Full Judgment Text
1
Non-Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 8103/2009
COMMR.OF INCOME TAX,RAJKOT Appellant(s)
VERSUS
GOVINDBHAI MAMAIYA Respondent(s)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL No. 8104/2009
CIVIL APPEAL No. 8105/2009
CIVIL APPEAL No. 8106/2009
CIVIL APPEAL No. 8107/2009
CIVIL APPEAL No. 8108/2009
CIVIL APPEAL No. 8109/2009
CIVIL APPEAL No. 8110/2009
J U D G M E N T
A.K. SIKRI, J.
The question of law that arises for consideration in all
JUDGMENT
these appeals which are filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax,
Rajkot (hereinafter referred to as the 'Revenue') is common. The
respondents in all these appeals are also common. The three
respondents (hereinafter referred to as the 'assessee') are
brothers. The issue raised is identical in all these appeals which
pertains to different assessment years and that is the reason that
there are eight appeals before us. For the sake of convenience, we
will refer to the facts emerging from the records of Civil appeal
No.8103 of 2009.
Page 1
2
2. The respondents are three brothers. Their father died
leaving the land admeasuring 17 acres and 11 gunthas to the three
brothers and two other persons who relinquished their rights in
favour of the three brothers. A part of this bequeathed land was
acquired by the State Government and compensation was paid for it.
On appeal, the compensation amount was enhanced and additional
compensation alongwith interest was awarded.
3. The respondents filed their return of income for each
assessment years claiming the status of 'individual'. Two
questions arose for consideration before the Assessing Officer. One
was as to whether these three brothers could file separate returns
claiming the status of the 'individual' or they were to be treated
as 'Association of Persons' (AoP). Second question was regarding
the taxability of the interest on enhanced compensation and this
interest which was received in a particular year was to be assessed
in the year of receipt or it could be spread over the period of
JUDGMENT
time.
4. Without going into the detail as to how this question
traversed and decided by one forum to other, suffice it is to state
that the Assessing Officer had passed the assessment order by
treating their status as that of a AoP. The Assessing Officer had
also refused to spread the interest income over the years and
treated it as taxable in the year of receipt. Ultimately, the High
Court has decided that these persons are to be given the status of
'individual' and assessed accordingly and not as AoP and that the
Page 2
3
interest income is to be spread over from the year of dispossession
of land, that is the assessment year 1987-88 till the year of
actual payment which was received in the assessment year 1999-2000
applying the principles of accrual of income. It is in this
backdrop that the Revenue has approached this Court challenging the
decision of the High Court.
5. Insofar as the treatment of the respondents giving the status
| sessing on that basi<br>a. Learned counsel<br>at this aspect stand<br>It would be suffice<br>a and Company, Ludh | |
|---|---|
| J & K and | Chandiga |
| er taking note of s<br>summed up the legal |
20 which are reproduced below::
JUDGMENT
“19. In the case of CIT v. Indira Balkrishna , AIR
1960 SC 1172, this Court held that "association of
persons" meant an association in which two or more
persons joined in a common purpose or common action.
As the words occurred in a section which imposed a
tax on income, the association must be one the
object of which was to produce income, profits or
gains. In that case, the co-widows of a Hindu
governed by Mitakshara law inherited his estate
which consisted of immovable properties, shares,
money lying in deposit and a share in a registered
firm. The Appellate Tribunal found that they had not
exercised their right to separate enjoyment and that
Page 3
4
except for jointly receiving the dividends from the
shares and the interest from the deposits, they had
done no act which had helped to produce income. This
Court held that the co-widows succeeded as co-heirs
to the estate of the deceased husband. It was held
that since the widows had an equal share in the
income from immovable properties, Section 9(3) of
the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922 will apply. So far
as other incomes were concerned, it was held:
"Coming back to the facts found by the
Tribunal, there is no finding that the three
widows have combined in a joint enterprise to
produce income. The only finding is that they
have not exercised their right to separate
enjoyment, and except for receiving the
dividends and interest jointly, it has been
found that they have done no act which has
helped to produce income in respect of the
shares and deposits. On these findings it
cannot be held that the three widows had the
status of an association of persons within the
meaning of section 3 of the Indian Income Tax
Act."
20. The meaning of "an association of persons"
was also examined by this Court in the case of G.
Murugesan & Brothers v. CIT , (1973) 4 SCC 211. It
JUDGMENT
was held in that case that an association of
persons could be formed only when two or more
individuals voluntarily combined together for
certain purposes. Volition on the part of the
members of the association was an essential
ingredient. It was further held that even a minor
could join "an association of persons" if his
lawful guardian gave his consent. The income in
that case arose under two heads - house property
and dividends from shares. The question before this
Court was whether the dividend income should be
assessed in the hand of an association of persons
Page 4
5
or individuals. One Sinnamani Nadar executed a
settlement deed in favour of his four grandsons.
The property covered by the settlement deed
comprised of a house property which had been let
out and some shares. The donees were to enjoy the
income of these properties during their lifetime.
Thereafter, the properties were to devolve on their
children. In that case, it was pointed out that
Income Tax return was filed in the status of
association of persons prior to the assessment year
1959-60 to 1962-63, the returns were submitted as
individuals specifically stating that the donees
were not functioning as an association of persons.”
