Full Judgment Text
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CASE NO.:
Appeal (civil) 3453 of 2002
PETITIONER:
M/s. Jindal Stainless Ltd. & Anr.
RESPONDENT:
State of Haryana and Ors.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/07/2006
BENCH:
ARIJIT PASAYAT & S.H. KAPADIA
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N T
WITH
(SLP (C) No.10003/2004, SLP (C) No.10007/2004
SLP (C) No.10156/2004, SLP (C) No.10164/2004
SLP (C) No.10167/2004, SLP (C) No.10206/2004
SLP (C) No.10381/2004, SLP (C) No.10391/2004
SLP (C) No.10404/2004, SLP (C) No.10417/2004
SLP (C) No.10501/2004, SLP (C) No.10563/2004
SLP (C) No.10568/2004, SLP (C) No.10571/2004
SLP (C) No.11012/2004, SLP (C) No.11271/2004
SLP (C) No.11326/2004, T.C. (C) No. 13/2004
SLP (C) No.14380/2005
C.A.Nos.2608/2003, 2637/2003, 2769/2000, 3144/2004,
3145/2004, 3146/2004, 3314/2001, 3381-3400/1998,
3454/2002, 3455/2002, 3456-3459/2002, 3460/2002
3461/2002, 3462-3463/2002, 3464/2002, 3465/2002
3466/2002, 3467/2002, 3468/2002, 3469/2002,
3470/2002, 3592/1998, 4471/2000, 4476/2000,
4651/1998, 4954/2004, Writ Petition No. 512/2003,
C.A. Nos. 5141/2004, 5143/2004, 5144/2004, 5145/2004,
5147/2004, 5148/2004, 5149/2004, 5150/2004,
5151/2004, 5152/2004, 5153/2004, 5156/2004,
5157/2004, 5158/2004, 5159/2004, 5160/2004,
5162/2004, 5163/2004, 5164/2004, 5165/2004, 5166/2004,
5167/2004, 5168/2004, 5169/2004, 5170/2004,
Writ Petition (C) No. 574/2003, C.A. Nos. 5740/2002,
5858/2002, 6331/2003, 6383-6421/1997, 6422-6435/1997,
6436/1997, 6437-6440/1997, 7658/2004, 8241/2003,
8242/2003, 8243/2003, 8244/2003, 8245/2003, 8246/2003,
8247/2003, 8248/2003, 8249/2003, 8250/2003, 8251/2003,
8252/2003, 918/1999, SLP (C) No.9496/2004, SLP (C)
No.9569/2004, SLP (C) No.9883/2004,
SLP (C) No.9891/2004, SLP (C) No. 9898/2004,
SLP (C) No. 9904/2004, SLP (C) No. 9910/2004,
SLP (C) No. 9911/2004, C.A. Nos. 997-998/2004,
SLP (C) No.9976/2004, SLP (C) No.9993/2004,
SLP (C) No.9998/2004, SLP (C) No.9999/2004,
C.A.Nos. 1956/2003, 2633/2003, 2638/2003, 3720-
3722/2003, SLP (C) No.10153/2004
ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.
These appeals and certain connected matters were
initially heard by a two-Judge Bench of this Court. The
matters were referred to a larger Bench by order dated
26.9.2003 as the Bench hearing the matters doubted the
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correctness of the views expressed in M/s. Bhagatram
Rajeevkumar v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. and Others
[1995 (Suppl.) 1 SCC 673] which was relied on in a
subsequent decision in State of Bihar and Others v. Bihar
Chambers of Commerce and Others [1996 (9) SCC 136] . The
matters were dealt with by a Constitution Bench to decide with
certitude the parameters of the judicially evolved concept of
’Compensatory Tax" viz-a-viz. Article 301 of the Constitution of
India, 1950 (in short the ’Constitution’).
The Constitution Bench in Jindal Stainless Ltd. & Anr.
v. State of Haryana & Ors. [2006(4) SCALE 300] [speaking
through one of us (Kapadia, J] concluded as follows :
49. In our opinion, the doubt expressed by the
referring Bench about the correctness of the
decision in Bhagatram’s case 1995 Supp. (1)
SCC 673 followed by the judgment in the case
of Bihar Chamber of Commerce (1996) 9 SCC
136 was well-founded.
50. We reiterate that the doctrine of "direct and
immediate effect" of the impugned law on trade
and commerce under Article 301 as
propounded in Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of
Assam AIR 1961 SC 232 and the working test
enunciated in Automobile Transport
(Rajasthan) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1962
SC 1406 for deciding whether a tax is
compensatory or not vide para 19 of the report,
will continue to apply and the test of "some
connection" indicated in para 8 of the
judgment in Bhagatram Rajeevkumar v.
Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. 1995 Supp.
(1) SCC 673 and followed in the case of State
of Bihar v. Bihar Chamber of Commerce (1996)
9 SCC 136, is, in our opinion, not good law.
Accordingly, the constitutional validity of
various local enactments which are the subject
matters of pending appeals, special leave
petitions and writ petitions will now be listed
for being disposed of in the light of this
judgment.
