, he does not disclose. In any
event such a deposition is only in the nature of hearsay and no
more, which is also uncorroborated. However, significantly, he
admits that the accused had already reported the matter to the
Police and that no case of ill-treatment of the deceased was ever
registered against the appellant.
11. Perusal of the testimony given by Nandish Yadav (PW-10), son of
the maternal brother of PW-2, in our considered view, is also of
no consequence in advancing or establishing the case of the
prosecution. He only states that, “we suspected” the role of the
accused “for he used to beat her often”. Elaborating further, he
states that such fact was disclosed to him by the villagers. We
find that this statement, apart from being in the nature of
hearsay, is vague and unspecific with regard to time, place and
manner of alleged cruelty. It is on such counts that he suspected
the accused to have murdered the deceased. Significantly, in the
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cross-examination part of his testimony, we notice all these facts
to have been deposed for the first time in the Court and as we
have noticed in the testimony of PW-9 that no complaint of ill-
treatment was ever reported to anyone. Hence, therefore, the
case of the prosecution stands unproven.
12.
The Trial Court in its judgment, while convicting the accused,
heavily relied upon the statement of PW-9 and the purported
statement of the Investigating Officer which is termed as UD
Exhibit marked as Exhibit 3/1. The relevant findings in the
judgment is extracted as under :
“The deceased’s death as the post mortem
report discloses was not due to drowning.
From the evidence of P.W.9 and I.O. it
appears that while the deceased was found
missing then on the next day the villagers
tried to search her dead body in the said
well by means of Jhagar but it was not
found and on the next day the dead body
was found in the same well. So, these facts
indicate that the deceased did not commit
suicide rather she was murdered and her
dead body was thrown in the well and the
fardbeyan of the accused regarding the
death of the deceased is due to suicide does
not appear to be probable.”
13.
Similarly, the High Court, based its findings primarily on the
UD, in arriving at the factum of guilt of the accused. The Court
proceeded to add that:
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The medical evidence suggests that the death
“
took place 48 to 96 hours prior to post mortem.
Autopsy on the body of the deceased was done
th
on 14 August, 1988 at about 3 P.M. as per
medical evidence, if calculation is made, the
th
deceased died sometime between 12 August,
th
1988 (about 3 P.M.) 10 August, 1988
and
(about 3 P.M.) that is why the I.O. suspected
that the deceased was murdered at least two
days before the post mortem. At least one day
prior to the date of recovery of body, she was
murdered and her body was thrown in the well.”
14.
It is in this backdrop, that non-examination of the Investigating
Officer attains significance. It is not that the Investigating Officer
was not available or that the factum and manner of investigation
was deposed by his colleague who was also associated with the
same. Non-examination of the Investigation Officer has, in the
attending circumstances rendered the prosecution case to be
doubtful if not false. The offence under Section 201 IPC could
not have been proven without his examination.
15.
The Courts below presumptively, proceeded with the acquired
assumption of the guilt of the accused for the reason that he was
lastly seen with the deceased, and lodged a false report,
forgetting that as per the version of the father of the deceased,
father of the accused had himself apprised him of his missing
daughter, at least two days prior to the incident. Doubt and
suspicion cannot form basis of guilt of the accused. The
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circumstances linking the accused to the crime are not proven at
all, much less beyond reasonable doubt.
16. We may reiterate that, suspicion howsoever grave it may be,
remains only a doubtful pigment in the story canvassed by the
prosecution for establishing its case beyond any reasonable
doubt. [Venkatesh v. State of Karnataka, 2022 SCC OnLine
SC 765; Shatrughna Baban Meshram v. State of
Maharashtra, (2021) 1 SCC 596; Pappu v. State of Uttar
Pradesh, (2022) 10 SCC 321]. Save and except for the above,
there is no evidence: ocular, circumstantial or otherwise, which
could establish the guilt of the accused. There is no discovery of
any fact linking the accused to the crime sought to be proved,
much less, established by the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt.
17. It is our bounden duty to ensure that miscarriage of justice is
avoided at all costs and the benefit of doubt, if any, given to the
accused. [Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P.
(1952) 2 SCC 71].
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18.
In normal course of proceedings, this Court does not interfere
with the concurrent finding of facts reached by both the courts
below. It is only in exceptional cases where we find the
concurrent findings to be absurd, leading to travesty of justice, it
is our duty to rectify miscarriage of justice. [Ramaphupala
Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1970) 3 SCC 474, Balak
Ram v. State of U.P., (1975) 3 SCC 219, Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai
V. State of Gujarat, (1983) 3 SCC 217].
19. Hence, in our considered view, the courts below have seriously
erred in passing the order of conviction based on incorrect and
incomplete appreciation of evidence, causing serious prejudice to
the accused, also resulting into travesty of justice.
20. In view of aforesaid, we find that the order of conviction and
sentence passed by 5th Additional Sessions Judge, Palamau,
Daltonganj in Sessions Trial Case No.50 of 1989 dated
10.05.2001 as affirmed by the High Court of Jharkhand at
Ranchi in Criminal Appeal No.214 of 2001 dated 23.7.2004
titled as Guna Mahto v. State of Jharkhand needs to be
interfered with.
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21.
We set-aside the orders passed by both the courts below. Since
the appellant is already on bail, his bail bond shall stand
discharged.
22.
Appeal stands allowed.
………………J.
(B.R. Gavai)
……………..…J.
(Sanjay Karol)
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Dated: 16 March, 2023
Place: New Delhi