6. In the present case, the admitted facts are that the property
in question which was acquired by the Government, came to the
respondents on inheritance from their father i.e. by the operation
of law. Furthermore, even the income which is earned in the form
of interest is not because of any business venture of the three
assessees but it is the result of the act of the Government in
JUDGMENT
compulsorily acquiring the said land. In these circumstances, the
case is squarely covered by the ratio of the judgment laid down in
Meera & Company (supra) inasmuch as it is not a case where any
“Association of Persons” was formed by volition of the parties for
the purpose of generation of income. This basic test to determine
the status of AoP is absent in the present case.
7. Insofar as the second question is concerned, that is also
covered by another judgment of this Court in Commissioner of Income
Tax, Faridabad vs. Ghanshyam (HUF) reported in (2009) 8 SCC 412,
Page 5
6
albeit, in favour of the Revenue. In that case, the court drew
distinction between the “interest” earned under Section 28 of the
Land Acquisition Act and the “interest” which is under Section 34
of the said Act. The Court clarified that whereas compensation
given to the assessee of the land acquired would be 'income', the
enhanced compensation/consideration becomes income by virtue of
Section 45(5)(b) of the Income Tax Act. The question was whether
it will cover “interest” and if so, what would be the year of
taxability. The position in this respect is explained in paras 49
and 50 of the judgment which make the following reading:
“49. As discussed hereinabove, Section 23(1-A)
provides for additional amount. It takes care of the
increase in the value at the rate of 12% per annum.
Similarly, under Section 23(2) of the 1894 Act there
is a provision for solatium which also represents
part of the enhanced compensation. Similarly, Section
28 empowers the court in its discretion to award
interest on the excess amount of compensation over and
JUDGMENT
above what is awarded by the Collector. It includes
additional amount under Section 23(1-A) and solatium
under Section 23(2) of the said Act. Section 28 of
the 1894 Act applies only in respect of the excess
amount determined by the court after reference under
Section 18 of the 1894 Act. It depends upon the
claim, unlike interest under section 34 which depends
on undue delay in making the award.
50. It is true that “interest” is not compensation.
It is equally true that Section 45(5) of the 1961 Act
refers to compensation. But as discussed hereinabove,
Page 6
7
we have to go by the provisions of the 1894 Act which
awards “interest” both as an accretion in the value of
the lands acquired and interest for undue delay.
Interest under Section 28 unlike interest under
Section 34 is an accretion to the value, hence it is a
part of enhanced compensation or consideration which
is not the case with interest under Section 34 of the
1894 Act. So also additional amount under Section 23
(1-A) and solatium under Section 23(2) of the 1961 Act
forms part of enhanced compensation under Section
45(5)(b) of the 1961 Act.”
8. It is clear from the above that whereas interest under
Section 34 is not treated as a part of income subject to tax, the
interest earned under Section 28, which is on enhanced
compensation, is treated as a accretion to the value and therefore,
part of the enhanced compensation or consideration making it
exigible to tax. After holding that interest on enhanced
compensation under Section 28 of 1894 Act is taxable, the Court
dealt with the other aspect namely, the year of tax and answered
JUDGMENT
this question by holding that it has to be tested on receipt basis,
which means it would be taxed in the year in which it is received.
It would mean that converse position i.e. spread over of this
interest on accrual basis is not permissible. Here again, we would
like to reproduce the discussion contained in paras 53 and 54 which
gives the rational in coming to the said conclusion. Paras 53 and
54 read as under:
“53. The scheme of Section 45(5) of the 1961 Act
was inserted w.e.f. 1-4-1988 as an overriding
Page 7
8
provision. As stated above, compensation under the
L.A.Act, 1894, arises and is payable in multiple
stages which does not happen in cases of transfers
by sale, etc. Hence, the legislature had to step
in and say that as and when the assessee claimant
is in receipt of enhanced compensation it shall be
treated as “deemed income” and taxed on receipt
basis. Our above understanding is supported by
insertion of clause (c) in Section 45(5) w.e.f. 1-
4-2004 and Section 155(16) which refers to a
situation of a subsequent reduction by the court,
tribunal or other authority and recomputation/
amendment of the assessment order.
54. Section 45 (5) read as a whole [including
clause (c)] not only deals with reworking as urged
on behalf of the assessee but also with the change
in the full value of the consideration
(computation) and since the enhanced
compensation/consideration (including interest
under Section 28 of the 1894 Act) becomes payable/
paid under the 1894 Act at different stages, the
receipt of such enhanced compensation/
JUDGMENT
consideration is to be taxed in the year of receipt
subject to adjustment, if any, under Section
155(16) of the 1961 Act, later on. Hence, the year
in which enhanced compensation is received is the
year of taxability. Consequently, even in cases
where pending appeal, the court/tribunal/authority
before which appeal is pending, permits the
claimant to withdraw against security or otherwise
the enhanced compensation (which is in dispute),
the same is liable to be taxed under Section 45(5)
of the 1961 Act. This is the scheme of Section
45(5) and Section 155(16) of the 1961 Act. We may
Page 8
9
clarify that even before the insertion of Section
45(5)(c) and Section 155(16) w.e.f. 1-4-2004, the
receipt of enhanced compensation under Section
45(5)(b) was taxable in the year of receipt which
is only reinforced by insertion of clause (c)
because the right to receive payment under the 1894
Act is not in doubt.”
0. In view of the above discussion, we allow these appeals in
part and set aside that portion of the impugned judgment of the
High Court whereby spread over of the interest received under
section 28 of the 1894 Act, on the enhanced income is allowed with
the direction that it would be taxed in the year in which such
interest on enhanced compensation was received.
.........................J.
[ J. CHELAMESWAR ]
JUDGMENT
…........................J.
[ A.K. SIKRI ]
NEW DELHI
SEPTEMBER 04, 2014
Page 9