In all these appeals and connected matters the basic
issue revolves round the concept of "Compensatory Tax". In
all these matters the concerned High Courts do not appear to
have examined the issue in the proper perspective, as they
were bound by the judgments in Bhagatram’s case (supra) and
Bihar Chambers of Commerce’s case (supra).
At this juncture, it is necessary to take note of what has
been stated in paragraphs 42 to 45 of the judgment rendered
by the Constitution Bench, which read as follows :
42.To sum up, the basis of every levy is the
controlling factor. In the case of "a tax", the
levy is a part of common burden based on the
principle of ability or capacity to pay. In the
case of "a fee", the basis is the special benefit
to the payer (individual as such) based on the
principle of equivalence. When the tax is
imposed as a part of regulation or as a part of
regulatory measure, its basis shifts from the
concept of "burden" to the concept of
measurable/quantifiable benefit and then it
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becomes "a compensatory tax" and its payment
is then not for revenue but as reimbursement/
recompense to the service/facility provider. It
is then a tax on recompense. Compensatory
tax is by nature hybrid but it is more closer to
fees than to tax as both fees and compensatory
taxes are based on the principle of equivalence
and on the basis of
reimbursement/recompense. If the impugned
law chooses an activity like trade and
commerce as the criterion of its operation and
if the effect of the operation of the enactment is
to impede trade and commerce then Article
301 is violated.
BURDEN ON THE STATE:
43.. Applying the above tests/parameters,
whenever a law is impugned as violative of
Article 301of the Constitution, the Court has
to see whether the impugned enactment
facially or patently indicates quantifiable data
on the basis of which the compensatory tax is
sought to be levied. The Act must facially
indicate the benefit which is quantifiable or
measurable. It must broadly indicate
proportionality to the quantifiable benefit. If
the provisions are ambiguous or even if the Act
does not indicate facially the quantifiable
benefit, the burden will be on the State as a
service/facility provider to show by placing the
material before the Court, that the payment of
compensatory tax is a
reimbursement/recompense for the
quantifiable/ measurable benefit provided or
to be provided to its payer(s). As soon as it is
shown that the Act invades freedom of trade it
is necessary to enquire whether the State has
proved that the restrictions imposed by it by
way of taxation are reasonable and in public
interest within the meaning of Article 304(b)
[See: para 35 of the decision in the case of
Khyerbari Tea Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. State of
Assam reported in AIR 1964 SC 925.
SCOPE OF ARTICLES 301, 302 & 304 VIS-@-
VIS COMPENSATORY TAX:
44. As stated above, taxing laws are not
excluded from the operation of Article 301,
which means that tax laws can and do amount
to restrictions on the freedom guaranteed to
trade under Part-XIII of the Constitution. This
principle is well settled in the case of Atiabari
Tea Co. AIR 1961 SC 232. It is equally
important to note that in Atiabari Tea Co. AIR
1961 SC 232, the Supreme Court propounded
the doctrine of "direct and immediate effect".
Therefore, whenever a law is challenged on the
ground of violation of Article 301, the Court
has not only to examine the pith and
substance of the levy but in addition thereto,
the Court has to see the effect and the
operation of the impugned law on inter-State
trade and commerce as well as intra-State
trade and commerce.
45. When any legislation, whether it would be
a taxation law or a non-taxation law, is
challenged before the court as violating Article
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301, the first question to be asked is: what is
the scope of the operation of the law? Whether
it has chosen an activity like movement of
trade, commerce and intercourse throughout
India, as the criterion of its operation? If yes,
the next question is: what is the effect of
operation of the law on the freedom
guaranteed under Article 301? If the effect is to
facilitate free flow of trade and commerce then
it is regulation and if it is to impede or burden
the activity, then the law is a restraint. After
finding the law to be a restraint/restriction one
has to see whether the impugned law is
enacted by the Parliament or the State
Legislature. Clause (b) of Article 304 confers a
power upon the State Legislature similar to
that conferred upon Parliament by Article 302
subject to the following differences:_
(a) While the power of Parliament under Article
302 is subject to the prohibition of preference
and discrimination decreed by Article 303(1)
unless Parliament makes the declaration
under Article 303(2), the State power
contained in Article 304(b) is made expressly
free from the prohibition contained in Article
303(1) because the opening words of Article
304 contains a non-obstante clause both to
Article 301 and Article 303.
(b) While the Parliament’s power to impose
restrictions under Article 302 is not subject to
the requirement of reasonableness, the power
of the State to impose restrictions under
Article 304 is subject to the condition that they
are reasonable.
(c) An additional requisite for the exercise of
the power under Article 304(b) by the State
Legislature is that previous Presidential
sanction is required for such legislation.
Since relevant data do not appear to have been placed
before the High Courts, we permit the parties to place them in
the concerned Writ Petitions within two months. The
concerned High Courts shall deal with the basic issue as to
whether the impugned levy was compensatory in nature. The
High Courts are requested to decide the aforesaid issue within
five months from the date of receipt of our order. The
judgment in the respective cases shall be placed on record by
the concerned parties within a month from the date of the
decision in each case pursuant to our direction.
Place these matters for further hearing in third week of
January, 2007.